European Business Interests In Lebanon: An assessment of EU private foreign direct investment in the reconstruction era by Khalil, Ali Moussa
Durham E-Theses
European Business Interests In Lebanon: An
assessment of EU private foreign direct investment
in the reconstruction era
Khalil, Ali Moussa
How to cite:
Khalil, Ali Moussa (2000) European Business Interests In Lebanon: An assessment of EU private foreign
direct investment in the reconstruction era, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham
E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/4248/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Office, Durham University, University Office, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
European Business Interests in Lebanon: 
An Assessment of E U Private Foreign Direct 
Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
The copyright of this thesis rests with 
the author. No quotation from it should 
he published in any form, including 
Electronic and the Internet, without the 
author's prior written consent. Al l 
information derived from this thesis 
must be acknowledged appropriately. 
Ali Moussa Khalil 
PhD Thesis 
University of Durham 
Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 
2000 
1 3 JUL 20W 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment of EU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should 
be published without their prior consent and information derived from it 
should be acknowledged. 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment of EUPrivate Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
Dedication 
To my parents... for 
their unlimited support 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment of EU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
Acknowledgements 
Although the rights for this thesis rest with myself, I can sincerely testify that without 
the invaluable contributions of many others, this work would have not seen the light. 
Right at the top of the list of contributors comes my supervisor, Dr. Emma Murphy, 
whose support and guidance are beyond appreciation. I wi l l always be short of words to 
thank her for the immense help with which she backed me, particularly, when the PhD-
frustration symptoms threatened to become overwhelming. 
My family's contribution to this work is beyond valuation. Although migration is 
historically a common behaviour in Lebanon, I was the first member of my family to 
leave home, and I fully realise the sadness that my departure inflicted on them. 
Moreover, without my parents' financial support I would not be writing these words 
today. I am aware how difficult this turned out to be at times, and I wi l l always 
remember their all round support. 
I would like to thank the director of the Centre for Lebanese Studies at Oxford, Mr. 
Nadim Shehadi for giving me access to the CLS archives and conferences, and also for 
his help in initiating my contacts for fieldwork in Lebanon. He might not realise the 
extent of his help, but I can bear witness that it was essential for getting my research on 
the right track. The further assistance I got from the Lebanese economist, Dr. Kamal 
Shehadi was vital for pursuing contacts in Lebanon. The contributions of all my 
interviewees (listed at the end of this thesis) whether in London or in Beirut, were 
fundamental for the completion of this research. 
The friendly atmosphere at the Centre for Middle Eastern & Islamic Studies made my 
stay in Durham very enjoyable. I will always recall the 1995-96 M.A. seminars with 
Prof. Tim Niblock and Prof. Anoushervan Ehteshami. At all times, I wil l remember 
them not only as great academics but also as true friends who were continually on call 
to help. 
I should pin up the useful comments I got from my friends, Warwick Knowles and 
Paola Rocchetti, who took the trouble to read through parts of my thesis. However, I 
would need an extra chapter to thank all my friends at Durham for all their support 
during the peaks and troughs of my research period. Those who were around me on my 
viva day, anxious as i f they were the one being examined and joyful for my success, I 
cannot thank them enough for their touching support. They know who they are. 
iv 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment of EU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
I owe special thanks to my examiners, Prof. Rodney Wilson and Dr. Gerd Nonneman, 
for a challenging viva and very useful comments. 
My last thanks go to Isabelle, who was the invisible force pushing me to finish my 
work. I wil l never be able to thank her enough for being by my side, helping me until 
the last minute. 
Finally, I can wholeheartedly claim that this PhD thesis is my least achievement at 
Durham. The friendships I established are far more precious and cherished. In ten-years 
time, I might forget the title of my thesis, however, I shall not forget the names of my 
true friends I met at Durham with whom I shall always try to keep in contact. 
v 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment of EU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
Table of Contents 
List of Tables xii 
List of Charts xiv 
List of Abbreviations xvi 
Transliteration of Arabic terms xvii 
Abstract xviii 
Introduction 1 
Part One 5 
Chapter One: Historical Relations between Europe and Lebanon 6 
1.1 Introduction 6 
1.2 European interest in the Middle East in the 19 th century 7 
1.2.1 Implications of the European expansion on the region's economy 12 
1.2.2 The second half of the 19 th century: European economic control in the Ottoman 
Empire 13 
1.2.3 The First World War and its legacy: absolute Franco-British supremacy in the 
Middle East 14 
1.2.4 World War I I : major changes in the powers in the region 15 
1.2.5 Summary: Europe and the Middle East 17 
1.3 Development in the historical relations between Europe and Lebanon 18 
1.3.1 European rivalries in Mount Lebanon 19 
1.3.2 The prosperity of silk production: inward foreign investment 21 
1.3.3 The establishment of the French mandate 23 
1.3.4 French economic interests in Lebanon during the mandate period 26 
1.3.5 End of the French mandate 28 
1.3.6 French interests after independence 29 
1.4 Conclusion 31 
V I 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment of EU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
Chapter Two: The Development of Economic Relations between European Countries 
and Lebanon since the Establishment of the E C 34 
2.1 Introduction 34 
2.2 The foundation of the EC 34 
2.3 The European economic approach towards southern-Mediterranean countries 36 
2.3.1 The Global Mediterranean Policy 38 
2.3.2 Agreements concluded with the GMP 40 
2.4 Effects of the enlargements of the EC 42 
2.4.1 Attempts to avoid the negative impact of the enlargement 43 
2.5 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 47 
2.5.1 Free-trade area 48 
2.5.2 Economic co-operation and concerted action 49 
2.5.3 Financial co-operation 49 
2.5.4 MEDA Programme 49 
2.5.5 The Euro-Mediterranean Associations Agreements 50 
2.6 Economic relations between the EU and Lebanon 52 
2.6.1 Trade (figures and agreements) 53 
2.6.2 First non-preferential trade agreement 55 
2.6.3 Preferential trade agreement 57 
2.6.4 First co-operation agreement with the GMP (1977) 59 
2.6.5 Implications for trade 61 
2.7 EU capital flow into Lebanon 64 
2.8 The Lebanon-EU Partnership Agreement 68 
2.8.1 Capital Flow: aid and investment 70 
2.9 Conclusion 74 
Chapter Three: The Lebanese Economy from Independence to Reconstruction 78 
3.1 Introduction 78 
3.2 The history of the Lebanese economy 79 
3.2.1 The formation of Lebanon 79 
3.2.2 The economy after independence 82 
3.2.3 Economic policies after independence 88 
3.2.4 Summary: the economy before the civil war 90 
vi i 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment of EU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
3.3 Economic consequences of the civil war 92 
3.3.1 First phase (1975-82) 93 
3.3.1.1 Recession in economic sectors 93 
3.3.1.2 The impact of war on foreign companies 100 
3.3.2 The second phase of the civil war (1983-1990) 101 
3.3.2.1 Summary: the impact of the civil war 105 
3.4 Post-civil war period: recovery and reconstruction 105 
3.4.1 The Ta'if Agreement 106 
3.4.2 The new government; militias disarmed 108 
3.4.3 The economic side of the story 109 
3.4.3.1 The flow of capital 111 
3.4.4 The reconstruction process: Hariri's vision of reconstruction and economic 
development 'Horizon 2000' 112 
3.4.4.1 'Horizon 2000's' requirements for appropriate economic environment 114 
3.4.4.2 Envisaged cost of recovery 115 
3.4.4.3 'Horizon 2000' macroeconomic perspective 115 
3.4.4.4 'Horizon 2000' sources of finance 116 
3.4.4.5 Feasibility of the 'Horizon 2000' 118 
3.4.5 The policies of Hariri's government in practice 120 
3.4.5.1 Monetary achievements 120 
3.4.5.2 Fiscal achievements 122 
3.4.6 Macroeconomic picture in 1998 125 
3.5 Conclusion 129 
Part Two 131 
Chapter Four: Theoretical Approach to the Motives for Firms Engagement in FDI 
Activities - Theories of Foreign Direct Investment 132 
4.1 Introduction 132 
4.2 Defining foreign direct investment (FDI) 132 
4.3 Theories of foreign direct investment 134 
4.3.1 Classical Theory of International Investment 134 
4.3.2 International Product Life Cycle Theory 136 
4.3.3 Monopolistic - Oligopolistic Advantage Theory 138 
vii i 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment of EU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
4.3.4 Market Imperfections Theory 141 
4.3.5 Internalisation Theory 145 
4.3.6 Eclectic / O.I.L. Theory 146 
4.4 The usage of theories of FDI in the case of EU private investments in Lebanon 147 
4.5 Conclusion 153 
Chapter Five: Overview of European Business in Lebanon 155 
5.1 Introduction 155 
5.2 Foreign direct investments in Lebanon 155 
5.3 Foreign firms in the post-civil war period (1990-93) 159 
5.3.1 Fields of interest for foreign firms (90-93) 161 
5.4 Reconstruction process charms foreign firms 162 
5.4.1 Business interests of foreign firms (1993-98) 168 
5.5 A survey of EU companies amongst foreign companies registered in Lebanon (93-98) 169 
5.5.1 Representation of EU member states among EU companies 172 
5.5.2 Business interests of EU firms 173 
5.6 EU companies partnership with local counterparts 174 
5.7 EU firms share in public sector contracts 182 
5.7.1 EU companies in the rehabilitation of Lebanon's electricity 183 
5.7.2 EU companies in the rebuilding of the telecommunication sector 186 
5.7.3 Transportation (including airports and ports) 188 
5.7.4 Water supply and wastewater 191 
5.7.5 Solid waste treatment 193 
5.7.6 National education, higher education, and sports 194 
5.8 Conclusion 196 
Chapter Six: Case-Study Firms on E U Private Investments in Lebanon 198 
6.1 Introduction 198 
6.2 Trade (retail) 199 
6.2.1 Inchcape Retail Services - Lebanon SAL (Spinneys) 199 
6.2.1.1 Incentives for Inchcape's investment in Lebanon 201 
6.2.1.2 Obstacles for FDI according to Inchcape's experience 203 
6.2.1.3 Inchcape's plans for the future 205 
ix 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment ofEU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
6.2.2 Other EU firms in retail 208 
6.2.2.1 Ecomax SAL 208 
6.2.2.2 BHV/MonoPrix 210 
6.2.3 Trade and FDI 211 
6.2.3.1 What the theory of FDI says 212 
6.2.3.2 The theory of FDI applied to EU firms in retail sector 213 
6.2.3.3 Size of FDI activities conducted by EU firms in retail 216 
6.3 Contracting 216 
6.3.1 Kvaerner Construction International - B eirut (Trafalgar House) 217 
6.3.1.1 Incentives for Kvaerner to conduct business in Lebanon 218 
6.3.1.2 Difficulties faced by Kvaerner 219 
6.3.1.3 Contracting is the motive 220 
6.3.2 Other contracting EU firms 221 
6.3.2.1 Seimens SA 221 
6.3.2.2 Bouygues 221 
6.3.2.3 Hochtief A G 222 
6.3.2.4 Ansaldo 222 
6.3.3 Contracting and FDI 222 
6.3.3.1 The theory of FDI applied to contracting 223 
6.3.3.2 Size of FDI activities conducted by EU firms in contracting 226 
6.4 Finance 227 
6.4.1 Schroders 227 
6.4.1.1 Incentives to be based in Beirut 229 
6.4.1.2 Is Schroders a foreign investor in Lebanon? 229 
6.4.1.3 Deals arranged by Schroder Asseily 230 
6.4.2 Other finance firms 232 
6.4.2.1 Paribas Ltd 232 
6.4.2.2 Commerzbank 232 
6.4.2.3 Flemings 233 
6.4.3 Finance and FDI 235 
6.4.3.1 The theory of FDI applied to finance 236 
6.4.3.2 Size of FDI activities conducted by EU firms in finance 239 
6.5 Conclusion 240 
x 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment of EU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
Chapter Seven: Reasons for the Lack of FDI in Lebanon 242 
7.1 Introduction 242 
7.2 International Product Life Cycle Theory as a motive for FDI in Lebanon 242 
7.3 Ownership of specific advantage as a motive for FDI in Lebanon 244 
7.4 Internalisation as a motive for FDI activities by EU firms in Lebanon 245 
7.5 Oligopolistic reaction as a motive for FDI in Lebanon 246 
7.6 Location-specific advantage as a motive for EU firms FDI in Lebanon 248 
7.6.1 Trade barriers 249 
7.6.2 Natural resources 250 
7.6.3 Size of the market 250 
7.6.4 Cost of factors of production 252 
7.6.4.1 Cost of land and property 252 
7.6.4.2 Availability of skilled-cheap labour 252 
7.6.4.3 Cost of finance 255 
7.6.5 Public administration 256 
7.6.5.1 High level of bureaucracy 256 
7.6.5.2 Lack of transparency and openness 259 
7.6.5.3 Lack of a legal framework for FDI 260 
7.6.5.4 Labour social security cost 264 
7.6.5.5 Work and residency permits for foreigners 265 
7.6.5.6 Lack of a coherent policy to attract foreign investments 268 
7.6.6 Lack of political stability 271 
7.6.7 Lack of economic stability 273 
7.7 Conclusion 274 
Conclusion 277 
Bibliography 291 
X I 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment of EU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
List of Tables 
Table 1.1 French investments in Lebanon during the mandate 28 
Table 2.1 Agreements signed wi th non-member Mediterranean countries 
pre-Euro-Med 40 
Table 2.2 Association Agreements signed between the E U and Mediterranean 
countries 51 
Table 2.3 Lebanon's imports by country o f origin between 1960-65 53 
Table 2.4 Lebanon's exports by country o f destination between 1960-65 55 
Table 2.5 Lebanon's exports by countries o f destination, 1968-70 56 
Table 2.6 Lebanon's exports by destination, 1972-73 57 
Table 2.7 Lebanon's imports by origin, 1972-73 59 
Table 2.8 Lebanon's trade wi th the EC after the Co-operation Agreement 62 
Table 2.9 E U finance for the reconstruction by the end o f 1998 72 
Table 2.10 Form o f foreign aid channeled into reconstruction 72 
Table 3.1 List o f foreign banks operating in Lebanon before the c iv i l war 87 
Table 5.1 Increase in F D I inflows into Lebanon after the beginning o f 
reconstruction 156 
Table 5.2 Inter-Arab investments 158 
Table 5.3 List o f foreign firms registered between (1990-93) 160 
Table 5.4 Foreign companies registered in Lebanon after 1993 163 
Table 5.5 Country o f origin for foreign f i rms registered in Lebanon (1993-98) 170 
Table 5.6 E U firms divided according to country o f origin (Registered 93-98) 172 
Table 5.7 Lebanese companies subsidiary of, or aff i l iated to E U companies 
registered between 1-1-1993 and 31-3-1997 175 
Table 5.8 Contracts taken by E U firms in the rebuilding o f the electricity sector 184 
Table 5.9 Contracts awarded by E U firms in Telecommunication sector 187 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment of EU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
Table 5.10 Contracts awarded to E U firms in transportation sector 189 
Table 5.11 Contracts awarded to E U firms in water supply and waste water sector 191 
Table 5.12 Contracts awarded to E U firms i n solid waste treatment 193 
Table 5.13 Contract awarded to E U firms in education and sports sectors 195 
Table 6.1 GDP per capita in Lebanon and the neighbouring countries 202 
Table 6.2 Comparative economic indicators f r o m Lebanon and neighbouring 
countries 202 
Table 6.3 Lebanon's external trade w i t h some E U countries in 1996 212 
Table 6.4 Retail activities according to F D I criteria 214 
Table 6.5 Contracting activities according to F D I criteria 224 
Table 6.6 Contracting activities according to F D I criteria 237 
Table 7.1 Administrative cost facing foreign companies in Lebanon 267 
xiii 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment of EU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
List of Charts 
Chart 2.1 Reconstruction foreign finance by the end o f 1998 (Total USS 4,368) 71 
Chart 2.2 Total E U finance (USS 1,665.6 mi l l ion) 71 
C h a r t 2.3 Share o f E U member-states in E U reconstruction finance to Lebanon 71 
Chart 5.1 Foreign companies registered between (90-93) 161 
Chart 5.2 Foreign f i rms divided by business f ie ld (90-93) 162 
Chart 5.3 Business activities o f foreign firms registered in Lebanon (1993-98) 
Total 146 firms 169 
C h a r t 5.4 Foreign companies registered in Lebanon (93-98) Total 146 170 
C h a r t 5.5 E U firms vs Arab countries firms in Lebanon (Reg.93-98) 171 
C h a r t 5.6 N o n E U companies registered in Lebanon (93-98) 171 
C h a r t 5.7 Number o f E U firms (76) divided by member-state (Reg. 93-98) 172 
C h a r t 5.8 Business sector o f E U companies (Reg. 93-98) Total 76 173 
Chart 5.9 Business interests o f EU-subsidiaries 181 
C h a r t 5.10 E U subsidiaries divided according to the country o f the E U partner 
(Total 99) 182 
C h a r t 5.11 Contracts taken by E U firms in electricity sector out o f a total o f USS 
1,337.9m 186 
C h a r t 5.12 Number o f contracts taken by E U firms in electricity sector divided 
among member states (Total 23 contracts) 186 
Chart 5.13 Value o f contracts taken by E U firms in electricity sector divided 
among member states (Total USS 1,136.22m) 186 
C h a r t 5.14 Share o f E U firms in the value o f contracts in telecommunication 
sector (Total USS 746.9m) 188 
X I V 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment of EU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
Chart 5.15 Contracts taken by E U firms in telecommunications sector divided 
by member states 188 
Chart 5.16 Value o f contracts taken by E U firms in telecommunications divided 
by member states (Total US$ 534.31m) 188 
C h a r t 5.17 Contracts taken by E U firms in transport sector out o f a total o f US$ 
1,163.5m 190 
Chart 5.18 Number o f contracts taken by E U firms in transport sector divided 
among member states (Total 14) 190 
Chart 5.19 Value o f contracts taken by E U firms in transport sector divided 
among member states (Total US$ 516.05m) 190 
Chart 5.20 Contracts taken by E U firms in water & waste water sectors out o f a 
total o f US$ 477.2m 192 
Chart 5.21 Number o f contracts taken by E U firms in water & waste water 
sectors divided among member states (Total 11) 192 
Chart 5.22 Value o f contracts taken by E U firms in water & waste water sectors 
divided among member states (Total US$ 76.35m) 192 
Chart 5.23 Contracts taken by E U firms in solid waste sector out o f a total o f 
US$ 665.3m 194 
Chart 5.24 Number o f contracts taken by E U firms in solid waste sector divided 
among member states (Total 5) 194 
Chart 5.25 Value o f contracts taken by E U f i rms in solid waste sector divided 
among member states (Total $ 8.91m) 194 
Chart 5.26 Contracts taken by E U firms in education sector out o f a total o f US$ 
450m) 195 
Chart 5.26 Number o f contracts taken by E U firms in education sector divided 
among member states (Total 4) 196 
Chart 5.27 Value o f contracts taken by E U f i rms in education sector divided 
among member states (Total $ 199m) 196 
X V 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment of EU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
List of Abbreviations 
A A S M M Association o f Af r i can States, Madagascar, and Mauritius 
A F E S D Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development 
B . O . T Build . Operate. Transfer 
C D R Council for Development and Reconstruction 
D . B . O . T Design. Bui ld . Operate. Transfer 
E C European Community 
E C U European Currency Uni t 
E D L Electricite du Liban 
E F T A European Free Trade Area 
E I B European Investment Bank 
E U European Union 
E U A European Uni t o f Account 
F D I Foreign Direct Investment 
G A T T General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
G D P Gross Domestic Product 
G M P Global Mediterranean Policy 
I D A L Investment Development Authori ty o f Lebanon 
K F A E D Kuwai t i Fund for Economic Development 
L D C Less Developed Countries 
M N C Multi-National Corporation 
N M P New Mediterranean Policy 
O . T Operate. Transfer 
O C T Overseas Countries and Territories 
P L O Palestine Liberation Organisation 
P M Prime Minister 
PSP Progressive Socialist Party 
T M C Trans-Mediterranean Countries 
T N C Trans-National Corporation 
I INC I A D United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
V A T Value Added Tax 
W T O W o r l d Trade Organisation 
xvi 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment of EU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
Note on Transliteration 
Very few Arabic names and terms have been referred to in this thesis. Rather than 
adopting a formal system of transliteration, I have therefore transcribed names using the 
most commonly used formats. 
xvn 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment of EU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
Abstract 
The flow of foreign direct investment has long been regarded as the main engine of 
growth in developing countries. Lebanon has aimed at attracting foreign direct 
investment to contribute to its economic recovery in the post-civil war period. EU 
countries were expected to be a major source of investment inflows, partly, due to their 
rich historical relationship, and partly, as an expected result of the new Euro-Med 
approach, adopted in the 1990s. 
This thesis assesses the EU private business interests in Lebanon during the 
reconstruction period, and investigates to what extent EU business engagements 
involved FDI. Within this framework, this thesis examines the role of the EU in 
encouraging the flow of EU private investments into Lebanon. This thesis falls into two 
parts. The first assesses the history of economic relations between Lebanon and Europe 
in the modern period, and the development of these relations after the establishment of 
the EC, examining the role of the latter in reshaping these relations. It also assesses the 
development of the Lebanese economy since independence from France. In the second 
part of the thesis, the theoretical framework of FDI is applied to a survey of EU private 
businesses operating in Lebanon. This helped in answering two questions: what 
business activities did involve FDI, and why EU firms engagement in FDI was very 
shallow. 
The thesis concludes that the lack of FDI activities in Lebanon, whether EU or non-EU, 
was a result of the lack of comparative location-specific advantages. It also suggests that 
the Lebanese government should assume a stronger role in improving Lebanon's 
comparative advantages in order to attract FDI. The EU should provide substantial help 
- within the Euro-Med approach - to encourage EU private business investments in the 
country. 
xviii 
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Introduction 
Economic relations with the countries of the EU are rooted in the modern history of 
Lebanon. The influential political position that the European powers achieved in the 
ailing Ottoman Empire allowed for the flourishing of European trade with the Levant 
region as well as encouraging some European investments, notably from France. The 
independence of Lebanon in 1943, and the establishment of the European Community 
in 1957, have given these relations new perspectives. However, like the majority of 
southern Mediterranean countries, Lebanon has found that its relations with Europe 
have primarily taken the form of a largely one-way flow of trade. Europe has exported 
its goods to Lebanon, but by and large has not matched these with either imports from 
Lebanon or private foreign direct investment into its economy. 
Hopes were raised that this relationship could be altered in Lebanon's favour when the 
post-civil war reconstruction plan of 1993 envisaged a substantial role for the private 
sector in the process of economic regeneration. Foreign direct investment was 
considered to be vital to this process and it was anticipated that such investment would 
be forthcoming as the government took a lead in the rehabilitation of the economy and 
its infrastructure. 
This thesis examines whether this has indeed been the case. By surveying and analysing 
the nature of the business activities of EU firms in Lebanon in the period 1993-98, 
(during which the architect of reconstruction, Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, held office), 
the thesis is able to identity the nature, extent and limitations of private FDI originating 
from EU countries. The thesis shows that, despite early optimism, the bulk of such 
business activity has been in contracting, trade and service provision, rather than in 
direct investment. Using criteria drawn from various theories of FDI, most notably 
Dunning's Eclectic Model, the thesis shows that the reasons for this reluctance lie in 
Lebanon's lack of location-specific advantages. The limited size of the market, the high 
costs of factors of production, the failure to establish a suitable legal framework for 
investment, the prevalence of red-tape, bureaucracy and corruption, and continuing 
economic and political instability all combine to make Lebanon a relatively unattractive 
destination for FDI. 
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Lebanon might have, indeed to some extent did, expect that its past positive and 
prosperous relations with the countries of Europe, and the growing interest of the EU in 
assisting the development of the states of the southern Mediterranean, might have 
encouraged European private firms to invest in the rejuvenated economy. The thesis 
demonstrates, however, that the policies and programmes of the EU and European 
governments have so far done little to encourage investment in Lebanon, although they 
have provided some direct financial support for the reconstruction programme, which 
had provided some opportunities for EU contracting firms. 
The thesis concludes with suggestions as to how the Lebanese government can act to 
offset the current lack of location-specific advantages. It also points out that progress 
with the EU's Barcelona process may yet provide some encouragement for European 
FDI in Lebanon. 
Despite a wealth of literature on Lebanon's politics and, to a lesser extent, economics, 
very little has been said before now on foreign investments in Lebanon. Thus, while 
secondary sources were used for providing the historical background and the theoretical 
chapters, the thesis has relied on primary sources to construct the survey of EU business 
activities in Lebanon. These have included Arabic and English newspapers, government 
publications and special reports. However, the main primary source used in the thesis 
was the interviews conducted by the author in Lebanon and the UK. Interviewees 
included representatives of EU firms operating in Lebanon, Lebanese economists and 
government officials, and representatives of business organisations. It has to be pointed 
out that statistics were very difficult to obtain and, in some instances, impossible. The 
civil war of Lebanon has left the government statistics departments out of order. No 
adequate statistics on FDI in Lebanon were available. The researcher has therefore 
compiled many of the statistics included in the thesis himself. 
The thesis is divided into two parts: the first falls into three chapters while the second 
part includes four chapters. In chapter one, I assess the economic relations between 
Lebanon and Europe in the modern period The aim of this chapter is to investigate the 
development of an economic interest in Lebanon on the part of European powers, and 
how it fell within their wider regional interests. Through this chapter I follow the 
development of private European business interests that occurred during the second half 
of the 19 th century and developed with the establishment of the French mandate. In 
2 
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chapter two, I examine the impact of the establishment of the European Community on 
economic relations with Lebanon, and in particular on the flow of trade and capital from 
the member-states. This chapter also assesses whether the EU has more recently played 
an important role in encouraging direct investment activities by EU firms in Lebanon, 
concluding with an assessment of the recent Barcelona process. 
Chapter three gives a detailed picture of developments in the Lebanese economy during 
the post-independence, civil war and reconstruction periods. In this chapter, I set the 
scene for the research by making the reader aware of the characteristics of the Lebanese 
economy and the environment which awaits potential foreign direct investments from 
the EU or elsewhere. 
The second part of this thesis focuses on the issue of foreign direct investments in 
Lebanon during the researched period. In chapter four, I state the theoretical approach I 
have adopted in examining the activities of EU firms in Lebanon. Using theories of 
foreign direct investment, I determined a set of criteria with which to consider the 
overseas activities of a firm as FDI. 
Chapter five includes a survey of EU firms that operated in Lebanon during the 
researched period (1993-98). The aim of this chapter is to categorise business interests 
of EU firms in Lebanon, and the representation of Member states amongst these firms. 
This chapter highlights the major business activities of EU firms, particularly projects 
related to the reconstruction process. This chapter shows that European firms were 
mainly interested in contracting, and to a lesser extent, finance and trade. Firms from 
EU countries got a majority of the contracts tendered by the government to rehabilitate 
the devastated infrastructure of the country. It showed also that French firms were the 
most highly represented amongst other EU-nationalities. 
In chapter six I take the research further by looking at specific case studies of EU firms 
that operated in Lebanon during the researched period. I chose firms from the three 
sectors that proved most popular amongst EU firms, in the previous chapter. I use the 
criteria extracted from the theories of FDI to examine the operations of these chosen EU 
firms. Chapters five and six show that FDI activities did not score highly amongst the 
interests of EU firms operating in Lebanon. 
3 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment of EU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
Chapter seven attempts to answer why there was a scarcity of FDI activities by EU 
firms. Just as I used the theories of FDI to, in the previous chapter, investigate whether 
EU firms were investing in Lebanon, I use the theories here to explain why they were 
not investing in Lebanon. The result of this research revealed that Lebanon did not 
provide competitive location-specific advantages to attract foreign direct investments 
from the EU, or other potential sources of FDI. 
The thesis ends with a conclusion in which I suggest ways in which the Lebanese 
government can act to counter the absence of location-specific advantages. I also 
suggest areas for further research. The thesis thus has prescriptive value and makes a 
contribution to the understanding of both academics and policy-makers. 
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PART ONE 
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Chapter One: Historical Relations between Europe and Lebanon 
"There had been a 'Sheikh Francis' in every generation since the Sixteenth 
century, since the day Suleyman the Magnificent had granted the King of France 
[Francis] the right to keep an eye on the fate of the minorities in the Levant, as well 
as the Holy sites, and the French king had written to the chiefs of the great families 
in the Mountains assuring them of his protection. Amongst these recipients was one 
of our Sheikh's ancestors. He is said to have received the message the day his first 
child was born. The child was immediately christened Francis " 
Amin Maalouf, "The Rock ofTanios" 
1.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to establish the historical background of economic relations 
between European businesses and Lebanon. The chapter shows the extent of Lebanon's 
importance to European powers and businesses during the last two centuries. The 
discussion starts with the regional context of European economic interests in the Middle 
East and then spotlights specific interests in Lebanon. It will also serve to contextualise 
the dynamics of contemporary European business relations with Lebanon, and help to 
identify the position of Lebanon on the map of European business interests in a regional 
context. 
It is quite difficult to trace the very beginning of relations between Europe and the 
Middle East. They can be traced back to the twelfth-century Crusades, when friendship 
and alliances were established between the Maronites of Mount Lebanon and the 
"Frankish invaders".1 During the same century, in 1180, the Maronite church was united 
with Rome.2 By the fifteenth century, clerics from the Maronite church were being sent 
to study in Rome. Relations can be traced also to 1535, when Francis I arranged a treaty 
with Suleiman the Magnificent, giving France capitulatory privileges in the Ottoman 
Empire. France then strengthened its power in the Middle East, mainly Syria, as it 
declared itself the protector of the Maronites, as they were part of the Catholic Church 
to which France belonged and of which France was then the most significant power. 
My concern in this chapter is European relations with the Middle East in the modern era 
although it is difficult to separate more recent developments from their historical 
context. Modern relations between the Middle East and Europe began with Napoleon's 
1 Meo. Leila M. T, Lebanon Improbable Nation: A study of political development (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1965) p. 25. 
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invasion of Egypt in 1798. An extension of the war between Britain and France, the 
French occupation of Egypt and the subsequent attempt to occupy Syria (both parts of 
the Ottoman Empire at the time) led to an alliance between Britain and the Ottomans, 
forcing the French to retreat. This alliance was the first between the Ottoman Empire 
and a non-Muslim state.3 Moreover, already by the end of the eighteenth century, the 
Ottoman Empire (or the "World of Islam", as Kamal Salibi calls i t 4 ) was seriously 
conscious of the impact of European penetration. The Ottomans were impressed by the 
superiority of the European armies who had defeated them many times since the 
seventeenth century. They realised that some European methods of development should 
be adopted in order to meet the European challenge.5 
1.2 European interest in the Middle East in the 19th century 
The interests of European powers in the Middle East region were a combination of 
political, strategic and economic. Although different, these interests were in many cases 
very much interrelated. The relations with the Ottomans varied from one European 
power to another due to differences in interest. The more that relations with the 
Ottoman Empire were beneficial to European power's supremacy, the more these 
powers were interested in developing it. Accordingly, there were many conflicts among 
the European powers in the region due to the competition to gain more privileges from 
the Ottomans. These conflicts, supported sometimes by the Ottomans themselves, 
caused fluctuations in European powers' influence in the region. France, for instance, 
had significant privileges in the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century, both 
political and commercial However, when Napoleon occupied Egypt, where he was later 
defeated, the French lost all these privileges to their rivals, the British, who had allied 
themselves with the Ottomans. 
Napoleon's defeat in 1814 ended the French obstruction of British policy in the 
Ottoman Empire. Britain had now secured its supremacy in the Levant, the Persian 
Gulf, the Red Sea and Southern Arabia. Moreover, the trade routes to India and the Far 
East were secured. No threat could come except from Russia, which helped both Britain 
and the Ottomans against France and accordingly strengthened its position. Britain's 
2Hourani. A, A History of the Arab Peoples (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap, 1991) p. 265. 
3 Hourani. A, op.cit, p. 265. 
4 Salibi. K, The Modern History of Lebanon (1965) p. 120. 
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concern over Russian influence stemmed from the latter's interests in Iran, which was 
close to the British Empire in India.6 
The British interest in the Middle East in the first half of the nineteenth century had 
both strategic and economic aspects. As the Committee of Imperial Defence observed, 
the British Empire was "naval, Indian, and colonial".7 Therefore, the routes to the 
British Empire in India were to be protected and the Middle East was the main land 
route to it. The southern route to India that goes around Africa was already protected by 
the British existence in South Africa. This British anxiety about India made it keen not 
to allow any threat to the weak Ottoman Empire, which worked as a buffer zone 
between ambitious Russia and British India. British commercial interest lay in Egypt, as 
the British textile industry became dependent on Egyptian cotton, especially after the 
cut in supply from America during the American civil war.8 However, the Middle East 
did not represent just a source of raw materials for Britain. On the contrary, it became a 
significant market. Between 1815 and 1850, British exports to the Eastern 
Mediterranean increased by 800 per cent, by which time Bedouins in the Syrian desert 
were wearing shirts made of Lancashire cotton, as Albert Hourani noted.9 
French interests in the Middle East appeared to be predominantly cultural. Being a 
Catholic power, France introduced itself as the protector of the Catholics in the Ottoman 
Empire. French Jesuits established their missions in Syria (contemporary Lebanon 
included), and special relations, going back to the twelfth century, were developed with 
the Maronites. However, French interests were by no means restricted to the cultural 
arena only. Back in the eighteenth century, the French privileges acquired from the 
Ottomans established a prosperous commercial relationship between France and the 
Middle East. At that point in time French trade with the region flourished while other 
European trade, British in particular, was in decline. Well over half the sea-borne trade 
was controlled by the French merchants of Marseilles. French exports of woollen cloth, 
for instance, were more in demand in the Middle East than other European products 
because they were thinner, lighter and softer, and therefore more suitable to Middle 
5 Salibi. K (1965) op.cit, p. 120. 
6 Peretz, D, The Middle East Today (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1963) p. 89. 
7 Ismael. T, The Middle East in World Politics: a Study in Contemporary International Relations (New 
York: Syracuse University Press, 1974) p. 22. 
8 Peretz, D, op.cit, p. 98. 
9 Hourani. A, op.cit, p. 267. 
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Eastern use. The French had an additional advantage in that their manufacturers 
provided steady markets for most of the primary products then exported from the 
Middle East, especially short-stable cotton.1 0 However, this French supremacy in the 
Middle East was to collapse by the end of the eighteenth century with the beginning of 
Napoleonic wars. Owen has pointed out that the French trade in the Mediterranean was 
almost entirely destroyed, first by the restrictions imposed on exports by the Convention 
in 1793, and then by the command of the sea exercised by the British fleet after the 
battle of the Nile (1798). French merchants living in Istanbul, Izmir, and along the 
Syrian coast were either imprisoned or forced to flee as soon as their country 
commenced hostilities against the Ottoman Empire, losing most of their assets in the 
process. This was a great victory for Britain, as it expelled not only the French 
merchants from the Mediterranean but also all Napoleon's allies including the Dutch, 
Austrians and Italians. This development was to be accompanied by the first stages of 
the industrial revolution in the Britain. 1 1 
Russian interest in the Ottoman Empire was confined to securing a maritime route to the 
warm waters of the Mediterranean through the Straits of the Bosphorous and 
Dardanelles. Also, they were keen to keep other powers' fleets out of the Black Sea. 
Those interests incited the Russians to seek superiority in the region, once through 
negotiations with the Ottomans, and another time through using military power to 
occupy the region. However, when Russia declared war against the Ottoman Empire, in 
1877, and its army tried to advance towards Istanbul, Britain stood by the Ottomans' 
side. It was clear that no European power would allow any attempt to dismantle the 
Ottoman Empire by another.12 A separate and notable Russian interest in the Middle 
East was in Palestine, as Russia tried to appear as the protector of the Orthodox 
Christians. However, no significant Russian commercial interest in the Middle East 
occurred in the first half of the nineteenth century. 
Germany did not show any particular interest in the Middle East before 1890. Under 
Bismark, German concern was directed towards more pressing European problems. He 
preferred not to challenge the British and French in Africa and Asia, unless this 
Owen. R, The Middle East in the World Economy. 1800-1914 (London: Methuen, 1981) p. 83. 
"Ibid. 
1 2 Hourani. A, op.cit, p. 279. 
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challenge would strengthen Germany's position in Europe, while he left the Balkans 
and Middle East to the manoeuvres of his Austrian and Russian allies.13 
Accordingly, the majority of European trade with the Middle East in the first half of the 
nineteenth century was British. The interruption of French trade with the Middle East 
opened the way for the increasing output of British manufactured goods. The Middle 
Eastern market gained significant importance for the British, as it became the alternative 
destination for their goods that were banned from entering several European markets 
due to the war with Napoleonic France. With regard to the enormous increase in 
factory-produced goods for example, cotton textiles increased from some £10 million at 
the beginning of the wars with France to some £30 million at the end, clearly showing 
the importance of the Middle East as an alternative market.14 British exports to the 
Levant were valued at £300,000 by 1816, the first year after war. Two years later, at the 
peak of the post-war boom, the value of these exports had increased to £800,000. Cotton 
goods contributed to more than half of the total sum of British exports in both periods, 
valued at £190,000 and £550,000 respectively. Until 1845-9 British exports to the 
Middle East averaged more than £3,000,000 a year. By this same period, Turkey, Egypt, 
and Africa provided 14 per cent of the world market for British cotton piece goods.15 
On the other side of the Mediterranean, France started establishing for itself an 
influential role in the Maghreb. In 1830, French troops occupied Algiers. Economic 
incentives were behind this invasion. Due to economic growth, the French merchants of 
Marseilles wanted a strong trading position on the Algerian coast.16 The occupation of 
Algeria was the first step to controlling the Maghreb, as will be discussed later in this 
section. However, France did not neglect the Eastern Mediterranean and tried to re-
establish its links with it. This process took the French a number of years. In the 1840s, 
French trade with the Eastern Mediterranean was strengthened again, at the same time 
as the industrial revolution in France. The need for raw materials increased trade 
between France and the Middle East. Silk and cotton were imported from Izmir in the 
1830s, later on challenged by Beirut and Alexandria as they became the most notable 
ports for silk and long-staple cotton respectively.17 
1 3 Peretz. D, op.cit, p.100. 
1 4 Owen. R, op.cit, p. 84. 
1 5 Ibid. 
1 6 Hourani. A, op.cit. p. 260. 
1 7 Owen. R, op.cit. p. 86. 
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Once again, British trade was rivalled by the French who, with the Austrians, revived 
their sea-borne trade with the Middle East. Owen argues that the "total value of the sea-
borne trade of these two countries with the Middle East was just under £2,000,000 
(compared with Britain's £2,500,000) in 1840/1 and about £3,500,000 (as compared to 
Britain's £6-6,500,000) at the end of the same decade. In the case of Austria, he adds, 
these figures exclude the important overland trade, which in the early 1840s may have 
been worth another £2,000,000. 1 8 
One of the main reasons for this prosperity in European trade with the Middle East was 
the enormous development in transportation. With the coming of the steamship in the 
1830s and 1840s, transportation became faster, safer and cheaper. The moving of goods 
from producing countries to markets in large quantities became easier. Regular 
steamship routes were established between Egypt and the Levant from 1835 onwards. 
Being faster than the sailing ships, the new ships allowed the merchants to move easily 
from one port to another looking for markets.19 Issawi noted that steamships converged 
on the various ports of the region from several origins. Ships arriving in North African 
ports were mainly from France and England. Egypt, Syria, and Turkey received ships 
from England, France, Trieste, and Italy. Turkey received, through the Black Sea, ships 
coming from Russia and Austria, while the Red Sea ports and the Persian Gulf received 
ships from India. 2 0 The English were the first to establish steamship routes to the 
Eastern Mediterranean, hence travelling between Beirut and Alexandria, and from there 
to Liverpool became faster and more regulated. The first French steam-ship travelled 
from Marseilles to Constantinople in May 1837. Michel Chevalier said that this steam-
ship route was founded to create strong links between Europe and the East. While these 
were initially political and moral links, they were also materialistic, "which means links 
of business and interest, the most important issue in our [European] positivistic l i fe" . 2 1 
Several steps were taken in Europe to strengthen the trade with the Eastern 
Mediterranean. France lifted the strict rules that were imposed on the French trade with 
eastern Mediterranean and "Berber" (North African) countries. Thus, by 1835, traders 
did not need to obtain previously required licenses and insurance for their trade. 
1 8 Owen. R, op.cit. p. 86. 
19Ibid. p. 89. 
2 0 Issawi. C, An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa. (London: Methuen, 1982) p. 5. 
2 1 Chevalier.D, "Mujtama' iabal luhnanfi 'axxr a-thawrah a-sina'iyahfi oroupa". The Community of 
Mount Lebanon in the Ape of Industrial Revolution in Europe. Arabic edition (Beirut: Annahar. 1994) 
p.337. 
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Moreover, the consulate fees of 2 per cent imposed on the goods imported from the 
Eastern Mediterranean to Marseilles were abolished.22 
1.2.1 Implications of the European expansion on the region's economy 
The European commercial expansion in the Middle East in the first half of the 
nineteenth century had several implications for the region's economy. Firstly, the 
European demand for certain products, such as raw materials for industry, stimulated 
the expansion of the production of these crops, as they became significantly profitable 
products. In Egypt, cotton was the main crop as the British textile industry depended 
heavily on it. In Syria, silk became the predominant crop, in addition to cotton and 
cereals. This development reveals how the production system in the Middle East was 
shaped by European demand. The production cycle was increasingly controlled by 
European market needs, not by domestic needs. 
Secondly, this connection between the European markets' demands and the Middle East 
supplies linked the economy of Middle Eastern regions to the world economy. 
Production was affected by fluctuations in the European business cycle, and the prices 
of the products were determined by international prices. 
Thirdly, the new trade boom gave vast importance to the coastal port towns in the 
region. Towns like Beirut and Alexandria gained great importance at the expense of 
interior cities, like Damascus, which had been central to trade in the past. The European 
merchants did not have access to the interior areas. However, they needed to deliver 
their goods to the interior markets. Here the role of the coastal towns appeared. These 
coastal towns, later on cities, were the mediators between European trade and the 
interior markets. European exports spread from these cities all over the interior regions, 
and raw material productions were collected in these cities to be shipped later to 
Europe. 
22, Chevalier, D, op.cit, p.340. 
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1.2.2 The second half of the 19th century: European economic control in the 
Ottoman Empire 
The second half of the nineteenth century witnessed growing European influence in the 
Ottoman Empire. Although European powers pledged to respect the independence of 
the Empire as they signed the Treaty of Paris in 1856, they did not refrain from 
interfering in the internal affairs of the Empire. However, it was obvious that no 
European power favoured the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. When the Russians 
threatened to occupy Istanbul in 1877, as was mentioned previously, Britain supported 
the Ottomans against Russia. The powers preferred to defend a weak and dependent 
Ottoman Empire as this would allow them to have privileges and concessions in the 
regions of the Empire. 
The Middle East, as a principal route to the British Empire in India and other European 
colonies in the Far East, became of paramount importance after the opening of the Suez 
Canal in 1869. As a result, main land and sea routes needed for reaching the Far East 
passed through the region. This development increased the European, mainly British, 
interest in Egypt, as this canal would save much time and expense in reaching markets 
and colonies. Britain tried to control the canal to protect its marine route from being 
threatened by any power. Moreover, Britain tried to secure all seaways from the Red 
Sea to the Indian Ocean, managing to achieve this by controlling the western coasts of 
the Arabian Peninsula. 
During the same period, European influence developed into financial interference. The 
Ottomans borrowed large sums of money from Europe, with the burden of the interest 
service and repayment becoming astronomical by 1875. In 1881, a Public Debt 
Administration representing foreign creditors was set up and given control over a large 
part of Ottoman revenues, and financial policies.23 In Egypt, the situation was no better. 
Under Khedive Ismail, Egypt borrowed money on large scale. By 1876 it was no longer 
able to afford the repayments and Egypt's share in the Suez Canal was sold to the 
British. Eventually, the French and British got their hands on the entire financial 
system. Some years later, in 1882, under the pretext of protecting the legitimate 
authority from Ahmad 'Arabi's government, British troops occupied Egypt. Now 
Britain could secure its control over the Suez Canal. 
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Similar developments were taking place at the western end of the Mediterranean. 
Already established in Algeria, the French occupied Tunisia in 1881. This military 
interference was preceded by financial intervention when Tunisia became heavily 
indebted to the European banks in 1869. In Morocco, another European player appeared 
on the arena. Spain invaded the country in 1860, an action it took to extend its influence 
in the country and to oppose the spreading British one. The contrast between the 
European powers' policies in North Africa (Britain, France, Spain) was reconciled 
finally at the beginning of the twentieth century, in 1907, when France and Spain shared 
the control over Morocco by dividing it, while the French supremacy in the region was 
acknowledged by the others. Italy came late to the scene by declaring war on the dying 
Ottoman Empire in 1910 and occupying Libya. 2 4 
The twentieth century began with the Ottoman Empire being in an unenviable situation. 
Threats were coming from everywhere: Russia pushing from the North trying to have 
concessions in the Straits; Britain controlling Egypt, the Arabian coasts and the Persian 
Gulf; France having a free hand in the Maghreb; Italy occupying Libya; and the Balkan 
countries gradually shaking of Ottoman control. Only the heartland of the Empire, in 
Turkey, Syria and Iraq, was still under the Ottoman control. In short, the region was 
riddled with European influence. Out of all the European powers, only Germany, after 
Bismarck, was developing relations with the Ottoman Empire. By the end of the 
nineteenth century, German trade with the Ottoman Empire jumped from the 15th place 
to second. Britain was worried about these developments, mainly because Germany was 
growing as a potential threat to other European powers. This in part explains the way 
coalitions were formed in the First World War. 
1.2.3 The First World War's legacy: Absolute Franco-British supremacy in the 
Middle East 
In the 1920s, no power could challenge the supremacy of Britain and France in the 
Mediterranean. The Ottoman Empire had collapsed; Germany and the Austro-
Hungarian Empire were defeated; Russia became the Soviet Union and its internal 
issues took precedence over foreign affairs; and the US preferred isolation. Britain and 
France divided the Middle East between them, according to the Sykes-Picot Agreement 
2 3 Hourani. A, op.cit, p.281. 
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of 1916. The French-British supremacy was recognised by the League of the Nations 
through the establishment of mandates over the countries that were considered unable to 
manage their administrations. Lebanon and Syria were put under a French mandate 
while Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan were put under a British mandate. 
British interest in the Middle East was still concerned primarily with the production of 
cotton in Egypt and Sudan, the sea route to India through the Suez Canal and later the 
air-routes that crossed the region with Egypt as the centre, oil in Iran, which became 
prominent for Britain and second only in importance as a source of oil to the Caribbean 
(Iraq also became a source of oil later on, however, it was not as important as Iran), 
investments all over the region, mainly in Egypt, and markets for British manufactured 
goods. 
The French showed great interest in the Maghreb during the same period. A source of 
manpower for the army, and containing a significant French community, in addition to 
being a source of important raw materials and markets, the Maghreb received 
remarkable attention. The French commenced building roads, railways, and generating 
electricity, while on the other hand, they were exploiting the natural resources of 
phosphates and manganese.25 In the Middle East, Hourani argued that the French 
interest was limited to a few investments in Lebanon and Egypt, particularly the Suez 
Canal, and "some degree of moral commitment to the Christians of the mandated 
territory". Only the oil of Iraq became prominent to the French as by 1939 it represented 
half of French oil imports. Nevertheless, this does not prejudice the fact that France's 
military existence in Syria and Lebanon strengthened its position in the region, and 
provided land and seaport bases for its army, in addition to a military air-route to its 
empire in Indo-China. 
1.2.4 World War II : major changes in the powers position in the region 
The Second World War changed the balance of power in the Middle East. The British 
managed to keep their influence in the region after the war while their allies, the French, 
were forced to abandon their mandate in the Levant. The earlier defeat of Germany had 
weakened the French position and forced them to accept the British desire to give the 
2 4 Hourani. A, op.cit, p.282. 
2 5 Ibid, p.320. 
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promised independence to Syria and Lebanon. Germany and Italy were defeated and 
pushed out of the region, while American interest was just starting to develop. Only the 
USSR appeared as an alternative power in the Middle East. 
For the USSR, the new influence it acquired revived its old ambitions for a special role 
in Turkey and Iran. In Turkey, the USSR was not happy with the situation in the Straits 
and wanted to deny the warships of non-Black Sea countries the right to get through 
while, on the other hand, giving those of the Black Sea countries the right to pass freely 
to the Mediterranean. In its effort to make this desire actual, the USSR denounced the 
1925 Turko-Soviet neutrality treaty in 1945 and then claimed the rights to Turkish 
territories, which had been taken from the Ottomans in 1878 but returned to Turkish 
rule in 1921. The British and US support for Turkey made the USSR's pressure fruitless 
and it terminated in October 1946.26 In Iran, the USSR tried to strengthen its influence 
in the northern provinces. It was an attempt to weaken Iran and turn it into a dependent 
state, in addition to exploiting its oil richness. Here also, the USSR failed, and 
ultimately withdrew its troops in return for oil concessions. However, these oil 
concessions remained on paper only and never turned into reality. 
Britain, the second great power in the Middle East, wanted to maintain its influence in 
the region through treaties with independent states, a policy it had followed in the 1930s 
but which had failed in the long term. Britain's interests in the Middle East were still 
those of communication and oil. The Suez Canal was still a vital maritime route for 
British trade and war ships; air-routes to India over the Levant were also important; and 
Iranian oil remained prominent. Yapp has argued that the British treaties of the 1930s 
were replaced by British dependence on the Arab's goodwill to maintain their influence 
in the 1940s, hence they harvested the consequences in the 1950s.27 The British interest 
in Iran received the final knock with the nationalisation of oil in 1951. Britain lost its 
refinery in Abadan (the biggest refinery in the world), its share in the oil company, and 
the vital oil supplement. In the Arab world, Britain failed to reach agreements with the 
Arab states that would guarantee the continuation of its influence in the region. This 
generalisation had to exclude Transjordan, where an agreement provided Britain with 
the right to use the military bases within the country. 
Yapp. M, The Near East since the First World War (London: Longman, 1996) p.395. 
Ibid. p. 400. 
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Britain attempted to re-establish its influence in the region through the foundation of the 
Baghdad Pact in 1955. The Northern Tier states of Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and later Iraq 
joined together in a pact with the "purpose of military defence against the USSR"28. 
Britain's anxiety about the future of its interests in the Middle East reached its climax 
with Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company in July 1952. However, the 
British and French military intervention to regain their control over Suez Canal 
hastened the demise of their influence in the region which was largely replaced by the 
US and Soviet. Nevertheless, the war showed the extent to which the Suez Canal was 
crucial to Britain's economy as the closure of the canal blocked the way of oil 
shipments, and also brought Britain to an economic crisis. This was revealed in the drop 
in the Sterling rate - already weak before the operation - due to US pressure on Britain 
to withdraw from Suez. This war was the final blow to British and French influence in 
the Middle East. Despite the fact that the French control continued over the Maghreb, it 
was obvious that the Middle East was no more a region of European influence but rather 
an arena for American and Soviet activities. 
1.2.5 Summary: Europe and the Middle East 
The region of the Ottoman-controlled Middle East had proved to be of significant 
economic interest for the European powers in the 18 th and 19 th centuries. The 
revolutionising of European industry necessitated the need for sources of raw materials 
and markets. The area of the Middle East that was under the Ottoman control provided 
all these provisions. Agricultural raw materials needed for textile industry were 
available, or at least had the potential to grow. Egypt became the source for cotton while 
Syria provided the silk. This same region that produced the raw material was also an 
important market for the manufactured products. Moreover, the region provided access 
to European colonies further afield that also possessed raw materials and markets. By 
establishing a stronghold in the Middle East, European powers were able to control the 
trade route to India and later the maritime route to oil in the Persian Gulf. It was within 
this framework of interests that European investments in the region had manoeuvred. 
Investments ranged from cotton growing in Egypt and Sudan, and silk-reeling in Syria, 
to the improvement of transportation (ports and railway) around the region. They 
invested as well in fields that strengthened the region's dependence on Europe in 
2 8 Yapp. M, (1996) p. 405. 
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foreign trade. Thus, banking systems developed rapidily in some towns providing 
capital for foreign trade in which imports from Europe proved to be the main 
component. 
1.3 Development in the historical relations between Europe and Lebanon 
It is important to note that relations between Europe and Lebanon were very much fused 
with Europe's relations with Syria, as Lebanon did not exist as a separate entity before 
1920. The whole area, including the current Jordan and Palestine, was referred to by 
Europeans as the Levant. Beirut was the sea outlet for Damascus through which trade 
exchange with overseas countries was conducted. However, Mount Lebanon had a 
peculiarity distinguishing it from other parts of Syria. The most prominent characteristic 
was its being predominantly a Christian Maronite enclave, to which the latter fled from 
other parts of Syria. The Maronites tried persistently to avoid being subjected to the 
Muslim authorities, of which the Ottomans had represented the latest. This might 
explain their decision to settle in some parts of Mount Lebanon, which served as a safe 
shelter from Muslim controL The hard paths of the mountain often prevented the 
Muslim armies from being able to subordinate them completely. 
Through their persistent claim of being different from the Muslim surroundings, 
Maronites sought foreign protection. This was expected to come from Christian Europe, 
which was showing interest in the Levant. As mentioned earlier, France declared itself 
the protector of the Catholic Maronites after the treaty of 1535 between Francis I and 
Suleiman the Magnificent, which gave France the first capitulatory privileges in the 
Ottoman Empire.29 The links between France and the Maronites developed quickly as 
Europe was itself witnessing enormous developments. The industrial development in 
Europe gave certain importance to the European relations with the Maronites as the 
Levant attracted the Europeans as a market for their new production. 
Modern relations between Europe and Lebanon were enhanced in the first part of the 
19th century, with the establishing of steamship routes between European and Eastern 
Mediterranean ports. Beirut, a small town on the Mediterranean between Alexandria 
and Izmir, which counted a population of not more than 6-7000 at the beginning of the 
19th century, became the much-frequented port of Syria and the main storage deposit 
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for the foreign traders. Dominique Chevalier argued that Beirut's port took over the role 
of the two small port-towns of Tripoli and Sidon, which, in addition to Acre, attracted 
the bulk of commercial activities in the 18 th century. It was a convenient place for the 
English merchants as they were seeking bases for their trade in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. The French occupation of Italy contributed to the English merchants' 
move, as it deprived them of their commercial storage in the Italian ports. The French as 
well were keen to look for new trade bases as their establishments in Acre, Sidon and 
Tripoli were corrupted by the monopolisation and blackmailing practised by the Pashas, 
Chevalier added. The consequences of the Egyptian expedition were another 
incentive.30 Owen has argued that the feeling of being secure incited the European 
merchants to prefer Beirut due to its close proximity of the mountain to which they 
could withdraw in times of troubles.31 Salibi and Chevalier noted that the freedom and 
protection that were granted by the Amirs of Lebanon made Beirut welcoming to 
Europeans. Thus, European consulates were moved to Beirut in the 1820s, while all 
super-powers' representations developed by the 1840s into general consulates. Philip 
Hitti stated that the city hosted several American and British missionaries and a growing 
number of French traders and businessmen. In addition, a bazaar of Greek and Italian 
shops had flourished.32 Chevalier has said that ever since, Beirut's development has 
been linked to the European economy.33 Owing to its growing importance, many other 
commercial centres lost their own importance to Beirut. Damascus, for instance, became 
dependent on Beirut. By mid-century, for example, Damascene merchants needing 
letters of credits had to go and obtain them from Beirut.3 4 
1.3.1 European rivalries in Mount Lebanon 
The European behaviour in Mount Lebanon reflected the rivalries among them. The 
period of Egyptian occupation witnessed remarkable European activity showing the 
keenness of these powers to find or strengthen their footholds in the region. During the 
rebellion against the Egyptians in 1840, Britain, the ally of the Ottomans at that time, 
2 9Salibi.K, op.cit, p. 12. 
3 0 Chevalier. D, op.cit, p. 341. 
3 1Owen. R, op.cit, p. 98. 
3 2 Hitti.P.K, A Short History of Lebanon (London: Macmillan, 1965) p. 165. 
33Chevalier.D, op.cit, p.341. 
Salibi-K, op.cit, p. 121. 
3 4Owen. R, op.cit, p.98. 
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backed the insurgents and supplied them with arms. The British had no interest in 
keeping the Egyptians, who were on good terms with the French, in Syria. Russia 
interfered in this insurgency by supporting the rebels, mainly the Greek Orthodox. It 
was a step to enhance Russia's position as the protector of this Christian sect in the 
region. Austria did not hesitate to exploit the weakness of the French position by trying 
to gain the privilege of protecting the Catholics.35 Indeed, European consuls started 
interfering in every issue related to disputes between the religious groups of Mount 
Lebanon. European consuls were competing for gaining guardianship over these groups. 
The French and the Austrians consuls were competing over the Maronites' and other 
Catholics' guardianship; Russian consuls managed to draw the Greek Orthodox to their 
side; the Druse, who until 1841 did not hold any special relations with a European 
power, were taken up by the British who were upset with Maronites' alliance with 
France. This increased the Maronites' antagonism towards the British and pushed them 
to throw themselves on the French side entirely.36 
European trade with Syria (including contemporary Lebanon) witnessed tough 
competition between the French and English merchants in the 19 th century. In spite of 
the French embarrassment in the region due to the consequences of the Napoleonic wars 
at the turn of the century, the French merchants managed to re-establish their business 
in Syria, which they had not lost entirely owing to their relations with the Maronites in 
Mount Lebanon. Indeed, French merchants almost held the Syrian market under their 
control such that it became not merely a market for their products but also a source for 
raw materials needed for French industry. The British attempts to take over the French 
role in the Levant's market incited them to look towards the interior, mainly Aleppo, 
which became a crossroads for British trade with India and the Persian region.3 7 
However, the scarcity of production in Syria in the first half of the 19th century made it 
difficult for the European merchants to find enough goods to fill their shipments on 
their way back to Europe. Owing to this situation, European merchants tended to collect 
money and precious metals like gold and silver. The English merchants were the 
keenest amongst their European counterparts in accumulating such metals. They also 
collected old Turkish currencies that were made of gold and silver. The figures show 
3 5Salibi.K, op.cit, p. 41. 
3 6Salibi. K, op.cit, p.55. 
"Chevalier.D, op.cit, p. 347. 
Owen. R, op.cit, p. 86. 
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that English exports of goods to Syria in 1835 did not exceed FF 173,000 while they 
took out some of FF 2,000,000 of money, gold and silver.3 8 This policy created 
financial problems and impoverished the region as the European products were flowing 
into its markets and absorbing all its financial resources.39 Nonetheless, a distinction 
between French and British trade policies should be made. Chevalier points out that as 
English merchants tended to take precious metals out of the region in exchange of their 
goods, the French imported various raw materials, like silk and oily plants. In a way, 
this had a better effect on the economy but still did not cover the deficit in the balance 
of trade between Europe and the region.4 0 
1.3.2 The prosperity of silk production: inward foreign investment 
The prosperity of silk production in Mount Lebanon owed much to the European 
demand for silk starting back in the seventeenth century. Carolyn Gates has argued that 
this European need for silk stimulated trade between Europe and Lebanon, which 
exported silk to France and Italy. 4 1 The next two centuries saw an increase in production 
following the increase in European demand, with Mount Lebanon beginning to 
specialise in silk production. This grew rapidly in the nineteenth century due to a surge 
in exports to France. Gates maintained that "Lebanon's position in the nineteenth-
century international market economy was shaped by the development of sericulture" 
which became the engine of growth in that period.42 As demand increased, it dragged 
the prices up with i t . 4 3 Silk came second only to gold and silver on the list of exports at 
the beginning of the 1850s, but moved to first place in 1854.44 As a result of the 
increase in European demand the production of silk in Mount Lebanon and Syria 
increased by 350 per cent between 1873 and 1902.45 The dependence on the French 
market was obvious according to Gates who stated that 40 per cent of silk exports went 
to France in 1873. This figure reached 99 per cent in 1914.46 The capital invested in silk 
production became significant, as well. The annual operating capital of the spinning 
38Chevalier.D, op.cit. p. 347. 
3 9Ibid. 
4 0Ibid. 
4 1 Gates.C. L , The Merchant Republic of Lebanon: Rise of an Open Economy. (London: I.B.Tauris, 1998) 
p. 12. 
4 2 Gates. C. L , op.cit, p. 13. 
4 3 Chevalier.D, op.cit, p. 360. 
"Ibid. 
4 5 Gates. C. L , op.cit p. 13. 
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factories of Mount Lebanon was estimated at FF 9 m of domestic resources, compared 
to FF 8-9 m of foreign resources, as Gates pointed out. Meanwhile, domestic fixed 
capital had an additional FF 2.3 m and foreign fixed assets reached FF 0.2 m. 4 7 Salibi 
pointed out that the French-built factories and the local firms' imitations employed large 
numbers of workers and made silk production the primary feature of Lebanon's 
economy at that period.48 Indeed, half of the population of Mount Lebanon was 
economically dependent on sericulture by then.4 9 Chevalier noted that the silk 
production was a two-way investment: it was a source of profit for foreign trade and the 
French textile industry, and opened the way for foreign capital into the region, on the 
one hand, but supported at the same time a domestic productive system, on the other.50 
The previous character of Beirut as the enterpot of foreign exports into Damascus and 
interior Syria was changed due to the fact that Beirut became a silk exporter.51 
However, this single commercial crop production, according to Zamir, increased the 
dependence on imported food and "made the Sanjak (Mount Lebanon) more vulnerable 
to crop failure in both the mountain and the neighbouring areas". Zamir added that the 
economy was affected, at the turn of the century, by the reduction in demand for raw 
silk products, which was previously the main source of income.52 
The importance of silk production drew foreign direct investments into the industry. In 
the second half of the nineteenth century, French and British businesses established silk 
reeling factories in Mount Lebanon. Five of the nine factories that existed by 1852 were 
owned by French, while another two belonged to British firms. The number of French 
factories increased by 1870 to ten, while many of the old factories were modernised.53 
Available figures on foreign direct investment in silk industry, as mentioned earlier, 
suggested the engagement of FF 8-9 million of foreign capital in silk production. 
However, Issawi stated that foreign investments in the region of Syria up until 1914, of 
which the majority was French, totalled FF 500 m (Sterling 20 m). 5 4 Gates noted that 
4 6 Gates. C . L , op.cit, p. 13. 
4 7 Ibid. 
4 8 Salibi. K, op.cit, p. 116. 
4 9 Gates. C. L , op.cit, p. 14. 
5 0 Salibi.K, op.cit, p. 116. 
Chevalier.D, op.cit, p. 360. 
5 1Owen.R, op.cit, p. 154. 
5 2Zamir.M, The Formation of Modern Lebanon (London Dover, N.H: Croom Helm, 1985) p. 14. 
5 3 Gates. C.L, op.cit, p. 14. 
5 4 Issawi. C, op.cit, p. 71. 
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only a moderate amount of these foreign investments were channeled into agriculture 
and the silk industry.55 This can be explained by the French divestments from the silk 
industry in 1870s and 80s. French ownership of silk-reeling factories declined from 56 
per cent in 1852 to less than 5 per cent in 1885. This French withdrawal from the 
industry coincided with higher local investments in silk production.56 
Nevertheless, the French interest in Beirut was shown in other investments. There was 
the French Compagnie Ottomane de la route Beyrouth-Damas and other infrastructure 
companies like Compagnie du gaz de Beyrouth and the water company Eaux de 
Beyrouth.51 Other French investments were channeled into fields dominated by utilities. 
The French divestments from the silk-reeling industry were due to the lack of interest. 
Cheaper products became available somewhere else, and thus investing in Lebanon's 
silk industry became economically unattractive and less profitable. Their following 
investments in utilities showed their interest in developing the role of Beirut as a 
regional hub. The Beirut-Damascus road is a good example of the French intention to 
improve trade with the region through Beirut. 
1.3.3 The establishment of the French mandate 
The Maronites strove during their history in the area of Mount Lebanon to achieve their 
autonomy and independence from the Muslim authority. To claim that the Maronites 
always longed to have their own separate entity within a defined territory is no 
exaggeration. France, their patron for centuries, was the European power to be entrusted 
with fulfilling this long-held aspiration. This dream came close to reality in World War 
I , particularly after the French troops seized the territories of Syria and Mount Lebanon. 
The later San Remo conference in 1920 gave France the mandate over Lebanon and 
Syria. On 1 s t September 1920, General Gouraund, the French High Commissioner for 
Syria and Lebanon declared the establishment of "Grand Liban" to the delight of the 
Christian Maronites of Lebanon. The new entity comprised, in addition to Mount 
Lebanon, the annexed areas of the Bekaa Valley, Jabal Amil (in the south) and the 
whole coastal line stretching from the north of Tripoli to the borders of Palestine, which 
was placed under a British mandate. The towns of Beirut, Sidon and Tyre were 
5 5 Gates. C.L, op.cit. p. 17. 
5 6 Ibid. p. 14. 
5 7 Ibid. p. 15. 
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included. It was claimed that these territories had been detached from the Lebanon 
Princedom (Imarah) under the mutassarifate system that was established after the civil 
war of 1860. Salibi considered the French declaration of the establishment of Greater 
Lebanon as representing "a fulfilment for the Lebanese nationalist aspirations".58 
However, it is worth mentioning that this was not a Lebanese aspiration, i f the term 
Lebanese was to include the inhabitants of the newly annexed regions. It was rather a 
Maronite wish. The Muslims had their own aspirations hoping to join Syria in a united 
Arab state, hence their opposition to the declaration. 
The creation of the Lebanese State, however, was viewed by many historians as not 
being a mere fulfilment of the French pledges to the Maronites but more as a French 
interest. Meir Zamir considered that "the establishment of Greater Lebanon must 
therefore be examined in the wider aspect of French policy in the Levant during and 
immediately after the war". 5 9 He asserted that the French "civilising mission" had the 
clear political goal of strengthening France's position in an area in which its interests go 
back for centuries, and where its missionaries were first to lay the foundations for its 
colonial ambitions.60 Even the stretching of Lebanon's boundaries was more of a French 
aim than a Lebanese, as they realised the importance of Beirut as an outlet for Mount 
Lebanon. The Lebanese historian, Hassan Halak, quoted a political memorandum sent 
from the French administration of the League of the Nations to the political and 
commercial administration in 13 August 1920, in which the French stated that Lebanon 
required the boundaries that were recognised by France in 1860. It also said that not 
joining Tripoli [north Lebanon] and Beirut [the capital] to Lebanon meant that this 
country was doomed to die. It stated overtly that "Lebanon must stay the base for 
French influence in the Levant, and as much as it could be strong and viable France 
could strengthen its position in Syria".6 1 
The French economic interest in Lebanon was also significant. The French capital that 
was invested in Syria and Mount Lebanon before World War I was estimated at more 
than FF200 million. Indeed, France had controlled almost all aspects of the economy in 
both countries concerned at the turn of the century. These included: The Ottoman Public 
5 8Salibi.K, op.cit, p. 119. 
5 9Zamir. M, op.cit, p. 38. 
6 0Ibid. p. 39. 
6 ,Halak. H, "Tarikh luhnan al-mi'axxir 1913-1952". The Contemporary History of Lebanon 1913-1952. 
(Beirut: Dar a-Nahdah al-'arabiah, 1994) p.100. 
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Debt Committee (France had more than 63 per cent of Ottoman Public Debt), 
Damascus-Hamah Railway Company; Beirut Port Company, Electricity and Water 
Companies, Tobacco Company, in addition to the French banks, mainly the French 
company of Banque de Syria et du Grand Liban, Real Estate Bank of Syria, Leon Credit 
Bank, and the Maritime Transportation Company. Al l these companies were holding the 
reins of the economy in the two countries, and were overtly transferred into a monopoly 
in the interest of the French capital.62 These investments could explain the French 
anxiety to protect interests in the region. Indeed, these interests incited the French to 
prefer maintaining the status quo before the war (i.e. supporting the ailing Ottoman 
Empire's authority) to avoid further European competition in the region. Indeed, this 
had happened after the defeat of the Ottomans as the French and the British sat to divide 
the Levant between each other. The meeting between Clemenceau and Lloyd George, in 
March 1919, revealed explicitly the difference in the interests of the two powers. The 
French insisted on having all of Syria while the British considered that the French 
should have only Lebanon with a certain limit in the north to leave a sea outlet for the 
British and the Arabs. Lloyd George was not happy either with having to grant the 
French control over the northern railway that stretched to Turkey.6 3 Basically, the 
British were trying to minimise the French influence in the Levant while French 
interests were too dear to be given up. 
The French contributed greatly during their mandate over Lebanon to the shaping of the 
Lebanese state. In 1926 a new constitution was founded which was almost a copy of the 
French constitution. However, this period witnessed strict French control over the 
country. The French language became an official language, and the Lebanese flag was a 
French flag with a Cedar tree in the middle. Muslim opposition to the French mandate 
and to the concept of a Lebanese entity was suppressed. Hence, Muslim leaders realised 
that they needed to accommodate themselves to the new situation. For this positive 
development, the French administration rewarded them by appointing a Muslim to the 
post of the speaker of the parliament, Sheikh Mohammed al-Jisr. However, Hasaan 
Halak told that when Al-Jisr was nominated to the presidency by Muslims and a notable 
number of Christians, the French rejected him strongly. They then suspended the 
6 2Dahir. M, Tarikh luhnan al-ijtima'i 1914-1926 (The Social History of Lebanon) (1974) p. 111. 
Zamir. Op.cit, p. 39. 
Taqi a-Din. S, al-Tatawwur al-tarikhi li-mushkila al-luhnaniwa 1920-1970 (The Historical 
Development of the Lebanese Problem 1920-1970) (1977) p. 39. 
25 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment of EU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
constitution and appointed a Christian president. Halak argued that the French declared 
overtly that the president should be a Maronite Christian as they thought the only way to 
guarantee their influential role in Lebanon was through keeping the power in the hands 
of the most loyal subjects, the Maronites. The appointment of Charlie Dabbass, who 
was not Maronite but was Christian, to the presidency was the result of the tough 
competition between the two prominent Maronite candidates, Emile Ideh and Bashara 
al-Khury. However, this rigid French opposition to the Muslim candidate shows their 
anxiety over their own interests and not those of the Maronites as might seem to have 
been the case. The French realised that i f a Muslim became a president, even a pro-
France one, Pan-Arabism zeal would be motivated in both Lebanon and Syria, and 
incite again a struggle for the Arab unity. This would by no means match the French 
interests in the country, argued Halak.64 
1.3.4 French economic interests in Lebanon during mandate period 
Since France proved to be purely motivated by self-interest in establishing Greater 
Lebanon, it was to be expected that the French would utilise the economic sectors of the 
country to their own pure benefit. They tried to improve the sectors that they were 
benefiting from, while neglecting the productive sectors that were seen as beneficial to 
the national economy of Lebanon. Beirut's port witnessed vast improvements, which 
strengthened its position as the main entrepot for import, export and transit services. 
Meanwhile, the French were criticised for neglecting the port of Tripoli in the north, on 
the basis of it being located in an Arabist stronghold.65 The French mandate period 
marked further centralisation of economic activities in Beirut. French, and non-French, 
capital flowed mainly into banks, insurance companies, transportation and public 
services. Meanwhile, domestic industry faced explicit French disapproval of its 
development.66 France was the main exporter to the Lebanese market, thus, the 
maintenance of productive sectors' backwardness was crucial for preserving French 
hegemony over the market. In contrast, the French mandate supported services. 
Halak.H, op.cit. p. 67. 
'Ibid. p. 137. 
!Taqi a-Din. S, op.cit, p. 40. 
Ibid. p. 42. 
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Tourism, for instance, was encouraged by lifting taxes imposed previously on hotels, 
entertainment places and houses and villas for rent.67 
French capital received comparative advantages, as opposed to other foreign or local 
capitals. The establishment of French authority in Lebanon meant having the French 
High Commissioner in charge of policy making. This, according to Gates, brought 
institutional changes to the benefit of French businesses and allowed French bureaucrats 
to promote French firms against other European or local businesses. French companies 
by then were able to prevent any other foreign competitors from venturing in the 
Lebanese economy.68 French investments in Lebanon during the mandate period 
reached FF 822.10 m. These were concentrated mainly in the banking sector (84.9 per 
cent) while the rest was distributed between utilities, ports, railways and tourism.6 9 
Foreign trade was also shifted to France's benefit during the mandate period. France 
replaced Britain as the main exporter to Lebanon. Meanwhile, imports from the 
neighbouring region remained relatively stable at 25 per cent of total imports. However, 
the decline in the silk industry changed the composition of Lebanese exports towards 
primary and manufactured commodities. Neighbouring markets received more 
Lebanese exports in the mandate period compared to the pre-war time. This can be 
explained by the change in trade components in which silk used to be the main exported 
product to Europe before the first war. In 1938, Lebanon exports to Palestine exceeded 
its exports to France. Palestine became the main market for Lebanon's products which 
comprised agriproducts, foodstuffs, textiles, cement, shoes and leather. Meanwhile, 
Lebanon's imports coming mainly from France included foodstuffs, textiles, garments, 
fuels, capital and producer goods and other.70 France's supremacy as the main exporter 
to Lebanon was to remain unchallenged until the end of the mandate. 
6 7 Taqi a-Din. S, op.cit, p. 47. 
6 8 Gates. C. L , op.cit, p. 19. 
69 
70 
Ibid. 
Ibid. p. 29. 
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Table 1.1 French investments in Lebanon during the mandate 
Category and firms F F 
million 
Slare 
(«> 
1- Banks 698.30 84.9 
Banque de Syrie et du Liban 300.00 
Cretiit foncier de Syrie 6.00 
Credit foncier d' Algerie et Tunisie 125.00 
Compagnie Algenenne 267.30 
2- Utilities 77.00 9.4 
Electricite de Beyrouth 75.00 
Societe d'electricite la Kadicha 2.00 
3- Ports and Entrepots 20.50 2.5 
Compagnie du port, de quais, et d'entrepSts 
de Beyrouth 
16.00 
Compagnie generate du Levant 4.50 
4- Railroads 15.00 1.8 
Compagnie frangaise du chemin de fer DHP 15.00 
5- Miscellaneous 11.30 1.4 
Radio-Orient 3.30 
Grands hotels du Levant 8.00 
Total 822.10 100 
Source: Gates. C. L (1998), p. 19 
1.3.5 End of the French mandate 
Complaints against the French mandate started to rise in Lebanon as people saw in it an 
aspect of colonisation instead of mandatory authority (that was assumed to be 
qualifying the native population to manage their country). A growing co-operation 
developed between the Sunni Muslims and a significant proportion of the Maronites 
who aspired to independence from France. The latter tried to secure its interests in 
Lebanon by the treaty of 1936, similar to that agreed with Syria. However, this attempt 
failed in both countries. During World War I I , Lebanon came under the control of 
Vichy France. Concurrently, the government of Free-France - established in exile in 
Britain - promised the Lebanese independence once the war was ended and its authority 
restored. When the Free-France troops occupied Lebanon, thanks to the British, they 
had to fulf i l their pledges of independence guaranteed by Britain. Indeed, the British 
were the predominant power in the Levant after the war as France was exhausted - a fact 
realised by a large proportion of the Lebanese. The new bourgeoisie, a prominent 
member of which was Bashara al-Khuri (first president of independent Lebanon later) 
and his Constitutional Union Party, found that their connections with the British would 
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be the sole way to get rid of a French mandate that was no longer serving their 
interests.71 Under British pressure, France had to recognise the independence of 
Lebanon on 22 October 1943. 
1.3.6 French interests after independence 
The recognition of Lebanon's independence, which the French unwillingly accepted in a 
period of weakness, did not mean in any way that they were ready to abandon all their 
interests in the country easily. French interests in Lebanon were as dear to France as 
those of Syria. Thus, France tried hard to conclude treaties, through which it could 
safeguard its cultural, economic and strategic interests. The governments of the two 
newly independent states rejected such treaties vehemently. However, the French were 
willing to use all means available to force a compromise. Among these means was the 
presence of the foreign troops (French and British) and the troupes speciales (composed 
of local soldiers but still under French command). Lebanon and Syria raised the matter 
at the UN Security Council, where a prolonged debate took place. In an overt attempt to 
sideline the UN, the French representative, Foreign Minister George Bidault, declared 
that the French and the British would solve the problem together, under the French-
Anglo Agreement of December 13, 1945. Meanwhile, the British representative Sir 
Alexander Cadogan expressed his government's desire to withdraw the British troops 
from the Levant "at the earliest possible moment".72 This showed clearly the disparity 
between Britain and France over the Levant problem. The resignation of General De 
Gaulle from the French presidentship eased the tension between France and Britain on 
the one hand, and France and Levantine states on the other. De Gaulle had wanted to 
guarantee a special position for France in the Levant and was at the same time very 
suspicious of the British intentions to replace France's influence in the region. The new 
government held military talks on the withdrawal with the British in Paris, March 1 s t 
1946. A Lebanese delegation participated, and a schedule was agreed upon. The 
evacuation was completed on April 17 from Syria, and on December 31, 1946 from 
Lebanon.73 
7 1Taqi a-Din. S, op.cit. p. 57. 
7 2 Abu Salih. A. S, History of the foreign policy of Lebanon. 1943-1958 (PhD thesis: 1971) pp. 50-66. 
7 3Ibid, pp.63-66. 
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The collapse of France's political and military hegemony over Lebanon after 
independence was accompanied by a deterioration in some aspects of its economic 
domination. France lost its position as the major exporter to Lebanon. The mandate 
authorities had played a major role in preventing non-French products from competing 
with the French ones, as was mentioned earlier. After the war, US exports to Lebanon 
and Syria jumped straight to the top of the list, without any significant competition, 
while Britain came second. France's share meanwhile deteriorated severely. This plunge 
in the French share was due to many major changes: the absence of the French mandate 
authority, which freed the market from severe restrictions; the resentment among the 
native population of the negative French position regarding Lebanese aspiration for 
independence; and the crucial weakness of France's economy after the war.7 4 
The US's swift invasion of the markets, in both Lebanon and Syria, was due to the 
strength of the American economy, that had not been affected by the war in the other 
parts of the world. The US economy was growing rapidly while the economies of the 
other powers were exhausted by the war expenses. Nevertheless, Britain's exports' 
growth was due to the emminence Britain gained as a consequence of its support for 
those who had demanded independence.75 
The deterioration in France's trade with Lebanon after independence, however, should 
in no way be interpreted as evidence that the French economic hegemony over Lebanon 
had collapsed forever. Indeed, although Lebanon's economy was contained in the 
Sterling zone for a few years, France managed to draw it back to the Franc zone through 
the Catroux Accord of 1944, which gave France great control over the country's 
reserves of foreign currency needed by merchants to finance their imports. Moreover, 
France held the reins of monetary policy through the Banque de Syria et du Grand 
Liban which was still under French administration. Meanwhile, the French influenced 
many other sectors through the French companies whom the new independent 
government had agreed to honour with their previous concessions, particularly in public 
utilities. The Franco-Lebanese Monetary Agreement of 1948 institutionalised the 
French predominance, as it regulated Lebanon's place in the Franc zone and provided 
[only] partial access to the countries' foreign currency reserves held in Paris until 
4Dahir. M, op.cit, pp. 58-60. 
7 5Ibid. 
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1953. This accord was seen by the Lebanese administration as a "cornerstone of a 
policy aimed at creating a strong, fully convertible currency in which international 
markets had confidence".77 Under this agreement, the French central bank guaranteed 
the convertibility of 67 per cent of Lebanon's French Franc balances at a fixed pound 
Sterling/French Franc exchange rate until 1958, while Lebanon was freed from the de 
jure monetary dependence on France.78 As a result of this accord, a third of the French-
held Lebanese Franc balances were guaranteed and they lost 45 per cent of their value 
after the devaluation of the French currency the day after the agreement went into 
effect. Moreover, Lebanon agreed to buy French-abandoned property in Lebanon for 
LL 20 m and also to respect the French concessions until their expiry dates.79 The 
French also established a number of organisations that had the aim of maintaining 
business interests in the country. One of those was the semi-official trading company 
Societe d'etudes et de realisations industrielles, agricoles et commerciales (SORIAC). 
This played a major role in fighting other foreign firms' interests in Lebanon and trying 
to win contracts for French firms. Eventually, the Lebanese government was forced to 
take action against SORIAC to curb its corrupted ways of conducting business.80 
1.4 Conclusion 
European relations with Lebanon up until its independence were obviously dominated 
by the French. Britain challenged the French at some points in time, trying to gain a 
foothold in the Ottoman controlled territory. The Russians and the Austrians also tried 
this. However, those attempts were prominent when France's influence in the Ottoman 
Empire was weakened. French interests in Mount Lebanon were similar to the overall 
European interests in the Middle East and North Africa: sources of raw material and 
potential markets. However, the difference between the case of Lebanon and the rest of 
the region is the cultural connection that France launched with the Catholic Maronites 
of Mount Lebanon since the 12th century. However, France's interests can by no means 
be considered as motivated by the mere moral obligation towards their co-religionists. 
The French had economic interests in the territory resembling to a great extent their 
760wen. R, The Economic History of Lebanon 1943-1974: Its Salient Features. In BarakatH (ed) 
Towards a Viable Lebanon (London: Croom helm, 1988) p. 30. 
7 7 Gates. C.L, op.cit, p. 97. 
7 8 Ibid. 
7 9 Ibid. 
8 0 Ibid. p. 93. 
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colonial interests in North Africa. Hence, Zamir emphasised that the French 
missionaries were the first to lay the foundations for their colonial ambitions.81 They 
supported agriculture in Mount Lebanon by encouraging silk production, which was 
needed to feed the silk factories of Lyon and Marseilles. French businesses got engaged 
in the silk-reeling industry in the 19th century, the produce being exported to France to 
supply the textile industry. However, they were the first to withdraw once competitive 
industrial silk started coming from Far Asia. That move harmed the economy of Mount 
Lebanon, which by then was dependent on the French market for its single crop 
produce. The French 'moral obligation' towards the Maronites did not prevent them 
from rendering their silk agricultural and industrial production obsolete. However, the 
French developed transportation by enlarging the port of Beirut and improving roads 
and other utilities. This was for the sake of their foreign trade. French banks that 
operated in Beirut were mainly there to provide commercial loans for foreign trade with 
France. During the mandate, as was mentioned earlier, France developed the 
commercial position of Beirut ignoring the productive sectors of the economy. This says 
a lot about the importance of Lebanon as a market for foreign trade, and an enterpot for 
exports into the region. The economy of Lebanon was shaped to be dependent on 
France and to create opportunities confined to French businesses only. Inevitably, this 
helped in making the French businesses more aware of, and knowledgeable about, the 
Lebanese market, when compared to other foreign businesses. The thesis will test 
whether this, despite the French departure from Lebanon, and the decline in France's 
influence, is still an advantage for French companies conducting business in Lebanon 
today. 
Concerning the question of foreign direct investment, we can argue that the modern 
history of Lebanon had some periods during which foreign investments flowed into it. 
This means that it was once an attractive destination for FDI. Obviously, the interest in 
investing in the country was limited by the opportunities arising at the time. The silk 
industry proved to be the niche for foreign direct investments in the 19th century. The 
significant flow of French capital and expertise into this sector in Mount Lebanon is a 
valid example. Apart from the economic growth instigated by this industry in Lebanon, 
the country became a major source of silk for the textile industry in France. This foreign 
capital would not have been directed to Lebanon if opportunities for business had not 
8 1 Zamir. M, op.cit, p. 39. 
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been attractive. The raw material for silk industry was available and ready to develop 
while local labour was abundant. Meanwhile, foreign investors brought capital and 
expertise. The result was, on the one hand, economic growth for the region materialised 
in higher incomes from agriculture that provided the raw materials and in employment 
opportunities, while on the other, it provided intermediate material for European 
industries. However, this industry deteriorated when it became less attractive to produce 
in Lebanon. Investments in the silk industry in Mount Lebanon can be compared to 
contemporary foreign investments in oil industries. Foreign companies invest huge 
capital in oil-producing countries. However, had a substantial alternative source of 
energy been discovered, massive waves of divestments would be inevitable. 
On the other hand, other business sectors had a fair chance to flourish, like the financial 
and non-financial services in Beirut late in the 19th century. The location of Beirut on 
the Mediterranean and its proximity to the silk-producing mountains gave the city 
certain advantages. As it was mentioned earlier, at some points in time, European 
merchants wanted to operate from Beirut as they felt safe being close to the mountains 
to which they could flee in case of trouble. This can be seen as another location-
advantage that played a pull-factor role at that time. The essence of this argument is 
firstly, that Lebanon has been attractive for European businesses and direct investments 
at some periods of time, when certain pull-factors were available in the country. If 
similar or relevant pull-factors occurred in Lebanon at other periods of time, the country 
should be considered an attractive destination for European and foreign investments. 
Secondly, Europe has a history of business activity with, and in Lebanon, including 
FDI. This history, as the thesis will demonstrate, has played some role in determining 
the present willingness, and capability, of European investors to consider Lebanon as an 
FDI destination. The role of France is particularly significant in this regard. 
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Chapter Two: The Development off Economic Relations between 
European Countries and Lebanon since the Establishment of the E C 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this section is to assess the impact of the creation and development of the 
EU on European economic relations with Lebanon. The previous chapter highlighted 
the European interests in Lebanon within the context of their interests in the Middle 
East in the 19th and early 20 th century. This chapter will highlight the relations between 
the EU and Lebanon within the context of the former's relations with the Arab 
Mediterranean countries. In order to achieve this, I shall trace the development of 
relations between the European Community and Lebanon and within the contemporary 
context of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. That will include a survey of the EU 
policies towards Lebanon and an analysis of trade between the EU member states and 
Lebanon. By the end of this section, I shall establish whether these relations ever 
involved the flow of FDI from the EU into Lebanon. I shall also investigate whether EU 
policy towards Lebanon is encouraging for EU private businesses or not. 
2.2 The foundation of the E C 
The European Economic Community (EEC) was officially established on 1 January 
1958 by the Treaty of Rome. The six founding countries included Belgium, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Simultaneously, 
another community, the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) was 
established.82 Six years before, on 18 April 1951, the same countries had signed the 
treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which came into 
force on 23 July 1952, and which is considered to be the first stone in the building of the 
European Community. Its idea was introduced on 9 May 1950 by Robert Schuman, the 
then French Foreign Minister, who put forward a plan for France and Germany to "pool 
all their coal and steel production under a joint High Authority, within an organisation 
open to any other country in Europe".83 
8 2 Borchardt. K, European Integration, the Origins and Growth of the European Union. (European 
Documentation. Periodical 1995) p. 9. 
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However, the appeals for European unity go back to the 1920s. One of the first attempts 
took place in the aftermath of the First World War, when in 1923 the Austrian founder-
leader of the Pan-European movement, Count Coudenhove Kalergi, called for the 
creation of the United States of Europe. Other attempts followed but were doomed to be 
unsuccessful due to the nationalistic and imperialistic ideologies which dominated 
Europe at that time. Only after the devastation produced by World War I I was the idea 
of European unity accepted. The total collapse of Europe accompanied by the "political 
and economic disintegration of outdated national structures set the stage for a 
completely fresh start and called for a far more radical approach to the reordering of 
Europe".84 The Europeans realised that they had turned into weak nations and had lost 
their prominence in the international arena. Their political and economic supremacy had 
been eclipsed by two new ones, the USA and USSR. This realisation and the 
understanding that only unity could put an end to "Europe's woeful history of conflict, 
bloodshed, suffering and destruction"85 were crucial factors prompting the idea of 
European unity. 
Without denying the tremendous role played by the woeful situation of Europe after the 
war in pushing towards unity, it can be argued that economic factors were the real 
catalyst for the success of the European Community. The fact that the unification 
procedure did not interfere in the members' politics and was purely economic 
contributed to this success. The Treaty of Rome stated clearly that the Community, by 
the establishment of a common market and an economic and monetary union, should 
have the task of promoting a "harmonious and balanced development of economic 
activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high 
degree of convergence of economic performance, a standard of living and quality of 
life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among member states".86 This 
pattern was maintained until 1970, when the basis for political co-operation between 
member states was established under the European Political Co-operation agreement 
(EPC), and improved by the Single European Act in 1987. However, this did not go 
beyond consultation between foreign ministers and constant contact between officials. 
The aim was to improve communication between the member states over all major 
8 4 Borchardt. K (1995), p. 5. 
85Ibid. p:23. 
86Treaty Establishing the European Community as amended by subsequent treaties. Rome, 25 March, 
1957. 
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foreign policy issues. In Maastricht, in 1992, the Heads of State and Government signed 
the Treaty of European Union and agreed " to pursue the gradual development of a 
common foreign and security policy".87 
Thus, Since its foundation, the European Community's main objective was to achieve 
economic integration between member states. As Haifaa Jawad pointed out, until the 
1970s, the Community's attention was directed inwards rather than outwards. This 
attention focused mainly on the removal of trade barriers between the member states, 
building up the Common Agricultural Policy and achieving ever-improving standards of 
living for its members.88 
2.3 The European economic approach towards southern-Mediterranean 
countries 
The European Community's economic approach to the Arab-Mediterranean countries 
was not shaped into an organised economic policy until 1972. Before that, relations 
between the two sides were random, unsystematic and on a case-by-case basis. Lebanon 
was the first Arab-Mediterranean country to sign a non-preferential trade agreement 
with the EEC in 1965. Special Association Agreements between the EEC and both 
Morocco and Tunisia were concluded in 1969. Lebanon and Egypt signed agreements 
on Preferential Trade in 1972. Enzo Grilli stated that the agreement with Lebanon never 
entered into force, although he was unable to provide the reasons.89 These were 
association agreements concluded under Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome, which 
entitled the Community to "conclude with one or more states or international 
organisations agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and 
obligations, common action and special procedures".90 
The agreements between the EC and the Mediterranean non-member states were 
considered justifiable as many of these countries had strong historical and cultural ties 
with most of the member states. France had strong connections with the Maghreb 
countries (Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria), in addition to the previously mandated 
87Borchardt. K, op.cit. p. 60. 
88Jawad.H, Euro-Arab relations, a study in collective diplomacy. (Reading, Ithaca Press: 1992) p. vii. 
89Grilli. E. R, The European Community and the developing countries (Cambridge University Press: 
1993) p.182. 
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Mashreq countries of Lebanon and Syria. Italy had substantial relations with its 
previous colony, Libya, and with Malta and Tunisia. Relations between Germany and 
Turkey were not to be neglected. Indeed, the factors steering the EC approach towards 
the southern Mediterranean region have stirred a considerable debate as to whether 
European interests in the region are political, strategic, or purely economic. Ghassan 
Salami perceived European interests in the region as an issue of security "for which the 
catchword has changed over the years from oil deliveries to terrorism and now to 
Islamism".91 However, it can be argued that the motives for an EC approach towards the 
region are interrelated. If the European emphasis was on security issues, it has to be said 
that economic instability in the region can affect the security of Europe. Stability in the 
region of the Mediterranean (or the Middle East for a wider perspective) is hindered by 
many obstacles, according to a list drawn by Gerd Nonneman.92 These were a 
combination of political, strategic and economic obstructions. Salame" himself 
recognised the European economic interests in the region when stating that such 
interests, combined with their reliance on the Middle Eastern oil and gas exports, and 
public opinion concerns do not allow passive behaviour by the EC towards the area.93 
As far as trade is concerned, this region still represents an important outlet for the EC 
exports.94 Another concern that should be highlighted is the potential for an increase in 
immigration from the region of the Mediterranean (and the Middle East) as a result of 
economic failure or political upheavals.95 Therefore, a combination of factors including 
strong historical links, proximity, security, potential for markets and fear of excessive 
immigration contributes to Europe's interest in the region of the Mediterranean. 
Although the US and the Soviet Union had stronger influence in diplomatic or militarily 
crises in the region, Ellen Laipson noted that, judged by other terms, "Europe has, and is 
Text of the Treaty establishing the European Community as amended by subsequent treaties, Rome, 25 
March, 1957. Part six, Article 238. 
9 1To emphasise the impact of proximity on security issues, he recalled the incident of two "missing-
target" Libyan missiles falling on an Italian island in 1986. 
Salame\ G, Torn Between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean: Europe and the Middle East in the Post-
Cold War Era. Middle East Journal (48) no.2. Spring 1994, p. 11. 
9 2 Nonneman. G, Key Obstacles to Stability in the Middle East. In Nonneman. G, The Middle East and 
Europe (ed) second edition (London: Federal Trust for Education and research, 1993) p. 29. 
9 3 Salamd. G, op.cit, p.2. 
94Grilli. E.R, op.cit, p. 180. 
9 5 Miller. G, An Integrated Communities Approach. In Nonneman. G, The Middle East and Europe. 
Op.cit, p. 3. 
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likely to continue to have, a more sustained and durable political, economic and cultural 
presence in the region".96 
However, despite the fact that the Mediterranean basin is a strategic and vital region for 
Europe, the EC did not manage to develop a coherent policy in its approach to this 
particular area. The EC's relations with the Mediterranean countries were confined to 
bilateral agreements with individual countries, mainly concerned with trade without any 
signs of co-operation. This approach, in many cases, could be seen as contradictory to 
the Treaty of Rome, which emphasised that the purpose of association with the overseas 
countries and territories that have special relations with EC Member states is to promote 
the economic and social development in these countries, establish close economic 
relations with them, further the interests and prosperity of the inhabitants of these 
countries to lead them to the economic, social and cultural development to which they 
aspire.97 The EC's approach hardly included any of these objectives. 
2.3.1 The Global Mediterranean Policy 
In 1972, a new approach towards the Mediterranean countries was adopted under the 
new Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP). At the Paris summit in October 1972, the 
Heads of States and Governments declared that the Community "attached essential 
importance to the fulfilment of its obligations towards the countries of the 
Mediterranean basin with which agreements had been or will be concluded, agreements 
which should be the subject of a global and balanced approach".98 
The new Global Mediterranean Policy seems to have had several motives. A mixture of 
political and economic developments urged the EC to re-think its Mediterranean policy. 
However, literature does not agree on the reasons for the establishment of the GMP. 
Some authors, like Nadia Mustafa, argued that with the GMP it became obvious that the 
EC was trying to strengthen its political presence in the region. This aim was 
significantly different from the pre-GMP aims, which were purely concerned with 
9 6 Laipson. E, Europe's Role in the Middle East: Enduring Ties, Emerging Opportunities. Middle East 
Journal. (44) no. 1. Winter 1990. p. 7. 
"Treaty of Rome, Part four. Article 131. 
98Grilli. E.R, op.cit, p. 185. 
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economics, particularly trade. Jawad agreed on the political considerations saying that 
the Europeans were eager to reduce the influence of the superpowers (US, USSR) in the 
region, an influence which had come to fil l the vacuum left after the decline of 
European influence following the Suez War.100 Strategically, the Mediterranean 
countries were keen to see the EC challenging the other powers in their region in a way 
to ease the absolute control of those powers, she stated. However, Jawad looked at the 
economic-strategic considerations as well, highlighting the fact that Mediterranean 
countries were either the sources or the outlets of their oil supply coming from the 
Middle East or North Africa. Thus, the EC wanted to secure these sources. Although 
she pointed out that the 1973 oil crisis increased the importance of a new Mediterranean 
policy, this development should not be seen as particularly influential in the 
establishment of the GMP policy as it was launched before the crisis appeared. 
Nevertheless, Jawad considered that the emerging economic power of the EC after 
achieving the Customs Union and the Agricultural Common Market, and the scheduled 
joining of the UK, Ireland and Denmark in 1973, created the best time for a more 
"ambitious co-operation policy". External pressure on the EC coming through the 
international trade negotiations (Tokyo Round) held under the GATT, which opposed, 
with the US, the trade preferences in the Mediterranean, was proposed by Jawad as 
another reason for the GMP. 
Enzo Grilli added to these reasons the widespread dissatisfaction among the EC 
member states at the patchwork of agreements reached in the 1960s, most of which 
were due to be renegotiated soon. On the other hand, he pointed out that the oil 
producing countries were becoming assertive in their claims over the control of their 
natural resources, and that the sea routes of this vital commodity seemed to be 
threatened by the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean. The good economic 
conditions of the EC, characterised by expansion in its economies' output and full 
employment, according to Grilli, represented a favourable time for the EC to "pay 
greater and more systematic attention to the Mediterranean region".101 
"Mustafa. N Ornupa wal watan al-'arabi (Europe and the Arab World). (Beirut: markaz dirassat al-
wihdah al-'arabiah, 1986) p.212. 
100Jawad. H, op.cit, pp. 28-31. 
1 0 1 Grilli. E. R, op.cit, p:186. 
39 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment of EU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
2.3.2 Agreements concluded within the GMP 
Upon the approval of the Council of Ministers in November 1972, the European 
Commission was instructed to commence negotiations of new agreements with the 
Mediterranean countries from June 1973. Grilli pointed out that the "articulation of a 
global approach towards the area was being based for the first time on clear and explicit 
premises". He stated that these premises were proximity, similarity of climatic and 
ecological conditions - "and thus of agricultural productions"- with southern Europe, 
reciprocal interests in the area of energy and labour supply, and the role of a bridge 
between the Community and Africa played by the Maghreb and Mashreq countries. 1 0 2 
Negotiations with the Maghreb countries started in 1973. However, the co-operation 
agreements with those countries were not concluded before 1976. Algeria signed an 
agreement with the E C for the first time as an independent state, while Tunisia and 
Morocco had had Special Association Agreements since 1969. Negotiations with the 
Mashreq countries did not start until 1976 despite the demands of those countries since 
1973. Co-operation Agreements with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria were signed in 
1977. The Agreements with Syria and Jordan were their first with the E C . 1 0 3 
Table 2.1 Agreements signed with non-member Mediterranean countries pre 
Euro-Med 
Country Non-
preferential 
trade 
agreement 
Preferential trade 
agreements 
Special 
Association 
Agreement 
Co-operation 
Agreement 
Morocco 1969 1976 
Algeria 1976 
Tunisia 1969 1976 
Libya No agreements 
Egypt 1972 1977 
Israel 1975 
Jordan 1977 
Syria 1977 
Lebanon 1965 1972 1977 
Turkey 
Cyprus 1972 
Source: Compiled by the author from various sources. 
2 Grilli. E. R, op.cit, p:186. 
3Enzo R Grilli, op.cit, pp. 182. 
Jawad.H, op.cit, pp. 31. 
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The negotiations for the new agreements were tough and encountered many difficulties, 
according to Jawad. The disagreement among the member states concerning the 
agricultural side of the GMP was one of the main obstacles to overcome. Consumer 
countries that did not produce agricultural products competitive to Mediterranean 
products, like Britain, favoured agreements which would guarantee cheaper food 
imports. Meanwhile, producer countries, like France and Italy, feared the potential 
competition from non-member Mediterranean countries' products. They considered the 
agreements a real threat to their own agricultural production.104 However, such 
reservations did not reflect the real positions of these two countries towards the 
Mediterranean policy. Indeed, France was the member state that pushed forward the 
plan of the new Mediterranean policy at the Paris Summit, while Italy was also keen on 
moving from the periphery of the EC to be at the centre of a larger integrated 
community. Their concern was to offset any negative impact of the agreements by 
imposing restrictions on agricultural imports. Italy was looking for compensation from 
the EC, which was to come in the form of support to its agricultural sector and 
opportunities for its labour force in northern European countries.105 In this sense, the 
two member states cannot be considered to have been jeopardising the new approach to 
the Mediterranean in the 1970s but were merely concerned to defend their own interests. 
The new Co-operation Agreements followed the same pattern with each southern 
Mediterranean country. They granted the industrial products of the Mediterranean 
countries free access to the EC markets. Refined petroleum and certain textiles were 
excluded, however, to protect the European textile industries. Poor countries, like 
Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco were affected badly by this decision, as textiles represented 
their main industrial exports. With regard to agricultural products, the measures adopted 
in the agreements did not favour non-member countries as tariff concessions were 
confined to a limited range of products and calendar restrictions were imposed to 
protect EC production. Jawad considered that it was basically a policy aimed to provide 
EC markets with non-seasonal agricultural products.106 
Taking into consideration the GATT rules of international trade, Grilli pointed out that 
the EC wanted the trade relations with the southern Mediterranean countries to be based 
Jawad. H, op.cit, p. 31. 
'Ibid. p. 22. 
'Ibid. p. 33. 
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on reciprocity. However, "reverse preferences from the Mediterranean countries to the 
Community could be graduated in time and extent to reflect the differences in levels of 
development of the various countries". He emphasised that the objective of the new 
Mediterranean policy was to extend concessions covering at least 80 per cent of the 
agricultural products exported by each Mediterranean country to the Community, and 
thus "establish the basis for the creation of a free-trade area with these countries".107 
On the financial and technical side, the agreements included financial and technical aid, 
to help with the development of the Mediterranean countries. The seven Arab countries 
concerned were destined to receive an amount of ECU 669 million in the period 1978-
82 under the first protocols. In the allocation of this money, the poorest countries, like 
Morocco, Lebanon and Egypt had priority over the others.108 The subsequent financial 
protocols (1982-86) saw a total increase in funds of 52 per cent.109 In a way, one could 
view this aid as a substitute for the losses of the southern Mediterranean countries 
caused by the agricultural policy of the EC, and as a means of supporting and pushing 
towards industrialisation. 
The agreements included a section on establishing joint institutions, by which a 
cooperation council would manage each agreement. Moreover, the European 
Commission established a permanent representation in each of the signing countries. 
Agreements with the Maghreb countries contained a separate section that regulated the 
status of migrant labour from these countries resident in the EC. 
2.4 Effects of the enlargements of the E C 
The subsequent enlargements of the EC had several side effects on the non-member 
Mediterranean countries, mainly those who depended heavily on the EC markets for 
their exports. The first northern enlargement, for instance, affected Morocco by 
depriving its fruit and vegetable products from free access to the UK markets, which 
became subject to the EC trade rules. These products lost their competitive position, as 
well, to the Mediterranean member states that had the preference for marketing their 
agricultural products (Italy, France).110 The second enlargement, during which Greece 
1 0 7Grilli. E. R, op.cit, p. 187. 
108Jawad. H, op.cit, p. 34. 
,09Ibid. 
1 1 0Grilli.E.R, op.cit, p. 197. 
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joined the EC in 1981, posed a serious threat to the Maghreb countries. Greece was a 
major producer of olive oil, and this meant tough competition for Tunisian and 
Moroccan exports still subjected to entry duties. The third enlargement in 1986, during 
which Spain and Portugal joined the EC, raised deep concern among non-member 
Mediterranean countries as these two new members were producers of the same 
products of most of these countries. The countries mostly affected were again the 
Maghreb countries, Morocco and Tunisia in particular, and Egypt. Spain's membership 
meant an increase in the EC's agricultural production of 25 per cent in vegetables, 48 
per cent in fruits, and 59 per cent of olive oil. Thus the self-sufficiency of the EC would 
reach 100 per cent or more.111 The economies of Morocco and Tunisia were largely 
structured upon their dependence on the EC markets as outlets for their agricultural 
products. All of a sudden, they found themselves in an incompetent position providing 
free and preferential access for their previous competitors, Spain and Portugal. 
The third enlargement of the EC also threatened the manufactured products of non-
member Mediterranean countries. Spain and Portugal produced similar products to 
those produced by the Maghreb countries and Egypt. The premier field of competition 
was the textile and clothing industries as the EC markets were the main consumers of 
these countries' textile exports. About 80 to 90 per cent of total textile exports of 
Morocco and Tunisia in the period 1978-80 were destined for the EC markets.112 Grilli 
considered Portugal a strong competitor in textile-clothing exports with Egypt and 
Tunisia.113 
2.4.1 Attempts to avoid the negative impact of the enlargement 
The negative impact of the enlargement of the EC on the non-member Mediterranean 
countries led the former's institutions to seek a new strategy to avoid the adverse effects 
of the European development on the Mediterranean region. The importance of a closer 
economic co-operation with the non-member Mediterranean countries was expressed by 
the Commission of the European Communities. The Commission pointed out that as a 
leading power in the Mediterranean, the EC had a direct concern in the future 
1 1 1 Jawad. H, op.cit, p. 40. 
u 2Ibid. p. 41. 
1 1 3Grilli.E. R, op.cit. p. 199. 
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development of the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries.114 It emphasised, as 
well, that the EC's interests and security were at stake. In its Guidelines for Economic 
Co-operation, in 1985, the Commission considered that the obstacles preventing the 
development of the non-member Mediterranean countries included: 
Fast population growth with economies unable to absorb a 2-3 per cent a year 
increase in labour force; 
The coverage of an increasingly large proportion of food requirements by imports; 
- Trade deficits; particularly with the Community; 
External debt putting a brake on expansion; 
- The great fragility of the industrial fabric.115 
The Commission suggested three main areas of co-operation that should be given 
priority: 
Support for the Mediterranean countries' food strategies with a view to reducing 
food dependence; 
The development of detailed, long-term co-operation in fields such as industry, 
science and technology, trade, and training- through which Community support 
would be lent to all those engaged in promoting economic growth; 
Support for the Mediterranean countries' efforts to promote regional and multilateral 
co-operation, including co-operation with Africa. 1 1 6 
Another report introduced by the Committee on Development and Co-operation to the 
Council of the European Communities in 1986, emphasised again the importance of 
developing economic co-operation with the non-member Mediterranean countries. The 
report reaffirmed that the objectives of a global Mediterranean policy were 
1 1 "The Community and the Mediterranean countries: Guidelines for economic co-operation 
(communication by the Commission to the Council. Commission of the European Communities. 26-9-
1985). 
115ibid,p: 2. 
u 6The Community and the Mediterranean..., op.cit. p. 4. 
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"to establish and enrich the degree of economic interdependence to benefit both 
North and South of the Mediterranean region; to provide in the medium and long 
term for increased food production leading to self-sufficiency; to protect and 
promote the interests of the rural, economic and social infrastructure in the less-
developed Mediterranean countries".117 
The Committee's report considered the allocation of proper financial resources and their 
management crucial to the outcome of the EC's Mediterranean policy. It also supported 
the development of joint ventures in small and medium sized rural industrial projects. 
The need to ensure mutually acceptable levels of trade, in which the interests of the 
poorest Mediterranean countries regarding their 'so-called' sensitive products should be 
protected, should be given particular attention, the report stated. Moreover, it 
recommended that the EC institutions, IMF and World Bank help to solve debt 
problems of the countries in the region, in a way to help the poor people to produce 
their own needs. At the same time, food strategies should be devised to achieve 
agricultural self-sufficiency; the promotion of private investment in the Mediterranean 
countries, and improvement of social and cultural policies in the EC aiming at the 
harmonious integration of migrant workers and their families into European societies 
was required.118 
Many of these recommendations were repeated in 1989 in an opinion released by the 
Economic and Social Committee, which urged the Community to redress the 
shortcomings of its Mediterranean policy. This was all the more important as the region 
was becoming the focus of US and Japanese trade, investment, economic aid and above 
all, technological "colonisation". Moreover, it pointed out the demographic gap between 
the EC, whose population forecasts anticipated a fall from 320 to 310 million in 2020, 
and the TMCs (Trans-Mediterranean Countries) whose population was expected to rise 
from 200 to 500 million. In such case, this "demographic time-bomb" would affect the 
Community, who in no way would be able to curb the entry of millions of emigrants.119 
1 1 7 Renzo Trivelli (Rapporteur), Report drawn on behalf of the Committee on Development and Co-
operation, on the communication from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council 
concerning the Community and the Mediterranean countries: guidelines for economic co-operation. 
3.7.1986. p. 6. 
l ,8Ibid,pp. 7-9. 
1 1 9 Opinion on the Mediterranean Policy of the European Community. Economic and Social Committee. 
12.7.1989. p. 3. 
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Thus, the Committee urged the EC to make some changes in its Mediterranean policy 
including ruling out the protectionist measures against TMC exports, as "they would 
exacerbate the TMCs' socio-economic problems and lead to a drop in their imports 
from the Community". The Committee suggested that this should be followed by a joint 
development strategy between the EC and non-member Mediterranean countries in 
which competition problems should be tackled, while EC policies (concerning 
agriculture, industry, energy...etc.) must be revised to achieve balanced geographical 
and sectoral distribution of production. Moreover, the Committee considered that the 
disparities between Southern and Northern EC members must be ironed out, in order to 
give the Southern parts of the EC the role of bridge between the most economically 
advanced parts of Europe and the developing economies of the Mediterranean 
120 
countries. 
A Mediterranean policy, according to the Committee, should be based on mutual 
recognition of each country's national and historic identity, and must: 
have a joint perspective which transcends the national interests of the individual 
member states and TMCs; 
- disregard pleas for special treatment from certain TMCs which claim to have closer 
ties with the Community; 
- abandon the current bilateral EC-TMCs relations, as these aggravate the imbalances 
between Mediterranean nations; 
- co-ordinate member states' national TMC co-operation policies within a joint 
framework, providing Community support (people and resources) for national and 
regional initiatives, and furthering the transfer of powers in the matter to the 
Community, which should become the main actor121. 
The importance of the development and diversification of agricultural products for 
alleviating dependence on food industries was re-emphasised by the Committee as a 
goal of the Mediterranean policy. Added to this, was the need for diversification in 
agricultural exports; economic complementarity between the Community and the TMCs 
Opinion on the Mediterranean Policy of the European Community (12-7-1989). op.cit, pp. 4-6. 
1 2 1 Ibid. p. 7. 
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through co-operation in industrial, services, research and development, training and 
other sectors; and regional and multilateral co-operation.122 The latter was given 
significant attention by the Committee as it considered the regional economic 
integration of the TMCs "crucial to the integrated development of the Mediterranean 
basin as a whole". Special reference was made to the Arab Maghreb Union between 
Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia, and the Arab Co-operation Council 
between Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and North Yemen. These integration attempts were 
welcomed by the Committee which recommended that the Community support such 
• . . . 121 
initiatives. 
To sum up, there was a clear disparity between the EC's Mediterranean actual policies 
and the recommendations introduced by various committees concerned. A global 
Mediterranean policy was favoured by all the committees instead of very limited 
bilateral ties. Moreover, great attention should be given to the development aid, mainly 
to improve non-member Mediterranean countries' industrial abilities, and to achieve 
self-sufficiency in food needs. Through these recommendations, one could draw a map 
of the region in which the Southern parts of the EC would no more be the periphery of 
the Community but rather the pivot of interaction between Northern Europe and the 
Mediterranean basin, a role which would be favoured by southern EC countries as long 
as their interests were protected. However, most of these recommendations did not seem 
to have been adopted by the EC and the Mediterranean policy did not witness crucial 
changes in the 1980s. Apart from the renewal of bilateral agreements, including 
financial protocols, with most of the Mediterranean countries, nothing else happened. 
2.5 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was initialised by the announcement of a New 
Mediterranean Policy (NMP) in December 1990. After the Cannes summit of June 
1995, the initiative developed into a joint conference including the EU members and the 
12 non-member Mediterranean countries, which took place in November 1995 in 
Barcelona.124 The 'Barcelona Declaration', which was adopted unanimously, laid the 
1 2 2 Opinion on the Mediterranean Policy of the European Community (12-7-1989). op.cit, p. 8. 
1 2 3 Ibid. 
1 2 4 Libya was not included while the Palestinian Authority was represented. 
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framework for the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and co-operation. Kamal Shehadi 
noted that this framework had three pillars: political and security issues, social and 
cultural exchange, and economic development.126 The economic side of the declaration 
followed the guidelines prepared by the EU Commission in October 1994 and was 
endorsed by the European Council in December 1994. These guidelines envisaged the 
creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area comprising 600-800 million people 
and 30-40 countries over the next 10-15 years. It would also be characterised by 
expanded free trade and foreign investment, substantially increased EU official financial 
flows and enhanced regional integration among these countries.127 The outcome of the 
conference was to establish an economic and financial partnership in the Mediterranean 
region. This was based on: the progressive establishment of a free trade area; the 
implementation of appropriate economic co-operation and concerted action in the 
related areas; and a substantial increase in the EU's financial assistance to its 
128 
partners. 
2.5.1 Free-trade area 
The participants in the conference agreed on the establishment of a free-trade area 
between the EU and its Mediterranean partners. The year 2010 was set as the target date 
for the full establishment of this area. With due observance of the WTO obligations, 
most trade was to be covered in the new area. Tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in 
manufactured products were to be eliminated progressively according to timetables to 
be negotiated between partners. Trade in agricultural products was to be liberalised 
progressively through reciprocal preferential access among the parties but with respect 
to the GATT negotiations. Trade in services including the right of establishment was to 
be liberalised gradually with due regard to the GATT agreement.129 
1 Shehadi. K, The Lebanese-European Partnership Agreement as a Pathway to Economic Integration, in 
Shahin. W & Shehadi. K (Ed) Pathways To Integration: Lebanon and the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership. (Beirut, The Lebanese Centre for Policy Studies: 1997) p. 2. 
1 2 6 Ibid. 
1 2 7 Riordan. E (and others), The World Economy & Implications for the MENA Region. 1995-2010. 
Working Paper Series. (Cairo: Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, Iran & Turkey, 1995). 
Working Paper 9519. p. 67. 
1 2 8 Commission of the European Communities, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Report on the Barcelona 
Conference 27-28 November 1995. p. 4. 
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2.5.2 Economic co-operation and concerted action 
A wide area for economic co-operation was agreed by the participants. As far as private 
businesses were concerned, they stressed the importance of creating an environment 
conducive to investment. This was the result of the participants acknowledgement that 
economic development must be supported by internal savings, "the basis of 
investment", and by foreign direct investment. Moreover, enterprises were to be 
encouraged to enter into agreements with each other. Such co-operation was to be 
promoted by providing a favourable environment and regulatory framework. 
Other areas of co-operation included the development of infrastructure, with particular 
reference to the need for efficient transport systems, modernised telecommunications, 
and information technologies. 
2.5.3 Financial co-operation 
The participants acknowledged the need for a substantial increase in financial assistance 
in order to guarantee success for the creation of the free-trade area and the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. In this sense, they welcomed the European Council's 
decision at Cannes to set aside ECU 4,685 million, in the form of available Community 
budget funds for the period 1995-99, for financial assistance. Increased EIB loans as 
well as bilateral financial contributions from member states were to supplement this 
financial assistance. Moreover, they agreed on the necessity for effective financial co-
operation to be managed within the framework of a multi-annual programme, taking 
into account the special characteristics of each partner. They reaffirmed on the 
fundamental importance of sound macro-economic management to ensure the success 
of the partnership.130 
2.5.4 MEDA Programme 
The MEDA Programme is the main financial instrument of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership, and was instituted at the Barcelona Conference. It has formed the main part 
of the EU five-year financial assistance package of ECU 4,685 million decided on at the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Report on the Barcelona Conference, op.cit, p. 4 
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Cannes Summit in June 1995.131 The MEDA Programme replaced the twenty-year old 
Financial Protocols that had previously provided the framework for financial co-
operation between the EU and Mediterranean countries. A new Framework Financing 
Convention was concluded with partners eligible to MEDA. The main feature of the 
new Convention included: 
- The establishment of a national co-ordinator for the beneficiary partner in order to 
oversee overall programming and implementation. 
- A wide field of potential beneficiaries, including private operators and members of 
civil society. 
- The granting of "the most favoured donor" fiscal treatment and the exemption of 
MEDA financing from taxes and duties.132 
The funds of the MEDA Programme were to be divided between bilateral and regional 
co-operation. Approximately 90 per cent of them were to be allocated to bilateral co-
operation. However, the two are seen as "complementary to enable the political and 
economic impact of the MEDA programme to be sustained and the objectives jointly 
adopted in the Barcelona Declaration more effectively reached".133 
2.5.5 The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements 
The signing of Association Agreements between the EU and Mediterranean-
neighbouring countries had started before the Barcelona conference. Tunisia and Israel 
had already signed Association Agreements, while Morocco had initialled one. 
Agreements with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Authority were being 
negotiated or discussed. Cyprus and Malta were already linked to the EU through 
Association Agreements signed in 1973 and 1971, respectively. Meanwhile, Turkey was 
preparing to enter a custom union with the EU. 1 3 4 These agreements had followed the 
blueprints of the Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area that was proposed by the 
Commission in 1994, and upon which the Barcelona Declaration was based. 
1 3 1 Commission of European Communities, Implementing MEDA 1996-1997 Report. COM (1998) 524 
final. 14.09.98. p. 3. 
1 3 2 Ibid. p. 4. 
1 3 3 Ibid. p. 7. 
1 3 4 The Barcelona Conference and the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements, op.cit, p. 3. 
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The European Commission saw the Association Agreements as the legal instruments for 
establishing "deeper and wider relations with the Mediterranean partners".135 Their 
provisions built upon the old Co-operation Agreements of the 1970s. These Association 
Agreements provided for "the institutionalisation of political dialogue, the 
establishment of a free trade area, economic co-operation, social and cultural and 
financial co-operation, notably through the MEDA programme".136 
Table 2.2 Association Agreements signed between the EU and Mediterranean 
countries 
Conclusion of 
Negotiations 
Signature of 
Agreement 
Entry into Force 
Morocco November 1995 February 1996 March 2000 
Algeria Negotiations in progress 
Tunisia June 1995 July 1995 March 1998 
Egypt June 1999 
Israel September 1995 November 1995 
P.A. December 1996 February 1997 July 1997 
Jordan April 1997 November 1997 
Syria Negotiations in progress 
Lebanon Negotiations in progress 
Source: Commission of the European Communities, "Annual Report of the MEDA Programme 1998. P: 
7. & http://www.euromed.nety 
The subsequent agreements between the E U and southern Mediterranean countries show 
the importance of this region to the EU. It can be argued that the EU had signed most of 
the earlier agreements only due to the pressure exerted by the second-party countries. 
Nonetheless, the EU would have not bowed to any pressure if the interests of the E U -
members were not secured. The agreements concerned contribute to the impression of 
the relation between the EU and southern Mediterranean countries as being a love-
1 3 5 Commission of the European Communities, Annual Report of the MEDA Programme 1998. COM 
(1999) 291 final, p. 7. 
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hatred relation. The EU is keen to expand the markets for its exports in the region of the 
Mediterranean, and the economic development of the countries concerned would serve 
such aim. Nonetheless, the EU fears the consequences of economic failure in the region. 
Many member states endure problems resulting from the influx of immigrants from 
southern Mediterranean countries (North Africa in particular). These problems are 
either related to economic (unemployment) or cultural problems (difficult assimilation 
or integration of migrant communities). Although some EU member states are in need 
for migrant labour, the European are becoming choosy and are confining their requests 
to qualified labour for specific industries. Economic development in the countries of the 
Mediterranean would serve such aim, as well. In this sense, the cases of southern 
Mediterranean countries are almost identical. The differences lay in the level of their 
dependence on the EU as a destination for their exports, or their migrant labour. 
Lebanon, thus, can be seen as different from Tunisia or Morocco. The accession of 
Spain and Portugal into the EC did not affect Lebanon's exports to the Common Market 
as much as it affected North African countries. The latter were dependent on Europe for 
their agricultural and manufactured exports. Moreover, the issue of migrant labour in 
Europe was never as thorny with Lebanon as it is with North African countries. In the 
following section, the economic relations between the EU and Lebanon are investigated, 
to assess their development, and the implications for European business interests in the 
country. 
2.6 Economic relations between the EU and Lebanon 
The establishment of the EC meant that relations between member states and other 
countries, like Lebanon, had a new regulatory body whose rules would affect the 
bilateral relations that were occurring before. The previous chapter has shown how 
France dominated the relations between Lebanon and Europe in the second half of 19th 
century and the first half of 20th century. European trade and investments flowing into 
Lebanon originated in France mainly. In this part, I examine the trade flow between the 
EU and Lebanon and the flow of capital (aid and investment) from the EU to Lebanon. I 
will also assess the impact of the agreements that over the time have come into being on 
the economic relations between the two parties. Inevitably, given the predominant role 
of trade in the relationship, much of the remainder of the chapter will be devoted to this 
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subject. It is important to discuss this fully to contextualise and provide proper 
consideration of the nature, and limits, of the relationship. 
2.6.1 Trade (figures and agreements) 
As a Mediterranean Arab country, Lebanon has always played the role of a gateway for 
EU trade with the inland Arab countries. This role is a continuation of the historical role 
played by Lebanon over previous centuries. However, Lebanon was not only an 
entrepot for transit trade between the EC (or other industrialised countries) and the Arab 
countries. It was also an important market, which became a significant destination for 
the EC exports. Indeed, the EC has always provided the highest proportion of 
Lebanon's imports. This was always accompanied by a huge deficit in the balance of 
trade between the EC and Lebanon given the fact that Lebanon's exports to the EC 
countries were insignificant. 
Table 2.3 Lebanon's imports by country of origin between 1960-65 (LL 000) 
Year EC 1 EFT A 1 Arab Japan US East. Bloc 
1960 338,215 318,801 149,973 15,936 125,849 53,664 
1964 429,443 450,892 206,904 209,088 114,963 
1965 579,920 244,915 232,464 39,963 181,069 130,570 
Source: Recueilde Statistiques Libanaises. Annie 1965. Vol. 2 
Looking at the figures of Lebanon's foreign trade since 1960, two years after the 
establishment of the EC, we find that EC exports to Lebanon amounted to L L 338.215 
million (US$ 107.030 million).137 The bulk of these exports came from West Germany, 
L L 103.444 million, followed by France, L L 92.018 million, and Italy, L L 70.434 
million. These figures kept increasing until in 1964 when the total exports of the EC to 
Lebanon reached L L 429.443 million. West Germany and France stayed on top of the 
list with L L 125.620 million and L L 124.039 million respectively. Italy came slightly 
behind with L L 103.716 million. EC exports increased remarkably in 1965 (LL 579.920 
million), this time thanks to the French whom doubled their exports to Lebanon (LL 
The exchange rate of US Dollar against the Lebanese Pound was L L 3.16. 
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251.657 million).1 3 8 The EC exports were matched only by the EFTA exports at this 
time. EFTA exports exceeded the EC's exports in 1964 (LL 450.892 million). Among 
EFTA countries, Britain was the principal exporter to Lebanon. Its share in 1960 
totalled LL 256.805 million. It jumped to LL 363.512 million in 1964, but decreased to 
LL 244.915 million in 1965.139 
Lebanon's imports from other major industrialised countries did not match the size of 
imports from the EC. Japan lagged far behind in 1960 with LL 15.936 million total 
amount of exports to Lebanon. This amount increased gradually over the years but did 
not exceed LL 39.963 million in 1965. US exports to Lebanon fluctuated from one year 
to another starting with LL 125.849 million in 1960, rising up to LL 264.714 million in 
1962, and then decreasing to LL 209.088 million in 1964, to drop in 1965 to LL 
181.069 million. 1 4 0 Eastern Bloc exports to Lebanon did not represent any competition 
to the EC's either. The total amount of imports from the Eastern Bloc in 1960 was LL 
53.644 million. This amount rose to LL 114.963 million in 1964 and to LL 130.570 
million in 1965.141 
The proximity of the Arab countries to Lebanon did not lead to any competition with 
the EC exports as these were heavily dependent themselves, as was Lebanon, on the 
industrialised countries. Arab countries' exports to Lebanon amounted to LL 149.973 
million in 1960 and increased gradually to LL 232.464 million in 1965. Syria was the 
main supplier with a total of LL 45.215 million of exports in 1960. This amount 
increased gradually to LL 102.241 million in 1965. Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and 
Jordan came after.142 Nonetheless, there was considerable diversity between Lebanon's 
imports from the EC and industrialised countries on the one hand, and the Arab 
countries on the other. Lebanon's major imports from the EC consisted of industrial and 
processed industrial supplies, capital equipment and consumer goods. On the other 
hand, Lebanon's imports from the Arab countries consisted mainly of petroleum 
products from the Gulf countries (Iraq and Saudi Arabia), and agricultural products 
from the neighbouring countries. 
13S: Recueil de Statistiques Libanaises (1965). Published by the Ministry of general planning, Department 
of Central Statistics. Beirut- Lebanon, p. 319. 
139Ibid. 
140Ibid. pp.317-319. 
141Ibid.pp. 320-321. 
142Ibid. 
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Meanwhile, the EC proved to be a minor destination for Lebanon's exports. These 
amounted to only LL 10.363 million in 1965, that is just 3 per cent of the value of EC 
exports to Lebanon in the same year. The EC imports from Lebanon were only 
marginally higher than the Eastern Bloc's imports and those of the EFTA countries'. 
Exports to the Arab world were seven-fold the size of exports entering the EC markets 
(LL 75.761 million). Although exports to the EC increased dramatically in the 
following two years, they were still far from closing the widening gap with exports to 
the Arab world. In 1965, exports to the EC reached LL 28.907 million - almost three-
fold the record of 1960. However, Lebanon's exports to Arab countries reached LL 
200.280 million. 
Table 2.4 Lebanon's exports by country of destination between 1960-65 (LL000) 
Year EC EFTA East Bloc Arab 
1960 10,363 8,829 10,263 75,761 
1964 22,053 15,092 18,474 126,986 
1965 28,907 24,121 18,230 200,280 
Source: Recueil de Statistiques Libanaises. Annee 1965. Vol. 2 
2.6.2 First non-preferential trade agreement 
Until 1965 trade between Lebanon and the EC member states was not regulated by any 
trade agreements. In 1962, the Lebanese government approached the EC to explore 
possibility of obtaining tariff concessions. At first, the request did not find favourable 
ground within the EC and, thus, bore no fruits.1 4 3 However, it resulted three years later 
in the signing of a non-preferential trade agreement on 21 May 1965. This agreement 
was not confined to trade, but included also technical co-operation. As far as trade was 
concerned, the parties agreed on reducing non-tariff barriers. Meanwhile, technical 
assistance in the form of training and equipment was to be co-ordinated. The agreement 
came into force on 1 July 1968.144 
143 Jawad. H, op.cit, p. 17. 
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Table 2.5 Lebanon's exports by countries of destination, 1968-70 (HMO) 
Year E C Arab JSrt A 
1968 14,498 334,063 31,006 
1969 36,925 35,438 
1970 43,423 410,373 28,452 
Source: Recueil de Statistiques Libanaises. Annee 1973.No. 9 
By analysing the figures of trade between Lebanon and the EC after the non-preferential 
agreement was concluded, no significant increase in Lebanon's exports to the EC 
countries can be observed. The total amount increased by 7 per cent only in 1969. The 
increase reached 17.5 per cent in 1970. However, the total amount was still just LL 
43.423 million. The principal destination for Lebanon's exports in the EC countries was 
Italy. In 1968 it received LL 10.983 million of total imports from Lebanon (31 per cent 
of total EC imports from Lebanon). This amount increased to LL 13.405 million in 
1969 (36 per cent) and decreased to LL 13 million (29.9 per cent) in 1970. France 
followed suit in 1968 with LL 10.357 million (30 per cent), and LL 10.770 million (29.2 
per cent) in 1969, while jumped to LL 12.673 million (29 per cent) in 1970. West 
Germany came third with LL 7.854 million in 1968 (22.8 per cent), and LL 7.578 
million in 1969 (20 per cent), while its share increased to LL 9.413 million (21.7 per 
cent) in 1970.145 These figures, despite the non-preferential agreement, did not exceed 
significantly the EFTA imports from Lebanon, which amounted to LL 31.006 million in 
1968, and LL 35.438 million in 1969, to drop to LL 28.452 million in 1970. Britain 
imports from Lebanon amounted to LL 18.699 million in 1968 (60 per cent of EFTA 
imports), LL 20.135 million in 1969 (56.8 per cent) and LL 14.533 million in 1970 
(51.1 per cent). Nonetheless, a comparison between the EC and Arab countries imports 
from Lebanon would clearly show the striking difference in value. Lebanon's exports to 
the Arab countries amounted to LL 344.063 million in 1968, and they jumped to LL 
410.373 million in 1970. In both years, the EC countries' imports from Lebanon were 
equivalent to only 10 per cent of Arab countries' imports. Syria, on its own, imported 
from Lebanon more than the EC countries collectively did (LL 43.432 million). Given 
the small size of Syria as a market compared to the EC, the poor results of the non-
preferential agreement are evident. 
Jawad. H, op.cit, p. 18. 
145 Recueil de Statistiques Libanaises (1970) op.cit, p. 304. 
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On the other hand, the EC exports to Lebanon increased after the agreement of 1965 
came into force in 1968. It is worth mentioning that the EC exports had dropped in 1967 
to LL 481.009 million, but in 1968 the figures leaped to LL 541.547 million. In 1969, it 
increased to LL 574.032 million, and in 1970 to LL 645.475 million. France and West 
Germany, followed by Italy, were the main exporters, as in the previous period. In 1970, 
France's share in the EC exports to Lebanon was 32.7 per cent (LL 211.030 million). 
West Germany's amounted to 30.6 per cent (LL 197.630 million), and Italy's share 
reached 23.2 per cent (LL 149.663 million). Britain kept its position as a major non-EC 
exporter to Lebanon, though its exports dropped from LL 364.250 million in 1967 to LL 
272.300 million in 1968. In 1970, Britain's exports amounted to LL 258.168 million. 
Remarkably, Switzerland had the highest share of Lebanon's imports in 1970 
amounting to LL 273.223 million. 
2.6.3 Preferential trade agreement 
Not surprisingly the non-preferential agreement of 1965 did not satisfy the Lebanese 
government, not least since no substantial progress had been achieved in the field of 
technical assistance. Thus another agreement was concluded in 1972. This new 
agreement was a preferential one, and was mainly concerned with trade, and for a 
period of five years only. The EC granted tariff reductions up to 30-40 per cent to 
Lebanese exports to the EC, and an immediate tariff reduction of 45 per cent for 
industrial products (except textiles and petroleum products). Certain agricultural 
products such as citrus fruits, onions, garlic, bananas, mangoes, and avocados were 
given concessions as well. Lebanon, in return, granted the EC exports customs 
concessions ranging from 6 to 30 per cent. These were to be enforced according to an 
agreed timetable.146 
Total EC France US Eastern 
Bloc 
Arab 
countries 
1972 96,259 52,750 44,962 71,636 57,154 679,289 
1973 377,223 
(222,223 
exc. New 
members) 
161,912 148,228 
(now 
member 
of EC 
72,069 72,654 787,141 
Source: Recueil de Statistiques Libanaises Annee 1973.No. 9 
6Jawad. H, op.ciL p. 19. 
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The pattern of trade between the EC and Lebanon changed enormously between 1971 
and 1973 (time of signing the agreement). The accession to EC of new member states 
(Denmark, Ireland, and mainly, Britain) increased the volume of exchanges 
significantly. However, the EC-6 had increased their imports and exports to Lebanon, as 
well. The total Lebanese exports to the EC increased from LL 53.177 million in 1971 to 
LL 96.259 million in 1972, and leaped to LL 377.223 million in 1973. If we deduct 
from this the new member states' share (LL 154.605 million) we find that the EC-6 had 
increased their imports by nearly 131 per cent (LL 222.618 million). France, who 
increased its imports by 206.9 per cent (from LL 52.750 million in 1972 to LL 161.912 
million in 1973) played a major role in this increase. Britain, as well, increased its 
imports from Lebanon by 229.8 per cent (from LL 44.962 million to LL 148.228 
million). At that time, the EC became the main destination of the Lebanese exports in 
the Western world, leaving the US far behind with not more than 19 per cent of the 
value of the EC's imports (LL 72.069 million in 1973). The Eastern Bloc represented no 
competition to the EC, as its imports from Lebanon were equivalent to 19 per cent of 
EC imports (LL 72.654 million in 1973). 
However, the major destination of Lebanon's exports remained the Arab countries. 
Those countries imported a total of LL 787.141 million in 1973. In comparison, the total 
EC's imports were equivalent to less than 42.8 per cent of value of Arab imports. Saudi 
Arabia, Libya and Kuwait were the three main Arab recipients. Indeed, these three 
countries imported, collectively, more than the whole EC did. On the other side, the EC 
enforced its position as the main exporter to Lebanon after concluding the preferential 
agreement. EC exports rose from LL 990.041 million in 1972 to LL 1,484.284 million 
in 1973. These figures include the exports of the new entrants (Britain, Denmark and 
Ireland) which amounted to LL 285.961 million. The main exporters were West 
Germany (LL 380.839 million); France (LL 361.915 million); Italy (LL 293.724 
million) and the UK (LL 261.409 million). The US share in Lebanon's imports (LL 
377.542 million in 1973) was very poor compared to the EEC's. The same was true for 
the Eastern Bloc and Arab countries' shares, which amounted LL 277.386 million and 
LL 346.071 million respectively. 
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Table 2.7 Lebanon's imports by origin, 1972-73 (LL 000) 
Year Total EC West 
Germany 
France US Eastern 
Bloc 
Arab 
countries 
1972 990,041 316,107 300,434 322,355 220,396 306,603 
1973 1,484,284 
(1,198,323 
exc. New 
members 
380,839 361,915 377,542 277,386 346,071 
Source: Recueil de Statistiques Libanaises Annee 1973. No. 9 
The EC exports to Lebanon in 1973 included various products such as: transport 
equipment; electric and non-electric machinery; crude and manufactured fertilisers; 
iron, steel and manufactures of metals; natural and manufactured gas (Italy); plastic 
materials; chemicals; medicinal and pharmaceutical products; meat products; and 
textiles and clothing.147 On the other hand, Arab countries' exports to Lebanon were 
consisting mainly of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq and Saudi Arabia, in 
addition to miscellaneous agricultural and manufactured products from the 
neighbouring countries.148 
2.6.4 First co-operation agreement within the GMP (1977) 
Due to its dissatisfaction with the agreements signed with the EC up to 1972, the 
Lebanese government approached the EC asking to negotiate a new agreement. 
Negotiations between the EC and the Lebanese government started in 1975, at the same 
time as other Mashreq countries. These negotiations culminated with the signing of a 
co-operation agreement of unlimited duration in 1977, based on Article 238 of the 
Treaty of Rome. The purpose of this co-operation agreement, as stated in Article 4, was 
mainly to promote: 
- Participation by the Community in the efforts made by Lebanon to develop its 
production and economic infrastructure in order to diversify its economic structure. 
Such participation should be connected, in particular, with the industrialisation of 
Lebanon and the modernisation of its agriculture; 
1 4 7 Annual Bulletin for Arab countries foreign trade statistics, (according to SfTC. R Divisions) 1970 
&1973. Council of Arab Economic Unity, General Secretariat, Arab Central Statistical Bureau. Cairo. 
October 1976. pp. 138-253. 
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The marketing and promotion of sales of products exported by Lebanon; 
- Industrial co-operation aimed at boosting Lebanon's industrial production through 
the following measures: 
a- encouraging the participation by the Community in the implementation of 
Lebanon's industrial development programmes, 
b- fostering the organisation of contacts and meetings between Lebanese 
and Community industrial policy-makers, promoters and firms in order to 
promote the establishment of new relations in the industrial field in 
conformity with the objectives of the Agreement, 
c- facilitating the acquisition on favourable terms of patents and other 
industrial property by means of financing in conformity with Protocol 1 
and/or by other appropriate arrangements with undertakings and 
institutions in the Community, 
d- permitting the removal of non-tariff and non-quota barriers likely to 
impede access to either market; 
- Co-operation in the fields of science, technology and the protection of environment; 
- Participation by Community operators in programmes for the exploration, 
production and processing of Lebanon's resources and any activities which would 
develop these resources on the spot, and the proper performance of co-operation and 
investment contracts concluded for this purpose between their operators; 
- Co-operation in the fisheries sector; 
- The encouragement of private investments which are in the mutual interest of both 
parties; 
- Exchange of information on the economic and financial situation, and on 
developments therein, as required for the proper functioning of the Agreement. 
Concerning trade, the Agreement aimed at ensuring a better balance between Lebanon 
and the Community by increasing the growth of Lebanon's trade and improving the 
conditions of access for its products to the Community markets. Thus, quantitative 
restrictions on imports of industrial products originating in Lebanon were to be 
abolished by the time this agreement came into force. These products excluded those 
listed in Annex I I of the Treaty of Rome. The Community reserved the right to 
introduce ceilings on imports of other products. Nevertheless, the Agreement stated that 
1 4 8 Annual Bulletin for Arab countries foreign trade statistics. 1976. pp. 138-253 
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the ceilings provided for in Article 13 should be abolished not later than 31 December 
1979.149 With respect to agricultural products, custom duties on the imports originating 
in Lebanon were to be reduced by different rates. Reductions on citrus fruits ranged 
from 40 to 80 per cent; grapes, 60 per cent, and other products ranged from 40 to 80 per 
cent. However, the imports of some of the agricultural products were limited to specific 
periods of the year. For example, the imports of table grapes were allowed into the 
Community markets only from 1st of November to 14th of July. Taking into 
consideration that grapes are normally a summer crop, this meant that imports were 
allowed only in the off-season. The same applied to watermelons, from 1st April to 15th 
June. These were protectionist measures to avoid competition with the Community's 
agricultural products. 
The Agreement included, in addition, a protocol on technical and financial co-operation. 
According to the protocol, the Community would participate, within the framework of 
financial and technical co-operation, in the financing of measures that would contribute 
to Lebanon's economic and social development. To this purpose, 30 million European 
units of account (eua) were allocated to Lebanon, within a period to expire on 31st 
December 1981. This amount was to be given in three forms: 20 million eua in the form 
of loans from the EIB (European Investment Bank) granted from its own resources on 
the terms set out in its statute; 2 million eua in the form of loans on special terms; and 8 
million eua in the form of grants. This aid was to be used in the financing or part-
financing of capital projects in the fields of production and economic infrastructure, 
aimed in particular at diversifying Lebanon's economic structure and, especially, at 
promoting its industrialisation and modernising its agriculture. It was also earmarked to 
finance technical co-operation as a preliminary or complement to capital projects drawn 
up by Lebanon and technical co-operation in the field of training.150 
2.6.5 Implications for trade 
In the period 1978-79 the EC imports from Lebanon increased from around US$ 41.5 
million (5.1 per cent of Lebanon's total exports) to around US$ 60.1 million (6.8 per 
149Text of the Co-operation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Lebanese 
Republic. 1977. Articles 11, 13. 
150Text of the Protocol 1, Co-operation Agreement, 1977. op. cit 
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cent of Lebanon's total exports). In 1980 it rose to around US$ 71.3 million (LL 
244.4 million). 1 5 2 The amount of Lebanon's exports to the EC deteriorated in the 
following years (US$39.1 million in 1983) to end up with US$ 60.41 million in 1985 
(including Greece). In 1987, the figures went up again reaching US$ 91.44 million 
(including Spain & Portugal).153 However, this fluctuation can be attributed to the status 
of turbulence Lebanon went through in those years. 
Table 2.8 Lebanon's trade with the E C after the Co-operation Agreement: 
Imports Exports 
1978 846.5 41.5 
1979 1,237.3 60.1 
1980 71.3 
1983 39.1 (inc. Greece) 
1985 60.41 
1987 1,623.38 (inc. 
Spain, Portugal) 
91.44 
Source: Compiled by the author from varioust sources cited in the above paragraph. 
On the other hand, the EC exports to Lebanon kept increasing after the new co-
operation Agreement came into force. They increased from US$ 846.5 million in 1978 
(37.7 per cent of total Lebanon's imports) to US$ 1237.3 million (38.7 per cent of 
total)154, and it reached to US$ 1,623.38 million in 1987 (including Spain & 
Portugal).155 Thus, one of the main objectives of the co-operation Agreement, which 
was to ensure a better trade balance between Lebanon and the EC, was not reached. On 
the contrary, the gap widened between the imports and exports between the two parties 
concerned. Compared to other destinations, the EC's share of Lebanon's exports stayed 
very low. In 1979, it amounted to only 6.8 per cent of total Lebanon's exports, while 
Arab countries' share amounted to 73.1 per cent, and the Eastern Bloc share reached 
11.1 per cent. The US share dropped to 1.6 per cent in the mean time. Even when the 
Arab countries imports from Lebanon started dropping its share stayed high (88.9 per 
cent).156 In 1985, when the amount of the Arab countries imports dropped to US$ 
1 5 1 Statistical indicators of the Arab world for the period 1970-79. (Economic Commission for Western 
Asia (ESCWA) and the League of Arab States: 1981). p.135. 
'"Statistical abstract of the region of the Economic and Social Commission of Western Asia. 1978-1987. 
Twelfth issue. Baghdad. December 1989. p. 263. 
153Arab Monetary Fund, Foreign Trade of Arab Countries. 1980-1990. No.8,1991. p. 175. 
l54Statistical indicators of the Arab world, op.cit, p. 130. 
155Arab Monetary Fund, op.cit, p. 178. 
1 5 6 Statistical abstract of the region, op.cit, p. 263. 
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253.19 million, the EC imports did not count more than 24.2 per cent of this number.157 
On the other hand, the EC's share of Lebanon's imports kept increasing. In 1979 it 
amounted 38.7 per cent of Lebanon's total imports.1 5 8 While in 1983 it leaped to 48.4 
per cent. Despite the drop in the figures of exports to Lebanon in 1987 (US$ 783.02 
million) the share stayed at 42.6 per cent of Lebanon's total imports.1 5 9 Arab countries 
share, on the other side, was 15.7 percent in 1979.1 6 0 It increased to 14 per cent in 1981, 
and then dropped to 8.5 per cent in 1985.161 
The pattern of trade between Lebanon and the EU instigates many interpretations 
concerning the reasons behind its 'one-way' flow. We have seen that the Lebanese 
market has been historically dependent on imports, particularly from Europe. The size 
of Lebanon's exports was always minimal compared to its imports. Only at the time of 
the silk industry prosperity in the 19 th century did Mount Lebanon's exports increase 
significantly. Otherwise, Lebanon imports from European countries, particularly after 
independence, were steadily increasing. The signing of trade agreements between 
Lebanon and the EC did not reverse the trend of trade. On the contrary, the gap between 
Lebanon's imports from the EC and its exports was still widening. This shows that 
Lebanon has always had a highly consuming market that always preferred European 
brands and products. Nonetheless, it gives the impression that Lebanon's industry was 
never competitive enough to enter the European markets. The agreements between the 
EC and Lebanon, particularly the 1977 Co-operation Agreement, gave some of 
Lebanon's industrial exports access to the Common Market, yet the size of exports did 
not change radically. In this sense, the European side cannot take the blame for the 
failure of Lebanon's exports. However, it can be suggested that the EC did not 
contribute significantly to reduce the imbalance in trade with Lebanon. The agreements 
with Lebanon never attempted to loosen the tight grip on the agricultural imports from 
Lebanon. The Common Agricultural Policy of the EC was always an obstacle in the 
way of agricultural imports. Moreover, although industrial imports from Lebanon were 
allowed into the Common Market, there was a list of products exempted from the 
permission (Annex I of the Treaty of Rome). The technical assistance envisaged in the 
agreements did not leave its prints on the size of Lebanon's industrial exports. This can 
1 5 7 Statistical abstract of the region, op.cit, p. 175. 
1 5 8 Statistical indicators of the Arab world for the period 1970-79. op.cit, p. 130. 
1 5 9 Arab Monetary Fund, op.cit. 
160Statistical indicators of the Arab World for the period 1970-79. op.cit. 
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be attributed to the political instability which hit the country during the mid-seventies 
and continued until the late eighties, which destroyed any attempt for industrial 
development in the country. It can also be suggested that the EC had shown no genuine 
commitment to assisting private European FDI in Lebanon that might have helped 
balance the Lebanese trade deficit. 
2.7 EU capital flow into Lebanon 
The main funding institution in the EC (now EU) is the EIB (European Investment 
Bank), which was created by the Treaty of Rome in 1958. Other funding is also 
provided from the EEC budgetary funds. The EIB grants and guarantees long-term 
loans to enterprises, public authorities and financial institutions to finance projects 
contributing to regional development, projects for converting undertakings or creating 
fresh activities and projects of common interest to several member states or the 
Community as a whole. Moreover, the EIB, according to the Treaty, can finance 
operations in non-member states. Thus, the Bank funding has been gradually extended 
to various overseas countries under several agreements, conventions and decisions. The 
countries that benefited from EIB funding were: Greece; seventeen Associated African 
States, Madagascar, and Mauritius (AASMM); certain Overseas Countries and 
Territories (OCT); Turkey; and subsequently some thirty other states in Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific, which are joint signatories with the AASMM of Lome' 
Convention, as well as Portugal and Yugoslavia.162 
Arab countries (Mediterranean and non-Mediterranean countries) did not appear as 
recipients on the lists of the EIB loans until 1978. This was after the ratification of the 
Agreements between the EEC and Maghreb and Mashreq Mediterranean countries. 
Lebanon was the first and only Arab country to receive loans from the EIB in 1978 
(apart from Sudan and Mauritania who were included in the African States and the 
Lome Convention schedules). The first loan consisted of 3 million eua and was 
authorised in November 1977. It was part of the 20 million eua loan stipulated in the 
Financial Protocol of the Co-operation Agreement signed in 1977. The agreement 
stipulated 30 million eua to be given to Lebanon for the period up to 31 October 1978. 
This first loan was to part-finance the installation of three additional 70 MW generating 
1 6 1 Arab Monetary Fund, op.cit. p. 178. 
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sets at Jieh thermal power station near Beirut. In the mean time, the European 
Commission decided to set up an office in Beirut to house a permanent delegation to co-
ordinate the implementation of the financial protocol. 1 6 4 
When the Lebanese government requested a better deal in 1981, it had already used up 
its entire EIB quota under the 1977-81 financial protocol and 18 per cent of its EC 
budgetary fund quota. Lebanon was looking for an increase in the amount of loans and 
grants under the coming financial protocol. The EC Commission supported this 
application by pointing out that under the new financial protocol, financial aid should be 
increased by 43 per cent to cover inflation and exchange rate losses.165 In February 
1981, a Lebanese delegation to Brussels required, among several demands, more long-
term credits from the EIB needed for the industrial reconstruction.166 The renewed 
financial protocol was signed in 17th June 1982 for a duration of four years, and 
allocated to Lebanon an amount of ECU 50 million. Of this, ECU 34 million were in the 
form of loans from the EIB and ECU 16 million from the Community's budgetary 
resources. The latter part was composed of ECU 5 million in loans on special terms and 
ECU 11 million in grants.167 The EC funds were committed to the schemes of the 
Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), which was in charge of allocating 
the funds. Most of these funds were channeled into power projects in Zouk and Jieh.16* 
Compared to other Arab Mediterranean countries, Lebanon got a relatively high 
percentage of loans. With seven loans amounting to over ECU 42 million received in 
1983, it was third only to Egypt (which got five loans amounting to over ECU 59 
million) and Morocco (which received five loans amounting to over ECU 53 million). 
Tunisia and Algeria received five loans amounting to over ECU 36 million and two 
loans of over ECU 21 million respectively. The other Mashreq countries (Jordan and 
Syria) were far behind Lebanon. Jordan received eight loans that amounted to over ECU 
21 million, while Syria received one loan amounting to over ECU 11 million , 1 6 9 
However, consideration should be given here to the situation of Lebanon, and its need 
1 6 2 EIB (European Investment Bank) Annual Report, 1977-78. 
1 6 3 EIB Annual Report 1978. 
! 6 4 E I U (Economist Intellegence Unit) Lebanon & Cyprus Report 1st quarter 1979. p. 10. 
1 6 5 EIU, Lebanon & Cyprus report, 3rd quarter 1981, p. 9. 
1 6 6 EIU, Lebanon & Cyprus report. 2nd quarter, 1981. p. 12. 
1 6 7 Protocols to the EEC-Lebanon Co-operation Agreement and their basic texts. Office for official 
publications of the European Communities. Brussels 1990. p. 179. 
1 6 8 EIU, Lebanon & Cyprus Report. 4th quarter, 1981. p. 9. 
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for aid due to the civil war it was going through, and the consequences of the Israeli 
invasion in 1982. These events necessitated the dissemination of aid to Lebanon. 
The EC has helped, to a certain extent, in the reconstruction plan of Lebanon that started 
after the Israeli invasion (1982) and the establishment of the new government under the 
newly elected president Amin Gemayel. In addition to the ECU 50 million that Lebanon 
was entitled to under the renewed financial protocol, the EC agreed, in 1983, to give 
around US$ 37 million for Beirut's water supply system, and another ECU 50 million 
for special reconstruction aid. 1 7 0 Though the reconstruction process was hindered due to 
the resumption of the civil war, the EEC continued the support, most of which was a 
result of several Lebanese delegates to Brussels asking for help. In 1985, the head of the 
CDR signed an agreement with the EEC to provide US$ 10.5 million in special loans 
and grants to help rebuild 350 schools damaged by the war. This covered nearly half of 
the funding required by the government's US$ 24 million plan to repair 1000 schools 
throughout Lebanon. Furthermore, the EEC agreed to provide hundreds of tons of food 
in emergency food aid. 1 7 1 
The second financial protocol came to an end in 1986. Negotiations for renewing it took 
place, and resulted in the signing of the third financial protocol on 2nd December 1987 
for a duration of four years, expiring on 31 October 1991. It amounted to ECU 73 
million. Of this sum, ECU 53 million were in the form of loans from the EIB, ECU 20 
million in the form of grants from the Community's budgetary resources, and ECU 1 
million in the form of contributions to risk capital formation from the Community's 
budgetary resources.172 In the same year, and in separate decision, the EC granted ECU 
2.7 million as emergency aid to help the victims of the Camps War that took place 
between the Shia Amal Movement and the Palestinians in the refugee camps of Beirut 
and South Lebanon. The EC agreed, as well, to provide various types of food aid. 1 7 3 
Therefore, similar to previous conditions, the EC aid was not confined to the financial 
protocols. In April 1988, the EC announced a grant and loan totalling ECU 2 million to 
build a printing plant for school books, which was to be run by a government agency 
1 6 9 EIB Annual Report 1983. 
1 1 0 EIU, Lebanon&Cyprus. 2nd quarter 1983.p. 11. 
, 7 1 E I U , Lebanon & Cyprus. 3rd quarter, 1985. p. 15. 
'"Protocols to the EEC-Lebanon co-operation agreement and other basic texts. 1990. p. 187. 
m E I U , Lebanon &Cyprus Report 3rd quarter, 1987. p.14. 
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and provide books at only 60 per cent of the book sale prices. On August 31, another 
ECU 8.6 million emergency aid was announced by the EC, of which ECU 5.3 million 
was for food supplies and the balance for tents, medicines, pumps, and generators. 
However, this assistance was to be channeled through non-governmental organisations 
rather than through the Lebanese government.175 
However, it was suggested that due to the ongoing war during the 1980s, Lebanon did 
not use all the aid made available by the EC. Thus, by the end the war, Lebanon was 
eligible to claim all the previously allocated funds. In October 1992, the Lebanese 
government was granted a new aid package, which included the unclaimed funds and a 
fourth financial protocol covering the 1991-96 period. The total funds of this aid 
package were valued at ECU 350 mill ion. 1 7 6 
The capital flow from the EU into Lebanon in the form of aid can be seen as a part of 
the EU global policy towards the Mediterranean region. As we established earlier, the 
economic development of the non-member Mediterranean countries was in the interest 
of the EU as it would help expanding the markets for EU exports. It would also serve in 
reducing labour migration into member states and enforce political and economic 
stability in the region. Moreover, the flow of aid can be described as a moral obligation 
towards these underdeveloped countries. Lebanon always imported most of its needs 
from the EU in exchange for little exports. It can be argued that aid has indirectly 
compensated for some of Lebanon's losses by contributing to reducing the deficit in 
Lebanon's current account. It was also hoped to instigate a process of industrial 
development to improve Lebanon's exports. Nonetheless, the civil war of Lebanon 
imposed special conditions on the relations with the country compared to other 
Mediterranean neighbours. Lebanon needed lots of aid during and after the war to 
rebuild the country and to resuscitate the malfunctioning economic sectors. Yet, the 
most important phase in the relations between the EU and Lebanon is the period 
following the civil war. This was accompanied by the significant development in the 
European approach towards the region of the Mediterranean represented by the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership initiative promoted by the EU. 
lEIU, Lebanon & Cyprus report. No.3,1988. p. 15. 
SEIU, Lebanon& Cyprus report.No.4, 1989. p. 15. 
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2.8 The Lebanon-EU Partnership Agreement 
As a signatory of the Barcelona declaration, Lebanon is expected to sign an Association 
Agreement with the EU, similar to the ones concluded between the EU and each of 
Tunisia, Morocco and Israel, P.A and Jordan. However, the negotiations that started in 
1996 have not yet been concluded. The Lebanese government has required some 
concessions that are not included in the draft agreement. The agreement follows the 
same pattern of the agreements already signed with other Mediterranean partners. The 
political side of the Association agreement is not problematic, as it focuses on co-
operation against terrorism and drugs, and seeks commitments on arms control. 
However, obstacles lay mainly in the economic and the social sides. On the economic 
side, the agreement aims at liberalising trade in goods and services in accordance with 
the planned Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area by 2010. Although this might sound 
encouraging as it removes obstacles for international trade, the Lebanese government 
has fears concerning some implications. 
First, the accomplishment of a free-trade area means the reciprocal removal of all tariff 
and non-tariff barriers to trade in manufactured products within 10 years from the 
signing of the agreement. However, the free trade would not be extended to agricultural 
products. Although the Barcelona Declaration stated that trade in agricultural products 
would be progressively liberalised, this wi l l still be done on a reciprocal preferential 
basis. Agricultural exports to the EU markets are still restrained by the EU Common 
Agricultural Policy. 1 7 7 Indeed, the Barcelona Declaration had stated that the 
liberalisation of trade in agricultural products would go as far as various agricultural 
policies allow. 1 7 8 This in fact institutionalises the restrictions on agricultural exports 
within the Euro-Mediterranean agreements. Nasser Saidi argued that this area of 
negotiations with Lebanon needs flexibility from the EU. By allowing Lebanese 
agricultural products access to the EU markets the cost of transition for Lebanon would 
be reduced. Meanwhile, the EU market would absorb Lebanon's products easily as the 
quantities involved would be negligible in the vast EU market.179 
1 7 6 Lebanon. The Annual Business. Economic, and Political Review 1997-8. (Oxford Business Group, 
1998) p.57. 
1 7 7 Ibid. p. 58. 
1 7 8 European Commission, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Report on Barcelona Conference 27-28 
November 1995. p. 4. 
1 7 9 Saidi. N, Lebanon and the European Union at the Crossroads: An Interim Assessment of the 
Partnership Agreement in Pathways to Integration, op.cit. p. 21. 
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Second, the financial support provided by the EU to the Mediterranean partners for 
structural adjustment purposes has a criterium that does not favour Lebanon. Saidi noted 
that the earmarked grants are allocated according to the country's size of population, its 
absorptive capacity (or willingness to undertake economic and social reforms), and per 
capita income (poverty). Lebanon in this sense is not in a competitive position. The 
population of Lebanon is small, while its economic system is already liberal with a 
limited public sector, and its per capita income is relatively high. 1 8 0 Saidi raised the 
point of reconstruction cost whose requirements need to be addressed within the EU 
approach. 
Nevertheless, there are other economic problems preventing the Lebanese government 
from signing the agreement. However, it is the Lebanese government that needs to 
improvise solutions for such problems through a better fiscal policy. The first problem 
is the impact of a free-trade area on the government revenues. Import duties account for 
around 45 per cent of the Lebanese government revenues while more than half of those 
come from duties on imports from the EU. It is estimated that the losses to the Lebanese 
government would be around 35 per cent of its revenues. This would be due to the 
expected diversion in consumer interests toward reduced-price EU products.181 The 
proposed solution for this problem is the introduction of a General Sales Tax to be 
replaced later by a Value Added Tax. However, some observers have pointed out that 
some custom duties are over 50 per cent while VAT would never reach these heights.182 
The other suggested solution to cover the loss from custom duties is the diversification 
of government revenues through much needed fiscal reform. This would include raising 
the share of direct taxation in government revenues as they have the lowest share of 
GDP in the region (around 14 per cent only). 1 8 3 
The other problem facing the Lebanese government is the dependence of local industry 
on the protection provided by the government through high tariffs. The removal of tariff 
barriers would mean rendering the local industry uncovered in a competition with now 
cheaper EU products. The industrialists seem to accept the fact that competition would 
be tough and thus Lebanese industry would have to improve the quality of its 
1 8 0 Ibid. p. 22. 
1 8 1 Lebanon. The Annual Business. Economic, and Political Review 1997-8. Op.cit, p. 58. 
1 8 2 Author's interview with Sir. James Sillar. Assistant to the Secretary-General of the Arab-British 
Chamber of Commerce. London. 1998. 
1 8 3 Saidi.N, Lebanon and the European Union...." Op.cit, p. 26. 
69 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment of EU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
production. However, this does not offset the threat of job losses due to the expected 
closure of many local industries that would not be able to compete. 
On the social side of the Partnership Agreement, the Lebanese government is expected 
to commit itself to a series of bilateral agreements with EU member states obliging it to 
re-admit refugees staying currently in Europe but who came originally from Lebanon. 
These would include nationals of other countries or stateless people who lived 
previously in Lebanon. It is feared that this would bring back substantial numbers of 
Palestinian refugees who left Lebanon during the war. 1 8 5 Indeed, even the repatriation of 
Lebanese refugees in Europe would create social problems in Lebanon due to the lack 
of job opportunities for the majority of them. Thus, the Lebanese government is 
unlikely to accept such condition. 
2.8.1 Capital Flow: aid and investment 
The EU partnership Agreement with Lebanon is not entirely negative. The overall 
agreement is expected to be beneficial to the Lebanese economy, which eventually 
would adapt to the new system. The historical openness of Lebanon to the international 
community testifies to this effect. The EU financial and technical assistance is expected 
to help Lebanon in adjusting to the new system by modernising its economic sectors. So 
far, the EU has played a crucial role in financing the reconstruction programme, 
launched by the Hariri government in 1993. Capital flow in the form of aid has been 
dispersed through the EU Commission and the EIB. By the end of 1998 (Hariri's 
departure), foreign finance available for reconstruction reached US$ 4,368 million. The 
EU's participation represented 17 per cent of the total amount. The EIB's share stood at 
12 per cent while the EU commission's was 5 per cent.1 8 6 In addition, some member 
states had agreed separate aid packages with Lebanon. Italy's aid represented 10 per 
cent of total foreign finance, while France's reached 7 per cent. Germany also took part 
in financing the reconstruction process by providing 3 per cent of the so far agreed 
foreign financing. Spain's share was 2 per cent. Therefore, the EU's total aid 
represented over 38 per cent of the total foreign financing. The remainder of the 'bi l l ' 
Author's interview with Sa'ad al-'Owaini. Lebanese Industrialists' Association. Beirut. August 1998. 
Lebanon. The Annual Business. Economic, and Political Review 1997-8. op.cit, p. 58. 
Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR). Progress Report. March 1999. p. 76. 
70 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment of EU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
was picked up by the IBRD (World Bank, 16 per cent), various Arab funds (28 per 
cent), and others. 
Chart 2.1 
Reconstruction foreign finance by the end of 1998 
(Total U S $ 4,368) Comm. Banks Kuwait 
7% AFESD 
12% 
Saudi 
KFAED 
France 
Germany 
3% 
AFESD: Arab Fund for Economic & Social Development 
SFD: Saudi Fund for Development 
KFAED: Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development 
Chart 2.2 Chart 2.3 
Total EU finance (US$ 1,665.6 million) 
countries 
Others 
Share of EU member-states in EU 
reconstruction finance to Lebanon 
EU 
Spain o% 12% 
Germany 
Source: CDR Progress Report. 
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Table 2.9 E U finance for the reconstruction by the end of 1998 (million US 
dollars) 
EU EtB Prance Germany Italy Spain Belgium 
198.2 532.6 292.7 119.1 416.5 105 1.5 
Source: CDR Progress Report. March 1999. p. 78. 
Italy stood as the major donor amongst European countries. France, the traditional 
'patron' of Lebanon, came second. However, a specific attention needs to be given to 
the form of aid provided by Lebanon's donors. The majority of the aid provided to 
Lebanon was in the form of loans and only a small fraction of it was in the form of non-
repayable grants. By the end of 1998, the total amount of grants reached US$ 551 
millions, representing only 13 per cent of the overall foreign finance. Over a third of 
foreign finance was in the form of soft-loans, while the remainder was in the form of 
export credits, commercial and other types of loans. The major donor of grants, 
however, was the EU Commission. The amount of EU grants reached US$ 191.4 
million. The amount of grants has represented over 96 per cent of the EU aid to 
Lebanon's reconstruction. This can be explained as being part of the financial assistance 
allocated by the EU for the Mediterranean region as part of Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership. On the other hand, the EIB aid package did not include any grants at all. 
The EIB's policy is to provide loans only. The second major donor of grants to Lebanon 
was Saudi Arabia (US$ 160.1 million). Only US$ 19.5 million of Italy's aid package 
was in the form of grants. France was slightly more 'generous' with US$ 24.8 million. 
Table 2.10 Form of foreign aid channeled into reconstruction 
(US$ million, unless otherwise slates) 
Type EU Saudi UN IBRD ftaly Prance Germany 
Loans 6.9 532.6 .... 683.9 396.9 268 102.2 
Grants 191.4 160.1 46 1.4 19.5 24.8 16.8 
% of 96.6 0 100 100 0.2 4.9 9.3 16.4 
grants 
out of 
total 
aid 
Source: CDR. "Progress Report, March 1999". p. 80. 
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The EU aid was predominantly project specific. Hence, the involvement of the EIB in 
funding a remarkable number of major rehabilitation projects.187 It could be argued that 
this type of conditional aid is more efficient when corruption is feared to exist. 
However, it was suggested that the EU aid was tied, as well. This was seen as a reason 
for the success of European firms in picking up a large proportion of reconstruction 
projects.1 8 8 Indeed, a previous head of the CDR had spoken of some tied aid by which 
the EIB would demand allocating the job concerned to a European f i r m . 1 8 9 Although 
such conditions might impose on the recipient limited space to bargain for a cheaper 
price, it is certainly advantageous for European businesses in Lebanon. Moreover, the 
tied aid did not seem to be confined to the EIB aid only. The bilateral aid coming from 
EU member states was tied by conditions on allocating it to firms from these 
countries.190 Although official documents were not available to support such arguments, 
this information can be supported by the correlation of the origin of a firm acquiring an 
infrastructure contract and the source of funding. It is not, therefore, surprising that 
French firms took most of projects funded by France. 
As for the flow of EU private direct investments into Lebanon, particular emphasis was 
given to the role of these investments in boosting economic development. These are to 
be encouraged along with free trade in services through liberalised movement of capital 
and the free right for establishment. Indeed, the position of Lebanon with respect to the 
right for establishment is significantly different from the agreements with other 
partners.191 The Association Agreement with Tunisia, for instance, stated that, 'The 
Parties agree to widen the scope of the Agreement to cover the right of establishment of 
one Party's firms on the territory of the other".1 9 2 It added that the Association Council 
would make recommendations for achieving this objective. In the case of Lebanon, the 
immediate free right for establishment would give the Lebanese economy a comparative 
advantage in attracting European service industries.193 Saidi noted that these right are 
already "very generous" in Lebanon.194 As for the liberalisation of capital movement, 
1 8 7 Lebanon. The Annual Business. Economic, and Political Review 1997-8. Op.cit, p. 57. 
1 8 8 Ibid. 
1 8 9 Author's interview with Al-Fadl Shalak. Previous Head of the CDR. Beirut Summer 1996. 
1 9 0 Ibid. 
1 9 1 Ibid. 
1 9 2 The text of the Association Agreement between the EU and Tunisia, signed in July 1995. 
http://www.euromed.net/ 
1 9 3 Lebanon. The Annual Business. Economic, and Political Review 1997-8. op. cit p. 5. 
1 9 4 Said.N, in "Pathways to Integration", op.cit p. 28. 
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Lebanon is a pioneer in the region in this sense, as the free movement of capital is one 
of the principles of its economy. As for the EU's role in encouraging the flow of EU 
private direct investments into Lebanon, this was declared in the Future Policy of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The MEDA Programme stated that the financial 
assistance would be available to several types of beneficiaries including private 
operators and members of civil society.195 Moreover, the EU has established special 
Business Centres in several Southern Mediterranean countries to provide assistance to 
local businesses. Although these Business Centres' assistance is non-financial, one of 
their tasks is to help local businesses in finding appropriate business partners from 
either the EU or any other country or region. This partnership may take the form of joint 
venture, business alliance, licensing, sub-contracting, technical co-operation agreement 
and technology transfer.196 Business Centres have already been established in Egypt, 
Syria, Jordan, Gaza-West Bank, Morocco and Tunisia. However, with no obvious 
reasons for the delay, this service is yet to be established in Lebanon. In 1995, the EIB, 
whose funds mainly go to public sector infrastructure projects, has extended in 1995 
"global loans" of ECU 3 million to the new Lebanese financial enterprise, Lebanon 
Invest SAL. These were to go into financing small and medium-sized enterprises in 
industry, tourism and service sectors. Priority was to be given to EU-Lebanese joint 
ventures.197 Moreover, the EIB involvement in funding several projects in 
Mediterranean countries assures private businesses of the feasibility of these projects. 
Helen Kavadia, of the EIB, stated that "the market generally interprets the Bank's 
agreement to fund a project as a result of sound appraisal and financial prudence".198 
This could encourage European firms to engage in business in the host country, mainly 
in projects funded by the EIB, as the financial risk in such cases is obviously minimal. 
2.9 Conclusion 
Clearly, the southern part of the Mediterranean basin is of strategic and economic 
importance to the EU. The countries of this region are either suppliers of the EU's needs 
1 9 5 Commission of European Communities, Implementing MEDA 1996-1997 Report. COM (1998) 524 
Final. 14.09.98. p. 4. 
1 9 6 EUROMED Special Feature. Issue No 10 -1 October 1999 http://www.euromed.nety. 
1 9 7 "Financing Provided By The EIB In The Non- Member Mediterranean Countries". 
http://www.euromed.net/. 
198Kawadia. H, The Role of the European Investment Bank in the Mediterranean partners. Paper 
presented at the 7th EURO-MED Information and Training Programme for Diplomats. Mediterranean 
Academy of Diplomatic Studies. University of Malta 19.11-22.11.1999. 
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of energy resources or a significant destination for its exports, or both. It is also a source 
of immigrating population, many of which EU countries fear their potential influx due 
to economic and political instability. France, in particular, which has utilised the 
abundance of cheap immigrant labour in the past, now tries to curb the influx of more of 
them. Therefore, enhancing the process of economic development in these countries 
would certainly be in the interest of the EU member states. This would help, on one 
hand, in expanding the markets for EU exports and, on the other, would encourage the 
labour force of southern Mediterranean countries to remain home and, thus, spare the 
EU the burden of migrant labour that might not fit European needs. Although some 
member states have registered their need to attract immigrant labour, these countries are 
looking for labour qualified for very specific industries. Therefore, European countries 
needed to improvise a comprehensive approach towards this vital and strategic region. It 
is surprising then to find that a coherent European economic policy towards the 
Mediterranean region was not considered until early 1970s, and that a comprehensive 
approach was not formed until the 1990s. 
European business interests in the southern part of the Mediterranean are historically 
well established. The previous chapter has shown the strong trade relations between 
France, Britain and Italy on one side, and the countries of southern Mediterranean on 
the other. Lebanon was recognised as a major destination for exports and an entrepot to 
the markets of the Arab region. These trade relations were enhanced after the 
establishment of the EC. It could be argued that the increase in demand for European 
products in the Lebanese market was the reason for Lebanon's high imports from the 
EC and not the special relations that have developed with the EC. Trade agreements 
between Lebanon and the EC were mainly responding to Lebanon's request for better 
access of its exports to the increasingly protected markets of European countries. This 
also applies to the other southern Mediterranean countries, which were struggling to get 
their exports into the common market of the EC. However, the majority of trade 
agreements signed between the EC and these countries, although improving the quotas 
of their exports, have widened the gap between the maximising exports of the EC and 
the slowly growing imports from the 'southerners'. This, nonetheless, could be 
considered good news for European businesses at the time. Their exports to the region 
were flourishing. In the case of Lebanon, the widening gap in its trade with the EC 
revealed the characteristics of Lebanon for having a high consuming market. It could be 
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argued, however, that although the trade agreements with the EC (later EU) did not 
offer massive concessions to Lebanon's industrial exports, the latter were not 
competitive enough to enter the Common Market. This describes the nature of Lebanon 
as being a non-producer country but a significant consumer. Agricultural exports would 
have been of great help in reducing the gap in the balance of trade. However, the EU 
was never willing to grant significant concessions, due to its rigid Common Agricultural 
Policy. 
In the early 1990s, the Euro-Mediterranean approach brought a new element into the 
equation. Instead of preferential single-tracked trade agreements with the southern 
neighbours, the EU decided on a global approach by introducing the free-trade area. 
Accompanying this was the financial assistance allocated for joining countries to 
develop their economies and promote industrialisation. Lebanon is yet to sign the 
partnership agreement with the EU. The Lebanese government still fears the loss of its 
revenues generated through custom duties, which need to be replaced by other sources. 
Here again, the good news for European businesses is that their exports will be granted 
free access to the markets of the region giving them comparative advantage that are not 
available to other foreign imports. They will also be competing with poorer-quality 
locally produced goods. 
Clearly, there was a predominance of trade in the economic relations between the EU 
and Lebanon. This was due to the lack of other business engagements between the two 
sides. The Lebanese government was always concerned about the biased balance of 
trade with the EU, and tried continuously to reduce the gap. However, the methods to 
strengthen the position of Lebanese exports, through technical and financial support to 
its domestic industry, did not achieve the anticipated success. 
As for the EU's role in encouraging direct investments by EU private businesses, a 
generalising judgement of the EU policies cannot describe the situation. Clearly, the EU 
policies towards the region of the Mediterranean have never been constant. Therefore, 
the best way to assess the EU's role in encouraging EU businesses to operate in 
Lebanon is by looking at its policy through the different phases of the relation between 
the two parties. In the first phase that stretched from the establishment of the EEC until 
1977 (the first Co-operation Agreement), the European Union did not develop a clear 
policy towards the region, including Lebanon. In other words, the EU can be described 
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as careless in its approach before the seventies. This was clear concerning trade, thus the 
same would apply to investments. In the second phase (1977-1990), the Co-operation 
Agreement hinted to the encouragement of private investments. However, nothing 
concrete materialised in this field. Nonetheless, it has to be said that this phase was 
characterised by the ongoing civil war of Lebanon. Any plans for encouraging direct 
investment would have been scrapped due to the high political risk that was prominent 
then. The third phase (1990s) is a suitable time to judge the role of the EU. By 1990 the 
civil war was ended and Lebanon was making its first attempts to rebuild the country. 
The EU's policy towards Lebanon was part of its new Euro-Mediterranean approach. 
Although described as very beneficial for European producers whose exports would be 
entering the markets of the southern countries freely, the new approach can be perceived 
of as being in the interest of European businesses interested in conducting business or 
investing in the region. The EU financial assistance earmarked for economic 
development in these countries has created opportunities for European firms. The 
MEDA Programme provides assistance for local small and medium-sized enterprises in 
finding a European partner. In other words, it helps European firms in finding southern 
Mediterranean business partners. In the case of Lebanon, the financial assistance has 
certainly created opportunities for European firms. The financing of some 
reconstruction projects has provided European firms with business opportunities, 
particularly when the EU or member state funding was conditioned to go to a European 
beneficiary. On the other hand, the fact that the EU and member states have been 
pumping capital into Lebanon could be seen as encouraging for private European 
businesses and investments. The EU and member states are very unlikely to be dumping 
their capital into a country without minimum assurances that it would lead to economic 
development. The high percentage of loans as opposed to grants within the European 
aid would indeed support this argument. A loan can be interpreted as a stake in the 
country which economic development would assure its repayment. However, there is 
always a combination of factors that would affect a firm's decision to establish business 
in a particular country. The role of the EU in the case of Lebanon can be auxiliary but 
certainly not decisive. 
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Chapter Three: The Lebanese Economy from Independence to 
Reconstruction 
"Lebanon is the Middle Eastern market that is most familiar to the largest 
number of international companies doing business in the area...booming 
Beirut serves as a watch post or operational centre for the rest of the Middle 
East, or even as a base for manufacturing and exporting throughout the 
area" 
Lebanon: A Switzerland of the Orient199 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the history of Lebanese economy, providing the reader with an 
historical, political and economic context for the following analysis of contemporary 
European business interests in Lebanon. The chapter aims to familiarise the reader with 
the development of the Lebanese economy through a study of the post-independence, 
civil war and reconstruction periods. For each period, the political context for economic 
development is given, since these have bearings on the direction and content of that 
development. At the end of each period, the salient points regarding the interests of 
foreign, and specifically European, businesses operating in Lebanon are summarised. It 
should be noted that this not a survey of European business interests in Lebanon during 
these periods. Rather it is an attempt to illustrate how the unique economic structures of 
Lebanon, including its tradition of laissez-faire policies and the predominance of 
services and trade over productive economic activities, have created an environment in 
which foreign business interests are largely confined to certain sectors of the economy 
and are not heavily engaged in direct investment. A more detailed analysis of the effects 
of specific government policies and economic developments at the present time in 
Lebanon wil l be offered later in the thesis. At this stage, however, the objective is to 
provide a broader and long-term context that will shed light on the general historical 
appeal (or lack of it) of the economy for foreign investors. 
Business Prospects in the Middle East: Opportunities for Financing. Trade and Investment. Business 
International European Research Report. (New York: Business International, 1975) p.93. 
78 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment of EU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
3.2 The history of the Lebanese economy 
It is no exaggeration to say that every single Lebanese, ordinary or official, longs to see 
Lebanon being compared to Switzerland, or Beirut being named the 'Paris of the 
Orient'. However, the above statement, far from being contemporary, dates back to the 
heydays before the civil war, when Lebanon was enjoying a fast-track growing 
economy, with Beirut being the primary centre for business activities in the region. This 
prosperity was reversed by the turmoil through which Lebanon went. Foreign 
companies and individuals fled Lebanon, as the environment became hostile towards 
them. The end of the civil war in 1991 was accompanied by a Lebanese will to rebuild 
the devastated economy and attract foreign capital into the country. A full-scale 
reconstruction process was undertaken to rebuild the country's infrastructure, and to put 
the economy back on track. Attracting foreign investments was one of the major goals 
of the Lebanese government as the major source of capital inflows. 
The interesting aspect of the Lebanese economy before the civil war is its peculiarity 
when compared to its neighbours: an economy that was furthering its openness while 
the surrounding countries were erecting barriers against outsiders. It was a stronghold of 
laissez-faire in a region where state-led, more accurately, state-controlled economies 
were becoming common. Many factors contributed to Lebanon's uniqueness when 
compared to its neighbours. History, people, location, nature, climate, environment, and 
neighbours all played a role in shaping Lebanon, politically and economically. To 
understand the specific characteristics of Lebanon's economy today, we need to look at 
the past to see how such a system was developed. 
3.2.1 The formation of Lebanon 
The establishment of the Lebanese entity preceded its independence in 1943 by only 
two decades. As mentioned before, the French mandatory authorities formed Lebanon 
in its present borders, in September 1920. Mount Lebanon, populated mainly by 
Christian Maronites and Druse, was enlarged to include the coastal towns of Beirut, 
Tripoli, and Sidon, in addition to Jabal Amil, the fertile Bekaa valley and Akkar plain. 
The French gave it a new name, 'Greater Lebanon'. However, a massive shaking of the 
demographic balance took place. The annexed parts were predominantly Muslim (Sunni 
in the towns and Akkar and Shi'a in Jabal Amil, while the Bekaa had mixed Muslim 
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population in addition to Christians). It also brought other Christian sects within the 
borders of the newly established entity. Maronites were no longer the majority, but, it 
was still said that the number of Christian inhabitants was just higher than their Muslim 
counterparts. The issue of representation in the parliament was settled on the ratio of 6 
to 5 in favour of the Christians. 
This process was not all easy going. The Muslim population had no interest in joining 
the new state. Sunni Muslims, in particular, were still hoping to join Syria in a Pan-Arab 
state. Describing the Sunni opposition, Meir Zamir noted that if the Maronites were the 
chief proponents of the idea of an independent Lebanese state, the Sunnis were its main 
opponents. 'Their refusal to recognise Lebanon's existence as a legitimate independent 
entity separate from Syria posed the most difficult problem in the political development 
of modern Lebanon", he asserted.200 The new entity was considered by Sunnis as being 
very artificial and established to strengthen the foreign powers' dominance. Moreover, 
it meant losing the privileges they had enjoyed in relation to their religious supremacy 
under the rule of the Ottomans. However, the opposition was not merely a result of Pan-
Arabism or religious zeal among the Sunnis. It appears that economic interests played a 
major role in motivating the protest amongst the inhabitants of the newly annexed 
regions. Those regions did not have much in common with Mount Lebanon, as they had 
closer ties with the interior. Not surprisingly, this also involved Christian non-Maronite 
merchant families in the annexed regions, who had more interest in relations with the 
interior. Zamir noticed that Sunni merchants in Beirut and Tripoli always acted as 
middlemen in trade with the interior. A separation from Syria meant the loss of that role 
which was specifically theirs. Another reason for discontent among the Sunnis was the 
inequality in taxation, where the annexed regions were still paying the same rate of tax 
under the Ottomans while Mount Lebanon inhabitants enjoyed the same low rate they 
previously had. Sunnis felt they were being exploited by the Maronites as they were 
paying to fund the national budget, most of which was spent in the mountain.201 
Zamir drew an explanatory picture of the Lebanese problem with the Maronites' and 
Sunnis' attitudes as the opposite extremes, while other major groups swung in the 
middle. "Greek Orthodox, Druze, and Mutawallis (Shi'a) adopted a more moderate 
position between these two extremes", he noted. Their positions depended on how their 
2 0 0 Zamir.M, The Formation of Lebanon, op.cit p. 126. 
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notables perceived the best way their interests could be protected. This explains the 
Greek Orthodoxs' dubious position towards the new entity. Their economic interests in 
Syria and their dislike of the Maronites' supremacy contributed enormously to this 
attitude. The Druze were part of Mount Lebanon and "had a certain attachment to the 
notion of Lebanon as an independent entity". However, they feared the Maronites' 
domination. They were divided between proponents of the Lebanese entity and 
opponents who wanted the Pan-Arabist option. The Shi'a notables rejected annexation 
by sticking to the Pan-Arabist question. However, when the notion of an Arab state 
faded with Faisal's defeat, they realised the importance of co-operation with the French. 
At the end of the day, the Shi'a did not share with the Sunnis their ideal of an Arab 
state, believing that in such a state they would be treated as inferiors. 
Economic prosperity under the French mandate brought all the conflicting groups to 
terms with the new state. "It created the necessary climate for integrating the inhabitants 
of the annexed areas, especially their economic and political elites, thus enabling them 
to resist pressure and temptation from outside".202 Kamal Hamdan said that Beirut had 
gained great importance in the country's politics and economy at the expense of the 
mountain. 'The economic development affected the Lebanese attitudes towards each 
other, and the growth advocated the notion of belonging to the same political and 
economic sphere, mainly in Beirut" he suggested. The rise of a substantial educated 
urban middle class from different communal groups played a major role in this process. 
"With the distinguished development in business, the rise of a new bourgeoisie, and 
good education, the inhabitants of Beirut found themselves less willing to accept an 
outsider authority or any hierarchical religious authority", Hamdan added.203 Zamir 
considered Greater Lebanon an undoubted economic success. "With its new territories 
and ports and with Beirut, which became the economic and administrative centre for the 
whole of Syria, the country offered new economic opportunities which Lebanese 
entrepreneurs were quick to exploit". Merchants' fears of separation from Syria 
evaporated as no customs barriers were installed between the two countries204. The 
concept of Lebanon was finally accepted by its inhabitants. A growing class, ironically 
2 0 1 Ibid, p 127-128. 
2 0 2 Ibid, p.137. 
2 0 3 Hamdan. K, "al-aztruih al-luhnania: a-tawaif a-dinyah. a-tahaqat al-ijtimaiah. wal-hawiyah al-
wataniah" The Lebanese Conflict: Religious Sects. Social Classes, and National Identity. (Beirut. 1998) 
p. 62. 
2 0 4 Zamir. M, op.ciL p. 137. 
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coming mainly from the Maronites and Sunnis, the previous two extremes, was 
developing a common interest in the new state. They struggled together to gain 
independence from France. 
3.2.2 The economy after independence 
The capitalist system which started to develop during the second half of the 19 th century 
and which was strengthened under the French mandate carried on after independence. 
The trend in economic activities was towards the services that had flourished during 
mandate. Owen considered that the prosperity in the services sector, since the mandate 
period, benefited from the decline of the silk industry. This latter was "allowed to die 
off from want of support from the French and from financiers of Beirut and from 
absence of an alternative market to Lyon in the Syrian hinterland".2 0 5 The policy of low 
tariffs and the development of new infrastructure helped to expand trade, building and 
the new industry of tourism. 2 0 6 This system was consolidated after independence in 
1943. 
However, the economic prosperity that Lebanon enjoyed in the three decades after 
independence also benefited considerably from various changes in that period: 
- First, the expenditure of the allies during World War I I in Lebanon created a sort of 
capitalisation that funded economic activities, not only in services but also in other 
productive sectors and infrastructure. 
- The closure of the port of Haifa to Arab business, after the 1948 war, ended its 
competition with the port of Beirut, and left the latter as the main entrepdt for trade 
between Arab counties and overseas. 
- The flow of fugitive capital from Palestine after the creation of Israel, and from other 
Arab countries after the changes in their regimes over 1950s, found its way to Beirut. 
The overthrow of traditional regimes in Egypt, Iraq and Syria and the subsequent 
nationalisation trend caused capital flight. Lebanon was the major destination. 
- The Palestine problem caused the influx of a significant number of Palestine refugees 
into Lebanon. A substantial number of the newcomers had notable expertise in banking 
Owen. R, The Political Economy of Grand-Liban 1920-1970. In Owen. R, Essays on the Crisis in 
Lebanon. (Ed), (London: 1976) p. 26. 
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and other services that Lebanon benefited from. In addition, the agricultural sector 
gained a huge supply of cheap labour. 
- The abolishing of the customs union with Syria in 1950 freed the Lebanese merchants' 
hands in trade. This union, established by the French during the mandate period to 
organise the foreign trade of the two countries, became unsuitable to accommodate the 
different interests of the two partner countries. It became clear that the Syrian 
bourgeoisie was in favour of trade barriers as it was involved in domestic production, 
unlike the Lebanese bourgeoisie who was traditionally tied to trade with overseas. 
- The later increase in oil production offered Lebanon considerable revenues from duties 
imposed on oil pipes. Moreover, a lot of the wealth generated from oil in the Gulf 
counties was flowing into Lebanese banks as Beirut provided the most advanced and the 
only free banking system in the region. This was enhanced by decreeing bank secrecy in 
1956. Other Arab investments went into property and real estate.207 
The economy grew rapidly during the three decades after independence. Economic 
annual growth was estimated at 7 per cent in the 50s and 6 per cent during the 60s and 
early 70s. This was accompanied by very low rates of inflation that did not exceed 3 per 
cent per annum during the same period. However, this growth was not evenly 
distributed among the sectors. The tertiary sector, comprising trade, banking and 
services grew much faster than the other productive sectors. Commercial activities 
increased by 56.7 per cent between 1950-57, and in 1957 contributed a third of GNP. 
Nevertheless, the period extending till the burst of the civil war in 1975 witnessed 
development in all sectors, albeit disproportionate. 
Agriculture was affected by the decline in demand for silk, which reduced its 
importance as a productive sector considerably. There was no policy to support the 
ailing sector whose contribution to the GNP in 1957 was 15.6 per cent, when almost 
half of the labour force was engaged in agriculture.209 Eventually, rural-urban migration 
was a result of the decline in agriculture. The percentage of inhabitants of rural areas 
dropped from 49.25 per cent in 1959 to 38.8 per cent in 1970.2 1 0 The trend was towards 
Beirut and its suburbs, where migrants looked for opportunities in the prosperous sector 
2 0 7 Hamdan. K, 1998. pp. 86-89, Owen. R, 1976. pp.27-28, Taqi a-Din. S, 1977. p.90, and Gholmyah. N, 
1976. p.163. 
2 0 8 Hamdan. K, 1998. op.cit, p.91. 
2 0 9 Owen. R, 1976. op.cit, p.28. 
2 1 0 Hamdan.K, op.cit, p.94. 
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of services. The gap between rural and urban population figures was widened by 1974 
at which point the population of rural areas accounted for only 14 per cent of the 
country's population.211 Israeli attacks on southern Lebanon and Western Bekaa in 
retaliation against Palestinian guerrillas contributed hugely to this change. Many 
villages near the borders became uninhabitable and any farming activities there had 
been came to a halt. However, a positive contribution of agriculture was in its being a 
major source of foreign currency, constituting around 50 per cent of total exports. Fruits 
and vegetables had the highest share of exports to Arab Gulf countries. However, its 
share in GDP was around 10 per cent early in 1970s, just before the civil war. 2 1 2 
Industry lagged behind the services sector in the immediate post-independence period, 
as it did not receive similar preferential treatment from the government. With little 
protection through low external tariffs, and uncertain power supplies, industry had little 
chance to prosper. Industrialists lacked the political power to persuade the government 
to pursue pro-industry policies.2 1 3 However, in the late 60s and early 70s, the industrial 
sector developed rapidly. Hamdan explained this as a result of saturation in the tertiary 
sector, after which the Lebanese bourgeoisie embarked on a new process to extend the 
traditional role they had played. This role, which had previously by and large focused 
on financial and trade mediation, now came to include industry. The Lebanese 
bourgeoisie wanted to emphasise its role as the main mediator between the Arab 
markets and the rest of the world. 2 1 4 Marwan Iskandar attributes the prosperity in the 
industrial sector to several reasons. These included the relative political stability in the 
country compared to the neighbouring countries; a large supply of low-cost industrial 
labour; subsidised fuel and electricity; easy-credit terms; a strong and stable Lebanese 
pound (which helped reduce the cost of imported raw materials and machinery); 
growing export markets (especially in the Gulf countries); and effective trade protection 
for a number of industries.215 Iskandar's analysis shows that some problems that 
hampered industry during the 1950s seemed to have been solved; mainly the power 
supply and tariff protection. Nevertheless, it is the bourgeoisie's interest that granted the 
2 1 1 Jaber. T, "al-qita' a-zera'ifi luhnan. tahlvl wa qfaq" Agricultural Sector in Lebanon. Analysis and 
Prospects. (Beirut, LCPS: 1997) p.21. 
2 1 2 Lloyds Bank Economic Report. Lebanon. 1974. p.8. 
2 1 3 Owen. R, 1976. op.cit, p.28. 
2 1 4 Hamdan. K, 1998. op.cit, p.93. 
2 1 5 Iskandar. M & BaroudLE, The Lebanese Economy in 1982-83. (Beirut, Middle East Economic 
Consultants: 1984) p.31. 
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industrial sector some kind of assistance. Moreover, there had been some drastic 
changes in the government policies during the 1960s- the period that is known as 
Chehabist216 in Lebanon's contemporary history. These changes are to be discussed in 
the following section. Meanwhile, figures show that the growth in industrial production 
jumped from an annual rate of 5 per cent in the 1950s to 10 per cent in the 1960s.217 The 
share in the GDP was 13 per cent in 1968, and indeed jumped to an estimated 20 per 
cent in 1974-1975 on the eve of the civil war. Nominal capital tied up in industrial 
establishments reached L L 25 bn in 1974 compared to LL 1 bn in 1968, while industrial 
exports increased from 54 per cent of total exports in 1967 to 75 per cent in 1974.2 1 8 
The tertiary sector, which comprised trade and services (financial and non-financial), 
had the highest rate of growth, and contributed the biggest share of Lebanon's GNP in 
the post-independence period. Between 1950 and 1962, commercial activities alone 
contributed to between 29 and 31 per cent of GNP, while services' share was around 10 
per cent, and financial sector between 4 and 7 per cent. A'ayash pointed out that when 
looking at services in its broad concept, i.e. including trade, tourism and finance 
(tertiary sector, according to his definition), it is possible to say that this sector 
represented 2/3 of Lebanon's GNP. Trade represented the major component of 
Lebanon's GNP (around 30 per cent). Despite the chronic deficit in the balance of trade, 
commercial activities involving transit trade flourished remarkably in the post-
independence period. The French determination during the mandate period to strengthen 
Beirut's position as the entrepot of the region, and the bourgeoisie's commercial 
interests established a strong infrastructure for transit trade. The enlargement of the port 
of Beirut and the Beirut-Damascus road were developed mainly for this reason. This 
role was not new for Beirut: the city had been established since the early 19 th century as 
the entrepot for the interior parts of Syria, and later to serve the region under the French 
mandate. However, transit trade flourished rapidly after the neutralisation of the port of 
Haifa following the creation of Israel. Most Arab commercial activities were diverted 
through Beirut. The post-independence governments worked on maintaining this 
position by facilitating transportation. Later, the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967 gave 
Beirut a still better position. Indeed, the only maritime route between Europe and the 
Gulf countries was again the maritime tour around Africa. Beirut offered a more cost-
2 1 6 Chehabism is named after Preseident Fou'ad Chehab who was in power between 1958-64. 
2 1 7 Hamdan. K, op.cit, p.93. 
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effective alternative for these shipments through its transit trade facilities. Transit traffic 
was estimated at 5.3 tons in 1974.2 1 9 Moreover, Lebanon was the outlet for the Iraqi and 
Saudi oil on the Mediterranean. Petroleum traffic through Tripoli (Iraqi oil outlet) only 
mounted up to 9 million tons in 1973.2 2 0 The duties imposed on these transactions 
provided the Lebanese government with substantial revenues. Moreover, these activities 
created employment and business opportunities. The port of Beirut always had the 
problem of congestion, a proof of the high density of trade taking place. This could 
explain the plans to enlarge the facilities just before the beginning of the civil war. 
Financial services included banking, insurance, the financial market and the stock 
exchange. A'ayash noticed that the vast growth in the financial sector in the 1960s can 
be attributed to a major expansion in banking activities.221 It shows indeed how 
Lebanon started reaping the benefits of changes in the neighbouring countries, and how 
Beirut was strengthening its position as the financial centre of the Middle East. The 
number of banks operating in Lebanon reached 81 by 1974, a relatively high number for 
a population then only just above 3 mill ion. 2 2 2 However, banking services were not 
targeted at Lebanese clients mainly, but were operating regionally by serving other Arab 
countries. There was an abundance of capital to be managed. This was based on the 
fugitive-capital influx into Lebanon after the political changes in the surrounding Arab 
countries, and the capital surpluses resulting from the increase in oil production in the 
Gulf countries. This explains the impressive presence of foreign banks in Lebanon, 
which in 1974 reached 17 banks, including five Arab banks. Meanwhile, Lebanese 
banks with a majority of foreign shareholders mounted to 26, four of them with an Arab 
223 
majority. 
2 1 8 Iskandar. M, 1984. op.cit, p.32. 
2 , 9 EIU, Lebanon. Annual Supplement. 1976. p.21. 
2 2 0 Ibid. 
2 2 1 A'ayash. G, "Azmat al-malivah al-'amah fi Lubnan" (The crisis of Lebanon's public finance) (Beirut 
1997) p.31. 
2 2 2 The population was 3,065 thousands in 1974, according to the World Bank Annual Report, 1976. p:44. 
2 2 3 Balance Sheets of the Banks, Produced by the Association of Banks in Lebanon. 1983. 
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Table 3.1 List of foreign banks operating in Lebanon before the civil war 
No Foreign bank Arab = Nan-Arafe Country 
1 Banque di Roma * Italy 
2 Banque Nationale de Paris (Intercontinentale) * France 
3 The British Bank of the Middle East * Britain 
4 Algemene Bank Nederland N.V. * Netherlands 
5 The Chase Manhattan Bank * US 
6 First National City Bank * US 
7 The Chartered Bank * US 
8 Bank Saderat Iran * Iran 
9 Moscow Narodny Bank Limited * USSR 
10 Bank of America * US 
11 Habib Bank Limited * 
12 The Bank of Nova Scotia * Canada 
13 Arab Bank Limited * Jordan 
14 Rafidain Bank * Iraq 
15 Saudi National Commercial Bank * Saudi Arabia 
16 Jordan National Bank * Jordan 
17 Arab African Bank * 
Source: Association of Banks of Lebanon, Balance Sheets of the Banks. 1974. 
Another prosperous part of the financial services sector was the insurance sector, which 
attracted many foreign companies. In 1967, the number of foreign insurance companies 
was 110 while local companies numbered only 12. Competition was very tough 
between those companies, particularly small ones.224 Possibly, this competition played a 
major role in the continuous withdrawals and newcomers among firms operating in this 
sector. 
Non-financial services included mainly tourism, but also education, health care, and 
transport. The tourism sector developed rapidly during the sixties. Its share in the GDP 
was around 10 per cent in 1964 but reached 19 per cent by 1975.2 2 5 More than 40,000 
people were directly or indirectly employed in the sector. During this period, Lebanon 
had managed to establish itself as a perfect destination in close proximity to both 
Europe and the Arabian Peninsula. It has been said that "at a time when intercontinental 
travel still involved stop-overs, Beirut was a major stop on the routes to the Far East".226 
The social environment of Lebanon provided an apparent level of freedom that played a 
major role in attracting visitors from the Arab world. "For thousands of visitors from the 
Iskandar.M, 1984. op.cit, p.249. 
Lloyds Bank Country Report. Lebanon 1979. p:16. 
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more traditional Arab Gulf, Lebanon offered the freedom of Europe just a few hours' 
flight away".2 2 7 In fact, Lebanon was already established as a perfect place for summer 
breaks in the Arab world. Even earlier in the century, many Arab visitors used to spend 
summer seasons in Mount Lebanon. The increase in the wealth of Gulf countries 
boosted Lebanon's tourism industry as many Arabs bought property in Lebanon, 
particularly in the mountains, to spend their summer time there. The influx of tourists 
provided Lebanon with substantial amounts of foreign exchange that helped to offset 
the deficit in the balance of payments. 
Tourism and transit trade required a strong infrastructure to be built. Transport is 
normally one of the major demands. As mentioned earlier, the port of Beirut was 
working beyond its capacity, and plans were ahead to enlarge it. A new airport was built 
in the 1960s, to handle 2.8 million passengers and 145,897 tons of cargo in 1974. The 
EIU reports described it then as "one of the most important airports in the world". 2 2 8 
3.2.3 Economic policies after independence 
In a famous quote used by Nadim Shehadi, the Belgian expert Paul Van Zeeland 
commented on the way the economy functioned in Lebanon by saying, " I don't know 
what makes the economy work but it's doing very well and I wouldn't advise you to 
touch i t " . 2 2 9 He noticed that "invisibles" constituted most of the national income. Ideas 
of a liberal economy were indeed consolidated after independence. This was understood 
as the marginalisation of the government's role in the economy leaving that to private 
entrepreneurs. It was the liberal laissez-faire system that Van Zeeland advised not to 
touch, keeping the role of "invisible hands" pivotal in the growing tertiary sector while 
the state kept out of it. Shehadi considers that a laissez-faire system was an oddity in the 
post World War I I world when a dirigiste fashion was spreading, advocating more state 
intervention and planning in the economy. Lebanon, however, remained one of the few 
remaining "citadels of truly laissez-faire capitalism".2 3 0 
Lebanon. The Annual Business. Economic and Political Review 1997-98. "Skiing in the Morning..." 
Tourism Sector Overview, op.cit, p. 171. 
2 2 7 Ibid. 
2 2 8 EIU, Country Profile. Lebanon. 1976. p. 21. 
2 2 9 Shehadi. N, The Idea of Lebanon: Economy and State in the Cenacle Libanais 1946-54. Papers on 
Lebanon. No. 5.1987. (Oxford, Centre For Lebanese Studies) p. 3. 
2 3 0 Ibid, pp.4-6. 
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The Lebanese government in the first decade after World War I I intervened very little in 
the economy. By not leading the economy, it left the grounds for the private sector to 
operate freely. It provided a deflationary, free and stable monetary structure, and 
liberalised foreign exchange. Low taxes and low tariffs were preserved, protecting only 
those industries which were already in production. No attempt was made to contain the 
high propensity to consume imported goods.231 Indeed, this policy of government 
retraction was inherent in the thoughts of the founders of the constitution. Michel China 
- a principal author of the 1926 constitution - wrote in 1952 suggesting that 
"exaggeration in government intervention would make life more difficult. Private 
administration is more active and productive than government administration in 
Lebanon".232 A'ayash concluded that these thoughts surely had their impact on public 
finance. The government's budgets were very compatible with the idea of "non-
interventionist government, non-interventionist budget". This might explain why the 
government revenues were much higher than its expenditure between 1951 and 1961. 2 3 3 
Indeed, the government economic policy was affected by the input of the different 
presidents who took office in the post-independence period. Non-interventionism was 
preserved under Bishara Khouri - the first president after independence. Under the 
subsequent president, Camille Chamoun, the government spent extravagantly on some 
development plans. A new airport was built, in addition to better transportation facilities 
and a big sports complex. Owen noted that the real needs of the people in rural areas 
were not considered, and the benefits went to that small group of contractors that had 
special connections with the president. He also noticed that the Lebanese government 
was not concerned about strengthening its armed forces. The army stayed small in size 
as its number rose from 6000 in 1952 to just 10,000 in 1956-57 2 3 4 Under Army 
Commander Fou'ad Chehab, who was elected as president after Chamoun was forced 
out of office, the government's economic policy changed drastically. This was due to 
the turmoil Lebanon went through in 1958, when Muslims, mainly Sunnis, revolted 
against Chamoun's government after he sought to extend his term, an act which was 
against the constitution and which his predecessor had tried before but failed. The 
upheaval ended when the US Marines landed on the shores of Beirut upon Chamoun's 
2 3 1 Ibid, p.7. 
A'ayash.G, op.cit. p. 32. 
Ibid. 
Owen. R, 1976. op.cit. p.27. 
2 3 3  
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request. Chehab thought that, although Pan-Arabism contributed enormously to the 
Muslims revolt, encouraged by the unity between Egypt and Syria under Nasser, socio-
economic inequality had certainly played a pivotal role in the affair. In fact, income was 
unevenly distributed between the different classes and regions. Owen noticed that 
commerce, which contributed to almost a third of the national income in 1957, 
employed only 12 per cent of the working population. By contrast, agriculture, which 
contained almost half of the labour force, contributed only 15.6 per cent. He concluded 
that the lower-class urban Muslims felt their community was discriminated against and 
impoverished by the country's wealthy, predominantly Christian, rulers.2 3 6 Chehab 
introduced a new economic policy. He pursued an economic development policy in 
which the government was at the centre. He was the first to introduce planning into the 
Lebanese system using a French survey mission (IRFED). 2 3 7 He extended roads and 
electricity to rural areas; increased the government's expenditure on education by which 
schools were built in rural regions; and commenced a social security programme. He 
obviously was not happy with the free hand given to the private sector without any 
regulations. One of his major achievements was the establishment of the Central Bank 
to regulate the banking sector. Chehab introduced other governmental bodies, mainly 
the Council for Civil Service and the Central Inspection Institute. Here also, more 
regulation was being injected into the system. A major difference with his predecessors' 
policies was that Chehab focused on building the military power of the government. 
The army was expanded to 15,000 men and the police were strengthened. Coming from 
a military background obtained through the army, Commander Chehab already had his 
own system on which he could rely. In fact, the Deuxieme Bureau -his new intelligence 
service- was pivotal in supporting the regime against any trouble. 
3.2.4 Summary: the economy before the civil war 
Lebanon was witnessing a remarkable economic prosperity on the eve of the civil war, 
in April 1975. This prosperity was due to the economic boom that occurred over the 
1960s, and was continuing despite its ups and downs. 2 3 8 The economy was growing 
Robert Fisk argues that by the time US Marines landed the trouble was already finished and they 
found traveller-vendors trying to sell them various goods ranging from chewing gums to rugs!! In Fisk. R, 
Pitv the Nation. Lebanon at War (Oxford: O.U.P., 1991). 
2 3 6 Owen. R, 1976. op.cit, p. 28. 
2 3 7 Institut International de Recherche et de Formation Education au D6veloppement 
2 3 8 The 1967 war consequences, and the crisis of bankruptcy of Intra Bank in October 1966. 
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rapidly, with 5 per cent growth average per year during 1960-70 and then accelerated to 
9 per cent per year in 1970-75. GNP was growing as well, by 3 per cent per year since 
1960, and was estimated at US$ 1,070 per capita in 1974 2 3 9 (the World Bank figures 
were US$ 700 in 1974, and US$ 900 in 1975, while it was US$ 1,080 in 1976, 
estimated on the 1972-74 base period). 2 4 0 Despite the fact that the industrial and 
agricultural sectors did have a share in the country's GNP, the main catalyst for the 
economic prosperity was the services sector. In other words, a system of dual 
economies was developing, in which the flourishing services sector was coexisting with 
less developed agricultue and industry. The 'uniquely' developed financial services 
provided by Lebanese and foreign banks for the region, attracted a substantial amount of 
petro-dollar surpluses, in addition to a remarkable flight capital that escaped the 
nationalisation in various 'socialist' Arab countries. Beirut, then, maintained the role of 
entrepot to the Middle Eastern countries, trade wise. Through Beirut's port, most of the 
imported products were re-exported to the Arab countries. However, the foreign trade 
was always in deficit. In 1973, it amounted to LL 2,738.4 millions. 2 4 1 On the other 
hand, tourism was flourishing, and indeed, played an important role in easing the trade 
deficit by drawing substantial amounts of foreign exchange into the country. It also 
contributed 20 per cent to the country's GNP. The Merrill Lynch report considered this 
figure as notable, given that at that time, the international tourist industry was not as 
developed as it is today. 2 4 2 
Foreign businesses found their way to Beirut during the period preceding the war. This 
can be considered as a continuation of Beirut's strong business relations with Europe 
and the West, culminating from its historical role in trading with the surrounding region. 
European and US firms established their regional offices or branches serving Lebanon 
and the region from Beirut. Many comparative advantages like the location of Lebanon, 
the relative political and economic freedom it enjoyed, and the skilled-labour available 
for the services sector attracted these foreign businesses. The concentration of these 
foreign businesses in the services and trading sectors was obvious. The foreign banks 
list, for instance, included names like The Chase Manhattan, First National City Bank, 
Merrill Lynch International Limited, The Lebanese Republic. Preliminary Offering Circular, 
September 1994. 
2 4 0World Bank Annual Reports. 
2 4 1 E I U , Quarterly economic review. Syria. Lebanon . Cyprus. Annual supplement 1975. p. 25. 
2 4 2Merrill Lynch op.cit, p.21. 
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the British Bank of the Middle East, and Banque Nationale de Paris Internationale. 
Out of the 90 banks operating in Lebanon at the eve of the civil war 17 banks were 
foreign, while 26 local banks had foreign majority shareholders.244 The comparative 
advantages mentioned above contributed to the influx of these foreign banks into 
Lebanon. The Lebanese system enhanced the free-market characteristic of the economy 
by advocating banking secrecy, freedom of exchange and freedom of capital transfer. 
Beirut was the perfect financial centre to serve the then accumulating petro-dollar 
wealth in the region. 
Another factor that supported the prosperity of the country was the private remittances, 
which provided significant amounts of foreign exchange. The last figure of the 
remittances traced before the civil war was in 1970 when they amounted to $28 
mill ion. 2 4 5 Inevitably, this figure would have been expected to increase on the eve of the 
civil war, taking into consideration the huge rise in oil prices, a development which 
Lebanese emigrant labour and businessmen should have benefited from. 
Al l the conditions for economic prosperity existed in Lebanon on the eve of the civil 
war: an efficient financial sector; a great trading position and skills; fabulous climate 
and services for tourism; growing manufacturing industry (industrial exports, mainly to 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and Syria, had been increasing rapidly from LL 87.4 million 
in 1967 to L L 456.6 million in 1973) 2 4 6; and a moderate share of agriculture (12 per 
cent) 2 4 7 in a country inclined towards services rather than any other economic sectors. 
However, the civil war that flared up on April 13, 1975, brought the development 
process to a halt, and left the country, after sixteen years of conflict (the war ended 
officially in 1991), shattered economically, and in need of substantial help in carrying 
the burden of reconstruction. 
3.3 Economic consequences of the civil war 
To assess the economic consequences of the civil war in Lebanon, it would be better to 
divide the period of the war into two phases: first, 1975 until 1982, the date of the 
Balance Sheets of the Banks 1974. Association of Banks in Lebanon. Beirut pp.5-6. 
[ Balance Sheets of the Banks 1974. (Beirut), op.cit, pp.5-6. 
! EIU. Lebanon. Annual Supplement. 1977. p.30. 
'EIU, Lebanon. Annual Supplement 1974. p. 19. 
'Ibid. 
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Israeli invasion; and second, starting from 1983 until 1990. The reason behind this 
division is the different developments of the conflict, and consequently, the different 
impacts on the economy. Some factors that contributed significantly to the flare up of 
the civil war had a very marginal role in the second phase. Similarly, economic factors 
varied remarkably between the two phases. 
3.3.1 First phase (1975-82) 
During the first phase, the armed conflict that flared up was a result of internal and 
external factors. As extensive discussion of this matter is beyond the focus of this paper, 
it wil l be explained in general terms as a result of the Palestinian military existence in 
Lebanon, and the different perceptions of this existence between the various sects of 
Lebanon. The Maronite Christians declared, persistently, their disapproval of the 
Palestinian guerrillas' existence in Lebanon, and of their activities in launching 
resistance attacks on northern Israel. The situation had been exacerbated by the signing 
of the Cairo Agreement in 1969 between the Lebanese government and the PLO. 2 4 8 On 
the other hand, the majority of Sunni Muslims, the co-religionists of the Palestinians, 
and the Leftists, led by the Druse Kamal Janbulat (PSP) expressed widely their 
sympathy and willingness to support the Palestinian resistance. As the power of the 
state became questionable, and the security apparatuses could not control the guerrilla's 
activities, the Maronites started establishing their own militias. The declared excuse was 
to protect themselves from the guerrillas. In 1975, tension reached its climax. After 
firing at a bus of Palestinians reported to be guerrillas, in a Christian area, tension 
spread over the country, which was then dragged into a two-year round of fighting. 
Clashes and skirmishes occurred constantly afterwards, and the country was thrown into 
anarchy and disaster. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 left catastrophic 
prints. Ironically, it was conceived by many as the climax of political and militarily 
conflict, and it was believed that tension would go down afterwards. This optimism was 
based on the PLO's departure from Beirut, to be scattered all over the Arab host 
countries. This wish did not materialise, and as it will be shown later, politics and 
economics deteriorated further, shortly afterwards. 
Under the Cairo Agreement, the PLO was allowed to launch attacks against Israel from the Lebanese 
territory, and to be in charge of security in the Palestine refugees' camps. 
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3.3.1.1 Recession in economic sectors 
The fighting that flared up in April 1975 was concentrated in the central district of 
Beirut, the financial and commercial centre for the whole country. Many banks, offices, 
markets and hotels were either destroyed or looted. It brought economic activities to a 
halt, and imposed astronomical physical losses on businesses located in the fire zone. 
However, the spread of fighting throughout the country affected all economic sectors. 
The agricultural sector was affected by two different conflicts in Lebanon: the civil war, 
and the Israeli-PLO war. As the violence caused by the civil war took place mainly in 
Beirut and the surrounding areas, the agricultural parts of the country were relatively out 
of the war zone. This excludes some occasions when clashes expanded to relatively 
remote areas (Zahleh in the Bekaa Valley; and Sidon in the South). The main 
agricultural areas in Lebanon are the Bekaa Valley, the Akkar plain in the North, and 
the South, in addition to some narrow coastal plains. Many of these areas were spared 
during the civil war. On the other hand, the Israeli attacks, culminating in the invasion 
of 1982, had a bad effect on agriculture. Southern parts of the country suffered Israeli 
raids on a daily basis. However, the two armed conflicts had some common impacts 
concerning agriculture. Both conflicts contributed to the migration from rural areas to 
the cities (mainly Beirut). The Israeli raids, starting in the late sixties, forced many Shi'a 
peasants to flee their villages in southern Lebanon and to become slum-dwellers around 
Beirut. The civil war, on the other hand, also forced new demographic changes. 
Christian peasants in coastal villages south of Beirut (Damour, for example) had to flee 
their villages to the Christian eastern parts of Beirut after being expelled by the 
Palestinian guerrillas. The Palestinian action was said to be retaliation for the expulsion 
and genocide of Palestinian refugees in Tal Za'tar camp, in the Christian suburbs of 
Beirut. However, without denying the role of the war in the rural-urban migration, one 
has to admit that this trend was exacerbated by villagers' tendency to leave to Beirut 
where money, they thought, was easier to earn. 
In 1982, the share of agriculture in GDP was estimated at 9 per cent. Only 7 per cent of 
a total population of 3.3 million benefited from agriculture in 1981, compared to 19 per 
cent in 1970.2 4 9 The share of agricultural employment of the total active population 
dropped to 9.2 per cent in 1981. The Israeli invasion affected agriculture badly, 
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however, the consequences of this invasion on agriculture will be studied later on in this 
section. 
The industrial sector was developing significantly during the early 1970s. The years of 
war between 1975 and 1982 knocked out the whole process of growth in this sector. 
The physical capital stock of industry was vastly destroyed. In 1975-76 alone, between 
LL 500 million and L L 700 million direct losses were estimated, while indirect losses 
ranged between LL 972 million and LL 2.2 billion. Around 150 industrial 
establishments with total paid-up capital of L L 1 billion were destroyed, while another 
321 establishments were damaged. In total, 20 per cent of the fixed capital in industry 
was lost. 2 5 0 The next rounds of violence exacerbated these figures. According to the 
head of Lebanese industrialists' association, by the end of 1981, the losses engendered a 
decline in production capacity of around 25 per cent, while the labour force involved in 
industry dropped by 50 per cent.251 This is what Nasser Saidi referred to as losses in the 
human capital stock as many of the professional and skilled labour migrated, leaving 
production in the hands of a lesser-skilled workforce. This development, supported by 
the destruction of the physical capital stock, led to a reduction in productivity and 
forced a drop in real wages and earnings.252 The Israeli invasion in 1982 worsened the 
situation. More factories were damaged, and the cut in means of transportation (airport, 
port, and roads, mainly the Beirut - Damascus highway) impinged heavily on exports. 
To sum up the impact of war on the industrial sector in the first phase (1975-82), one 
could say that although industry did not represent a high share of the GDP of Lebanon, 
the substantial growth that the sector witnessed before the war was promising. The 20 
per cent share in the GDP before the war could have been increased given the potential 
resources and markets. The physical destruction of plants and the flight of skilled and 
professional labour affected the productivity, while the territorial divisions and cut in 
outwards transportation caused segmentation in labour and goods markets, and hindered 
the exports' access to other countries markets. 
Iskandar.M & BaroudLE, op.cit, p.5. 
250Ibid. p.32. 
2 5 1 Ibid. p.32. 
252Saidi. N, Economic consequences of the war in Lebanon, papers on Lebanon, (Oxford, Centre for 
Lebanese Studies: 1986) p. 6. 
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I f agriculture and industry were affected badly by the violent events of the civil war, the 
services sector was devastated. Lebanese financial and non-financial services were 
predominantly located in central Beirut and the surrounding areas. These received the 
biggest share of destruction once war flared up. This sector, which developed over 
decades of progress and contributed to 70 per cent of Lebanon's GDP in 19702 5 3, was 
thrown backward within a few years. 
In financial services, the vital banking sector was inevitably affected by the start of the 
civil war. Yet, it has to be said that after seven years (1975 until 1983), the banking 
sector unlike other sectors proved to be resilient. However, it was resilient in the sense 
that it weathered the turmoil instead of being destroyed. It provided, according to 
Iskandar and Baroudi, "a rare bright spot in the Lebanese economy during years of 
upheaval".254 Indeed, the number of banks registered in Lebanon increased from 81 in 
1974 to 92 in 1983.2 5 5 The increase was mainly among the Lebanese banks, from 31 in 
1974 to 45 in 1983. Foreign non-Arab banks increased by one bank, as did the Arab 
banks. Meanwhile, the number of Lebanese banks with foreign non-Arab control 
dropped to 15 (22 in 1974), compared to an increase in the number of Lebanese banks 
with Arab control to 10 (4 in 1974). However, these numbers cannot imply that all these 
registered banks kept operating in Lebanon during the turmoil. It was reported that 
many banks like Citibank and Chase Manhattan moved their headquarters from Beirut 
to Athens temporarily during the upheavals. These temporary headquarters soon became 
permanent as the hope of going back to Beirut was shattered.256 The balance sheets of 
some of these banks indicate that they were not operating in Beirut anymore at that 
time. For example, the Chase Manhattan Bank assets in Beirut totalled LL 283,039,638 
in 1974, while they amounted to LL 359,264,682 in 1983.2 5 7 Given changes in the value 
of money in terms of depreciation of the Lebanese pound 2 5 8, and price inflation, which 
stood at about 24 per cent annually in 1979-80259, it was obvious that the bank's 
operations in Lebanon were stalled. A comparison with another Lebanese bank supports 
the argument. The Banque du Liban et D'Outre-Mer had assets of LL 418,846,346 in 
253Llovds Bank Economic Report. Lebanon. 1974. p. 9. 
254Iskadar.M & BaroudiJE, 1984. Op.cit, p. 209. 
255Balance Sheets of the Banks, Association of Banks in Lebanon, 1983. 
2 5 6 E I U . Quarterly Economic Report Syria. Lebanon. Cyprus. 3rd quarter 1977. p. 15. 
257Balance Sheets of the Banks, 1974, op.cit, p. 13 and 1983. p. 97. 
2 5 8The US dollar was equivalent to LL 2.32 in 1974 while reached to LL 4.52 in 1983 
Banque Du Liban, Annual Reports. 
259Banque Du Liban, Report for the years 1979 and 1980. p. 6. 
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1974 which in 1983 they amounted to LL 5,624,215,474. 6 0 Thus one of the main 
consequences of the civil war was the flight of foreign banks, either completely or by 
reducing their activities to a minimum. 
Although the banking sector was resilient and kept functioning, apart from some weeks 
when the situation was too dangerous, most of the banks were facing new problems. 
Iskandar and Baroudi summarised these problems as: 
"J- the accumulation of bad debt as many commercial, industrial, and other 
establishments sustained damages which made it difficult to repay debts. 
2- the dearth of safe investment outlets on the local market, as locating safe and 
profitable investment in the private sector was becoming difficult. The alternative 
was to subscribe to treasury bills. 
3- the slow-down in import-export activity which had serious effect on commercial 
banks that considered the issuing of letters of credits and guarantee as a major and 
highly profitable aspect of their operations. 
4- the excessive competition as the number of banks was quite large compared to the 
size of the market. Before the war, most banks were able to acquire a share of the 
growing market. The slow-down in economic activities forced banks towards a stiff 
competition in order to maintain their share. Some of them gave un-guaranteed 
loans, others gave higher interest rate than treasury bills by 3-4 per cent. 
5- the rise in operating costs, as many banks opened new branches before the war. 
These branches added significant operating costs without providing the return in 
increased activity and clients, and hence growth revenue due to the slow-down in 
economic activities. "261 
Despite these problems, the banking sector survived. The total assets of the commercial 
banks, which amounted to LL 12,319 million in 1974, rose to LL 37,197 million in 
1980. This included a rise in foreign assets from LL 3,980 million to LL 13,401 million 
respectively. Credits to the private sector also increased from L L 5,733 million to LL 
16,166 million in the same period. Indeed, the central bank had to impose restrictions on 
credits in Lebanese pounds, which rose by 17 and 25 per cent in 1977 and 1978.2 6 2 One 
might attribute this phenomenon to what was mentioned above about the stiff 
competition between a large number of banks in a relatively stagnant market. But, 
"Balance sheets of the banks, 1974. p. 64 and 1983. p. 15. 
'iskandar.M & Baroudi. I, op.ciL pp. 207-209. 
2Banque du Liban, Report for the years 1979 and 1980. pp. 20-25. 
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questions do arise as to how the banking sector did survive. The increase in assets 
answers this question. The war affected the economic activities badly but the freedom of 
exchange and transfer of money was not touched. Money continued to flow into the 
country from different resources. In addition to the remittances from expatriates, 
Lebanese and Palestinians (remittances amounted to US$ 8.1 billion in 1982, while 
PLO annual spending reached US$ 900 mill ion) 2 6 3 , in the Gulf countries and elsewhere, 
one should remember the inflows of unofficial aid from the surrounding Arab regimes 
to the various factions involved in the civil war. 2 6 4 Almost every faction had an outside 
sponsor, transferring money which was then circulated in the economy. Moreover, the 
resilient Lebanese mentality motivated them to reject the standstill situation and use the 
breaks between rounds of violence to repair damages and conduct business. This helped 
in sustaining the economy, and consequently the banking sector, over that period. 
In insurance, the rapid growth that had characterised the sector in the early seventies 
came to a halt after the beginning of the civil war. The gross premiums in all branches 
of insurance dropped sharply in 1975-1976 to just LL 26 million in 1976. Before the 
war, the net premiums of only non-life branches averaged at L L 56.9 million annually 
between 1972-1974. The non-life branches net premiums picked up again in 1977 to LL 
44.5 million but were still 44 per cent below 1974 level. In all cases, the leading 
companies, mainly Lebanese, were getting the bulk of the premiums in the non-life 
branches. In 1972-1974, their share was 46 per cent, while in 1977 it increased to 62.4 
per cent. That was largely due to the withdrawal of 23 small foreign companies in 1975 
and 1976.2 6 5 Foreign insurance companies' share in the non-life branches dropped 
sharply from 61.7 per cent in 1972 to 24.6 per cent in 1979. Lebanese companies were 
strengthening their control over the insurance market. Their share increased from 71 per 
cent in 1980 to 76.8 per cent in 1982.2 6 6 However, in the life insurance branches, 
foreign companies, though very few (6 out 25 companies in 1982), maintained a high 
share of the market. Their share of net premiums amounted to 64 per cent over the 
1979-1982 period. This is to be attributed largely to the main position of American Life 
Labaki.B, Lebanese Emigration During the Civil war (1975-89). an article in Hourani. A & Shehadi. 
N (ed) The Lebanese in the world: A century of emigration (Oxford, Centre for Lebanese Studies: 1992). 
p.607. 
Makdissi. S, Political Coflict and Economic Performance in Lebanon. 1975-86. Occassional Papers 
Series (Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, Spetember 1987) p.6. 
265Ibid. p.251. 
266Ibid. pp:253-254. 
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Insurance Company in this branch. The share of this company alone averaged 55 per 
cent of total net life branch premiums between 1980 and 1982.2 6 7 
Generally, the war benefited the Lebanese insurance companies in one aspect only: the 
flight of many foreign competing companies. Though the total premiums fell at some 
stages, the bulk was now going to the Lebanese leading companies. 
Expectations for tourism were high on the eve of the civil war. The sector's share in 
GDP had increased from 10 per cent in 1964 to 19 per cent in 1975.2 6 8 There were 2.19 
million visitors to Lebanon in the first quarter of 1974, representing a 50 per cent 
increase over 1973. Indeed, the first quarter of the year witnessed 10.5 per cent increase 
over the same period of 1974. However, the fighting that flared up in the middle of the 
year brought the number of visitors from 537 thousands in the first three months down 
to almost zero.2 6 9 Estimated income calculated from the amount of bed-nights in Beirut 
declined from L L 967 million in 1974 to LL 670 million in 1975 and zero in 1976. It 
recovered to 200 million in 1911,210 a figure that was still minimal. Many hotels were 
completely destroyed or looted. However, the Merrill Lynch report suggested that the 
large number of Lebanese expatriates, many of whom continued to visit the country on 
regular basis over summer allowed the tourism sector to survive.2 7 1 Yet, the impact of 
those visitors on the hotel industry can be disputed because these Lebanese expatriates 
would have their family residences and would not need to stay in hotels. The number of 
hotels operating in Lebanon in fact dropped sharply. 
Over all, the country lost a crucial source of revenue with the destruction of the tourism 
industry. The losses were not confined to the physical capital stock. It was also about 
losing confidence in Lebanon as a good destination for tourists, mainly for Arabs. 
Indeed, many neighbouring countries benefited from the destruction of Lebanon's 
tourism industry. Huge numbers of Arab tourists redirected their destinations to Egypt, 
Jordan and other surrounding countries that replaced Lebanon. 
As for transport and transit trade, the civil war damaged this sector badly. The roads 
were in many places not safe to use due to the partition of the regions. The port was 
;7Ibid. p. 255. 
i8Llovds Bank Country Report Lebanon. 1979. p.16. 
i 9 EIU, PER. Annual Supplement 1977.P. 29. 
IQLlovds Bank Country Report Lebanon. 1979 p. 17. 
"Merrill Lynch Lebanon Report, (1994) p. 21. 
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closed for a long time as it was on the 'green line', while many of the goods stored were 
looted. Traffic had to be diverted to other Lebanese ports at Tripoli, Jounieh and Sidon, 
all of which had minimal capacity compared to Beirut port. The airport closed during 
the rounds of violence. In 1978 it handled 1.4 million passengers, which corresponds to 
only half the number of passengers in 1974. Middle East Airlines (MEA), the Lebanese 
carrier, suffered substantial losses. Many of its carriers were leased or operated from 
different airports during that period. Trans Mediterranean Airways (TMA), a Lebanese 
cargo carrier moved its headquarters to Paris. 
3.3.1.2 The impact of war on foreign companies 
Due to its position as the financial centre and the entrepot to the Middle East, Beirut had 
attracted the regional headquarters of many foreign companies. They ranged from banks 
and insurance companies to airlines and manufacturers. Beirut provided, in addition to 
freedom of exchange and tax exemptions, a friendly environment for Westerners to live 
in. The high rate of spoken English and French helped the Americans and Europeans to 
settle and conduct business in Beirut. 
The war in 1975 changed the picture. Beirut was no longer safe for foreigners. The 
random shelling and sniping did not distinguish between natives and foreigners. 
Besides, the market was stagnant and no business could be conducted. Foreign 
corporations started fleeing Beirut, initially on a temporary basis, though eventually all 
the temporary headquarters became permanent after the hopes for Beirut recovering and 
returning to its previous status were unfulfilled. The first foreign companies reported to 
flee the country were Bechtel, Goodyear, Firestone, Morgan Guaranty, Chase 
Manhattan Bank, First National City Bank, McDonnell-Douglas and Sheraton. Of the 
113 Japanese companies having offices in Beirut, three-quarters partly or wholly 
evacuated their staff and family members.272 Later in the same year, other big 
companies who had been established in Beirut for years decided to leave. Among them 
were the American Mobil Oil and ESSO Standard (Near East), and Shell Oil of the UK. 
Pan-American airlines and American Life Insurance Company were to follow suit. 2 7 3 Of 
the cities that replaced Beirut as the centre for foreign corporations' operations were 
Athens, Cairo and Amman. Some went to Tehran, others to Bahrain due to the financial 
2 7 2 EIU, QER, 1976, no.l, (1976) p. 9. 
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incentives provided. Indeed, most of the US companies chose mainly Athens, 
although some moved to Cairo, while European and Japanese moved to Tehran, Dubai 
and few to Cairo and Amman. Some of these cities, like Amman, were already trying to 
attract foreign interest and lure it away from Beirut. 2 7 5 Despite all the government's 
attempts to bring the foreign firms back in 1977, when the security situation was 
relatively better, the response was minimal. In January 1977, the government passed a 
law under which it would insure investments in Lebanon against the hazards of civil 
war, revolution, dissension and acts of violence. A banking free zone law, which 
exempted non-residents from foreign guarantee tax and from reserve requirements, 
came into effect on April 1 s t of the same year. However, foreign firms were no longer 
interested.276 
3.3.2 The second phase of the civil war (1983-1990) 
Lebanon's economy witnessed several changes after 1983. It was affected by the 
political and economic development that occurred over that period on both local and 
regional forums. Surprisingly, this period started with some optimistic expectations 
after the Israeli invasion and the restoration of a new government under a new president. 
However, this optimism did not stay for long. Pessimism was the overall picture again. 
Inevitably, the economy was affected by the worsened situation. However, one of the 
main factors of deterioration of the economy was the government's involvement in the 
conflict. Since 1975, the government had been to a great extent remote from the dispute. 
As the army had not been involved in the armed conflict, no cost of the war had been 
carried by the government. After 1983, the state became a party in the war and the army 
was fighting the Leftists in Western Beirut and the mountain. This led to a division of 
the army between Muslims and Christians. The government had already spent a lot of 
money on rebuilding the Lebanese Army. Military expenditure doubled from its pre-
1982 level (26.3 per cent of the budget in 1979).2 7 7 The involvement in the war meant 
2 7 3 E I U , QERno.4 (1976) p. 16. 
2 7 4 E I U , QER, no.3, (1977) p. 15. 
2 7 5 E I U , QER, no.2, (1976) p. 13. 
2 7 6 E I U , QER, no.2 (1977) p. 17. 
2 7 7 Elkhazen. F, The Lebanese Economy After a Decade of Tormoil, 1975-1985. In American-Arab 
Affairs. (Spring 1986) p.80; Saba. E, A New Role for Lebanon. Interview in the Arab Banker. Journal of 
Arab Bankers Association (London: Volume V, no. 4, July/August 1985) p.7. 
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drawing government resources to fund the conflict, a development that did not exist in 
the previous period because the war was funded 'privately'. 
Economic activities were reduced due to the complete separation of the regions which, 
consequently, meant isolation of the markets. Government revenues declined, as the 
government was not able to collect taxes and customs at a time when most of the ports 
were under the militias' control. Externally, the recession in the oil-exporting countries 
caused a decline in remittances from Lebanese expatriates, an income which had played 
a major role in sustaining the economy over the previous period. Finally, the PLO 
expulsion from Beirut ended the Palestinian 'mini-state' in Lebanon. Thus, the 
Palestinian economy in Lebanon was destroyed, and Lebanon was deprived of regular 
foreign currency inflows. 2 7 8 The reduction in government revenues and the excessive 
spending led to a large budget deficit (LL 10 billion in 1984, up from LL 7 billion in 
1982). The government resorted to borrowing in order to cover the deficit, and national 
debt reached L L 30.4 billion in 1984, up by L L 18 million from the 1982 level. 2 7 9 
Unlike other developing countries, the Lebanese government did not seek to finance its 
deficit through foreign aid. It relied instead on the internal financial sector. Treasury 
bills and commercial banks loans were the main source. That is why foreign debt was 
still minimal until the 1990s (US$ 290 million in 1992).2 8 0 
The developments on the political and security sides equally affected the various 
economic sectors. In the following section, a brief coverage of the impact on economic 
sectors in the period (1983-1990) is provided. In the agricultural sector, the 
consequences of the Israeli invasion in 1982 were realised from 1983 onwards. When 
the Israeli troops were re-deployed in the south, this region became a separate territory 
cut off from the rest of the country. Agricultural products of the South (citrus fruits, 
vegetables, tobacco...etc.) were denied access to the other Lebanese territories due to 
severe restrictions imposed by the Israelis. This meant also a decline in exports as the 
citrus fruits exports to the Arab countries came mainly from the south. Israel, moreover, 
started dumping loads of cheaper agricultural products in the Lebanese market (at least 
in the occupied parts). This represented stiff competition for the Lebanese products. It 
2 7 8 Elkhazen. F, The Lebanese Economy After a Decade of Tormoil, 1975-1985. op.cit. 
Kubursi. A, The War Economy of Lebanon: The Confessional Links. (Unpublished paper. Archives of 
the Cnetre for Lebanese Studies. Oxford) p.5., 
279Elkhazen. F, (1986) op.cit, p.80. 
280Merrill Lynch report, op.cit. p.28. 
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also motivated some Arab regimes to impose restrictions on Lebanese exports fearing 
that they might include Israeli products. Agriculture also suffered from an Israeli policy 
of destruction. The Israeli army tended to destroy wide acres of citrus fruit fields in the 
South, on the sides of the main roads, claiming it was a measure to curb resistance 
attacks. Resistance guerrillas used to ambush Israeli patrols in the fields, it was said. 
This caused huge losses for farmers in the South. After 1985, Israeli troops withdrew 
from the South but a narrow strip was kept as a security zone. The subsequent years 
were better as the security status improved in the rural areas. Moreover, the decline in 
the Lebanese pound rate gave the local agricultural products a more competitive 
position in the internal market as well as in the neighbouring Arab countries. However, 
agriculture still faced many problems such as the high cost of transportation and the 
lack of planning.2 8 1 
In industry, the pre-1982 situation allowed factories to operate during periods of calm, 
or in areas safe from shelling. The rounds of violence that divided Beirut again into two 
Eastern and Western parts, after 1983, affected industry badly as many of the factories 
were in the 'green line' area. In a survey prepared by the UN office, it was declared that 
800 factories were destroyed between 1985-1991. Out of them, 600 factories were 
destroyed in the war between the army under General Aoun's command and the pro-
Syrian government in 1989-1990. This led to a decrease in industrial exports, which was 
an important source of foreign currency.282 Industrial exports deteriorated in 1984 to 
US$ 145 million, compared to a US$ 524 million in 1981 and US$ 254 million in 1982. 
However, the period 1987-1989 witnessed some improvement. It reached to US$ 19 
million monthly in 1989 according to the Chamber of Commerce and Industry 2 8 3. The 
reasons for the fluctuation in the amount of the industrial exports are, on one side, the 
deterioration in production due to the closure of many establishments; decline in 
investments in industry; a decrease in credits to industrial establishments; and 
backwardness of available machinery which was not updated. Moreover, at the very 
beginning of this period, Lebanese industrial exports faced the closure of Arab markets, 
same as agricultural exports, as Arab countries feared the smuggling of Israeli 
1%X2UBanque du Uban," a-taqrir a-sanawi" Annual Report (1986) p.8. 
282Haidar. M, Asbah hohout al-lira a-luhnaniah 1975-1991: Dirassah min al-manzour al-iqtisadi wal-
malL Reasons for the Collapse of the Lebanese Pound in 1975-1991: An Economic and Fiscal 
Perspective. (London: Archives of the Centre of Lebanese Studies, 1993) p. 14. 
283Ibid. p.15. 
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products . On the other side, the increase in production and exports (in the second half 
of the 1980s) could be largely attributed to the depreciation of the Lebanese pound. The 
low rate of the Lebanese Pound gave Lebanese products competitive position in both 
internal and external markets, as the cost of production became less, while prices of 
imported goods jumped above consumer's purchase power2 8 5. 
The tertiary sector was hit with further deterioration after 1983. The hopes that rose in 
that year with the reconstruction plans soon collapsed. Many roads were rehabilitated 
and light poles were seen again in the streets of Beirut. The downtown district was 
cleared of barricades to be rebuilt. However, this work soon stopped, and the 
reconstruction process was hindered by the renewal of violence later during that year. 
Thus, the services sector that had a chance to pick up had a down turn again. Beirut's 
port and airport witnessed long periods of closure, a development accompanied by the 
closure of the Beirut-Damascus highway, which brought transit trade to a halt. 
In the financial sector, banking activities declined in that period as well. The 
deterioration in economic activities after 1983 affected the banking sector. This was due 
to the flight of capital; the depreciation of the Lebanese pound; political instability and 
economic stagnation.286 The real output of banking dropped sharply between 1982-
1987. The assets decreased by 24 per cent in real terms, annually. Real non-bank 
deposits followed suit by 25 per cent and real credits by 34 per cent. The number of 
banks dropped to 83 while branches increased to 703 by the end of 1987. This was due 
to the partition of regions, and a measure taken by banks since 1975 to facilitate 
banking operations. Problems of liquidity became common and some banks were 
unable to avoid bankruptcy. Many banks established offices abroad in the Arab 
countries and Europe (mainly France and Cyprus). This policy was considered 
defensive rather than expansionist as these banks followed their customers who fled the 
country, partly to avoid huge withdrawals. However, those offices proved not to be 
profitable as the original offices in Lebanon.287 Therefore, the sector that was resilient 
during the first years of the civil war and proved to be the only motive for optimism 
seemed to be retreating against the fiscal crisis, and the stagnation in the economy. 
285Banque du Liban Annual Report. (1986) p.80. 
2 8 6 Osseiran.F, Banking performance in Lebanon 1982-1987. Association de Banques du Liban, Rapport 
du Conseil (1989-1990) p.189. 
2 8 7 Osseiran.F, Bankinp performance in Lebanon 1982-1987. op.cit. pp.170-178. 
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3.3.2.1 Summary: the impact of the civil war 
The civil war changed the features of Lebanon's economy drastically. It caused a 
deterioration in GDP after steady growth; a budget deficit and huge public debt; sharp 
depreciation of the Lebanese pound; almost complete destruction of the productive 
sectors; and a brain drain after the flight of most professionals and skilled labour. 
During the years of war 990,000 Lebanese left their country.2 8 8 The reasons that 
exacerbated this economic deterioration could be found in the decline in the output of 
all productive sectors; the lack of capital, mainly after 1982 (both expatriates' 
remittances and foreign aid); and huge public debt. Indeed, the huge public debt was a 
result of the reckless fiscal policy applied by the government to cover its budget deficit, 
which mounted up due to the lack of governmental revenues usurped by militias. The 
central bank lost huge amounts of foreign currency reserves due to the reckless 
monetary policy trying to maintain an artificial rate of the Lebanese pound, which 
eventually did not work and ended up in a massive deterioration of the rate of the 
currency. 
Having said that, it would be irrelevant to talk about foreign firms operating in 
Lebanon. During the 1980s, not only foreign firms disappeared from Lebanon, but also 
foreign people vanished. The bombing of the American and French embassies in 1983, 
forced many of the remaining foreigners to leave the country. The abduction of 
foreigners in the later years was enough to push all of them out of the country. 
3.4 Post-civil war period: recovery and reconstruction 
The civil war drew to its end in 1990. The catalyst for this end was the signing of the 
Ta'if Agreement by the members of Lebanese parliament in October 1989. This 
agreement was to pave the way for national reconciliation and an end to the Lebanese 
conflict. However, there was a set of developments that formed a prelude to the Ta'if 
Agreement. By September 1988, the term of the outgoing President Amin Gemayel 
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came to an end with no elected successor. The Lebanese parliament was not able to 
convene to elect a new president. The 'constitutional void' resulted in handing the reins 
of power to the commander of the army, General Michel Aoun, who formed a martial 
cabinet. The rejection of this/air accompli by the then pro-Syrian cabinet meant that the 
country was run by two separate governments. A few months later, General Aoun 
declared war on Syria, aiming to end the Syrian military presence in Lebanon. This was 
to mark the start of another round of violence leaving in its wake vast human and 
physical losses. 
3.4.1 The Ta'if Agreement 
Mediation attempts that were undertaken by the US and the Arab League culminated 
eventually in flying the surviving members of parliament, in November 1989, to the 
town of Ta'if in Saudi Arabia. There, they agreed on a national reconciliation by signing 
what has been known since then as the Ta'if Agreement. This agreement stipulated the 
amendment of the constitution to establish some kind of balance between the sectarian 
factions of Lebanon. Back in Lebanon, the parliament convened on 5 November 1989 
and elected a new president, Rene Moawad, who was to be assassinated weeks later. A 
successor was elected promptly. The new president was Elias Hrawi, the MP of Zahleh. 
Aoun rejected the agreement and the subsequent presidential elections as being Syrian-
orchestrated. The stalemate in the Lebanese situation was to stay until the Syrian/'Ta'if-
Lebanon' alliance stormed Aoun's enclaves. He in turn fled to the French Embassy and 
asked his Lebanese Army troops to surrender to the Ta'if government. His agreed 
departure to Paris was to signal the end of the civil war of Lebanon. 
The Ta'if Agreement established important changes in the factional system of Lebanon. 
The Muslims' outcry about their maltreatment in the Lebanese constitution resulting 
from their under-representation in the parliament and the excessive authorities of the 
Maronite president was to have a response. The signing of the national reconciliation 
covenant in Ta'if led to the seventh amendment of the 1926 constitution that had been 
drafted by the French authorities, on 21 September 1990. Juhha considered the Ta'if 
amendments to be the most important after the fourth amendment of 1943, which 
Labaki.B, in Hourani.A & Shehadi.N, (1992) op.cit, p.609. 
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abolished the points referring to the French mandate authorities.289 Thirty-one points in 
the constitution were amended to accommodate the new changes. The most crucial of 
these changes were: shifting the executive authorities from the Maronite president, who 
was supposed to be assisted by ministers, to the Council of Ministers headed by the 
Sunni PM. The President became "the Head of the State and the symbol of its unity" 
while the Council became the authority that controled the armed forces and all 
executive authorities, which were previously mostly in the President's hands.290 The 
Council of Ministers was freed, in a way, from the President's upper hand through his 
right to dismiss the PM or the Council. After Ta'if, only a parliamentary vote could 
dismiss the PM. 2 9 1 The previous division of parliamentary seats between Christians and 
Muslims, which favoured the Christians, was changed as well. The formal ratio of 6:5 
seats was to become 1:1 between Muslims and Christians. However, this provision was 
meant to be temporary until a new, non-sectarian, electoral system was established.292 
The Shi'a share was improved by extending the tenure of the Speaker of the Parliament 
to four years instead of one. The office also received a vital boost by obliging the 
president to consult the Speaker after conducting compulsory parliamentary 
consultations before naming a new PM. 2 9 3 More importantly, the amended point 95 
stipulated that the parliament be elected on an equal basis between Christians and 
Muslims and should take suitable measures to abolish sectarianism. This was to replace 
the provision of 'just' distribution of public sector posts amongst factional groups.294 
The Ta'if agreement has overhauled the Lebanese ruling system, which was described 
by Paul Salem as "presidential" due to the excessive authorities having been attached to 
the president's office. 2 9 5 However, he considered that the coalitional and confessional 
aspects of the system remained intact. It stayed a matter of power-sharing based on the 
factional divisions of the Lebanese people and the representation of each sectarian 
group. Hudson commented that although the Ta'if agreement restored a "temporary" 
2 8 9 Juhha. S, "a-dustur a-luhnani. tarikhuh. ta'adilatuh. nassuh al-hali 1926-1991" (The Lebanese 
Constitution: Its History. Amendments. Current Text 1926-9PiBeirut. Dar el-'elm lil-malayin: 1991) 
p.:27. 
2 9 0 Juhha S, (1991) op.cit. 
2 9 1 Taif: The Changing Rules of the Political Game. In Lebanon 1997-8. Oxford Business Group. Op.cit, 
p. 16. 
2 9 2 Juhha. S. (1991) op.cit, p. 28. 
2 9 3 Ibid. p. 65. 
2 9 4 Ibid. p. 95. 
2 9 5 Salem. P, Framing Post-war Lebanon: Perspectives on the Constitution and the Structure of Power. 
Mediterranean Politics. (3) no.l Summer 1998. p. 14. 
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confessional order, it was a "fine-tuned one to accommodate new realities". 6 He added 
that the agreement had a clear commitment to dismantling confessionalism. Whether 
these commitments were met in practice is another matter indeed. As a matter of fact, 
not a single point in the constitution stipulates the religion of the president, the PM or 
the speaker. It has been always a tradition, rather than a constitutional rule. Apart from 
constitutional changes, the Ta'if Agreement provisioned other reforms. Amongst these 
were the disarming of militias; the formation of a Social and Economic Council to 
participate in economic and social policies; the implementation of widespread 
administrative decentralisation and the revival of municipal government; the 
redeployment of the Syrian 30,000-troops to the Bekaa Valley two years after 
establishing the first post-war government; and establishing special relations with Syria. 
Some of these provisions are yet to be implemented. 
3.4.2 The new government; militias disarmed 
It seems that the prerequisite to disarm militias and establish government's authority 
over the country was to establish a government with the warlords being its pillars. This 
is how we could describe the first post-war government established by Omar Karami in 
December 1990. Karami's government, supported by the Syrians, managed to disarm 
the Lebanese militias and extend the Lebanese Army's authority to the regions. Only 
Hizbollah was exempted because of its engagement in resistance against Israel. Even 
Palestinians were confined to their camps after stretching out into places like Sidon. 
Heavy weaponry was to be handed to the Lebanese Army. 
However, Karami's government had to go in May 1992 under heavy public pressure 
due to its failure to address economic problems. A new government was established by 
Rashid Sulh, not expected to solve the problem but to prepare the country for the first 
parliamentary elections since 1972. Elections took place despite huge Christian 
opposition, which saw the elections as being Syrian orchestrated. The prevailing 
Christian boycott of the summer elections resulted in the emergence of a new type of 
parliament characterised by an absence of real Christian representation. In addition, new 
strata of representatives appeared in the parliament composed mainly of pro-Syrian 
warlords and their followers, while many traditional notable families were relegated. 
2 9 6 Hudson. M.C, Lebanon After Ta'if: Another Reform Opportunity Lost? Arab Studies Quarterly. (21) 
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These elections ended by bringing Nabih Berri, the leader of Shia Amal Movement and 
strongest ally of Syria, to the helm of the parliament. Soon after, the majority of the new 
MPs were to suggest the name of Rafiq Hariri for the office of PM. He was the man to 
start the reconstruction process. 
3.4.3 The economic side of the story 
The 'War of Liberation' that was waged by General Aoun against the Syrians 
exacerbated the dire economic situation of the country. The currency had already 
depreciated immensely against the US dollar and the government had very limited 
revenues due to the absence of its authority. That meant resorting to borrowing to fund 
expenditure. The Lebanese exports that had flourished in the mid-eighties, due to the 
depreciation of the Lebanese Pound, were reduced by 23 per cent in 1988 and 21 per 
cent in 1989. Meanwhile, the IMF estimated the decrease in output at 15 per cent and 10 
per cent in 1989 and 1990 respectively.297 A'yash noted that despite a nominal increase 
of 114 per cent in the value of government revenues in 1989, this was enough to fund 
only 9 per cent of the expenditure. Thus, the budget deficit/expenditure reached 90 per 
cent while it was estimated at 20 per cent of GNP. Domestic public debt also increased 
by 88 per cent.2 9 8 
The positive impact of the end of the civil war and the establishment of a new 
government on the Lebanese economy is undeniable. Capital inflows from Arab and 
Lebanese expatriates' sources instigated a surplus in the balance of payments reaching 
US$ 1074 m in 1991. The same indicator had suffered a deficit of US$ 309m and US$ 
431 m in 1989 and 1990 respectively.299 GDP grew also by 40 per cent.3 0 0 On the 
monetary level, inflation decreased from 69 per cent in 1990 to 51 per cent in 1991. 3 0 1 
The exchange rate of the Lebanese pound showed a relative stability by depreciating by 
only 4.2 per cent against the US dollar. 3 0 2 Dollarisation that reached 77.2 per cent of 
no. 1, Winter 1999. p.28. 
2 9 7 Al-'Ayash. G, op.cit, pp.65-66. 
2 9 8 Ibid. 
2 9 9 Banque du Liban. Annual Report 1990-91-92 (Arabic version) p. 17. 
3 0 0 Ibid. & Manala. N, Assiyassah al-'imariyahfi lubnan: min khitat a-rmhoud ila al-harnamij al-inma'I 
(Reconstruction Policy in Lebanon: From the Recovery Plan to the Development Programme) (Beirut: al-
markaz al- 'arabi lil-ma 'aloumat - Assafir, 1995). 
3 0 1 Figures cited from Monetary Developments: Running a Tight Regime in Lebanon 1997-8. Op.cit, 
p.48. 
109 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment of EU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
bank deposits in September 1990 dropped to 73.6 by the end of the same year, and 
reached 68.3 per cent by the end of 1991. 3 0 3 The still high figures of dollarisation 
reflected the rather doubtful position of the Lebanese currency despite the relative 
stability of its rate. Interest rates on T-bills, which reached 24.98 per cent in real terms 
in 1990, had ascended to 28.18 per cent in March 1991 to descend afterwards to the rate 
of 19.47 per cent by the end of 1991. 3 0 4 This still high rate of interest affected the rate of 
dollarisation in deposits. Interest rates on borrowing in Lebanese Pounds had gone up 
following the T-bills rate, and also due to the volatility of its value. The other option 
was to borrow in dollars at a lower rate. On the fiscal level, the extending of 
government's authority to the regions enabled it to lay hands on substantial sources of 
revenues. Special reference can be made here to the illegally operated ports that had 
deprived the government of its traditional major source of revenues, the custom duties. 
Government revenues thus quadrupled from L L 126.4 bn in 1990 to LL 522.2 bn by the 
end of 1991 (over 300 per cent). In 1992, this figure had almost doubled to LL 1,030.9 
bn. 3 0 5 Meanwhile, the deficit/expenditure rate was reduced to 56 3 0 6 per cent in 1991. In 
1992 it was 58 per cent.307 This can be considered a big achievement when compared to 
the astronomical deficit figures of 1989 and 1990 when it reached 91 and 83 per cent 
respectively. However, the government did not seem to have a clear fiscal policy in 
order to reduce the high level of budget deficit and public debt. On the contrary, the 
government resorted to borrowing from the domestic market at high interest rates to 
cover its rising expenditure. Over 37 per cent of the government's expenditure went to 
fund public sector salaries, which amounted to L L 370 bn in 1991, while domestic-debt 
service was over 21.5 per cent. Investment figures surged sharply from LL 33.1 bn in 
1990 to LL 161 bn in the following year. The latter expenditure can be justified as the 
government had to start a development process to install some essential services that 
were completely destroyed. These figures were to double in 1992, in addition to other 
expenditure. The fiscal policy proved to be faulty when the government decided to 
increase public sector salaries by 120 per cent, adjusting them to the changes in the 
value of the Lebanese Pound. Enough funds were not secured for this swelling cost, 
particularly as other expenditures went up. Consequently, salaries reached L L 660.1 bn 
3 0 3 Monetary Developments: Running a Tight Regime in Lebanon 1997-8. Op.ciL p.40. 
3 0 4 Ibid. p.72. 
3 0 5 Ibid. p. 61. 
3 0 6 The statistics of the Central Bank pointed out that revenues were boosted by a Saudi donation of LL 
65.6 bn. 
110 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment ofEU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
(30.26 per cent of expenditure and 64.03 per cent of revenues). Investment doubled to 
LL 313.9 bn (14.39 per cent of expenditure). Obviously, more borrowing was needed to 
cover the deficit, thus internal debt service doubled, snatching LL 453.9 bn of the 
expenditure and representing 20.81 per cent. However, extra expenditure of LL 545.8 
bn went into miscellaneous current expenditure. That was because of the need to inject 
life into governmental departments that had been 'paralysed' for long periods of time. 
This amounted for over 25 per cent of expenditure.308 
The 1992 government budget rendered the economic situation very precarious. The 
exchange market was affected as the demand for dollars hiked parallel with a huge sale 
of LL T-bills. Capital flight was recorded as well, particularly from capital that had 
flowed into Lebanon the year before.309 The rate of the Lebanese currency plummeted 
against the US dollar from LL 879 by the end of 1991 to LL 1,730.5 in May 1992 when 
the Karami government was publicly forced to step down. However, under the Sulh 
government, the monetary situation did not improve. On the contrary, the deterioration 
of the Lebanese Pound continued, reaching a record high of LL 2,825 in September 
1992 during the first parliamentary elections.310 Improvements were not to happen until 
the end of the elections and consequent arrival of Hariri to the PM office. 
3.4.3.1 The flow of capital 
The capital flow that is meant here is both private investment and aid. The first was 
mostly to come from Lebanese expatriates while the second was expected from Arab 
and other friendly donors. As for the expatriate funds, despite a remarkable flow, it was 
below the Lebanese government's expectations. According to IMF statistics, between 
US$ 10 bn and US$ 15 bn were still held abroad by Lebanese expatriates in 1991. Yet, 
the majority of the significant influx of capital in 1991 went into real estate investments 
instead of being directed into productive investments.311 
After the end of the civil war and the restoration of the government's authority, the 
process of reconstruction should have started. However, rebuilding needed money while 
3 0 7 Al-'Ayash. G, op.cit, p.68. 
3 0 8 All figures are derived from Banque du Liban statistics in the Annual Report for 1990-91-92. 
3 0 9 Al-'Ayash. G, op.cit, p.71. 
3 1 0 Figures of exchange rate are from Banque du Liban statistics. Annual Report 1990-91-92. p: 50. 
3 1 1 The Middle East and North Africa. (Europa publications Limited, 1997) p.707. 
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revenues were scarce. The only way to jump-start the reconstruction was if foreign aid 
was channeled into the country. The Lebanese bet heavily on aid anticipated to come 
from abroad. Promises of Arab aid were made at the Arab leaders' summit in Baghdad 
in May 1990. They agreed to set up an International Fund for Assisting Lebanon. The 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and its consequent Gulf War I I caused the shelving of the 
idea.312 The Lebanese Minister of Exterior Fares Bouez announced in October 1991 that 
the fund was to be established with US$ 2 bn, US$ 500-$ 600 m of which would come 
from the Gulf States and a further US$ 500m from Japan, France, Germany, and Italy. 
Nothing came through, however. The World Bank took another initiative in December 
1991, by sponsoring a meeting for potential donors to Lebanon in Paris. PM Karami 
requested US$ 4,450 m for urgent projects over the subsequent three years. Only US$ 
700 m was pledged in response, most of which had been promised earlier through 
bilateral agreements.313 The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) 
agreed also to give a US$ 36 m loan for power projects, while the Arab Fund for 
Economic and Social Development (AFESD) granted US$ 73 m, also for power 
schemes. Italy emerged in February 1992 as the biggest Western contributor to 
Lebanon's reconstruction by earmarking US$ 460 m in loans and grants for various 
infrastructure projects. However, it was not clear whether all these pledges were 
included in the US$ 700 m promised earlier in Paris or not.314 What is sure is that very 
little promised aid was received. 
3.4.4 The reconstruction process: Hariri's vision of reconstruction and economic 
development 'Horizon 2000' 
The immediate impact of Hariri's appointment as the new Prime minister was seen in 
the rapid monetary recovery in the exchange rate. After the sharp deterioration of the 
Lebanese Pound, which reached LL 2,825 for a US$ 1 in 1992, the end of the same year 
witnessed a significant evolution of its value reaching LL 1,800 for a dollar. Hariri's 
arrival was seen as sign to commence the reconstruction process effectively. 
Being one of the architects of the Ta'if Agreement, Hariri committed himself to its 
application. Moreover, as the Syrian consensus is essential in Lebanese internal politics, 
3 1 2 The Middle East and North Africa. (Europa publications Limited, 1997), op.cit, p.707. 
3 1 3 Ibid. 
3 1 4 Ibid. 
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he had to pledge to strengthen relations between the two countries. These two pledges 
were amongst many Hariri declared in his Cabinet address to the parliament to win its 
vote of confidence.315 He announced the start of the repatriation of all displaced 
Lebanese and stressed the need for administrative reforms for economic development. 
Health care and education were to be improved, and modern infrastructure was to be 
built. "Without advanced telecommunications, Lebanon cannot hope to restore its 
former role as a regional business centre", he stressed.316 Hariri considered construction 
and development as two inter-linked aspects of the socio-economic problem that was 
facing Lebanon. For that he stressed three principles: 
- The consolidation of the free economic system, through which the 
government will act to solve our economic problems as part of the process 
of rebuilding the state on sound basis. He emphasised that the state will set 
the example for citizens by rationalising expenditure and desisting from 
futile expenses. 
- Problems that are facing construction and development shall be identified 
and solved accurately and scientifically to secure serious achievements. 
- Speeding up reconstruction absolutely does not mean neglecting the 
balanced and long-term development objectives. Therefore, he added, the 
government will draw up a socio-economic concept based on the free 
317 
economic system. 
Concerning the fiscal policy of his government, Hariri stressed that some of the most 
prominent priorities of his government were combating inflation and monopolies, 
stabilising the currency's rate of exchange, and restoring confidence in it. He ensured 
that the government's budget deficit would be eliminated through controlled 
expenditure and increased revenues. The latter was to be achieved by improving 
collection of taxes and levy of all custom duties. He promised to develop the taxation 
system on the basis of social and economic criteria. This would encourage Lebanese and 
Arab investments, and speed up the development cycle, he asserted.318 
3 1 5 SWB, Summary of World Broadcast. "Hariri's Speech in the Parliament" .BBC. 11, November 1992. 
p.2. 
SWB, Summary of World Broadcast. "Hariri's Speech in the Parliament. op.ciL 
3 1 7 Ibid. 
3 1 8 Ibid. 
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The reconstruction plan, 'Horizon 2000', was prepared by the Council for Development 
and Reconstruction (CDR), an agent that had been established by the government back 
in 1977 to be in charge of reconstruction. Even before the arrival of Hariri to power, his 
influence in the CDR was recognised. The head of the institute in the 1990's, Al-Fadel 
Shalak was one of his associates, while its new headquarters - an old Ottoman palace -
was renovated by Hariri. A few months after his appointment, Hariri announced 
'Horizon 2000'. It was a 10-year perspective programme (1993-2002) 
"for recovery and balanced development, with the overall target of doubling 
per capita gross domestic product (GDP) over the period, thus allowing 
Lebanon to regain its position among the world's upper middle income 
nations".319 
The founders of the plan considered that, despite the destruction caused by the war, an 
efficient spending on infrastructure rehabilitation and expansion and the reactivation of 
the productive sectors would yield quick economic returns. These would allow for the 
recovery of costs in public utilities in a few years, and then generate the revenue 
surpluses necessary for offsetting public budget deficits, meeting debt repayment 
obligations, and accelerating economic recovery. The plan furthermore assumed that 
Lebanon was a country with high financial credibility for a set of reasons: the state had 
been keen on meeting debt repayments even during the war; the total public debt stock 
stood "to-day at no more than 53 per cent of GDP and 68 per cent of official reserves" 
(1993); and the large liquid assets held by Lebanese abroad would sooner or later find 
their way back home. Meanwhile, it stressed that without the private sector taking up its 
role, the reconstruction process would not proceed steadily.320 
'Horizon 2000' sets two tasks for the government: to provide the private sector with an 
economic and financial environment conducive to the revitalisation of its activities and 
the resumption of its investments; and to consolidate public confidence in the state and 
in the future of the country. 
3.4.4.1 'Horizon 2000V requirements for appropriate economic 
environment 
319Republic of Lebanon, CDR, "Horizon 2000 For Reconstruction & Development". (1993) p.2. 
3 2 0 Ibid. pp. 3-4. 
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'Horizon 2000' states that the creation of an appropriate economic and financial 
environment for the private sector requires investments to be undertaken by the 
government. These are to include: 
- The provision of suitable physical infrastructure, including electricity, 
telecommunications, water supply, wastewater collection and treatment, roads, 
public transport and railways, ports and airports and government buildings...etc. 
An acceptable social infrastructure related to housing and resettlement, public 
health, education.. .etc. 
- The reactivation of productive sectors, including agriculture and irrigation, industry, 
oil, private sector services and tourism. 
- Channelling the savings of the public to private sector investments through the 
banking system, which should be freed from mandatory subscriptions to treasury 
bills in order to be able to concentrate on financing productive sectors. 
- Ensuring macroeconomic stability by having 'normal' inflation rates and a stable 
national currency. This is to happen through eliminating the public sector's current 
budget deficit.321 
3.4.4.2 Envisaged cost of recovery 
The public recovery expenditure was indicated in the base scenario of US$ 11,672 m (at 
1992 constant prices) over the 10-year period. This comprised US$ 10,212 m for 
physical investment, US$ 270 m for non-physical investments (institutional 
strengthening, programme planning and implementation support), and US$ 1,190 m of 
grant and credit support to the private sector.322 However, finance requirements of the 
plan did not stop at that level. The cost was envisaged to add up to about US$ 14.3 bn 
when valued at the time of spending. Moreover, an additional US$ 4.1 bn would be 
needed to meet budget deficits in the first two years, and debt repayment obligations 
throughout the period. Gross financing requirements would thus amount in total to some 
US$ 18.4 bn in current prices over the 'Horizon' period.323 
3.4.4.3 'Horizon 2000' macroeconomic perspective 
1 Horizon 2000 For Reconstruction & Development, op.cit, pp. 4-5. 
2 Ibid. p. 8. 
3 Ibid. p. 14. 
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As mentioned earlier, the reconstruction plan aimed at restoring the real GDP to its pre-
war level (1974) by 1995, and doubling the real GDP per capita in the period extending 
from 1992 to 2002. The aim was to move Lebanon into the group of upper middle-
income countries. 
Reducing public expenditure was the aim of the Base Scenario. The fiscal adjustment 
process had a target of progressive decline in expenditure from 26 per cent in 1993 to 15 
per cent by 2002. Current public revenues, meanwhile (excluding any net revenues from 
public enterprises), were envisaged to increase from 13 per cent of GDP in 1993 to 20 
per cent by 1998. The expected outcome was achieving a fiscal situation comparable 
with the group of upper middle-income countries.324 A balanced government budget 
was to be reached in 1995 and, thereafter, the budget would register surpluses mounting 
up to 9 per cent of GDP by the year 2000. The expected current budget surplus starting 
from 1996 would constitute the principal source of financing public recovery 
expenditures as well as debt services requirements, the plan asserted.325 
Government indebtedness is one of the definite results of 'Horizon 2000'. However, it 
will still be manageable according to the plan. The total debt stock was expected to rise 
from less than 50 per cent of GDP in 1992 to a peak of 84 per cent in 1995 and then to 
progressively decline to 39 per cent by 2002. As for foreign debt stock, it would peak at 
37 per cent of GDP in 1996 before decreasing steadily to 16 per cent by 2002. Total 
debt repayments (principal and interest) would rise to 11 per cent of GDP in 1994 
before declining consistently to 5 per cent by 2002.326 
3.4.4.4 'Horizon 2000' sources of finance 
Tapping the international market for foreign borrowing seemed to be the preferred 
source for the government in financing reconstruction. The plan assumed this would be 
the best option when current budget surplus would not be available. This argument was 
built on the "likely superior terms on official foreign currency borrowing compared to 
domestic currency borrowing (lower interest rates, longer maturity, and grace periods 
for capital repayments)". Domestic borrowing would be resorted to only in the case of 
Horizon 2000 For Reconstruction & Development, op.cit, p. 12. 
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unavailability of current budget surplus and foreign currency borrowing. The plan stated 
that this strategy of maximising the level of foreign finance was to minimise the extent 
to which government domestic currency borrowing crowded out private sector domestic 
currency borrowing.327 
'Horizon 2000' envisaged the contribution of foreign borrowing in the total public 
recovery expenditure to be 34 per cent (US$ 4.9bn) over the 10-year period. No foreign 
borrowing was anticipated to finance non-recovery expenditures. Domestic currency 
borrowing for investment purposes would be "relatively modest" (6 per cent of recovery 
expenditure). However, these would remain a significant source of meeting gross 
financing requirements (19 per cent), the plan emphasised. The role of domestic 
borrowing was still central, however, as it was expected to sustain the financing of some 
US$ 2.6 bn of other requirements (current budget deficits and debt repayments). 
Meanwhile, a shift from borrowing from the banking sector to borrowing from the 
public was to be introduced. This reduction in the government indebtedness to the 
banking system by reducing the compulsory financing of public sector operations would 
shift the banks' focus towards funding the private sector activities, the plan anticipated. 
Foreign grants were expected to contribute 6 per cent of expenditure, while receipts of 
interest and principal repayments under the credit support programme would contribute 
4 per cent.328 
The major envisaged source of funding, however, was the expected budget surpluses 
which would contribute 47 per cent (US$ 8.4 bn) of gross financing requirements over 
the 'Horizon' period, meeting US$ 7.1 bn (50 per cent) of the US$ 14.3 bn recovery 
programme requirements and US$ 1.6 bn (or 38 per cent) of other requirements. The 
plan reiterated, however, that budget surpluses would depend on the fulfilling of the 
fiscal adjustments and achieving surpluses in the revenues of EDL (Electricite du Liban) 
and Telecoms, targeted by the Base Scenario.329 
However, the dependence on sources of finance varied from a period to another within 
the 'Horizon 2000' period, which was divided into two sub-periods. 
Horizon 2000 For Reconstruction & Development op.cit, p. 13. 
Ibid. p. 134. 
Ibid. p. 127. 
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First period (1993-1997): Gross financing requirements were US$ 9.6 bn, of which US$ 
7.2 bn (75 per cent) relate to public recovery programme. Sources of finance were 
expected as follows: 
44% 
Foreign currency borrowing 
34% 
Domestic currency borrowing 
Current budget surplus 14 % 
Foreign capital grants 7 % 
Repayments under credit programme 1 % 
Second period (1998-2002): Total financing requirements were expected as US$ 8.8 bn, 
of which public recovery expenditures amount to US$ 7.1 bn (80 per cent). Sources of 
finance were envisaged as follows: 
Current budget surplus 84 % 
Foreign currency borrowing 7 % 
Repayments under credit programme 5 % 
Foreign capital grants 2 % 
Domestic currency borrowing 2 % 
Source: 'Horizon 2000'p. 134. 
3.4.4.5 Feasibility of the 'Horizon 2000' 
The above was a brief summary of the Hariri government's plan for reconstruction. It 
can be argued that this plan looks impressive at first glance. However, the best that can 
be said about it is that it was very optimistic. In some aspects, one could go further and 
describe it as superficial. The macroeconomic assumptions were not built on strong 
bases. Meanwhile, it seemed to show the best scenario ignoring completely any 
precautions for the worst scenario. No wonder that there was a mixed feeling amongst 
Lebanese officials and economists towards 'Horizon 2000'. These feelings can be 
topped by Hariri's remarks in 1997 that 'Horizon 2000' was not "a bible but a plan 
prepared by human beings" to which the government was sticking as much as possible 
and making alterations if needed. Yet he still believed that the programme "was 
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progressing on the right track". Economists had a different approach, questioning the 
suitability of the plan. An official source in the Ministry of Finance, under Hariri, 
commented that 'Horizon 2000' was never put into implementation because it did not 
need a great economist to show its inapplicability.331 Hamdan, as well, asserted that a 
few calculations could easily reveal the faults of the plan.332 A funny comment on the 
official denial of the usage of the plan described 'Horizon 2000' as an "orphan that no 
one is willing to adopt".333 Among the assumptions that can be criticised are the 
following: 
- The plan assumed that public sector investment in rebuilding the infrastructure 
would definitely generate economic activities that would be enough to cover the 
budget deficit and meet debt repayments. By creating a suitable environment for 
investments, the government believed the private sector would be keen to get 
involved and thus instigate growth. However, as much as the need for infrastructure 
to attract investment is true, even with the best infrastructure the response of private 
sector cannot be guaranteed. The local businesses might have an interest in business 
opportunities. However, any hesitation or delay in their response, due to particular 
uncertainties, would leave the government with the problem of covering a growing 
budget deficit due to maximising debt repayments. 
The assumption that Lebanon is a country with high financial credibility is to a great 
extent questionable, given the bases on which the plan built the assumption. Firstly, 
the usefulness of government keenness on meeting debt repayments through the 
years of war is arguable. The amount of debt accumulated during the war was still 
manageable compared to what it would be like once the reconstruction process kick-
started. Moreover, the government was depending on borrowing to finance its 
deficit, hence the steady increase in debt during the war period. Secondly, the fact 
that the total public debt stock was standing at no more than 53 per cent of GDP and 
68 per cent of reserves in 1993, does not contribute remarkably to justifying 
Lebanon's high financial credibility. As mentioned earlier, a huge increase in public 
debt was expected once reconstruction started due to the need for massive funds. 
This implies that the amount of public debt compared to the GDP would be much 
3 3 0 Interview with PM Rafiq Hariri in Lebanon 1997-8. The Annual Business. Economic and Political 
Review. op.cit, p. 32. 
3 3 1 Author's interview with Mazen Hanna. Advisor at the Ministry of Finance during Hariri's period . 
Beirut July 1998. 
3 3 2 Author's interview with Dr Kama! Hamdan. Lebanese economist Beirut July 1998. 
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higher (84 per cent in 1995 according to the plan). Therefore, in the case that the 
expected economic growth and increase of revenues did not occur, the public 
finances would be problematic. Thirdly, the plan highlights the government's belief 
in the certain influx of large liquid assets held by Lebanese abroad. This proved to 
be a very optimistic presumption. The expatriate capital proved to be cautious about 
returning to Lebanon due to the uncertain political and economic situation. 
Significant sums of the capital influx after the end of the civil war, for instance, 
quickly found its way out after the first economic turbulence. Besides, presuming 
that the expatriate capital would respond, there were no guarantees for the crucial 
role it would play in the economic recovery process. The previous experience with 
influx capital showed that investments in T-bills and real estate were preferred to 
any other productive investments. Therefore, it was uncertain whether expatriate 
capital would flow into Lebanon, and if it did, its productive influence was not 
guaranteed due to very lack of short-term commitments. Thus, Lebanon's high 
financial credibility needed a stronger base to be justified. 
3.4.5 The policies of Hariri's government in practice 
3.4.5.1 Monetary achievements 
Hariri arrived into the office of PM in the midst of an economic crisis in Lebanon, 
which reflected in the massive depreciation in the value of the Lebanese Pound, high 
dollarisation in deposits, and inflation reaching 120 per cent. After his arrival, he 
pledged to combat inflation and stabilise the national currency. Indeed, he succeeded in 
fulfilling his promise as the rate of exchange rose from LL 2,248 to US$ 1 in October 
1992 to LL 1,528 in December 1997, regaining 32 per cent of its value.334 Inflation fell 
from as high as 100 per cent on the eve of his arrival in office to 29 per cent in 1993, 
and just 8 per cent in 1997.335 Dollarisation fell from around 70 per cent of deposits in 
1993 to 56.5 per cent by the end of 1996.336 Foreign exchange reserves that had been 
exhausted defending the Lebanese Pound against depreciation in the previous years 
3 3 3 Author's interview with Dr Antoine Haddad. Lebanese economist. Beirut. July 1998. 
3 3 4 Banque Du Liban. Annual Reports. (1995). p.56 & (1997). p.58. 
3 3 5 Banque du Liban. Annual Report (1995). p.15. 
3 3 6 Banque Du Liban. Annual Report (1996) (Arabic version), p.38. 
(The IMF at 53 per cent for the end of 1996) 
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were beefed up again. Gross official reserves of foreign exchange rose from US$ 1.2 bn 
to over US$ 6.1 bn in 1998.337 
However, it has to be said that these monetary achievements were supported by other 
monetary measures that had an adverse effect on the economy. The government had 
resorted to funding its expenditure through borrowing from the domestic market at high 
interest rates. In this sense, it followed the pattern followed by previous governments in 
financing public expenditure. Interest rates on T-bills reached over 37 per cent in 1995. 
Such high rates were required to finance public expenditure and to defend the Lebanese 
Pound during periods of political uncertainties. However, the effect of the high interest 
rates on the economy was dismal. The government had crowded out the private sector 
from the economic cycle by depriving it of funding. It destroyed the chances of the 
private sector to receive affordable loans from the banking sector. The latter was 
'seduced' by the lucrative interest rates offered by the government on T-bills. Therefore, 
the government had contradicted the core of its 'Horizon 2000' plan, which envisaged a 
crucial role for the private sector in reactivating the economic cycle. Loans to the public 
sector reached LL 13,234.17 bn (US$ 8,666.7 m) in 1997, while loans to domestic 
private sector totalled LL 15,451.25 bn (US$ 10,118.70 m). 3 3 8 Therefore, if domestic 
lending had totalled LL 28,685.43 bn (US$ 18,785.48 m), the public sector has seized 
46 per cent of it. The greatest harm had been done to the productive sectors. 
Industrialists had only a very slim chance of receiving soft long-term loans from the 
domestic banking sector. Instead, only short-term, trade-oriented activities were 
financed. By 1997, only 12.44 per cent of banking loans to private sector went to 
industry, while agriculture received just 1.49 per cent. Moreover, lending to the private 
sector was characterised by high dollarisation. Loans in US dollars amounted for US$ 
8,817 m in 1997, representing over 87 per cent of total loans to the domestic private 
sector. This was due to uncertainty about the Lebanese Pound giving preference to 
dollar lending on the banks' side, and also to the high interest rates on Lebanese Pound 
borrowing, on the borrowers' side. On the other hand, the rate of the Lebanese Pound 
had been criticised for being over valued. A report by Flemings considered that the 
nominal value of the Lebanese Pound was 44 per cent over its real value in 1998. It 
3 3 7 Ibid. 
3 3 8 Banque du Liban. Annual Report (1997). (Arabic version) p.40. 
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stated that the monetary authorities interfered frequently to defend the rate of the 
339 
currency. 
3.4.5.2 Fiscal achievements 
Hariri pledged in his government's proposal to win the vote of confidence to eliminate 
budget deficit by controlling expenditure and increasing revenues. To do so he promised 
an improvement in the collection of taxes after reforming the taxation system on social 
and economic criteria, and the levy of all custom duties.340 The 'Horizon 2000' plan had 
stated that macroeconomic stability was to be achieved by eliminating the public 
sector's current budget deficit.341 Indeed, 'Horizon 2000' had promised a "wipe out" of 
the budget deficit by 1995 and an increased budget surplus thereafter.342 Here again, the 
plan and Hariri himself were very optimistic in assuming a sufficient increase in 
revenues and controlled expenditure. 
Government' revenues that were almost non-existent by the end of 1980s had improved 
slightly with the restoration of government's authority over major sources of revenues. 
However, these were still insufficient as they totalled only LL 1,059 bn at the time of 
Hariri's arrival into office in 1992. This covered only 47.7 per cent of expenditure in the 
same year.343 To increase revenues, the government embarked on fiscal reforms. The 
new government improved the collection of custom duties, which are traditionally the 
main source of government revenues. The figures of these duties have between 1992 
and 1993 reached LL 663 bn and accounted to 35.7 per cent of total revenues. These 
figures saw a steady growth in the following years. The share of indirect taxation in 
revenues jumped to LL 743 bn and LL 921 bn in 1993 and 1994 respectively. They had 
amounted to only LL 467 bn in 1992.344 
Flemings: Research, Currency Risk in EMEA. The Outlook for 1999. (London: Robert Flemings 
Securities. 30 December 1998). p. 28. 
3 4 0 See Hariri's speech earlier in this section on reconstruction. 
3 4 1 See the section on "Horizon 2000". 
3 4 2 Ibid. 
3 4 3 Statistics derived from "Lebanon 1997-8. op.cit, p.49. 
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As for taxation, the new government introduced a new tax reform in 1993 cutting 
personal and corporate income tax rates "to encourage compliance with tax payments 
and attract foreign investments".345 The new reforms included the following: 
- Profit taxes: The rate of profit taxes applicable to individuals involved in 
commercial, industrial and professional activities used to range from 6 per cent to a 
maximum of 50 per cent. The new reform slashed these rates to a flat rate of 10 per 
cent on financial companies, and a progressive rate from 2 to 10 per cent on 
industrial and commercial companies. 
Taxes on wages and salaries: These rates had thirteen income brackets ranging from 
a minimum of 2 per cent to a maximum of 32 per cent on incomes that exceeded 
seventy times the minimum wage. However, there was a concentration in the low-
wage earners as 92 per cent of the individuals had tax rates lower than 8 per cent. 
Only 1 per cent paid over 19 per cent in taxes. The new law slashed tax rates to a 
maximum of 10 per cent, while the minimum rate was 2 per cent. The latter was 
applied to annual incomes not exceeding LL 5 m (around US$ 3,330), while the 
former applied to incomes exceeding LL 75 m (US$ 50,000). 
- Taxes on capital accounts: These included stocks and bills issued by public and 
private institutions on which a flat rate of 5 per cent was imposed. However, other 
instruments like saving and current accounts, and Lebanese government T-bills were 
completely exempted from tax charges.346 
Taxes on property and its usage were amended while others remained untouched. As 
stated earlier, the declared motive behind this tax reform was to encourage compliance 
with payment (Le. restrict tax evasion) and attract foreign investments. The revenues 
from direct taxation, in addition to maximised indirect taxation, were supposed to boost 
the treasury with cash inflows to offset the chronic budget deficit in government 
expenditure. 
However, if the promise to increase government revenues was conceivable, as 
government revenues could not get worse by the time Hariri became PM, the promise to 
control public expenditure was questionable. One would wonder about the bases on 
which Hariri and the 'Horizon 2000' built their promises. Hariri had pledged at the 
same time to embark on a massive reconstruction process that needed huge sums of 
3 4 5 Dan, A, The Distributional Impact of Taxes in Lebanon: Analysis and Policy Implications. (Beirut, 
LCPS: 1999) p. 8. 
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money. His government also had the immediate task of stabilising a devastated national 
currency and restoring confidence in the country's economy. The money needed for the 
reconstruction process was not available and aid did not seem to flow in as expected. 
Meanwhile, the increase in revenues was not enough. Revenues rose to LL 2,241 bn in 
1994, of which direct taxation represented only 12.9 per cent. The increase in revenues 
was around 24 per cent. However, it was accompanied by about 65 per cent surge in 
public expenditure which reached LL 5,204 bn. 3 4 7 The major components of public 
expenditure were the salaries for public sector employees (32.9 per cent); interest 
payments on domestic debt (28.3 per cent); and investment expenditure (24 per cent). 
The latter had represented a massive leap as it stood at LL 146 bn and LL 393 bn in 
1992 and 1993 respectively. 
With the lack of revenues, the government resorted to borrowing from the domestic 
market. The domestic borrowing was double edged as it funded the public expenditure 
deficit on the one hand, and helped defend the Lebanese Pound and reduce inflation, on 
the other. However, this resulted in the accumulation of public domestic debt that 
jumped from a gross total of LL 6081.8 bn in 1993 to LL 9320 bn in 1994. In 1995, 
these figures increased significantly to LL 12,974.3 bn (around US$ 8.5 bn), and by the 
end of 1997 they reached LL 19,589.1 bn (over US$ 12.8 bn).3 4 8 Foreign debt that had 
been as low as US$ 327.5 in 1993, increased gradually to US$ 771.8 bn and US$ 
1,304.6 bn in 1994 and 1995 respectively. By the end of 1997 it had reached US$ 2,404 
bn. 3 4 9 However, the slow pace of foreign debt was not due to government's intention 
not to borrow from the international market, but due to the lack of available loans. 
Indeed, the Hariri's government had declared its preferential position towards foreign 
debt as opposed to domestic one. 
More borrowing meant higher interest payments burdening the budget. These amounted 
to over 65 per cent of revenues in 1994. The budget deficit/expenditure reached 56 per 
cent (19 per cent of GDP) in the same year.350 The 1995 budget registered 48 per cent 
deficit/expenditure (15.6 per cent of GDP). This was below the expected 44 per cent 
budgeted deficit, and was due to a sharp increase in T-bills interest rates. The latter was 
3 4 6 Dan, A, The Distributional Impact of Taxes in Lebanon, op.cit, pp. 8-12. 
3 4 7 Banque du Liban. Annual Report (1996) p.71. 
3 4 8 Ibid. (1996) p. 72 & (1997) p. 77. 
3 4 9 Ibid. 
3 5 0 Statistics derived from Lebanon 1997-8. op.cit. p. 49. 
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because of the presidential election crisis, which threatened the stability of the Lebanese 
Pound.351 The year 1996 was not better despite the fact that the expected budget 
deficit/expenditure was 37.7 per cent, and revenues were projected to increase to cover 
the primary budget. Contrary to all these expectations, revenues were below the 
projected figures while expenditure shot higher than anticipated. That was attributed to 
political unrest resulting from the Israeli 'Grapes of Wrath' attack in April and the 
parliamentary elections in the summer. Instead, budget deficit/expenditure registered 
51.1 per cent (18 per cent of GDP). 
3.4.6 Macroeconomic picture in 1998 
The year 1998 was the eve of Hariri's departure from office, although such a 
development was not expected by any one, not even by Hariri himself. The election of 
the new president, Emile Lahoud, proved to be a setback for Hariri's power. The new 
president, coming from the army institution, was not prepared to tolerate the unlimited 
powers of Hariri. The latter decided to step down, reiterating his support for the new 
president. However, it is worth looking at the economic situation of Lebanon on the eve 
of Hariri's departure. 
Unequivocally, the Lebanese economy witnessed a remarkable prosperity after the 
arrival of Hariri. The real GDP rose by 7 per cent and 8 per cent in 1993 and 1994 
respectively. It reached US$ 7.67 bn and US$ 9.29 bn in the same period. However, 
growth registered a turn in 1995, amounting to only 6.5 per cent and continuing to fall 
in 1996 to 4 per cent.352 In 1997, the Ministry of Finance projected an upturn in GDP 
growth to 7 per cent. However, the GDP growth deteriorated further to 3.5 per cent.353 
By 1998, the GDP growth rate hit a low record of 2 per cent.354 It was suggested that the 
remarkable growth in GDP figure had been due to huge capital inflows that were 
channeled into reconstruction. These were estimated at US$ 7 bn annually up to 
1998.355 However, the components of the GDP suggested a large bias to the interest 
component, which did not reflect real growth.356 
3 5 2 Ministry of Finance. Budget Report 1997. p.8. 
3 5 3 EIU Country Profile 1999-2000. p.37. 
3 5 4 Ibid. 
3 5 5 Ibid. p.18. 
3 5 6 Author's interview with Dr Kama! Hamdan. Lebanese economist op.cit. 
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The rate of dollarisation was still around 60 per cent of total deposits by the end of 
1998.357 Interest rates on T-bills were still over 15 per cent on 1-year bills. 3 5 8 
Meanwhile, inflation in prices was estimated at a rate of 4.8 per cent.359 The balance of 
trade registered a deficit of US$ 5,808.81 m by the end of 1998, while the balance of 
payments registered a deficit of US$ 487.6 m, compared to a surplus of US$ 419.8 in 
1997.360 However, it has to be mentioned that the surplus in 1997 was instigated mainly 
by a US$ 600 m deposit that came from Saudi Arabia to support the Lebanese 
economy.361 Total domestic debt increased to LL 21,685.7 bn, registering a 9.6 per cent 
increase from 1997. Foreign debt hiked to US$ 4,177 m in 1998, increasing by 75.87 
per cent from 1997s figure of US$ 2,375 m. 3 6 2 Total gross debt stood at LL 27,951.2 
bn. 3 6 3 by the end of 1998. The ratio of public debt/GDP reached over 110 per cent in 
1998.364 
After seeing all these frightening figures, which seemed to indicate the collapse of the 
economy of Lebanon, one wonders if Hariri did any good to Lebanon. The answer to 
this question is obvious by conducting a comparison between Beirut's conditions before 
1993 and after 1998. Hariri did indeed fulfil his pledge to build the country's 
infrastructure to a great extent. Before Hariri, electricity was a rare commodity, 
telephones did not exist, wastewater was mixed with drinking water and solid waste was 
'decorating' the streets. The 1960s-70s road network was heavily congested, Beirut 
International Airport was in a disgraceful condition, and the central district of Beirut 
was a ghost town. By 1998, new electricity networks reached the furthest villages of 
Lebanon, telephone services that were considered a 'blessing' became abundant, new 
infrastructural networks for wastewater and storm water were built, while garbage is 
now collected around the clock. The road system came a long way with new 
motorways, tunnels and flyovers that eased congestion in Beirut and improved 
connections with the regions. The completed section of the new airport is indeed state-
of-the-art, and the central district of Beirut is emerging as an impressively modernised 
town centre with the most possibly preserved historical architecture of the past. The list 
3 5 7 Banque du Liban. Quarterly Report. Fourth Quarter 1998. p. 12. 
3 5 8 Ibid. 
3 5 9 EIU. Country Profile 1999-2000. p.37. 
3 6 0 Banque du Liban. Quarterly Report. 4* Quarter 1998. p.22. 
3 6 1 Banque du Liban. Annual Report (1997) p.21. 
3 6 2 Banque du Liban. Quarterly Report 4* Quarter 1998. p.24. 
3 6 3 The external debt was converted at 1998 current rate of US $ (EIU rate: LL 1,516) 
3 6 4 GDP was estimated by the EIU at L L 25,374 bn in 1998. 
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is fairly long, particularly, i f we mention the new giant Sports Complex built by 
Kvaerner, and the expanded port of Beirut, etc. 
These achievements were not negligible. They changed the whole image of Lebanon 
from a country destroyed by a ferocious civil war to an inhabitable and welcoming 
country. However, the argument that can be raised here is about the methodology 
followed in the reconstruction plan, the cost that appears much higher than the 
achievements, and the distribution of resources amongst the regions and sectors to 
achieve the socio-economic development that Hariri pledged at the beginning of his era. 
What is meant here by the methodology followed in the reconstruction process is the 
way available funds were allocated. The issue of prioritising and phasing did not seem 
to appeal to Hariri's government. Although the reconstruction plan 'Horizon 2000' was 
divided into two phases, this did not seem to apply to projects. The government decided 
to build a new telephone network, which was desperately needed. However, it is 
questionable whether Lebanon really needed a vast network of over 1 million lines. A 
new airport was certainly a positive change, yet a 6 million airport is a bit over 
ambitious as the accomplished part of the new airport seemed to be sufficient in 1998. 
Concerning the cost of reconstruction, it is striking to see that the Lebanese government 
accumulated debt of over US$ 16 bn between 1993-98 for what was achieved. 
However, the heavy burden of expenditure has not been created by the cost of 
construction only. The money allocated for investment in the budget between 1993-98 
was L L 6,103 bn (US$ 3,996.7 m) . 3 6 5 This represented 16.15 per cent of a total budget 
expenditure of L L 37,784 bn in the same period. Meanwhile, investment expenditure 
from outside the budget was over L L 2,168 bn. This means around 20.70 per cent of 
government spending (over LL 39,952 bn) was allocated to investment.366 Therefore, 
the treasury was exhausted by other current expenditure, most prominently interest 
payments on public debt and public sector salaries and wages. Hariri admitted that 32 
per cent of his governments' expenditure (assessed by him at US$ 28 bn) went to 
servicing debt. He added that 19 per cent of spending financed the Army and Internal 
Security Forces, while 19 per cent was spent on social affairs. According to Hariri, 20 
per cent was channeled into reconstruction, as well as tourism, agriculture and 
Exchange rate L L 1,527 = US$ 1. 
Statistics assessed by the author depending on figures derived from Banque du Liban reports. 
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industry. Indeed, statistics show that 35.33 per cent financed the debt servicing (LL 
13,348bn) while 31.97 per cent of budget expenditure covered public sector salaries (LL 
12,081 bn) in the same period. Very little was left for investments in a budget that was 
already exhausted with deficit. 
The third argument concerning the distribution of resources between sectors and regions 
can be justified by the disappointing attention given to the productive economic sectors, 
and the unsatisfactory regional development. The government had focused on building 
infrastructure as its major task to stimulate the private sector. However, the private 
sector in productive sectors (manufacturing and agriculture) needed finance and 
government support for rehabilitation. However, the finance was snatched by the 
government itself from the path of the private sector. The government, as mentioned 
earlier, ended up crowding out private sector in its search for capital to finance its 
expenditure. Infrastructure is essential but has to be accompanied by development in 
other sectors that can benefit from its development. Kubursi stated that the "size, 
timing, nature, and costs of this infrastructure should be determined by its contribution 
to growth and its capacity to raise sufficient revenues to pay for i t " . 3 6 8 Meanwhile, 
agriculture as well received very little attention from the government. This is part of the 
regional socio-economic development that the government did not manage well. 
Supplying electricity and extending telephone networks is fine, but this needs economic 
activities to pay for these services. On the other hand, supporting agriculture would 
contribute to social stability by restricting migration from rural areas. However, the 
government failed, for instance, to create alternatives for farmers who were forced to 
abandon opium growing in the Bekaa area. No wonder the region of Northern Bekaa 
witnessed social upheavals in 1997 with demonstrations requesting attention from the 
state. In this sense the Hariri government and its reconstruction plan failed. Kubursi 
suggested that the reconstruction plan and the vision driving it had suffered from many 
structural biases. These were "an urban bias (in contrast to a rural-urban balance), a 
cement bias (in contrast to a balance between human development, technology, and 
construction), an import bias (in contrast to encouraging exports and domestic 
Interview with Ex-PM Rafiq Hariri, in Emerging Lebanon 2000. op.cit, p.23. 
3 6 8 Kubursi. A, Reconstructing the Economy of Lebanon. Arab Studies Quarterly. (21), no.l, Winter 1999 
p. 82. 
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production), and a services bias (in contrast to a balance between commodity producing 
sectors and non-commodity producing sectors)."369 
The faulty policy followed in the reconstruction process resulted in its failure. The weak 
assumption that prosperity is unequivocal once infrastructure is set up failed miserably. 
The accompanying political instability did not help the situation either. The presidential 
re-election crisis in 1995, the Israeli attack in April 1996, the presidential elections in 
1998, and numerous quarrels between Lebanese top politicians contributed to the 
'miscarriage' of the reconstruction process. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Lebanon established a friendly environment for foreign businesses through the laissez-
faire capitalist system that it developed successfully after independence. It was certainly 
affected by the mercantile mentality of the Lebanese elite that shaped the economy over 
the mandate period aided by their French patron. Lebanon consequently stood out 
amongst the neighbouring countries in the 1950s-60s when these were turning into 
curtailed state-led economies. Lebanon's free-market system enabled its economy to 
benefit from all the changes taking place in the region: The creation of Israel diverted 
Haifa's maritime traffic to Beirut, the flight capital that survived the land reform and the 
later nationalisation in Egypt and Syria found refuge in Lebanon's banking secrecy, and 
oil-generated-dollars needed a developed banking system to look after them. Thus, the 
foreign interest in Lebanon was not surprising. However, this interest was concentrated 
in the services sector, particularly finance. Foreign banks set up branches and 
representative offices to take a share of the business being generated. They were also 
serving the regional market, mainly the Gulf, by a proxy, which was Beirut. Foreign 
businesses got involved as well in other sectors of services. Particular reference can be 
given to the number of international hotels that started operations in Beirut, and airlines 
that used Beirut airport as a connection centre. However, the concentration of foreign 
businesses in services and trade was accompanied by a complete neglect of other 
economic sectors. Manufacturing and agriculture were out of the foreign focus. That can 
be attributed partly to the services-orientated economy of the country. Other productive 
sectors had never been appealing for foreign investment as they were still 
Kubursi. A, Reconstructing the Economy of Lebanon, op.cit. 
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underdeveloped. Lebanon did not have comparative advantages to attract foreign 
investment from Europe, or elsewhere, into manufacturing industry and agriculture. 
Meanwhile, it had an increasingly developing high-consuming market to attract 
European exports. The developed financial and non-financial services were certainly a 
comparative advantage for Lebanon into which foreign business interests flowed. 
However, the civil war has destroyed all the achievements of the pervious two-decades. 
Lebanon's services sector lost its prominent position in the region, and interest was 
diverted to other regional centres. 
In the post-civil war period, the Lebanese government embarked on a massive 
reconstruction plan aimed mainly at regaining Lebanon's prominent position in the 
region. Part of the strategy was to attract foreign investments. The Lebanese 
government realised the importance of private foreign capital in the process of 
economic development. The government issued numerous decrees offering incentives 
for private businesses, including foreign. Hence, the decision to slash personal and 
corporate income taxes, and the tendering of many projects on B.O.T. basis. The 
massive infrastructure rehabilitation was seen by Hariri and his governments as a 
necessity to encourage private and foreign businesses. The response of foreign firms 
wil l be discussed in the following chapters. However, the failure of the government to 
tackle economic problems and the accumulating public debt and budget deficit has 
exacerbated the already dire situation and counter-acted measures intended to attract 
FDI. Indeed, the current Lebanese economy holds little appeal, even for those 
companies who did business in Lebanon prior to the civil war. While the reconstruction 
plan created massive opportunities, the rest of this thesis wi l l examine whether EU 
private investment capital has responded to them. 
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Chapter Four: Theoretical Approach to The Motives for Firms 
Engagement in FDI Activities - Theories of Foreign Direct Investment 
4.1 Introduction 
Part One of this thesis provided the background material and context for a study of EU 
business activities in Lebanon in the contemporary period, and specifically European 
FDI. Chapter One established the historical commercial links between Europe and 
Lebanon, indicating the special relationship that existed between France and Lebanon. 
Chapter Two examined the impact of the creation and development of the EU on 
European business links with Lebanon. It showed the continuing dominance of trade 
over investment in that relationship, establishing the one-way nature of that trade, and 
the Lebanese demand for European consumer items. It also showed that, despite the 
growth of concerns within the EU over the requisites of economic development in 
southern Mediterranean states like Lebanon, little has been done until now to actively 
encourage private FDI from within the EU towards those countries. This may change i f 
Lebanon and the EU reach a partnership agreement. However, Chapter Three 
established the continuing economic weakness of Lebanon and the failure of the 
Lebanese governments during the modern era to put in place either the economic 
conditions or comprehensive policy packages that would attract such investments. 
In Part Two of this thesis, I will examine the extent and nature of European business 
activity in Lebanon in the present era, with the aim of establishing exactly how much of 
that activity falls within the category of FDI. In order to ascertain precisely why that 
activity has been so limited, it is first necessary, however, to determine the criteria by 
which FDI decisions are made. Chapter Four will therefore draw on established theories 
of FDI to propose such a list of criteria. 
4.2 Defining foreign direct investment (FDI) 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is one of the two types of long-term private 
international capital movement, the other being portfolio investment. The focus of this 
thesis is foreign direct investment. However, a distinction between the two types of 
investment should be mentioned, as they are similar in many aspects. 
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Dunning said that direct investment implies that the investing unit (usually a business 
enterprise) purchases the power to exert some kind of control over the decision-taking 
process of the invested-in unit (again, usually a business enterprise). Something other 
than money is involved in international direct business. This could simply be informal 
managerial or technical guidance.370 On the other hand, he added, it could incorporate 
the dissemination of valuable knowledge and/or entrepreneurship, in the form of 
research and development, production technology, marketing skills, managerial 
expertise, and so on. 3 7 1 
Hymer argued that the distinction between direct investment and portfolio investment is 
a question of who controls the enterprise.372 I f the investor controls the enterprise, his 
investment is direct investment. I f he does not, his investment is portfolio investment.373 
Czinkota meanwhile confined portfolio investment to the purchase of foreign securities, 
such as stocks or bonds, without implying any direct control over foreign operations.374 
On the other hand, direct investment entails much more than the purchase of securities. 
It is the establishment of overseas operations by a firm or the expansion of the existing 
operations. 
Reuber went further to encompass, under portfolio capital flows, governmental loans, 
loans by international agencies, borrowing via bonds and short-term loans, including 
bank loans and export credits.376 In assessing the difference between the two types of 
international investment, he argued that portfolio investment in credit instruments 
implies a fixed obligation to repay interest and principal, whereas direct investment 
implies a flexible repayment obligation geared to the success of the investment. 
Portfolio flows, he added, tend to be more general in character than direct investment, 
which tends to he "industry specific". Moreover, portfolio investment does not directly 
affect local ownership and control, whereas direct investment gives rise to non-resident 
ownership and control. Finally, Reuber noted that portfolio investment normally implies 
Dunning. J. H, Studies in International Business (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1970), p. 4. 
3 7 1 Ibid. 
3 7 2 Hymer. S.H, The International Operations of National Firms: A Study of Direct Foreign Investment. 
1976. (MIT Press: 1976) p.l. 
3 7 3 Ibid. 
3 7 4 Czinkota. M. International Business. 2nd ed, (Dryden Press, 1992) p.26. 
3 7 5 Ibid. 
3 7 6 Reuber. G, Private Foreign Investment in Development. (Oxford, Clarendon Press: 1973) p.53. 
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a transfer of capital only, whereas direct investment usually comprises a transfer of 
auxiliary factors in addition. 3 7 7 
Clearly, the control exercised by the investing company over the overseas venture is the 
most crucial factor in distinguishing FDI from portfolio investment. Notably, the US 
Department of Commerce defines a foreign investment as direct when a single investor 
has acquired a stake of a minimum of 10 per cent in a US firm. It was assumed that a 10 
per cent shareholder is a strong shareholder and would have a strong say in the 
operations of a firm.378 However, the same source has reiterated that firms that are 
integrated into the control structure of foreign-based multinational firms are those with 
a single foreign parent-firm establishing unambiguous and undisguisable control. 3 7 9 
4.3 Theories of foreign direct investment 
4.3.1 Classical Theory of International Investment 
Taoka suggests that classical theory considers that international capital movements are 
due to the differences in interest rates among countries. Funds will flow from areas of 
abundant capital where interest rates are low to areas of capital scarcity where interest 
rates are higher. However, he added, although it is often advanced as a theory of foreign 
direct investment, this theory is more appropriate for explaining indirect or portfolio 
investment. 
Czinkota explained that the classical theory of direct investment suggests that the 
motive for international direct investment is profit maximisation. Factors of production 
wil l tend to gravitate toward the location where the highest rate of return can be 
earned.381 The essence of the classical theory, stated Czinkota, is quite simple: 
productive resources will seek out the highest return. The logic is an extension of 
classical trade theory. Capital-rich countries wi l l tend to export capital-intensive goods 
and to invest capital abroad. Labour-rich countries on the other hand, will export labour-
Graham. E . M, Foreign direct investment in the United States. (London: Longman, 1995) p. 9. 
9 Ibid. 
0 Taoka.G, International Business. Evironments. Intitutions. and Operations. (HarperCollins, 1991) 
.48. 
1 Czinkota. M, op.cit, p. 26. 
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intensive goods and find that the labour force will have a tendency to migrate to richer 
countries. 
The argument is based simply on the differences in the cost of capital. Letto-Gillies 
noticed that the literature on foreign investment before Hymer's thesis (1960s) was 
based on neo-classical assumptions "and it ran mostly parallel to the neo-classical 
theory of trade".383 He referred here to the ideas of Ohlin (1933) and Iverson (1935), in 
addition to others. No distinction was made between portfolio and direct investment. It 
was all put within the framework of international capital movement. When discussing 
the reasons behind capital movements across countries, Ohlin, a major classical theorist, 
also argued that the difference in interest rates is the greatest stimuli to export and 
import of capital. Obviously, this argument remained as the core of the classical theory, 
to be echoed by Taoka and others. "Countries where the rate of interest is low find it 
profitable to export capital to countries where the rate is high". 3 8 4 However, it is not 
wholly explained this way, he noticed. Political considerations and capitalists' 
preferences for a diversity of investments can decisively influence the flow of capital 
movements between countries, without any need for great differences in interest rates. 
He argued that "investment trusts in particular attempt to spread their capital over 
securities in such a way as to reduce risks, and partly for this reason they buy foreign 
securities as well as domestic". He also noted that "such trusts have been important 
instruments for the exportation of British capital". 3 8 5 
In what can be considered as referring to foreign direct investment, Ohlin pointed out 
that the establishment of branch offices and factories by manufacturing firms in foreign 
countries is another way of international capital movement as capital would be 
transferred, in most cases, from the home country of the firm. He explained that firms 
resort to establishing production in countries that are protected by high tariffs to avoid 
such trade barriers. These companies might also be motivated by the desire to guarantee 
the supply of foreign raw materials. However, Ohlin argued that the establishment of 
great international enterprises does not invariably cause capital's transfer from the home 
country of the firm, as it might be borrowed from anywhere else. "Firms such as the 
Dutch Shell Company, with branches in a dozen countries, find it easy to borrow capital 
Ietto-Gillies. G. International Production: Trends. Theories. Effects. (Polity Press: 1992) p.78. 
Ohlin. B. G, Interregional and International Trade. (1967) p. 210. 
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in different countries, wherever the interest rate is low.' He considered this a proof 
for his previous argument that capital is normally exported from countries that have low 
interest rates. 
On this point, Iversen argued that the largest quantity of capital which can be transferred 
from one country to another in a given period, is the total amount of free disposable 
capital available in the period. 3 8 7 He also believed that differences in interest rates are 
the main motive for capital movements. Foreign investment involves higher risks than 
domestic investment, and that is why lenders would expect higher interest in overseas 
countries than at home.3 8 8 Ohlin concluded that capital movements are like migrations, 
they "vary decidedly from one phase of the business cycle to another". They are 
affected by the state of trade in general and the largest capital movements occur during 
boom periods, he added.389 
4.3.2 International Product Life Cycle Theory 
This theory suggests that a firm's investment abroad is part of an international life cycle 
of products or processes.390 Although it is a trade theory, this theory is believed to have 
important implications for foreign direct investment, and that patterns of trade and 
investment depend on the life cycle stage of the firm's product.391 
The life cycle of a new product progresses through five stages: introduction, rapid 
growth, competitive turbulence, maturity, and decline.3 9 2 According to Czinkota, this 
theory suggests that the development of new innovative products is most likely to occur 
in industrialised countries. One reason is that these countries are likely to have the 
research and technological capabilities necessary for new-product development. 
Another is that wealthier countries are likely to generate demand for new products. 
Furthermore, the firm introducing a product will probably want to locate production 
facilities domestically. As a new product is unlikely to face serious price competition 
3 8 5 Ibid, p.211. 
3 8 6 Ibid, p.211. 
3 8 7 Iversen, C. Aspects of The Theory of International Capital Movements. 1st ed 1935 (London: 1967) 
p.24. 
3 8 8 Ietto-Gilles. G, op.cit, p. 80. 
3 8 9 Ohlin. B, 1967.op.cit, p.213. 
3 9 0 Taoka. G, op.cit. p.50. 
3 9 1 Czinkota. M, op.cit, p.30. 
3 9 2 Taoka. G, op.cit, p.50. 
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initially, the firm wil l not be forced to build production facilities at the minimum-cost 
location. Production can therefore take place near the site of product development and 
research, where the production process can be monitored and adjusted.393 
Taoka, however, considers that during this "introduction stage" products or processes 
are designed to meet the needs of the home market, and are produced domestically. 
Costs are high because the scale of production is quite small. At this stage, there are 
usually no international activities or at most, minimal exports, to similar markets.394 
During the stages of rapid growth and competitive turbulence (combined in one growth 
stage with Czinkota), exports to other developed countries expand rapidly. Attempts to 
break the monopolistic position of the innovator firm erupt from home firms and other 
industrialised countries.395 Czinkota pointed out that firms representing competition 
abroad have certain advantages over the exporter, as they would not be subject to quotas 
and tariffs on the sales they are able to generate, and that they would not have to incur 
sizeable transportation costs in getting the product from the producer to the 
consumer.396 A result of this competition and supply capacity increase, according to 
Taoka, is a dramatic decline in market prices. This decline in prices and the resulting 
profit squeeze invariably results in more efficient methods of production and declining 
production costs. Taoka pointed out that these stages are often termed "wash-out" 
phases as firms that cannot achieve efficiency are forced to merge, are acquired, or go 
out of business.397 
In the maturity stages, firms wil l begin to replace their exports with local production to 
avoid import barriers imposed by the host governments, transportation cost, and above 
all, to protect the foreign market. This wi l l lead to licensing agreements or joint 
ventures with firms in foreign country, or to wholly owned investments.398 
The decline stage occurs as a result of the increase in stiff competition from other 
producers forcing the company to compete as a low-cost producer. As a consequence, a 
manufacturing company wi l l choose to shift production to a LDC where the cost of 
3 9 3 Czinkota. M, op.cit, p.30. 
3 9 4 Taoka.G, op.cit, p.50. 
3 9 5 Ibid. 
3 9 6 Czinkota. G, op.cit, p.30. 
3 9 7 Taoka. G, op.cit, p.50. 
3 9 8 Ibid. p.51& 
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production is cheaper. Taoka argued that imports begin to enter home country and other 
industrialised countries, and exports begin to disappear. During this stage, home country 
production disappears, as producers in developed countries can no longer meet the 
competition provided by imports. 3 9 9 Major developed countries' firms had set up plants 
in LDCs to retain their share in the global and domestic markets. Czinkota explained 
this decline as "while the initial direct investment was largely market motivated, the 
investment in developing-countries operations is cost motivated, because the product's 
survival now depends on the firm's ability to lower production costs".400 
4.3.3 Monopolisic - Oligopolistic Advantage Theory 
According to Taoka, this theory states that multinational corporations will invest 
abroad because of monopolistic or oligopolistic advantages due to any of several 
reasons. The advantages are assumed to overcome the disadvantages faced by a 
multinational corporation when it goes to an unfamiliar foreign market. "Each variant of 
the monopolistic-oligopolistic advantage theory places emphasis on a different factor 
but the general thrust is the same: The MNC possesses an exploitable factor that creates 
a monopolistic or oligopolistic advantage abroad or that will develop into an advantage 
i f the firm invests abroad" 4 0 1 Oligopoly, according to Friedman, is a market having few 
firms (but more than one firm) on the supply side and a very large number of buyers on 
the demand side, each of whom makes a negligible contribution to the market demand 
function. "A buyer wi l l take market conditions as given, for he cannot affect them, but a 
seller wil l inevitably be preoccupied with guessing the behaviour to be expected from 
rival sellers."402 Knickerbocker stressed that in oligopoly the products of those few 
sellers are close substitutes for one another, and that there is a substantial 
interdependence among the competitive policies of these firms. "Oligopoly is a 
definition of both the structure of a market and the behaviour of the firm selling in the 
market."403 
Czinkota. G, op.cit, p.30. 
3 9 9 Taoka. G, op.cit, p.51. 
4 0 0 Czinkota. G, op.cit, p.30. 
4 0 1 Taoka. G, op.cit, p.48. 
4 0 2 Friedman. J. W, Oligopol v Theory. Cambridge Surveys of Economic Literature (Cambridge, 
University Press: 1983) p.l. 
4 0 3 Knickerbocker. F, Oligopolistic Reaction and Multinational Enterprise (Boston, Harvard University: 
1973) p.4. 
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Friedman pointed out that according to Cournet Model, oligopoly can be approached 
from either of two directions: co-operative or non co-operative. The first is based on the 
assumption that oligopolists collude and that they will be able to make legally binding 
agreements. The second approach states that the oligopolists act independently of one 
another without colluding. However, each chooses the policy taking into consideration 
the behaviour expected from the other fellow oligopolists.404 
Knickerbocker spoke of oligopolistic reaction and oligopolistic equilibrium, while 
considering the former as a partial explanation of foreign direct investment. But first, 
the following shows how he explained those two approaches. 
Oligopolistic reaction: The oligopoly theory assumes that the acts of one firm wil l 
induce responses from fellow industry members, unlike the theory of pure competition. 
'This premise that firms are mutually interdependent means that the behaviour of firms 
in oligopolies will tend toward a pattern of action-reaction, move-countermove."405 
Oligopolistic equilibrium: The rivalry among oligopolists can potentially deteriorate 
into mutually destructive competition. Knickerbocker believed that oligopolists are well 
aware of that fact. Overtime, he said, they may reach an understanding (explicit or 
implicit) to avoid intense rivalry. Instead, they would introduce order into the market. 
Each firm restrains its own aggressive behaviour with the expectation that rivals wil l 
exercise the same restraint.406 
As was mentioned previously, Knickerbocker used the oligopolistic reaction as a partial 
explanation for FDI. His concern was to explain the motives behind US FDI, although 
he argued that this type of behaviour could not be the sole "or even principle 
explanation for why US firms have invested abroad". Oligopolistic reaction, according 
to Knickerbocker, must be 
"considered within a broad conceptual framework for two reasons. First, it is a 
description of essentially defensive firm behaviour. That is, if firm A makes a move, 
say investing abroad, then the concept of oligopolistic reaction tells us something 
about firm B, a rival to A, is likely to do. But, the concept of oligopolistic reaction 
does not explain why firm A moved in the first place. "40? 
Friedman. J, op.cit, p.21. 
Knickerbocker. F, op.cit, p.5. 
Ibid. p.7. 
Ibid. p.8. 
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A set of questions is to be answered to explain why oligopolistic moves and 
countermoves take the specific form of FDI, Knickerbocker suggested. These questions 
related to: the reason why US manufacturing industries have extended their activities 
abroad; why the bulk of such activities have taken place in industries with oligopolistic 
structures; and why, under oligopolistic conditions, firms have tended to match each 
other's moves of F D I . 4 0 8 
Ietto-Gillies noted that Knickerbocker used Vernon's product cycle model as the basis 
for his own theory. He suggested that the fundamental inducement towards FDI is to be 
found in the analysis of the product cycle model. The US economic environment created 
opportunities for a continuous stream of labour-saving, high incomes products and 
generally for product development. American firms became skilled at 'pioneering' 
products. This gave them an advantage over foreign firms who could not match their 
skills and capabilities. However, the European markets that lagged behind the US ones 
were ready after a few years to receive the labour-saving, high-income products. These 
markets were served by exports and FDI followed. Licensing in some cases preceded 
F D I . 4 0 9 However, in producing abroad, US firms faced some disadvantages: a foreign 
environment; less preferential treatment by host governments compared to domestic 
firms; and the cost of gathering information, etc. These disadvantages were offset by the 
advantages of accumulated knowledge of managerial, marketing, and organisational 
skills, in addition to the lower cost of inputs in European countries. Tariff and non-tariff 
barriers and the fact that producing near the market has allowed firms to offer after-sales 
services and to adapt the product to the requirements of local customers, all contributed 
to the US firms' move overseas. Knickerbocker conclusion that for FDI "the product 
cycle model suggests that the fundamental consideration underlying such undertakings 
has been the desire of the US businessmen to exploit overseas the novel skills that their 
firms acquired in the course of satisfying US demand".410 
There is therefore a link between product pioneering and the product life cycle, and 
oligopolistic structures, Letto-Gillies noted. He pointed out that firms that operate in 
fast-changing industries and are therefore involved in new products and new 
developments are also likely to experience various advantages. He anticipated that such 
4 0 8 Ietto-Gillies. G, op.cit, p. 130. 
4 0 9 Ibid, p.130. 
4 1 0 Ibid, p.131. 
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advantages would lead to few producers and sellers, in the long term, as economies of 
scale eliminate smaller producers and act as entry barriers to new ones. However, such 
advantages are due to economies of scale only. Special skills accumulated in the course 
of developing and managing new products, their production and marketing are also 
extra advantages, he explained. 'These skills help in both the domestic and foreign 
environments."411 
The question remains to be answered as to why other firms engage in a defensive 
foreign investment, which leads to a "bandwagon effect". Investment abroad involves 
uncertainty, mainly with a newly launched product. A rival firm also faces uncertainty, 
however, it is more risky not to invest. 'The risk is that the rival firm would gain 
considerable advantages from its aggressive move and then use the advantages against 
its rivals." 4 1 2 These advantages would include large-scale production, use of new 
production processes, and of vertical integration and general access to cheaper inputs. 
Marketing abroad should give advantages to the firm in both domestic and international 
market. Further aggressive moves can be built on the further organisational, managerial 
and marketing skills acquired from the first move. These advantages can change the 
competitive equilibrium, and gradually eliminate rivals. Other firms that would want to 
avoid such risks would follow up with their own FDI. "Ultimately, therefore, 
Knickerbocker explains the bunching up of FDI as the result of firms' defensive 
policies, which are designed to minimise risks in an oligopolistic environment."413 
4.3.4 Market Imperfections Theory 
The core of this theory is an assumption that a decision to undertake foreign direct 
investment is a move by the foreign firm to take advantage of certain capabilities not 
shared by local competitors. The first to talk about market imperfection and FDI were 
Hymer (in his PhD thesis of 1960), and Kindleberger, later in 1969. Caves mentioned it 
in 1974. Hymer noticed that frequently enterprises from different countries compete 
with each other because they sell in the same market or because they sell to other firms. 
"If the markets are imperfect, that is, if there is horizontal or bilateral monopoly or 
oligopoly, some form of collusion will be profitable. One form of collusion is to have 
4 1 1 Ietto-Gillies. G, op.cit, p. 131. 
4 1 2 Ibid. 
4 1 3 Ibid, p.132. 
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the various enterprises owned and controlled by one firm. This is one motive for firms 
t • f • ,,414 
to control enterprises in foreign countries. 
To exploit an advantage within an imperfect market, a firm would be better off by 
moving in and exercising control over subsidiaries. 
However, the profit of investing abroad should not be taken for granted as there are 
many risks involved. Kindleberger argues that a firm earns a higher return by investing 
abroad i f it undertakes and overcomes the costs of operating in a different political and 
legal environment at a distance from its decision-making centre.415 Higher return abroad 
is not sufficient as a motive for FDI, he considers, as capital markets would be a better 
way to achieve that. 
"If this were all (higher return), capital would move through organised capital 
markets rather than through firms that specialise in the production and distribution 
of goods. Capital markets specialise in moving capital, and under competitive 
conditions they are better at it than firms engaged in other lines. "416 
A higher return than that of local firms in a foreign market should be the aim of firms 
investing abroad, he continues. 
In operating abroad, a firm endures substantial extra costs. Kindleberger considers that 
it is not only the cost of travel, communication, and time lost in communicating 
information and decisions but also the cost of misunderstanding that leads to errors. An 
investing firm should have advantages to offset these disadvantages. 
"For a firm to undertake direct investment in a foreign country it must have an 
advantage over existing or potentially competitive firms in that country. If not, those 
firms, operating more cheaply in other respects because nearer to the locus of 
decision-making and without the filter of long-lines to distort communication, would 
put the intruder out of business. "4I? 
Robock echoed the same arguments stressing that a firm faces a number of additional 
costs or disadvantages when entering a foreign country, as compared to a local firm. 
"The local firm would have an intimate knowledge of the economic, social, legal, and 
governmental environment. The firm can only acquire this knowledge at a cost. 
Furthermore, the foreign firm incurs foreign exchange risks, risks of possible errors 
4 1 4 Hymer. S, op.cit, p.25. 
4 1 5 Kindleberger, C. P, American Business Abroad. Six Lectures on Direct Investment. (Yale University, 
1969) p . l l . 
4 , 6 Ibid. 
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and misunderstandings from cross-cultural operations, and additional costs of 
operating at a distance. ' A 1 S 
Kindleberger insists that in a perfect international market for products and factors of 
production there is no space for investment abroad. Local firms would be more 
qualified to serve their domestic markets. 
"In a world of a perfect competition for goods and factors, direct investment cannot 
exist. In these conditions, domestic firms would have an advantage over foreign firms 
in the proximity of their operations to their decision-making centres, so that no firm 
could survive in foreign operation. For direct investment to thrive there must be some 
imperfection in markets for goods or factors, including among the latter technology, 
or some interference in competition by government or by firms, which separates 
markets. "*19 
On this same point, Caves pointed out that the large stock of knowledge about the 
language, laws and customs of its native land is an intangible capital that is productive 
in guiding the local firm toward profit-maximising decisions. The investing firm would 
have to acquire this information or "run the risk associated with action under relative 
ignorance".420 On this view, Caves continued: "the dice are loaded to some degree 
against the multinational firm, and its emergence thus demands an explanation".421 
Caves provided the explanation himself. The firm, i f successful, would have intangible 
capital, as well, in the form of patents, trademarks, or general knowledge about how to 
produce and distribute its products. "Being intangible, these assets can in some measure 
be moved from one national market to another, gaining rents in new locations without 
impairing the stock left in service at the home base." He concluded that these 
advantages would offset the disadvantages resulting from the cost of collecting the 
intangible capital of information about the market.4 2 2 
Thus, successful operations in a foreign country need some compensating advantages 
for the firm. 'These advantages must be transferable within the enterprise and across 
4 1 7 Kindleberger, C. P, American Business Abroad.... op.cit, p. 12. 
4 1 8 Robock. S, International business and multinational enterprises. Fourth edition, (IRWIN, 1989) p.43. 
418Ibid. p.45. 
4 1 9 Ibid. p.13. 
4 2 0 Caves. R, International Trade. Intemaional Investment and Imperfect Markets. (Princeton University, 
1974) p.17. 
4 2 1 Ibid. 
4 2 2 Ibid. p. 18. 
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distances. These advantages are referred to as firm-specific or ownership-specific 
factors."4 2 3 Robock argued that the competitive advantage of firms is explained by 
imperfections in markets for goods or factors of production. 
"In the theoretical world of perfect competition, firms produce homogeneous products 
and have equal access to all productive factors. In the more realistic world of imperfect 
competition, as explained by industrial organisation theory, firms acquire competitive 
advantages through product differentiation, brand names, special marketing skills, and 
restrictions to entry." 
Other sources of competitive advantage, he adds, may be patented technology, internal 
or external economies of scale, or even differences in access to capital markets.424 
Hymer argued that as firms are unequal in their ability to operate in particular 
industries, one with an advantage over the others in the production of a certain product 
would find it more profitable to extend its production process abroad. He noticed that 
the firm could also rent or sell its skills rather than undertake the production in the 
foreign country itself. "Which method it chooses depends largely on the degree of 
imperfection in the market for the skill. I f the market is imperfect, the owner may not be 
able to appropriate fully the returns to the ability unless he controls its use."425 
Robock stated that the market imperfections model helps to identify the industries in 
which firms are likely to expand their direct operations either domestically or 
internationally. However, he argued, this model leaves many important questions 
unanswered. 
"Given the special advantage that permits the firm to invest abroad (i.e., the necessary 
condition), the model stops short of explaining why foreign production is the preferred 
means of exploiting the advantage (i.e., the sufficient condition). The firm's advantage 
can also be exploited through exporting or licensing. Furthermore, the theory needs a 
time dimension in the sense that the advantage might erode and require 
disinvestments. "426 
4 2 3 Robock. S, op.cit, p.43. 
4 2 4 Ibid. 
4 2 5 Hymer. S, op.ciL p.26. 
4 2 6 Robock. S, op.cit. p.44. 
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4.3.5 Interaalisation Theory 
This extends the market imperfections approach by focusing on imperfections in 
intermediate-product markets rather than on final-product markets.427 It assumes that the 
firm has a global horizon and it recognises that the enterprise needs a competitive 
advantage or a unique asset to expand. But the emphasis of the internalisation concept is 
on the motivations of the firm to extend its own direct operations rather than use 
external markets.428 Robock stated that many intermediate-product markets, particularly 
for types of knowledge and expertise embodied in patents and human capital, are 
difficult to organise and costly to use. In such cases, the firm has an incentive to create 
internal markets whenever transactions can be carried out more efficiently within the 
firm than through external markets. This internalisation involves extending the direct 
operations of the firm bringing under common ownership and control the activities 
linked by the market 4 2 9 The creation of an internal market, added Robock, permits the 
firm to transform an intangible piece of research into a valuable property specific to the 
firm. The firm can exploit its advantage in all available markets and still keep the use of 
information internal to the firm in order to recoup its initial expenditures on research 
and knowledge generation. 
Rugman considered that internalisation is the result of both natural market 
imperfections and unnatural market imperfections. 4 3 0 An example of the first is the 
knowledge, or the know-how, that is owned by the firm and is very difficult to price. He 
described it as a public good, like a lighthouse beam, a public park, a road or a bridge. 
'The consumption of it by one party does not prevent consumption of it by other 
parties." Yet, he confirmed that those could be private once property rights are 
established. One method of creating property rights over knowledge is through 
internalisation, by creating a market within the firm.431 On the other hand, unnatural 
market imperfections would include government-imposed tariffs on imports, foreign 
exchange control, and regulations on FDI. 
4 2 7 Robock. S, op.ciL p.45 
4 2 8 Ibid. 
4 2 9 Ibid. 
4 3 0 Rugman. A, International business: Finn and Environment.. (McGraw-Hill: 3rd printing 1985) p. 104. 
4 3 1 Ibid. p. 107. 
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4.3.6 Eclectic / O.I .L. Theory 
In his introduction to foreign divestment theory, McDermott considered Dunning's 
Eclectic Model of International Production as being one of "the most comprehensive 
tools for analysing and explaining patterns of FDI" . 4 3 2 Dunning's model stated that a 
firm's decision to engage in international production requires three conditions or 
advantages: 
• the firm's possession of ownership-specific advantage. Rugman called this Firm-
Specific Advantages in which a firm must possess a net ownership advantage vis a 
vis firms of other nationalities in serving particular markets (mainly foreign). These 
advantages are largely in the form of intangible assets which are, at least for a period 
of time, exclusive or specific to the firm possessing them; 4 3 3 
• when it is more profitable to internalise these advantages within the firm than sell 
them to independent parties; i.e. the firm possesses internalisation advantages. 
Rugman states that this secures the property rights over its firm-specific advantages, 
like knowledge, for example. He adds that this could be done through an extension of 
its own activities rather than by externalising them through contracts at arm's-length 
prices with independent firms. Moreover, alternatives to internalisation, such as 
licensing, management contracts, franchises, technical service agreements, turnkey 
projects, and subcontracts are not feasible methods of appropriating the firm-specific 
advantages;434 
• when there are certain benefits to be gained by exploiting the advantages outside the 
home country market; i.e. the firm possesses location-specific advantages.435 
Rugman illustrated that if the conditions stated previously are satisfied, it must be 
profitable to the enterprise to locate abroad, that is, "to utilise these advantages with 
at least some factor inputs (including natural resources) outside its home country". 4 3 6 
Otherwise, he added, foreign markets would be served entirely by exports and 
domestic markets by domestic production. 
It is from the above-mentioned advantages that the O.I.L. framework was derived, a 
combination of the three factors: Ownership-specific advantages (O); Internalisation 
4 3 2 McDermott M, Multinationals: Foreign Divestment and Disclosure. (McGraw-Hill: 1989) p. 10. 
4 3 3 Rugman. A, op.cit p.117. 
4 3 4 Ibid. 
4 3 5 McDermotL M, op.cit. p. 10. 
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advantages (I); and Location-specific advantages (L). Andersson considered those three 
advantages as cornerstones required for the undertaking of direct investment.437 
Further illustration for what these advantages should comprise was provided by 
Rugman as follows: 4 3 8 
Firm-Specific Advantages: The range of advantages that can lead to FDI can be 
summarised as follows: 
1- Propriety technology due to research and development activities; 
2- Managerial, marketing, or other skills specific to the organisational function of the 
firm; 
3- Product differentiation, trademarks, or brand names; 
4- Large size, reflecting scale economies; 
5- Large capital requirements for plants of the minimum efficient size. 
Internalisation Advantages: The conditions that favour internalisation include: 
1- High costs of making and enforcing contracts; 
2- Buyer uncertainty about the value of the technology being sold; 
3- A need to control the use or re-sale of the product; 
4- Advantages to using price discrimination or cross-subsidisation. 
Country-Specific Advantages: The location-specific advantages of the host country 
can include: 
1- Natural resources; 
2- Efficient and skilled low-cost labour force; 
3- Trade barriers restricting imports. 
4.4 The usage of theories of FDI in the case of EU-private investments in 
Lebanon 
In assessing the motives for foreign direct investment in Lebanon, a combination of the 
theories of FDI is to be used rather than confining it to one particular theory. An 
analysis of these theories shows that any of them could be applicable to describe one or 
Rugman. A, op.cit. p. 118. 
4 3 7 Andersson.T. Multinational Investment In Developing Countries: A Study of Taxation and 
Nationalisation (London, Routledge: 1991) p. 24. 
4 3 8 Rugman. A, op.cit. p. 119. 
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several cases of FDI, but none would be sufficient on its own to explain universally the 
motives for FDI. A quick critique of the content of the FDI theories previously 
mentioned justifies this approach. 
The classical theory of direct investment focused mainly on the capital movement factor 
with the differences in interest rates between countries being the major motive behind 
any international capital movement. This movement was seen as an export and import 
of capital stimulated by the differences in interest rates. It could be argued that if capital 
would migrate from a low interest country to a higher interest country it is inevitable 
that capital would be invested in shares, bonds, or even be deposited in local banks to 
acquire higher interest. Al l these activities would still be considered within portfolio 
investment. However, the interest rate factor was considered as a motive for FDI 
activities simply due to differences in the cost of capital. This argument has suggested 
that a foreign firm might be able to afford to pay a higher price for a factory, for 
instance, than a local competitor, just because it had a lower discount rate. A strong 
exchange rate for the home country's currency would certainly be an advantage for 
investing abroad. Differences in interest rates affect FDI when borrowing is considered. 
Obviously, an investing firm would seek funding with the lowest interest possible. I f 
borrowing at home were available at lower rates than the host country, this would lead 
to a transfer of capital from the home country to the investment destination. However, it 
is not the higher interest rate behind this capital movement. The capital is motivated by 
the firm's decision to invest in a particular economic activity in the host country. This 
might lead to the question: which motive comes first, the opportunity to invest or the 
cheap borrowing at home? Clearly, a firm would not consider borrowing for the sake of 
it only. Unless there is a projected role for the loan, a firm does not need to consider 
borrowing. Therefore, the firm's intention to exploit an opportunity for profitable 
investment abroad encouraged it to seek cheaper funding. Besides, as lower interest 
rates are targeted while seeking funding, capital then does not necessarily have to come 
from the firm's home country. Ohlin himself admitted this fact. He as well noticed that 
a firm might decide to establish production abroad due to barriers which obstract 
international trade. This means that differences in interest rates are not necessarily the 
reason for all international capital movements, and certainly not for direct investment in 
foreign countries. Indeed, this argument that highlighted the role of cost of capital in 
motivating FDI activities is the old explanation for international capital movement. 
148 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment of EU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
However, as Graham and Krugman have noticed, the argument has shifted towards 
studying the industrial-organisation considerations rather than the cost of capital, since 
the early work of Hymer in 1959. 4 3 9 
Suggesting that profit maximisation is the motive for international direct investment, as 
Czinkota claimed, contains a great deal of generalisation. Certainly, profit maximisation 
is the aim of the majority of foreign direct investment activities, as well as domestic 
investment. Yet, a substantial number of foreign activities of a firm would be to protect 
an existing share in the foreign market, which might be threatened by competition from 
domestic producers or other foreign exporters. This argument was adopted by most of 
the subsequent theories of FDI. Another generalisation is to assume that productive 
resources wil l seek out the highest return. This is the essence of the classical theory, 
according to Czinkota. Obviously, a higher return is a target of a firm's activities, and 
this could be applied to domestic activities, as well as to overseas ones. However, the 
theory offers no explanation of why there should be a higher return for investments 
abroad. A justification would he within the fact that this theory did not distinguish 
between direct and portfolio investments. Productive resources should then mean 
capital, while higher return should be obtained by seeking the highest interest rates. The 
classical theory is not adequate in itself to explain foreign direct investment activities 
due to the gaps that it does not try to fill. However, it should be taken into consideration 
that this theory was introduced before foreign direct investment was discussed as a 
separate activity. It does not provide a good basis to examine contemporary FDI 
activities and the motives behind it. Thus, this theory wil l not be used extensively in this 
research. 
Moving to the International Product Life Cycle Theory, this was introduced by 
Raymond Vernon, and is derived from a theory of international trade. So, like the 
Classical Theory, it originates from another theory. However, it focuses on the motives 
for overseas investments from the product angle rather than the interests of capital. It is 
one of the earlier theories that addressed FDI without mixing it with portfolio 
investment. This theory stipulates that investment abroad would be a subsequent step to 
trade. A producing company in a developed country invents a new product for the local 
market; introduces it to foreign markets; establishes production abroad to be close to the 
Graham & Krugman.. op.cit. p.28. 
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new markets and avoid trade barriers; and then, the low cost of production abroad wil l 
lead to a reversed export from the subsidiary abroad to the home market. Therefore, FDI 
has to be always a stage following international trade and never a precedent. 
This theory was used to understand the motives behind the US firms' decision to invest 
abroad. A comprehensive explanation is in fact provided by this theory to understand 
why many US firms decided to extend their production procedures abroad. The same 
could be applied to non-US firms in other developed countries. However, the 
international product life cycle theory does not provide a comprehensive framework for 
the understanding of why companies decide to engage in FDI. The focus on the product 
life perspective eliminates other aspects of investment within international production. 
A firm does not necessarily have to be involved in successful trade with a country in 
order to decide to invest there. Many firms decide to invest in buying a substantial share 
in companies abroad, merge with or buy out companies in foreign countries for reasons 
that are not related to the life cycle of their own products. It could be merely because 
that company has the potential for success and achieving high profit. Apart from the fact 
that it would be well established in the country, and has the knowledge of the market. 
Thus, this theory wil l be used in this research but not solely. 
The Monopolistic-Oligopolistic Advantage theory highlights the "exploitable factor" 
possessed by the firm, which could encourage it to invest abroad. However, as far as the 
oligopolistic factor is concerned, Knickerbocker pointed that it plays a role in 
motivating firms to invest abroad only when another rivalry company preceded it in 
establishing production abroad. He considered the second firm's behaviour as an 
oligopolistic reaction. To understand the first move of FDI he depended on the product 
life cycle theory. Therefore, those two theories are related in a subsequent way. And, as 
the theory of product life cycle wil l be used in studying the case of European direct 
investments in Lebanon, then the oligopolistic reaction approach is applicable as well. It 
is a very focused approach that does not serve as an explanation for the majority of FDI 
activities, but it would still justify many other decisions to invest abroad. This theory 
will be used to investigate whether some EU firms' moves into Lebanon were an 
oligopolistic reaction. 
The Market Imperfections Theory agrees with the monopolistic-oligopolistic approach's 
focus on the "exploitable factor". It stresses however, that i f the firm does not own an 
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advantage over local companies than there should be no motive for FDI. Such 
advantages and disadvantages between firms create imperfection in markets that could 
be exploited by advantageous firms whether domestically or internationally. Obviously, 
firms in developed countries have the advantage of access to research facilities and 
capital. Moreover, they have the marketing skills and brand names for which there is a 
strong demand for in developing countries. Thus, they already have an advantage when 
compared to local companies. But, as the theory suggests, these advantages need to 
compensate for the costs that a firm would endure while entering a market of which it 
had a very little knowledge. Clearly, i f a firm was profiting from exporting its products 
to a particular market, this should not necessarily mean that moving production to a 
proxy location should bring more profit. 
This theory does provide a useful explanation that helps when examining the motives 
behind FDI. Despite Robocks reservations about the gaps in this theory,4 4 0 it is 
justifiable to say that i f markets were perfect with all companies having access to 
necessary factors of production, then FDI would not be necessary. It explains numerous 
moves by many US companies to invest abroad, as with other companies from other 
developed countries in Europe, and Japan. The approach of market imperfections wil l 
be taken into consideration in this thesis, but still it cannot be used solely in explaining 
the reason behind every firm's decision to invest overseas. The 'exploitable advantage' 
which is firm-specific is essential, but a company would be looking for other 
advantages that can be acquired by investing abroad. These advantages could result 
from becoming close to natural resources, or having abundance of skilled and/or cheap 
labour. These are vital to any production activity while the market imperfections 
approach does not address them at all. Moreover, this theory does not clarify the stage 
when a firm would decide to shift from serving a particular market through exports to 
extending its production arm to the market itself. I f exports were serving the market 
adequately then there would be no reason to take the risk of setting up a production 
plant closer to it. The success of the firm's exports would be due to the quality of the 
product combined with its brand name and price. Therefore, another serious motive 
must have convinced the firm that moving production facilities to the remote market 
should be more profitable. This theory does not explain such reason. 
These were mentioned earlier while discussing the theory of market imperfection. (Confinement to 
exports or licensing, and the time dimension). 
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The Internalisation theory, on the other hand, follows up what the Market Imperfections 
theory started. However, the focus in this theory is not on the final product. It is rather 
concerned with the knowledge and expertise that a firm owns. The multinational 
company acquires knowledge through the research and development(R&D) conducted 
at home. It also develops expertise in producing and marketing. As the firm considers 
these advantages exclusive, and while the decision to produce abroad was taken, FDI 
would be preferred by the firm as opposed to franchising or licensing. The rationale is 
that the firm wants to keep its patent and exclusive knowledge internal without moving 
it to another company. In other words, this theory is concerned with the intangible 
assets that the company owns embodied mainly in knowledge. It is not easy to price 
knowledge, and most of the time the company would want to keep it within. That is 
why a subsidiary would be preferable by which the firm establishes its own internal 
market where patents would be flowing between the headquarters and subsidiaries and 
vice versa without leaking to outsiders. 
Noticeably, all theories of the international organisation mentioned previously seem to 
be flowing in a subsequent context, and to a certain extent complement each other. Each 
filled some gaps in every precedent theory. The product life cycle theory decided that 
production abroad is part of the product life that succeeds exports. The oligopolistic 
reaction decided that rival companies would follow the leading company fearing to miss 
an opportunity for profit, or even an existing market. Meanwhile, the market 
imperfection theory said that a firm would not move abroad unless its products were 
successful and there was a chance to exploit its advantages over local competitors. The 
internalisation theory's contribution to this discussion is that a company establishes 
production abroad not only because the product is successful, but also because the 
know-how should stay within the company. 
Hereafter comes Dunning's Eclectic Theory or his O.I.L framework for FDI. It is as i f 
Dunning thought: "Al l what was said is applicable but needs to be put together, and 
combined with what was not said". Thus his O.I.L framework brought together 
ownership-advantage with the internalisation-advantage, but then added to it what was 
always missing before, the location-advantage. Certainly, the firm needs to own an 
advantage over domestic firms to decide to invest abroad, and that would very likely be 
an intangible asset. Obviously, it is better to protect these assets rather than 
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externalising them. Therefore, internalisation is a perfect way to secure the firm's 
property rights. However, this was not enough for Dunning to motivate a firm to engage 
in FDI. He decided that locating the business abroad should be instigated by potential 
benefits from the location itself. He was referring to proximity to natural resources, 
skilled and/or cheap labour, and the ability to avoid trade barriers. In effect, Dunning 
found a major loophole in the previous theories, which left the question of the motives 
of FDI slightly vague. The decision to switch from exporting to producing abroad was 
still unclear. Recognising that a firm would benefit from market imperfections is not 
enough. Market imperfections could be exploited through trade as well. Meanwhile, 
internalisation is a measure to be considered after making the decision to produce 
abroad, after examining whether licensing or franchising are as suitable to protect the 
firm's specific advantages. So, the firm's move must have been triggered by other 
incentives coming from the location itself, i.e. some factors of production would be 
available at a competitive cost. 
4.5 Conclusion 
These are the theories that are to be used in this research. They have stipulated a wide 
range of criteria for the motives behind a firm's move to produce in a particular foreign 
country. The next step is to highlight these motives to examine how applicable they are 
for the case of European businesses in Lebanon. The motives to be applied suggest that 
a firm would engage in foreign direct investment for one of the following reasons or 
circumstances: 
• To benefit from the differences in interest rates between countries; 
• It is a stage in the product life cycle when a firm decides to replace exports by 
production abroad to achieve competitiveness by reducing the cost; 
• To exploit a specific advantage over domestic companies in the foreign market; 
• An oligopolistic reaction following another rivalry firm's decision to produce 
abroad; 
• I f market imperfections worked to the benefit of the firm to compensate for its 
disadvantages in a foreign market; 
• When the firm is unwilling to extend its patent knowledge of production to other 
firms abroad, but still wants to produce there; 
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• When the company realises a number of advantages in localising production in a 
particular foreign country, Le. access to cheaper factors of production, or avoiding 
trade barriers and transport cost. 
This set of criteria wil l be used to examine the presence of EU-private businesses 
operating in Lebanon during the reconstruction period. Two questions need to be 
answered. Firstly, to what extent is EU FDI present in the Lebanese economy and, 
secondly, how can we account for that presence, or indeed the absence of such a 
presence. The following chapter provides a survey of European business activity in 
Lebanon in the reconstruction period. It shows that such activity included trade, 
franchising, representation, contracting and FDI. In the later chapters, I will assess the 
size of EU-FDI activity and the factors contributing to its presence or absence. 
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Chapter Five: Overview of European Businesses in Lebanon 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to establish a profile of EU private business activity in 
Lebanon. This will include assessing its presence compared to companies from other 
nationalities; determining the sectors of business that EU firms are involved in; and the 
size of business presence of each EU member state. These assessments wil l help in 
identifying the main interests of EU firms in Lebanon, and to what limit Lebanon 
represents an attractive destination for EU firms. Ultimately, the aim is to identify the 
EU firms that are involved in FDI activities. 
Once we start discussing the issue of foreign direct investments in Lebanon in general, 
we have to take into consideration the immense difficulties in seeking information and 
figures that could reflect the size of FDI in Lebanon, and sectors that it is channeled 
into. These problems arise mainly from the fact that statistics provided by the Lebanese 
government are quite rare. Indeed, figures on FDI are not provided by the government. 
The only figures that were available were produced by UNCTAD and very limited Arab 
sources concerned with inter-Arab investments. Even these figures differ remarkably. 
Looking at available material on foreign companies registered with the Ministry of 
Economy and Trade, the same item of information varies from one list to another. The 
same problem was faced throughout this research when it comes to statistics on 
Lebanon. This makes the results of any calculations in the analysis approximate rather 
than absolutely accurate. 
5.2 Foreign direct investments in Lebanon 
EU-private direct investments in Lebanon should be looked at within the context of total 
FDI inflows into the country. The limited figures available on FDI in Lebanon have 
shown that it has increased significantly since the beginning of the reconstruction 
process. The figures provided by UNCTAD indicate that FDI amounted to $US 4 m in 
1992 but reached $US 35 m in 1995. The table below shows how these figures 
developed. 
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Table 5.1 Increase in FDI inflows into Lebanon after the beginning of 
reconstruction 
Ytm 11985/1990 11991 
[(average J 
lannually) I 
1992 1993 1994 199511996a 
4 6 7 351 30 
a: estimates 
Source: World Investment Report.(New York: UNCTAD, 1997) p.306. 
Clearly, FDI inflows increased gradually after the end of the civil war in 1991 til l the 
beginning of the reconstruction process at the end of 1993. The year 1995, according 
to these figures, witnessed a huge hike as FDI inflows increased by five times the 
figures of the year before. That could be attributed to the upsurge in the 
reconstruction process. 
However, these figures are not clear when it comes to examining the basis used to 
assess FDI inflows into the country. In fact, these figures seem to have excluded a 
significant amount of FDI. The UNCTAD analysis states that direct investment 
abroad is estimated on the basis of financial transactions between parent-firms and 
their foreign affiliates in the form of equity or loans, or earnings of affiliates that are 
not repatriated.441 This analysis emphasises that foreign affiliates can be financed 
from other financial resources, like loans obtained by parent-firms or foreign 
affiliates from commercial financial institutions in host or third countries, funds 
raised by parent-firms or foreign affiliates in host or third country capital markets, 
and loans received by foreign affiliates from home country financial institutions. 
Funds raised from these other sources seem to be apparent, the UNCTAD analysis 
affirms, when examining how the total assets of majority-owned foreign affiliates of 
US-based TNCs are financed. In 1994, parent-firms financed slightly more than one-
third of the value of the total assets of their foreign affiliates including the parent-
firms' share of their affiliates retained earnings. Meanwhile, most of these assets 
were financed by debt instruments coming partly from financial institution in the 
country of the foreign affiliate. 4 4 2 
1 World Investment Report, (New York: UNCTAD,1997) p.25. 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment of EU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
Thus, the UNCTAD figures do not reflect the real size of FDI in Lebanon. These 
figures include only the capital transfers from a parent TNC to its affiliate in 
Lebanon. As it has been shown, most of these TNCs raise funds outside their home 
countries, and are most likely to get it from a third country. However, the figures are 
still low and vague. Many companies have representative offices in foreign countries. 
In the case of Lebanon these are quite few. The budgets allocated to these offices are 
not clearly defined as being FDI or not. Foreign investments in property do not seem 
to be clearly identified. The figure of US$ 35 m for FDI in Lebanon in 1995 could 
easily be accounted for by the purchase of a single plot of land in Beirut. This figure 
is either completely unrepresentative or reflects a poor foreign interest in investing in 
Lebanon. This matter shall be addressed later in this chapter when assessing the 
presence of foreign companies in Lebanon. 
Another source of figures on foreign investments in Lebanon is inter-Arab 
investment statistics.443 There is a striking difference between those figures and 
UNCTAD ones. As UNCTAD estimated FDI inflows into Lebanon to be US$ 30 m, 
the other source shows that Lebanon's share of inter-Arab investments only was US$ 
250 m in the same year. Furthermore, it says that it increased up to US$ 312 m in 
1997. Out of a total US$ 1.59 bn total of inter-Arab investments, Lebanon's share 
was 19.6 per cent. It came third after Egypt US$ 532 m , and Syria US$ 328 m. 
While inter-Arab investments decreased totally from US$ 2.09 bn in 1996 by 23.9 
per cent, Lebanon's share increased by 7.6 per cent 4 4 4 
4 4 2 World Investment Report, (New York: UNCTAD, 1997) p.25. 
443 Taqrir manakh al-isstissmarfi a-duwal al- 'aabiah 1997 (Report on investment climate in Arab states 
1997). Produced by al-muassassah al-arabiah li-daman al-isstissmar (Arab Establishment for Investment 
Guarantees) 1997. p.37. 
4 4 4 Ibid. 
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Table 5.2 Inter-Arab investments (US$ million) 
Country 1996 1997 Percentage in 1997 
Egypt 532 33.5 % 
Syria 328 20.6 % 
Lebanon 250 312 19.6 % 
Total 2,090 1,590 23.9 % decrease 
Source: Taqrir manakh al-isstissmarfi a-duwal al- 'aabiah (1997) p. 37. 
The margin of difference between figures is conspicuous. I f UNCTAD estimates were 
correct, this means that inter-Arab investments into Lebanon were 8 times the size of 
FDI in Lebanon. This cannot be normal, as Arab investments should still be considered 
foreign investments. One reason that the author thinks could explain the difference is 
that inter-Arab investments did not specify the type of investments. It did not call it 
direct investments, for instance. This could lead to a suspicion that it might have 
included portfolio investments as well. However, if FDI figures were confined to 
transactions between parent-firms and their affiliates in Lebanon, then this could reduce 
the share of Arab investments within that figures to a minimum, as very few Arab 
investments in Lebanon could be included under that category. Although the author 
could not find specific data to support this argument, it is commonly known that Arab 
investments mostly come from individual businessmen. Indeed, the rise in Arab 
investments in Lebanon, in 1997, was caused by the purchase of a Lebanese bank 
(Credit Libanais) by a group of Gulf businessmen (the figure was around US$ 60 m), in 
addition to other deals in different banks.445 The last figures available on FDI in 
Lebanon are the estimates of the EIU reports that emphasised the fact that figures of 
FDI, and indeed, portfolio investments, are difficult to obtain. It echoed some estimates 
in 1997 that it was around US$ 1 bn per annum.4 4 6 In another report, the EIU shows 
how unreliable are the figures of FDI in Lebanon: the World Bank, in one publication 
put net inflows at US$ 2.55 bn in 1996, while in another publication it put it at US$ 80 
ibid, p.194. 
EIU, Country profile. Lebanon. 1997-98. p. 37. 
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m. The EIU thinks that the latter figure is more accurate. Still, this figure shows a 
stunning difference with the estimates it echoed in its report in 1997.4 4 7 
Within this uncertainty about figures of FDI in Lebanon, it would be an immensely 
difficult, even impossible, task to assess accurately the size of FDI in general, and EU-
private investments, in particular. However, the way to get around these problems is by 
assessing the presence of foreign companies in Lebanon, including EU firms, and 
examining the type of their activities in Lebanon. That will show relatively the extent of 
EU firms presence in Lebanon. The available data provided the names and numbers of 
these firms but no details of their capitalisation. Therefore, their numbers will judge the 
presence of these firms. Moreover, the involvement of EU firms in the reconstruction 
process will be examined to assess their share of business generated by the urgent need 
to reconstruct the country. 
5.3 Foreign firms in the post-civil war period (1990-93) 
The previous chapters showed how most of foreign companies which operated in 
Lebanon before the civil war had to cease their activities and leave the country. 
European companies were among these companies that had to minimise their presence in 
Lebanon. 
Some foreign companies resumed their activities in Lebanon when peace was restored. 
Foreign businesses seemed to have realised that a country coming out of a devastating 
civil war must represent huge opportunities for business, generated by the need to 
reconstruct in the aftermath period. However, the number of companies registered in 
Lebanon between 1990-92 shows that foreign business interests were still minimal. Only 
15 foreign firms were registered in Lebanon during that period, according to the lists of 
the Ministry of Trade and Economy. This could be attributed to the precarious state of 
the Lebanese economy that was revealed mostly in a very unstable exchange rate, high 
inflation rate, and vague fiscal policies. The instability on the economic scene was 
accompanied by political uncertainty. The government was in the process of extending 
its control over most of the Lebanese territories while first parliamentary elections after 
EIU, Country Profile. Lebanon. 1998-99. p.31. 
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the war were yet to be held. Such uncertainties, in any similar case, would maximise the 
risk factor in the decision-making process of any business considering launching new 
operation. That could certainly be the case of foreign businesses in Lebanon between 
1990-1993. 
The list of foreign companies that registered with the Ministry of Commerce and 
Economy is very short indeed. Only 15 companies came to Lebanon during that 
'interim' period between war and reconstruction. These represented countries from 
Europe, Arab world, and others. 
Table 5.3 List of foreign firms registered between (1990-93) 
iCo; Company Name Bustness/seetor Date Of Country 
1 East West Trade Trade 8-11-90 Britain 
2 i Kassion Construction of Roads Syria 
3: a-f anmiyah lil-awrak al- Finance 17-7-91 Jordan 
4 1 Emirates Airlines Airline 14-8-91 UAE 
5iMajdonarodnaya Knefa Media services 7-8-91 Russia 
6 al-watinyah lil-khadamat al- Maritime agency 26-9-91 Jordan 
7|Halah Trade Trade 25-1-92 Panama 
8: Middle East sanitary General trade Cyprus 
Marketina &Aaencies 
9;a-sharikah al-'amah lil-binaa Construction of Roads 17-3-92 Syria 
10!Czech Airlines Airline 17-3-92 Czechoslovakia 
11! Integra advanced Computer IT 1-8-92 France 
Systems 
12 Turkish Airlines Airline 21-9-92 Turkey 
13;United Marine Holdings A.G Trade & Finance 9-11-92 Liechtenstein 
QPjeratians.„_ 
14; Golf Agencies Company Ltd Trade & Finance 9-11-92 Liechtenstein 
©Derations. 
15:International Shipping Trade & finance 9-11-92 Liechtenstein 
Aaencieslid ©Derations 
Source: Compiled by the author from lists provided by the Ministry of Economy and Trade in Lebanon. 
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Chart 5.1 
Number of foreign companies registered 
between (90-93) 
• E U 1 1 • Arab • Non-EU European • Latin American 8 
Source: Derived by the author from lists of the Ministry ofEconomy and Trade. 
5.3.1 Fields of interest for foreign firms (90-93) 
The activities of foreign firms registered in Lebanon during this particular period did not 
show a trend towards a particular sector. Indeed, interests were diversified into various 
activities of mainly services and took the shape of representative offices. Some of the 
airliners that had stopped flying to Beirut during the war decided to come back. Other 
trade companies also probably felt it was safe enough to open a representative office to 
benefit from the ever-flourishing trade in Lebanon (the huge dependence of Lebanon on 
imports always created opportunities for trade even during the worst times of the civil 
war). It is noticeable that two Syrian contractors companies were registered during that 
period while no other foreign firm involved in such a field of business did so. The fact is 
that those two companies were involved in a few projects the government had 
undertaken to rehabilitate existing roads networks. The scale of business during that 
period was still very little. Thus, there were no incentives for foreign firms. 
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Chart 5.2 
Number of foreign firms divided by business 
field (90-93) 1 
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Source: Compiled by the author from the lists of the Ministry of Economy and Trade. 
5.4 Reconstruction process charms foreign firms 
The commencement of the reconstruction process was accompanied by an influx of 
foreign companies into Lebanon. This process was effectively kicked-started after Prime 
Minister Rafiq Hariri took office at the end of 1992. The country had had its first 
parliamentary elections by then and it was time to start rebuilding the economy and the 
devastated infrastructure. It was believed that the unstable economic situation needed the 
strength of Mr Hariri's financial position to navigate towards stability and then 
prosperity. A billionaire Lebanese-Saudi businessman, Hariri came with an agenda, with 
the start of the reconstruction process on top of its priorities. The first achievement of his 
government was the stabilisation, and later gradual evaluation, of the Lebanese pound 
exchange rate. Inflation was brought under control as well. The situation changed 
immensely from what it used to be before Hariri. It could be argued that the presence of 
Hariri encouraged businesses to get moving, and capital inflows to increase, given what 
was said about his position. He seemed to help in rebuilding the trust in the Lebanese 
economy by his presence at the top of the government. He commenced his 
reconstruction plan according to which the government was to rebuild the devastated 
physical infrastructure of the country. The plan was inevitably a state-led process. 
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However, given the fact that the public sector in Lebanon is very small and does not 
involve any industries, apart from utilities, private firms were needed to do the business 
while the government would meet the cost. It was the chance for private businesses, 
local and foreign, to compete for the jobs. This explains the surge in the number of 
foreign firms being registered in Lebanon since 1993 (see table). European firms were 
noticeably present in Lebanon again. Indeed, firms from EU member states were a 
majority among incoming foreign companies. The following table helps describing the 
picture of foreign business in Lebanon upon the beginning of the reconstruction process. 
Table 5.4 Foreign companies registered in Lebanon after 1993 
Co No Company Name Business/Sector Country 
1 Euroshipping maritime agency Italy 
2 Sommer S.A Promotions (Trade) France 
3 Hyundai Engeneering &Contracting Ltd Construction (contracting) S . Korea 
4 Brown & wilson Europe Tobacco I ndustry Belgium 
5 Nour Consult Int Engineering contracting, industrial 
services 
Norway 
6 Archicenter Associates Ltd Britain 
7 Siemens S.A Telecom, electricity (contracting) Germany 
8 Clemessy Electrcity rehabilitation (contracting) France 
9 Philips Medical Systems Int B.V Construction Netherlands 
10 Credit Commercial De France Finance (Representative office) France 
11 Bouygues Trade, Import & export, electricity 
(Contracting) 
France 
12 a-shahed Publishing ltd Publishing Cyprus 
13 Ingersol Dressor Pump Services S.A.R.L Industrial equipments (supplier) Switzerland 
14 Kukdong for Engeneering and Construction construction Korea 
15 Emeco S.A.L Trade Germany 
16 Maytag Int. Inc. Trade US 
17 UBAF Bank Ltd Finance (Banking) Britain 
18 Covec China 
19 Alcatel Contracting Telecom. (Contracting) France 
20 al-asmak al-kuwaitiah al-mutahidah Trade Kuwait 
21 Topcon Corporation Marketing Japan 
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22 Societa Italians Rati Telefoniche Interubane Construction (Telecom networks) Italy 
Sirti 
23 Trafalgar House construction Int. Ltd construction (contracting) Britain 
24 Digital Engineering Ltd Engineering consultants Ireland 
25 C&C construction Company Ltd Construction (contracting) Nigeria 
26 Itochu Corporation Trade (Imp &Exp) Japan 
27 Internationale Nederlanden Bank N.V (ING Finance (Banking i n s u r a n c e Netherlands 
Bank) Refunds) 
28 Ciba-Geigy Services Ltd Medication company Switzerland 
29 Hochtjef A.G Construction (contracting) Germany 
30 Sodexho Int. S.A. Hospitality (catering services) Panama 
31 Gulf international Bank Finance (banking) Bahrain 
32 Bauer SpezialtJefbau GMBH. Construction Germany 
33 Pepsi Cola Int. Ltd Representative office Bermuda 
34 Robert Fleming Holding Ltd Finance (Investment) Britain 
35 Alcatel Telespace Production of electronics (supplier) France 
36 Adidas Sarragan France Production, exp Simp of sports France 
wear 
37 3 M Gulf Ltd Trade Cyprus 
38 Hubei Provincial Int. Trade Cooperation Trade (Exp & Imp) china 
39 Paribas Ltd Finance (Banking & investment) France 
40 a-Sharikah al-qawmiyah lil-tashied wal t'amier Construction (contracting) Egypt 
41 Conspel construction Specialist Ltd Engineering Liechtenstein 
42 N.V Upjhon S.A. Pharmaceutical products Belgium 
43 S.A. Monroe Europe N.V. Representative office Belgium 
44 Elie Lilly (Suisse) S.A. Scienctific & technical aid Switzerland 
45 Marriott Int. Hotels Inc. Hospitality (Hotel) US 
46 Dyckerhoff & Widmann Aktiengesellschaft Contracting & construction Germany 
47 Commerz Bank Finance (Research in Economy Germany 
and finance) 
48 European Gas Turbines Research in Turbine gas, France 
(contracting) 
49 I.C.A.R. Construzioni Generali S.P.A. Contracting & construction Italy 
50 Pdysius S.A. Production, sales, maintainance of France 
products 
51 Citi bank N.a Finance (Banking) US 
52 Malaysian Airline System Berhad Marketing arial transportations Malaysia 
services (Airline) 
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53 Smithkline Beecham Marketing & technical 
Services 
54 E T D E 
55 Christjani & Nielson Ltd 
56 Ansaldo-Energia Spa 
57 Engineerig Business Development, Inc 
58 Berliner Bank Aktiengesellschaft 
59 a-sharikah a Saudiah lil-abhass wa nasher 
60 C A T. Int. Ltd 
61 Mother Cat Ltd 
62 sharikat markaz al-ma'adin a-sin'aiyah (metal 
ind) 
63 S.I .F. Bachy 
64 Shenfu Real Estate Development Co. Ltd 
65 Klochner Steel Middle East FZE 
66 Reuters Ltd 
67 ABB Management (Middle east & North 
Africa)Ltd 
68 Club Flipper Turizmve Insaat Yatirimlari 
Sanayive 
69 Republic National Bank of Newyork 
70 Abed Ishak Abed al Hamza & Co 
71 Dames and Moore, INC 
72 Maraii for commerce Ltd 
73 Tecsa Technical Sales S.A. 
74 Kuwait Airlines Establishment 
75 Compania De Constructs Bucuresti S.A. 
Company 
76 Industrial Saudi Arabia Company for Windows 
77 Nizar Assaad & Qhassan Mouhanna Ets. For 
contract! 
78 Cowi Consulting Engineers Planners A.S. 
79 The Bank of Nova Scotia - Canada 
80 Trade Circle Int. (UK) Ltd 
Marketing office (Pharmaceutical Britain 
products) 
Consultancy, Electricity, Gas, France 
telecom, (contracting) 
General trade, contracting Britain 
construction of Electricity plants Italy 
(contracting) 
engineering, contracting, general US 
trade 
Finance. Representative office 
Pharmaceutical 
contracting 
Contracting 
Trade 
Germany 
Saudi Arabia 
Channel Islands 
Britain 
Channel Islands 
Britain 
Kuwait 
Works of drilling, pumping and France 
excavation 
Trade (enhance trading between China 
China SLebanon) 
Representative office .Promotion Dubai - UAE 
of steel sales 
News agency Britain 
representative office Switzerland 
Housing projects Turkey 
Representative office US 
Extract, manufacture and export Jordan 
marble 
Engineering (other) US 
Trade (agricultural products, Saudi Arabia 
fertilizers, 
Representative office (trade in ind. Panama 
Equipments 
Airline 
Construction 
Kuwait 
Romania 
Production of doors and windows Saudi Arabia 
Construction (contracting) Syria 
Engineering consultants Denmark 
Finance (Banking) Canada 
Investments in trade, industry and Britain 
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81 First Resort 
82 Archirodon Construction (overseas) Co. S.A. 
83 Banco De Ibero America S.A. 
84 Alhamma for Development and Commercial 
Agencies 
85 GEC/Alsthom - Societe D'etudes et de 
Montage 
86 Etablissements Jean Graniou S.A. 
87 Sagem S.A. 
88 International Turnkey Systems 
89 Guinier S.A. 
90 Abbott Laboratories S.A. 
91 Martwell Middle East Ltd 
92 Joseph Constantin Inc agir sous le nom de 
Melkart 
93 Brown and Root Projects Ltd 
94 Duro Dakovic Montaza L.L. 
95 St. FA Energy Telecommunication Industry* 
Trade In 
96 Intrecanales Y Tavora s.n. 
97 Joint-Stock Company Corporation Khortitsa 
98 Bouygues Offshore S.A. 
99 BAT (UK and Export) Ltd 
100 SDEM Enterprises S.A. 
101 Rendel Palmer & Tritton Ltd 
102 Commercializadora Romana De Costa Rica 
S.A. 
103 Societe de Commercialisation Assistance et 
Realisation pour L'lndustrie de Bailment 
104 a-saudiah al-hadissali-sina'atal-ma'aden... 
105 Ed.Zubl inAG 
106 Societe Francaise pour le Commerce Exterieur 
( S O F R A C E ) 
107 Marina Contractors Inc. 
108 Schneider Electric S.A. 
finance 
Trade (Marketing of Egyptain& Egypt 
foreign products) 
Engineering, construction, designing Panama 
Representative office Finance 
(Banking) 
Trade 
Industrial studies 
Electrics and telecom installations 
Representative office (consultancy 
in industries) 
Promotion of computer systems 
Investment, construction, 
electricity 
Pharmaceutical services 
Panama 
Saudi Arabia 
France 
France 
France 
Kuwait 
France 
Switzerland 
Trade &services 
Trade (fashion) 
Jersey - Channel 
Islands - Britain 
Canada 
Engineering, Trade (Exp& Imp) 
Construction & investment 
Contracting (electricity intallation 
f a public sector projects 
Construction 
Trade, exp-imp 
Contracting (tech. Studies&Work 
for Solidere 
Investment, technical services 
Industrial studies 
Contracting, engineering 
consultants 
Promotion, trade 
Britain 
Croatia 
Turkey 
Spain 
Ukraine 
France 
Britain 
France 
Britain 
Italy 
Engineering, construction, planning France 
Production of zinc sticks for wiring S . Arabia 
Contracting Germany 
Exp-lmp of sewing products France 
Contracting, engineering (touristic US 
sites) 
Studies & investment (electricity) France 
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109 Gestion Cajiltee Trade Canada 
110 Beverage Services Ltd Marketing, sales, technical services Bermuda 
111 Henny Penny Corporation Real estate, administration US 
112 Sony Gulf F Z E Trade in electronics Reg. in UAE 
113 Husain Abou T a a & sons Contracting (excavation of water) Jordan 
114 Compagnie D'Entreprises C F E Contracting-investments in railways Belgium 
&roads 
115 IMS Information Medical Statistics AG Computing (esp. in Switzerland 
pharmaceuticals) 
116 Capital Trust S.A. Finance (Investment) Luxembourg 
117 ICO Global Communications Holdings B.V. Telecom. Netherlands 
118 Ferrostaal A G Trade Germany 
119 Rabot Dutilleul Enterprise S.A Contracting (construction of France 
Lebanese University) 
120 United Distillers P L C . Representative office Britain 
121 LafrageS.A. Management of Industrial, and France 
financial cooperation 
122 Thyssen Hunnbeck GMBH Construction equipments Germany 
123 Levant Maritime Services S.A.R.L Transport Romania 
124 Cable News Int. Inc News agency US 
125 Dead S e a Industrial Establishment Manufacturing Sodium Chloride pills Jordan 
for water 
126 Compania de Agroquimicos. S.A. Manufacturing &selling chemical & Spain 
agricultural products 
127 Ayobco for construction Contracting construction Egypt 
128 Intrafor Realisation de travaux de fondation France 
129 HerveS.A. Construction France 
130 Biochemie GMBH manufacturing & selling of chemical Austria 
products 
131 Charalambos Venetis Bakery-Confectionery... manufacturing & distribution of Greece 
bread and sweets 
132 Groupe Actjf S.A. Consultancy (financial, legal, France 
accounting, and IT services) 
133 Imation International. B.V. Trade (Exp- Imp) Netherlands 
134 Hamad Abdulah a-Zamil& Bros Trade (medical & pharaceutical 
equipments 
135 ArsanaS.R.O Achat des marchandise pour Czechoslovakia 
les revendre 
136 Armenian Airlines Co. Airlines Armenia 
137 Opere Pubbliche SPA Contracting (construction) Italy 
138 Fortune Consultants Group Inc Finance (Investment) Britain 
139 ArcifS.A. Water projects & improvement of Romania 
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140 Homan Engineering Companu Ltd 
141 Orbit Production Ltd 
142 Financial Instrument and Investment 
corporation 
143 Novartis Pharma Services Inc. 
144 Private joint-stock Co. Volgonette 
Khimmontazh 
145 Alcatel cable France 
146 TotoS.P.A. 
soil 
Construction & engineering Nigeria 
Programming (TV production) Britian 
Construction equipments US 
Consulting & marketing for Switzerland 
chemical products 
Construction Russia 
Cable equipments (supplier) France 
Construction (Road between Sofar Italy 
& Mdeirej 
Source: Compiled by the author from lists provided by the Ministry of Economy and Trade in Lebanon. 
5.4.1 Business interests of foreign firms (1993-98) 
The business activities of foreign companies registered in Lebanon between 1993-98 can 
easily be interpreted as an indictor of the significant business opportunities in the 
country. It is not difficult to trace the impact of the reconstruction process. Out of the 
146 companies that were registered as foreign firms, 46 firms were looking for or 
already executing contracting jobs. The term 'contracting' that is used in this chapter 
refers to companies that were involved in the rebuilding process, or were competing for 
infrastructure projects. It comprises firms involved in reconstruction, 
telecommunications, electricity, water, wastewater, transportation, and others. This was 
either declared in their registration files, or traced through their activities in Lebanon. 
However, it is very common to see a firm engaged in more than one of these activities 
(for example: electricity and telecom). Over 28 companies were there for construction 
projects; 6 for telecommunications; 7 for electricity; 3 for water; and 11 for engineering. 
In addition, it should be taken into consideration that consultancy companies were there 
mainly because of the reconstruction projects (7 companies), while a substantial number 
of trading companies (27) were present to provide material needed for the reconstruction 
process. In this research, it was decided to include under the trade category all 
companies involved in import-export or supplying material manufactured abroad for the 
new projects. Many of these companies had established a representative office that was 
there to promote its products in the Lebanese market. Another 14 companies were 
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identified as finance firms. Those were to include commercial and investment banking, 
insurance companies, and finance houses. 
Apart from the government's plan, the rebuilding process was in action almost all over 
the country. This was a chance for foreign suppliers to conduct some trade business with 
Lebanon. Reconstruction does not necessarily mean restoring buildings and 
rehabilitating the infrastructure. A whole country was being 'reassembled', while almost 
everything required updating, to catch up with what the country missed during the years 
of war. Hence, the influx of foreign finance firms that found a niche in the market by 
offering to raise funds abroad, and help restructuring banks and finance firms that were 
affected by the war. All these could be considered incentives for foreign companies to 
operate in Lebanon during that period 
Chart 5.3 
98) Total 146 firms 
ontractin 
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Source: Compiled by the author depending on table 5,4. 
5.5 A survey of E U companies amongst foreign companies registered in 
Lebanon (93-98) 
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Looking at this list of foreign companies registered in Lebanon since the last quarter of 
1993, the presence of EU member states companies shows clearly. Out of 146 foreign 
companies registered until the beginning of 1998 we find that 76 were from the 
European Union. That represents over 52 per cent of the whole sum of foreign 
companies' inflow into Lebanon. Other companies belonged to a plethora of countries, 
coming mainly from non-EU European and Arab countries, in addition to some US, 
South Asian, Canadian, Latin American and African countries. 
Table 5.5 Country of origin for foreign firms registered in Lebanon (1993-98) 
EU 
— 
Non-EU 
European 
Arab South 
Asian 
US African Latin 
American 
Canadian 
76 20 19 8 10 2 6 3 
Source: Complied by the author from the lists provided by the Ministry of Economy and Trade. 
Chart 5.4 
Number of foreign companies registered in 
Lebanon (93-98) Total 146 
Others 
E U 70 
companies 
76 
Source: Complied by the author from the lists provided by the Ministry 
of Economy and Trade. 
It is interesting to see that firms from the EU-member states registered in Lebanon have 
outnumbered their counterparts of other nationalities. They were over four times the 
number of Arab companies and five times the US ones. The limited presence of the US 
firms could be explained by the US ban on its citizens from travelling to Lebanon. This 
meant that American businessmen were not allowed to utilise the opportunities arising in 
Lebanon. The easing of the ban later on resulted in the arrival of some US firms. The 
majority of US firms were registered in 1996, the same year in which the US hosted the 
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conference for 'Friends of Lebanon', to raise financial support for the Lebanese 
government to cover the cost of the reconstruction. 
The limited presence of Arab firms (19 firms) might raise some questions, especially 
given the figures of inter-Arab investments mentioned earlier in this chapter. Lebanon is 
part of the Arab world within which remarkable capital surpluses exist. It could be 
argued that i f the reconstruction process was creating attractive opportunities for 
business, then the response from the close and/or rich neighbours should be higher than 
that of European businesses. The factors of proximity, cultural and historical 
connections would support this argument. However, business response depends above 
all on the opportunities available and its compatibility with the firm's line of business. 
Arab firms that stepped in had possibly made such decision because they thought they 
had the ability to compete for reconstruction projects. This applies to many airliners and 
commercial banks. However, Arab businesses' presence in Lebanon should not be 
assessed through the number of Arab firms operating there within a particular period. 
Arab capital normally finds its way to local businesses and banks (i.e. buying shares of 
these businesses). Such investments cannot be ignored. Nevertheless, the activities of the 
majority of Arab firms are limited when compared to European, South Asian, and 
American firms. Looking back at the list of foreign firms in Lebanon, Arab firms' 
activities could be identified as construction, trade, airlines and commercial banks, in 
general. On the other side, EU, US, and South Asian firms had much more competitive 
position as their activities ranged from the supply of capital equipment for electricity and 
telecommunication to doing the actual job of installing power and telecom networks. 
Rebuilding the infrastructure of Lebanon needed technology, something that Arab firms 
still cannot compete in. 
Chart 5.5 Chart 5.6 
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Source: Complied by the author from lists provided by the Ministry of Economy and Trade. 
5.5.1 Representation of E U member states among E U companies 
Significant differences in the number of foreign firms in Lebanon were not only between 
EU and non-EU firms. It was also apparent among EU firms themselves. Some EU 
member states were highly represented when compared to other 'colleagues' in the EU. 
France had the biggest representation with 26 companies out of 76. Britain and Germany 
followed with 18 and 10 companies, respectively. Italy had 7 companies, while others 
were represented with less than 5 companies each. The apparent French outnumbering of 
other Europeans can be related to the historical connections between France and 
Lebanon. The preceding review of the historical relations between Lebanon and Europe 
has shown how the French were not alien to the Lebanese market. Relations between the 
two countries can be described as being warm despite some limited intervals of tension 
accompanying the process of independence. Unequivocally, French companies were in 
the same position as their EU counterparts: private businesses are always after 
opportunities. No difference in this sense exists between the French, British or German 
firms. However, the historical connection and familiarity between the French companies 
and the 'Francophonic' Lebanon would have certainly been an advantage. 
Table 5.6 E U firms divided according to country of origin (Registered 93-98) 
France Britain Germany Italy Belgium N.Lands Spain Luxem. Denmark Ireland Austria Greece 
26 18 10 7 4 4 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Source: Compiled by the author from the lists of the Ministry of Economy and Trade. 
Chart 5.7 
Number of EU firms (76) divided by member-state (Reg. 93-98) 
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5.5.2 Business interests of E U firms 
As the EU firms were the majority among foreign firms registered in Lebanon, the 
categorising of their activities would not differ much from the classification done earlier 
for business activities of foreign companies. The distribution amongst business sectors 
shows a great resemblance between the total foreign and total EU firms. Contracting 
came first followed by trade, finance, and then consultancy. 29 out of the 76 EU firms 
were in Lebanon for contracting purposes. Trade followed with 16 EU firms while 
finance activities attracted 10 firms. Firms conducting consultancy amounted to 7. In 
other words, 63 percent of contracting foreign firms in Lebanon came from the EU, 
compared to 40 per cent of foreign trading firms. Nearly two-thirds of finance firms 
came from the EU, while almost all consultancy firms (7 out of 8) were European. By 
and large, most of the earlier analysis applies here, mainly after we find that the 6 
telecom foreign firms were all EU firms; 5 electricity companies out 7 were from the 
EU; 5 engineering out of a total of 11; and 17 in construction out of a total 28. As it was 
revealed earlier, many of these contracting firms were counted more than once, as they 
were involved in more than one category of activities (Electricity & telecom, for 
instance). 
Chart 5.8 
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Source: Compiled by the author from the lists of the Ministry of Economy and Trade. 
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5.6 E U companies partnership with local counterparts 
In addition to the EU firms that were registered in Lebanon as foreign companies, with 
the beginning of the reconstruction process, other EU business connections were traced 
among some Lebanese local companies. The European connection to these local firms 
was through either partnership or shareholding by European businesses in registered 
Lebanese firms. The Lebanese commercial law allows for foreign firms to establish local 
companies. This has to follow the rules stipulated in this law, particularly, the rules 
concerning local partnership or representation in the board of directories of each firm. 
Therefore, it is possible to find foreign firms registered as local Limited Liability 
Companies in Lebanon with no local partner at all. However, the lack of information 
about foreign companies in Lebanon does not allow for in-depth research, particularly 
concerning the size of European share in a local firm. Nevertheless, this research's aim 
is to highlight the presence of EU firms and identify the business sectors they are 
involved in to assess their business interests in Lebanon. Thus, the material available 
wil l be utilised as much as possible. 
According to a study prepared by a Lebanese independent institute (Khalil Masri et 
Fils), 4 4 8 up to 100 Lebanese companies registered between 1 s t of January 1993 and 31 s t 
of March 1997 were subsidiaries of, or affiliated to EU companies. The data provided on 
these firms was not complete, leaving a remarkable amount of loopholes. However, such 
results were caused by the lack of information provided. 
The local companies that had EU connection were registered mainly in Beirut (77 firms) 
and Ba'abda, the centre of Mount Lebanon (22 firms). Noticeably, none were registered 
in the regions of the South, North and Bekaa. This shows the centralisation of business 
activities in the region of the capital and the surroundings. The following list shows the 
distribution of these firms amongst business sectors and nationality of EU partners. 
Lebanese companies subsidiary of, or affiliated to EU companies registered between 1-1-1993 and SI-
S'1997. A survey prepared by the independent institute, Khalil Masri et Fils (Beirut: 1998). 
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Table 5.7 Lebanese companies subsidiary of, or affiliated to E U companies 
registered between 1-1-1993 and 31-3-1997 
1; Rhone-Poulenc Liban 
i International SAL 
; Off-shore ; part of Rh6ne-Poulenc Group \ France 
2i Etabiissement Financier 
\ "BEMD" SAL 
: Finance. Part of 
| Lebanese BEMO 
\ Banque de i'Europe 
iMeridionale. Paris (BOD) 
! France 
3i Projects and General Supplies 
! Co. SAL 
I Tradco Ltd (among the major 
\ shareholders) 
j Cayman 
i Islands, 
i Britain 
4j Societe de Developpment des 
! Telecommunications au Moyen-
i Orient "SODETEM" SAL 
; Telecom. SODETEL sal. (France 
; Cables et Radio SA is a 
! shareholder) 
; France 
5: Valio International Middle East 
I SAL 
: Holding Subsidiary of the Finnish Valio; Finland 
Dairy Product Group 
6; Finnish Diary SAL ; Holding Subsidairy of Valio Dairy 
Product Group 
; Finland 
T- SALMIYA Technical Services 
! Co. SAL 
; General trade and 
i real estate 
8\Socotes Liban SARL | Inspection and 
i survey 
part of French Socotes group j France 
9 i Trans Services and 
\ Communications "TSC" SARL 
| Studies 
\ 10| Societe Fonciere D'Orient-
j Beyrouth SAL 
; 111RIWA - LAING Ltd SARL i Contracting John Laing International Ltd is i Britain 
a shareholder 
: 12 SAKO Steel Middle East SAL i Trade 
i 13! Betonvai Lebanon SAL I Ready-mix 
! concrete industry 
Affiliated to Betonvai Italian 
group 
i Italy 
; 14; Walter BAU Liban SARL I Construction and 
I contracting 
Part of Walter Bau group l Germany 
I 15 j Royal distributors SAL | Trade William Grant &Sons. B.V. 
Amsterdam 
i Netherlands ; 
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; 16iMARCER POR Liban. Societe 
i Industrielle et Commerciale de 
\ Marbre et du Granit SAL 
i Trade Marcepor-Marmoves 
Ceramics Portugal SA (BOD) 
i Portugal 
\ 17; Lebanon Invest i Holding capital Trust SA (BOD)) i Luxembourg; 
; 18; International Promotors & 
\ Advisors "IPA Lebanon" sari 
| Studies and 
i consultancy 
Soficade Establishment SA 
(Main shareholder) 
\ Luxembourg; 
i 19 i Gras Savoye Liban sal : Insurance 
\ brokerage 
part of Gras Savoye insurance i France 
group 
j phones) 
i Finland 
: 21 j Hospitality Management 
\ Services SAL 
i Data systems D.A.C. Systems Micros 
(shareholder) 
| France 
i 22i Fanadec Wa Siahat SARL i Publishing of 
| periodicals 
: 23 jOmega Meclical SARL \ Hospital 
; equipments 
; France 
i 24jBonna SAL i Pipes industry ; France 
i 25 Addidas Middle East SAL ; Trade part of Addidas group i France 
: 26;Hochtiff ! Construction Hochtiff (Lebanon branch) i Germany 
i 27; Lebanese Leasing Co. SAL Affiliated to the French Credit 
Agricole group 
; France 
i 28iStanger Lebanon SARL i Laboratory testing 
iof const. Materials 
i 29;Sofli SARL ! Contracting, 
: construction 
i materials 
Societe Hil sal - Lyon 
(shareholder) 
: France 
i 30; Inchcape marketing sevices 
I (Lebanon) SAL 
i Retail services Affiliated to the large British 
and international Inchcape 
group 
; Britain 
: 31; Indosuez Capital Moyen-Orient 
iSAL 
I Finance | France 
i 32:Princpe SARL i Research and 
! studies 
i France 
; 33|Quantec SAL I Marketing of IBM 
i computer 
i equipment 
Affiliated to the European 
division of IBM group 
i Italy 
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\ 34| Redland Readymix SARL i Concrete i Redland Readymix Ltd 
I (shareholder) 
\ Britain 
35: International Distilers Vintners -
\ Middle East SAL 
; Affiliated to International 
\ Distilers and Vintners (IDV) 
: Netherlands i 
i 36:Biaterm SARL ; Petroleum 
i suppliers for 
i airline companies 
I French shareholders : France 
i 37; Eugro Levant SARL : Monitoring 
I activities, 
igeotechnical 
I Eugro N.V. \ Netherland ; 
i 38; United Cargo Beirut SARL : Shipping and 
j transit 
i United freight forwarders SAL ; Italy 
l 39! Ober SAL : Holding : Part of the Ober fairs & 
i exhibition group. Ober 
i Investment 
: 40; Soci6te Franco-Libanaise "SFL"; General trade 
! SARL 
: France 
I 41 \ Knauf Lebanon SARL \ Building materials | Greece 
j 42IBAREP Middle East SAL i Workshop for 
: reparation of 
i industrial taps 
j Archeveque Technologie SA 
i (Shareholder) 
: 43; Wartsila Disel Middle East Ltd 
;SAL 
; Electronic 
i supplies 
iWarsila Disel Int. Ltd i Finland 
: 44: Viglienzone Adriatica (LIBANO); Off-shore 
| SARL 
: Italy 
: 45: Services Libanais de Promotion 
j Commerciales SAL 
: Alpenside Ltd ; Ireland 
; 46! Beirut Airport Services SAL ; Alysia Airport Services SA ; France 
j 471 ECO MAX SAL I Operators of ECO; ECO MAX 
iMAX chain of 
\ retail stores 
; France 
i 48; Euro-Mediterranee pour le 
\ Developpment SARL 
; Supply of : Wellcare Holding NV (main 
I technical services I shareholder, and in BOD 
i related to telecom ; 
: Netherlands ; 
; 49|LeverFattal SAL : Manufacturing, ; J-venture between Unilever 
:trade & marketing land Khalil Fattal et Fils local 
i of consumer \ group 
igoods 
: 50: Davis Langdon Lebanon Ltd 
iSARL i studies : shareholder) 
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51 i Gondrand SAL j Travel Atransport 
:agency 
i Gondrand Ltd (main 
i shareholder) 
: Britain 
i 52: Coutes Lorilleax Moyen Orient 
jSARL 
i Raw material for 
! paint 
i 53:Libano-Francaise D'lngenierie 
\ "LFI" SARL 
i Engineering : France 
; 54; Unilog Liban SAL ; Data systems : Unilog SA (shareholder) | France 
: 55; Mediterranean shipping Co. 
j Lebanon "MSC" SARL 
! Trade, Cargo 
j transport 
; United Agencies Ltd (main 
\ shareholder) 
; Ireland 
; 56; Sucden Liban SAL i Catering services 
i shareholder) 
: France 
j 57MTALEX SARL ! Chemical 
| products for 
! construction and 
| Societe Fiduciaria Vinecentine; Italy 
iSRL (main shareholder) 
\ 58; Advanced Construction 
! Technology Services "ACTS" 
| SAL 
i Construction 
i (execution & 
i supervision) 
| RMB International Ltd BVI 
i shareholder 
i 59 : Tractabel Lebanon SAL : Engineering ; Tractabel Development SA 
i (main shareholder) 
; Belgium 
; 60[Cos. ITALCo. SARL ; Contracting j Italcos, Cos.mar spa, Conapro i Italy 
| SA (shareholders) 
i 61; Middle East Capital Group 
i(MECG) SAL 
: Finance i Middle East Capital Group 
i(London) 
: Britain 
i 62: Eculine Liban SARL I General transport ! Affiliated to Eculine i Netherlands \ 
i 63! Wilo Salmon Lebanon SARL : Electrical pumps i Pompes-Salmon SA (main 
i shareholder) 
; France 
: 64iC.C.F. Holding Liban SAL i Finance i Part of Cr6drt Commercial de 
\ France 
| France 
: 65IGEMO Liban SARL 
\ 661 Partners in finance SARL 
I Enterprises, 
icontracting & 
I development 
i General studies & lO.R.f. SA (main shareholder) 
I analysis 
j France 
I France 
l Ready-mix 
i concrete industry 
i 68; Challenge Middle East SAL ; Off-shore i Challenge International 
| (shareholder) 
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\ 69IICAR International SAL ! Contracting ; Part of ICAR contracting 
! group 
\ Italy 
70! MKP Trading & Contracting 
;SAL 
\ General trade & 
i contracting 
: 711KPOS COMPUTER SYSTEM 
| (Lebanon) SARL 
| Electronic 
i equipment 
| KPOS computer system Ltd 
i (shareholder) 
i Britain 
; 72;Mouawad Hill SARL ; Contracting i Higgs and Hill Overseas Ltd \ Britain 
: 73i Svedaia Lebanon SARL i Construction 
I equipment 
| Svedala Industri A-B \ Sweden 
! Publishing of 
i phone directory 
; France 
i 75ILINDE Material Handling 
| Middle East SARL 
i Public works 
\ equipment 
; Germany 
; 76 j Heilit Koray Lebanon SARL i Construction i Heilit Woerner Bau AG 
\ (Munchen), Koray Yapi 
\ Industrisi ve Ticaret 
i Germany, 
i Turkey 
; 77!LibarusSAL 
78 i Sogelease Liban SAL i Leasing i Affiliated to the Societe 
i Generale banking group 
i France 
\ 79; Ericsson Liban SARL ! Telecom. : Ericsson ! Sweden 
i 801 Paralu Bifem SARL \ Aluminium 
! contracting 
; French shareholder i France 
: 81; Bureau Veritas Liban SAL i Affiliated to Bureau Veritas 
! Technical Inspection 
i International Group 
i France 
; 82|SPR Liban SAL i Contracting I French shareholder i France 
i 83IFTML i Telecom. Mobile 
Iphones 
I France Telecom. i France 
84 \ Sol Solution Moyen - Orient | Geological studies! Sol solution SA (shareholder) I France 
! 851CANA PlastSAL i Plastics and 
; derivatives 
\ Alphacan SA i France 
: 86 Camasut SAL i Telecom. 
! Infrustructure 
i studies 
i Camasut (main shareholder) i France 
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\ 87iComeca SARL i Cables and 
; electrical 
i equipment 
\ Comeca SA (shareholder) : France 
j 88| BATI - BOIS SARL ; Financial R.J.D.C. 
i (shareholder) 
: Belgium 
i 89iSoci6te EdraforSAL ; Geotechnical 
i activities 
| Edrasis PSALIidas SA (main 
: shareholder) 
I Greece 
i 90; CEP Moyen - Orient SAL : Supervision I French shareholder i France 
; 91 iMDA Lebanon SARL ; Project 
i management 
\ Monk Dunstone Associations 
i Group International 
j Britain 
j 92ISNAIDERO Middle East ; Kitchen and office j Member of INDEVCO Group 
[furnisher supplier j SAL 
j 93:E.C.L SARL i Engineering : Italy 
; 94: France portes - New Okal SAL ; France 
i 95iMartinsart-Liban SARL ! Bookshops i France 
i 96: Medialog SAL i Data systems ; France 
; 97: Al Comust SARL I Food products 
land beverages 
: France 
; 98:Sami Levant SARL j Transport i France 
: 99 i Geotechnique et Structure 
I Consultants (GSC) SAL 
; Infrastructure 
i studies 
: France 
Source: Derived by the author from lists provided by Khalil Masri et Fits Consultants. Beirut. 
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Chart 5.9 
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Source: Compiled by the author from the above list (Table 5.7). 
European businesses have shown a noticeable interest in trade and contracting activities. 
The interests that were revealed amongst locally registered firms with E U partnership 
resembled the business interests of European firms registered as foreign. However, trade 
activities seemed to be more attractive to E U businesses than contracting. This shows 
some difference with the purely foreign E U firms that had a predominant interest in 
contracting. The term trade is used in this part to cover the same activities referred to as 
trade in the earlier section on foreign companies. This included export-import activities, 
and the supply of products manufactured abroad. This could be a local agent or 
representative, or a partnership. In addition, firms involved in retail are included under 
trade. Therefore, the significantly large share of trade activities amongst these firms 
could reflect a high presence of European suppliers through local firms. This remarkable 
presence should not be surprising given the chronic deficit in the balance of trade 
between Lebanon and the EU. European producers, on one side, could be attracted by 
the highly consuming market, while Lebanese partners (or agents), on the other side, 
would know the needs of the market and thus go hunting for exclusive agencies. 
Contracting came second with 16 firms identified as being involved in related activities. 
The reconstruction process would have certainly influenced the establishment of these 
firms. The same can be applied to the cases of finance and consultancy firms. However, 
the new business activity conducted by two of these locally registered firms is the 
B.O.T. contracting. The Build-Operate-Transfer schemes were different from other 
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contracting activities because they involved investment by the firm that would expect to 
recoup its investment profitably before handing the new business to the government. 
The representation of E U member states amongst these firms reflected a prominent 
presence of French business interests. Of the 99 subsidiaries, 41 firms were identified as 
having a French connection. Britain came second again but only with 10 firms. This can 
only reflect the strong economic relations between Lebanon and France. Out of the 15 
countries of the EU, 12 countries were represented. However, the French had the upper 
hand with over 40 per cent. This French predominance will show again in the following 
parts of this chapter while discussing the share of E U firms in the business opportunities 
raised by the reconstruction process. 
Chart 5.10 
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Source: Compiled by the author from the list provided earlier in Table 5.7. 
5.7 E U firms share in public sector contracts 
We have established earlier that the commencement of the reconstruction process 
instigated the flow of European firms into Lebanon after 1993. The rebuilding of the 
country's infrastructure was the major catalyst for this influx. The data used earlier in 
this chapter shows clearly how almost all of them arrived after the beginning of the 
1JO 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment of EU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
rebuilding process, and with the majority being interested in business related to the 
reconstruction process. Hereafter we shall find out the role these firms played in the 
rebuilding process, and in fact, how successful they were in gaining contracts from the 
government. The data provided in this section would indicate the size of these firms' 
activities, and compensate for the lack of data on the capitalisation of foreign firms 
operating in Lebanon. The activities of the E U firms within the contracting process will 
be assessed and compared to non-EU firms. The two factors used in this process are, 
firstly, the number of E U firms rewarded major contracts in the various aspects of the 
reconstruction process, as opposed to non-EU firms. Secondly, the value of contracts 
taken by E U firms against those of non-EU firms. 
A major problem in collecting material for this part of the research was tracing the firms 
that were awarded contracts in the rebuilding of Lebanon's infrastructure. There are no 
publications by the government that give details about the firms awarded contracts. The 
CDR in its early reports used to name the contracting firms but stopped providing this 
information from 1995 onwards, confining their reports to details of contracts without 
mentioning contractors. However, some major contracts received a little more details in 
the reports by which the name of the contracting company was given. The alternative 
was to follow news reports through economic periodicals, which were covering the 
contracting procedures. 
5.7.1 E U companies in the rehabilitation of Lebanon's electricity 
The power sector was a major part of the reconstruction plan due to the important role of 
electricity in any development process. Lebanon's electricity network was utterly 
devastated during the war: Consequently, production capacity was far below the demand 
causing hideous rationing. The poor network needed complete replacement. The 
rehabilitation of this sector was given priority by the Lebanon's government, which was 
keen to attract foreign businesses into Lebanon. Electricity is one of the basic needs 
which foreign businesses, and local as well, would consider essential while considering 
establishing operation in a country. 
The massive plan opened the door for EU electricity companies to flow into Lebanon. 
The size of the projects imposed the need for experienced companies that could provide 
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capital equipment and install it. Thus, the share of EU firms in contracted projects in 
Lebanon showed mostly in the electricity sector. The total funds allocated for the 
electricity sector reached US$ 1,337.9 m by the end of 1998. Out of this total, the share 
of EU firms reached around US$ 1,136.22 m (Around 85 per cent of the total job was 
taken by EU companies). Looking at the types of projects, they ranged between 
consultancy, power plants rehabilitation, or building new plants and networking. Almost 
23 contracts out of a total of 56 went to EU firms. Obviously, they were the pricey ones. 
Among the EU countries, French companies had the highest share in both the number 
and value of contracts: around 17 contracts with a value of US$ 420.07 m. Italian 
companies followed the French closely in terms of value (US$ 413,5 m) with only three 
contracts. German firms received around US$ 291.15 m with three contracts as well. 
Table 5.8 Contracts taken by E U firms in the rebuilding of the electricity sector 
1 C o m p a n y Contract Valuta US$M Country Funding I Starting Duration 
1 M ELEC Rehabilitation of two 
substations (Jamhour 
& Bsalim) 
7 France France 01/05/93112 months 
2:Electricite de 
i France 
Supervision for work 
on the rehab. Prog. 
12.2 France France 01/07/93 21 months, 
| renewed 
:for 20 
j months 
3 Electncite de 
; France 
EDL reorganisation 
study 
6.39 France France 01/07/93 21 months, 
i renewed 
|for18 
i months 
4Ansakto Power plant 
rehabilitation 
106 Italy Leb, Kuwait, 
AFESD, 
KFAED 
01/10/93 18 months 
5 Clemessy Rehabilitation of 
distribution (Greater 
Beirut) 
51 France Leb, Wk, 
EIB 
01/11/93 18 months 
6 Bouygues Rehabilitation of 
distribution (regions) 
52 France Leb, WB, 
EIB 
01/11/93 18 months 
7 Electricity Supply 
Board of Ireland 
Sector 
implementation unit 
572 Ireland EU 01/12/9312 years; 
! extended 
ifor 6 
i months 
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: 8iAnsaldo : Building Zahrani : Exp& 01/01/95:30 months j 
: combined cycle power! i commercial \ 
; plant ! credits, 
! 9 Siemens i Build Beddawi power I274 I Germany ; Exp & 01/01/95:30 months : 
; plant i commercial i 
i credits, 
LAFESD 
10! European Gas ; Installation of new gasS32 i France 01/05/95:12 months \ 
i Turbines | turbines at Tyre 
TfiGEC Aisthom i Installation of new gas 129 I France 61/65/95] 12 months ! 
\ turbines in Baalbeck 
! 12!Clemessy I Additional To I France llBRD 6i/09/95] l 0 months 1 
i rehabilitation of 
i distribution 
! 13! Electricite de I Supervision of supply \ France \ France 6l709/95] l 2 months 
! France land installation of gas 
i turbines in Baalbeck 
land Tyre 
! 14!Eiectricite de I Training EDL 6.69 \ France 01/09/95! 
i France i personnel 
: 15: Electricite de i Supervision building i France : France 
! France ! of Zahrani & Bedawi 
I plants 
i 16i Electricite de i Management system j France 
; France :for MV subscribers 
i including value of 
: equipment 
; 17Fichtner \ Environmentai impact 6.15 I Germany IBRD 01/11/95! 4 months \ 
i assessment 
\ 181 Eiectricite de ! Consultany (collection 27.5 \ France ! France 01/12/95! 15 months, ! 
\ France \ improvement plan) ! renewed 
19|Groupe i Building four metai- 99 I France 61/69/96! 
I Schneider iclad substations in 
\ Beirut 
! 20;Spie Enertrans/ ! Installation of three 34 j France / 01/09/96! 
iCIemessy/ AEG|220KV substations in ! Germany 
ithe regions 
! France substations projects 
P22[pireili General Installation of 47.5 litaiy IEIB, iBRb; 1 '01/67/97! 
; underground cables 
23 Aicatei Cables ! installation of 57 \ France |EIB, IBRD ; 61/12/97! 
\ underground cables in 
; Greater Beirut 
Source: Compiled by the author from lists provided by the Council for Development and Reconstuction 
(CDR) Progress Report. 
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Chart 5.11 
Value of contracts taken by EU firms in electricity 
sector (out of a total of US $1,337.9) 
Others 
15% 
Eu firms 
85% 
I Eu firms 
I Others 
Source: Compiled by the author. Figures derived from CDR Progress Reports. 
Chart 5.12 
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Chart 5.13 
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states (Total US$1,136.22m) 
Ireland 
Germany 
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I France • Italy • Germany • Ireland 
Source: Compiled by the author. Figures derivedfrom 
CDR Progress Reports. 
Source: Compiled by the author. Figures 
derived from CDR Progress Reports. 
5.7.2 E U companies in the rebuilding of the telecommunication sector 
This is another sector that showed an abundant presence of EU firms. I f electricity was 
devastated in Lebanon in the post-war period, telecommunications were virtually non-
existent. In telephones, an overall rehabilitation was needed for the existing old 
networks, in addition to extending networks to areas that had never previously had 
telephone services. Here again, EU firms had the opportunity to seize as many contracts 
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as possible. Contracts comprised consultancy, extending networks and supplying 
equipment. Out of a total of US$ 746.7 m allocated for telecommunication projects, 
firms from the EU caught US$ 534.3 m (72 per cent). 
Table 5.9 Contracts awarded by E U firms in Telecommunication sector 
to Company Contract Value 
U S $ m 
Country Funding otarting Duration 
1 Deloitte & 
Touche 
Sector organisation 
study 
3.102 Britain WB 01/02/93 1? months, 
renewed 
for 4 
months 
(July 95) 
2 Alcatel Supply of spare parts 
& equipment to 
Ministry of Telecom 
1.8; France France 01/09/93! 12 months ! 
Alcatel Rehab & extend of 
exchange equipment 
21.68; France Leb 01/10/93 18 months 
Siemens Rehab & extend of 
exchange equipment 
33.68 Germany Leb 01/10/93 24 months 
;5 Ericsson Rehab & extend of 
exchange equipment 
22.72; Sweden Leb 01/10/93; 18 months ! 
6 ; 
7 j 
Alcatel 
Cabie& 
Wireless 
International network 
extension: earth 
station 
telecom management 
7.87 France 
5.662 Britain 
Leb 
IBRD 
01/05/94 18 months 
01/09/94 36 months 
8 | 
9 j 
10 
Alcatel 
Siemens 
Ericsson 
Rehab. & installation j 
of new fixed phone 
lines 
Rehab. & installation ! 
of new fixed phone 
lines 
Rehab. & installation ! 
of new fixed phone 
lines 
130.7;France 
153! Germany ! 
147! Sweden j 
: j 
Leb 
Leb 
Leb 
01/09/94 36 months 
01/09/94 36 months 
01/09/94 36 months 
11 Progis Inventory and stock 
management software i 
for MPT 
0.152; Austria Leb 01/07/95 3 months 
12 Sofrecom Local network studies j 
at 40 sites 
1.83 France France 01/02/96 12 months 
13 Ericsson Equipment for inter-
change traffic 
1.96! Sweden | Leb 01/02/96 4 months 
14 j 
15 
Siemens 
Alcatel 
Equipment for inter-
change traffic 
Equipment for inter-
1.32 Germany 
1.83! France 
Leb 
Leb 
01/02/96 4 months 
01/02/96 4 months 
; change traffic 
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Chart 5.14 
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5.7.3 Transportation (including airports and ports) 
The share of contracts awarded to E U firms in the transportation sector was not little. In 
terms of value, they snatched up to 44 per cent of the total expenditure of the 
government on that sector. However, the number of opportunities was limited in this 
sector. Certainly, the transportation networks (roads mainly) were devastated and needed 
a massive plan for upgrading. However, those jobs were taken by local and Arab firms. 
Only giant projects were seized by E U firms. Beirut International Airport is the major 
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project in this sector. At a cost of US$ 387 m, it was taken by a joint venture between 
the German Hochtief and Arab (Athens based) CCC. The expansion of the port of Beirut 
is another project that was given to the Spanish joint venture Entrecanales - Cubiertas. 
This explains how contracts involving E U firms mounted up to 44 per cent of the total 
value. The Spanish firms' contract was over a US$ 100 m while the German Hochtief 
joint venture with C C C was just below US$ 400 m. 
Again, French firms received the highest number of contracts (10 contracts). However, 
the biggest share in value went to German firms represented by Hochtief (74 per cent 
through one contract). We should take into consideration that the German company 
didn't get all the amount because it was through a joint venture. Nevertheless, even with 
half of the contract value, the German company comes first with around US$ 200 m 
(around 38 per cent). 
Table 5.10 Contracts awarded to E U firms in transportation sector 
tw-ffl-m-w-; 
1 Sofrerail j Railways study France !Leb, 
! France 
01/09/93 ; 9 months 
2 \ Port Autonome de i Consultancy (port) \ 1.5 I France Leb, EIB 01/12/93 136 
Marseille ! months 
"3tfeam7iAUR'iF7 i Consultancy 2.4 I Local/ Leb, 61/61/94" ]18 
SOFRETU i (Traffic studies) ; France France \ months 
4 Dan Group | Sector 2.7 I Denmark EU 61/65794 ]36 
i imlementation unit \ i months 
5 |Samtsc - Gisman i Restoration of the i 6.06 I France France 01/09/94 
| light-house at Ras- \ 
] Beirut 
6|iHochtief7cCC I Airport 387 \ Germany/ • Leb, EI B, 61/69/94 ]48 
i (joint venture) I Local KFAED ; months 
7 j Aeroport de Paris I Organisational 2.49 i France France 61/68/96 124 
i study of the \ months 
i Directorate General i 
iof Civil Aviation, 
land supply of 
i computer software | 
8 j Aeroport de Paris : Training in air traffic; 2.7 i France i France 01/08/96 j l 5 
i control procedures i ; months 
9-Aeroport de Paris i Meteorological 3.1 i France : France 01/08/96 ]16 
1 equipment ! months 
0 Aeroport de Paris j Radar simulator 2.6 I France i France : 01/08/96 119 
i months 
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11 Aeroport de Paris Training equipment 
for radar 
maintenance staff 
12 Aeroport de Paris Training equipment 
for aircraft 
maintenance staff 
Rehab & extension 
of the port of Beirut 
Clearance of 
wrecks from all 
basins in the port of 
Beirut 
13 Entrecanales / 
Cubiertas 
14 SAR/Mowlem 
France France 
2.4 France France 
102.8 Spain 
4.5 Britain 
EIB, Leb 
Leb 
01/08/96 10 
months 
01/08/96 14 
months 
15/01/97 24 
months 
01/09/97 
Source: Compiled by the author. Figures derived from CDR Progress Reports. 
Chart 5.17 
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5.7.4 Water supply and wastewater 
This sector included the rehabilitation of water supply networks, in addition to pumping 
and treatment plants. It also contained the wastewater projects that dealt with networking 
and treatment plants. The EU firms' share in this sector was not as high as in other 
sectors. It reached US$ 75.3 m (16 per cent) out of the total value of contracts in this 
sector (US$ 477.2 m). The 11 contracts that the various EU firms gained in this sector 
varied between consultancy, preparation of studies and equipment supply. The 
remainder of the contracts were taken by local companies. British firms gained four 
contracts with a value of around US$ 21 m. French firms received three contracts valued 
at around US$ 41 m (55 per cent of EU firms share). Italian and Greek firms got two 
contracts each. The value of their contracts were around US$ 11.55 m and US$ 1.43 m, 
respectively. 
Table 5.11 Contracts awarded to E U firms in water supply and wastewater sector 
e**fc Company Contract Value Country finding J Starting Duration 
mmmm mmmmmmmmm mmmiimmfsmMii US§M 1 $8t£ 
1 \ EMIT and SELC Extension of 
\ (consortium) \ Dbaye water 
i treatment plant 
;5.73 ; Italy ; Italy 01/12/92:30 months 
2:Lyonnaise des 
j Eaux &Dumez 
i (consortium) 
i Management 
I consultancy 
12.6 \ France ; France 01/08/93136 months 
3! Montgomery 
iWatson-Engico 
\ Updating studies 
son Awali-Beirut 
J m o t o r rw / s\\ ir\r 
:17 \ Britain iSFD 01/12/93 M 8 months 
4|Binnie& \ Sector 
i Partners \ implementation 
junit 
5jGico Costruzioni INERP list year 
jprog.wastewater 
| main server 
\ repairs & 
1 extension 
[IT 
1^82 
: Britain 
Iltaiy 
1'EU" 
TiBRD/ElB/T 
;Leb 
01/02/94|36 months 
01/04794112 months 
6 | E . N L B INERP 1st year 
jprog. Supervision: 
\ wastewater, North 
\Lebanon 
|a29 | Greece IlBRD / EIB \ 01/04/94] 12 months 
7 | E . N . B INERP 1st year 
; prog.supervision: 
j water supply, 
\ North Lebanon 
h/i'4 I Greece TlBRD/EiB 1 01/64794! 12 months 
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8 
9 
Howard 
Humphreys 
Sir Alexander 
Gibb / Khatib 
&Alami / KCIC 
Consultany for 
water supply & 
wastewater in the 
regions 
Consultancy for 
water supply & 
wastewater in 
Greater Beirut 
9.83 
3.39 
Britain 
Britain/ 
Local 
IBRD 
KFAED 
01/10/94 
01/11/94 
30 months 
26 months 
10 
11 
Pont a Mousson 
OTV 
Supply of pipes to 
Barouk water 
board 
Rehab & extension 
of water treatment 
plants 
4.7 
34 
France 
France France 
(French 
protocols) 
01/06/95 
01/08/96 36 months 
Source: Compiled by the author. Figures derived from CDR Progress Reports. 
Chart 5.20 
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5.7.5 Solid waste treatment 
The portion for EU firms in this sector was humble compared to other sectors; a total of 
five contracts only valued at around US$ 8.91 m. When compared to the total 
expenditure by the government on this sector, US$ 665.3 m, the EU firms' share does 
not exceed 1 per cent. Most of the expenditure has been allocated for projects to provide 
landfills, and garbage collection contracts. These contracts were taken by local firms. 
EU firms, as the table shows, mainly got contracts for consultancy. 
French companies again got the highest share of contracts (4 contracts) valued at US$ 
7.21 m. A single contract was taken by a German-Belgium joint venture for a total value 
ofUS$ 1.7 m only. 
Table 5.12 Contracts awarded to E U firms in solid waste treatment 
Company Contract Value 
* u r n 
Country Duration 
1 CREED i Consultancy 
i services for 
| landfill sites 
1.53 j France WB 07/01/94 12 months 
i 2 CREED j Supervision for 
I the Rehab of 
iQarantina plant 
0.19 i France WB 07/01/94 12 months 
\ 3 0TV | Rehab of 
| treatment plant 
j(Qarantina) civil 
i&mechanical 
j works 
5.3 i France WB 27/01/94 8 months 
; 4 : transtec/ j Sector 
iFichtner j implementation 
\ unit (consultancy) 
1.7 i Belgium/ 
| German 
EU 30/04/94 36 months 
j 5i CREED 7 I Long term 
iLiban j strategy for the 
Consult \ solid waste sector 
0.19 ! France/ 
jLocal 
IBRD 01/12/94 
Source: Compiled by the author. Figures derived from CDR Progress Reports. 
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Chart 5.23 
Value of contracts taken by EU firms in solid waste 
sector (out of a total of US$ 665.3m) 
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Chart 5.24 Chart 5.25 
Num b e r of c o n t r a c t s t a k e n by B J f irm s in 
s o l i d w a s t e s e c t o r d i v i d e d a m o n g m e m b e r 
s t a t e s (To ta l 5 ) 
I R a n e e • Belgium/German 
V a l u e of c o n t r a c t s t a k e n by B J f irm s in S o l i d 
w a s t e s e c t o r d i v i d e d by m e m b e r s t a t e s 
(To ta l U S $ 8 . 9 1 m ) 
Belgium 1 
Germany 
1 9 % 
R a n e e 
I France • Belgium/Germany 
Source: Compiled by the author. Figures derived from CDR Progress Reports. 
5.7.6 National education, higher education, and sports 
The rebuilding of this sector offered few opportunities for EU firms in terms of numbers 
of contracts, despite the huge number of projects. The fact that this sector involved all 
state schools and the national university buildings, in addition to sports complexes, 
created a huge number of opportunities. However, most of these contracts were very 
small in value due to their sizes (reconstructing schools and erecting new ones). Local 
companies got most of these contracts. Having said that, we should not get the 
impression that EU firms were crowded out in this sector. On the contrary, contracts 
that involved EU firms were valued at around US$ 274.22 m. This figure surprisingly 
represented 61 per cent of the government's total expenditure allocated for this sector. I 
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managed to trace five contracts. Three of them were taken by Italian firms but were 
relatively small (just over US$ 1 m together) Al l were supply contracts. The British 
Trafalgar House (later Kvaernar) got a very 'prestigious' contract to rebuild the main 
sports complex in the country at a cost around US$ 74 m. The German Zublin gained 
the contract for the building of the new campus for the Lebanese University. The value 
of the contract was around US$ 199 m. However, Zublin is not alone in that contract. 
Some local firms and a Turkish one have got a share of the contract but the percentage 
has not been disclosed. 
Table 5.13 Contract awarded to E U firms in education and sports sectors 
No Company Contract Value 
US$m 
Country Funding Starting 
date 
Duration 
HAIessandrini Equipment for 0.25 Italy Italy 01/09/94 4 months 
Strumentazione secondary schools 
2 Bicasa SPA Equipment for 0.19 Italy Italy 01/09/94 4 months 
secondary schools 
3 Tema Equipment for 0.78 Italy Italy 01/09/94 4 months 
International secondary schools 
4 Trafalgar House Building sports 74 Britain Saudi Arabia, 01/09/94 23 months 
(later Kvaemer) complex Kuwait, Leb 
5 Zublin Building Lebanese 199 Germany Saudi Arabia, 01/08/97 36 months 
University campus Oman, IBD, 
(Hadath) Leb 
Source: Compiled by the author. Figures derived from CDR Progress Reports. 
Chart 5.26 
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Chart 5.27 Chart 5.28 
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5.8 Conclusion 
The survey has proved that EU businesses represented the predominant foreign activity 
in the Lebanese economy during the reconstruction period. It also provided a framework 
for assessing the main business interests of the EU firms. The sectors of contracting, 
trade, and finance proved to be the most favoured amongst businesses. However, 
contracting stands out as the major reason behind the influx of EU firms and many other 
foreign firms. Obviously, the commencement of the reconstruction process instigated 
the flow of such foreign companies into Lebanon. The promising opportunities arising 
from the need to rebuild the devastated infrastructure attracted a number of foreign 
firms that had had no previous relations with Lebanon. Therefore, the influx of foreign 
companies - including EU ones - was not merely a return of foreign firms that had fled 
the country during the civil war. On the contrary, the majority of these firms were being 
registered for the first time. Multinational firms involved in power generation, 
construction, or telecommunication were particularly motivated by the opportunities 
arising from the need to rebuild these sectors. The data on the EU firms' share in the 
infrastructure rehabilitation showed how successful these EU firms were in snatching 
high value contracts. However, it could be argued that many of the EU firms have 
benefited from the conditional aid provided by the EU and the member states. The 
previous chapters had shown that some of the aid originating from the EU or the 
member states was conditional (Chapter Two, the section on EU funding of 
reconstruction). The data provided on the source of funding for every contract supports 
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this argument. It is not surprising then i f projects sponsored by French financial 
protocols were contracted to Electricity de France or Aeroport de Paris. Nonetheless, 
this does not deny the fact that the calibre of these firms was needed for the majority of 
the rehabilitation projects. They obviously offered a high quality product that other local 
and Arab firms could not provide. It was impossible for projects in electricity and 
telecommunication, for instance, to be taken by local firms who did not have the 
necessary qualifications. 
The survey has clearly shown the impressive presence of French firms compared to 
other European counterparts. The special historical relations between Lebanon and 
France have inevitably contributed to the prominent presence of French firms. The 
French have developed strong links with the population of Lebanon. The Francophonic 
aspect of Lebanon, in which a substantial part of the population speaks the French 
language, made it easier to forge links between the two countries. The French also had a 
past experience in the infrastructure building of Lebanon at the turn of the 20 t h century. 
They were also involved in operating the country's utilities sector until its independence 
in 1943. These factors must have given the French a comparative advantage against 
their counterparts in seeking business opportunities in Lebanon. In contracting, the 
factor of conditional aid provided by France should not be ignored. The conditional 
French funding for a plethora of projects helped many French firms in seizing these 
projects. In the case of funding coming from the EU, the French, and other EU firms, 
had an advantage compared to other foreign firms bidding for the same projects.4 4 9 
It has to be said, however, that the survey of EU firms in Lebanon did not help in 
identifying firms that are conducting direct investment from others engaged in different 
sort of business activities. The lists of registration did not clarify whether these firms are 
investing or not. It is indeed difficult to judge whether a firm is conducting investment 
or not, without investigating its activities in the country. Thus, in the next chapter, a 
number of EU firms' case studies will be investigated and compared. By the end of the 
chapter, a profile of EU private direct investments in Lebanon is hoped to be 
established. 
If a project is funded by the EU, only EU and local firms can take it. In case of French funding, only 
French and local firms can be awarded the project. (Interview with Al-Fadl Shalak, Ex-Chairman of the 
Council for Development and Reconstruction. Beirut September 2000). 
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Chapter Six: Case-Study Firms on EU Private Direct Investments in 
Lebanon 
6.1 Introduction 
The findings of Chapter Five have ascertained the extent of EU private business 
activities in Lebanon. It determined that only a small proportion of those activities 
appeared to fall directly into the category of FDI. Most were engaged in contracting or 
trade. This chapter aims to examine more closely the nature of EU private business 
activity in Lebanon through the close study of case studies. It will determine to what 
extent the firms studied were engaged in FDI, and the reasons why firms have or have 
not engaged in FDI. The criteria outlined in Chapter Four will be used as theoretical 
tools for identifying incentives and disincentives. 
We have already ascertained that amongst the EU firms registered in Lebanon as 
foreign firms, the three business activities that proved to be very popular were 
contracting, trade and finance. Companies involved in contracting activities (mainly 
construction) numbered 29 firms; trade attracted about 16 firms; and finance about 10. 
These figures include the EU firms registered between 1993-1998 only. Inevitably, 
these figures would increase i f we were to add the number of EU businesses registered 
as local firms through partnership or any other kind of affiliation. Those included 16 
firms involved in contracting (in addition to two B.O.T. contracting firms), and around 
30 trading firms. Moreover, the EU firms that were already operating in Lebanon before 
1993 should not be ignored. As discussed earlier in the previous chapter, the 
concentration of EU businesses in those sectors is not surprising when the massive 
national reconstruction plan is taken in consideration. 
As these three lines of business activities are dominant, the case studies for this research 
were chosen from firms involved in these activities. The way the case studies wi l l be 
discussed is as follows: I will identify a few firms in every sector with similar activities; 
I wil l study the case of one of these firms in details, and then use the other brief cases to 
provide supporting material. The overall aim of this chapter is to assess the interest of 
each firm in Lebanon, the reasons for choosing their particular activities, and to 
determine the type of business EU firms are involved in whilst in Lebanon, by figuring 
out whose business could be considered FDI, and whose could not. The information 
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collected during the fieldwork in Lebanon through interviews with representatives of 
the EU firms discussed later in this chapter will pave the way for a comprehensive 
discussion of motives and obstacles for investment in Lebanon. 
6.2 Trade (retail) 
The trade sector involves numerous lines of activities, which range from import-export 
to marketing and retail. I have chosen to focus on one line of trade business, which is 
retailing. The reason behind this selection is partly due to the apparent presence of the 
new 'giant' retailing supermarkets. It is one of the sectors that some foreign firms are 
represented in, either directly or through a local representative. There were some local 
retail supermarkets in Lebanon. Those were alone in the market before the arrival of EU 
brands. The firms covered in this study are: Inchcape (Spinneys), Ecomax, and ADMIC 
(BHV, MonoPrix). 
6.2.1 Inchcape Retail Services -Lebanon SAL (Spinneys) 
Lebanon's Inchcape Retail Services was wholly owned by Spinneys at the time of its 
arrival in Lebanon. Spinneys was a holding company, which was in turn held by another 
holding company, the UK-based Inchcape pic. The mother company was operating at 
two levels: Spinneys was a holding company that owns various percentage shares; in the 
case of Lebanon its holding was of 100 per cent, while in its Gulf operations they were 
of 49 per cent. Spinneys was in turn owned by Inchcape pic. 
Spinneys was established in 1948. However, it has changed hands six times in the last 
ten years: It was part of a family-owned company, Steel Brothers, but was sold to the 
British and Commonwealth Company. The latter was de-merged into two halves; the 
first went bankrupt while the second was subject to a management buy out. It was sold 
to an investment company, which was part of the Novel Group. This group went 
bankrupt and was subsequently bought by Inchcape pic in 1992. 
In Lebanon, Spinneys is just a brand name not a company, according to the general 
manager of Inchcape Retail Services- Lebanon SAL, Michael Wright. 
"We have other companies around the Gulf that have Spinneys incorporated with the 
company's name, like Spinneys Dubai, Spinneys Abu Dhabi. In this context, the 
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company is Inchcape Retail Services - Lebanon, and we have Spinneys as a trade 
mark. " 4 5 0 
Inchcape pic has a wide range of activities in the UK. It used to be on the FTSE 100 but 
dropped out recently because of the collapse of its share price after a sharp hike in the 
value of the Yen. The reason was that Inchcape pic had Toyota concessions across 
Europe. 
In the Gulf region, Spinneys has often had multi-role, or multi-stream companies. 
Spinneys Dubai has a consumer division, retail, catering, ship handling, export services, 
and others. In Lebanon, the company's activities are confined to supermarkets only. 
Inchcape pic (Holding- UK) 
Spinneys Automotive Financial Motor related 
Holding (Dubai) distribution & services e-commerce 
i retail 
Inchcape Retail 
Services (Beirut). Owner of Spinneys supermarkets. 
Spinneys have operated in Lebanon since 1948, the time the company was formed. Its 
operations comprised supermarkets and consumer products distribution until the 
beginning of the civil war when the supermarkets were closed "due to their dangerous 
locality". The company carried on in the distribution business throughout the war 
though. With the end of the war, the company sold its share in that business, took the 
name back, and "decided that the future is in retail". A feasibility study was conducted 
in 1994-95, and by 1996, Mr Wright moved to Beirut to start the process of doing the 
deal on the site and setting up operations. 
When the fieldwork for this research was conducted, the company was preparing to 
open its first supermarket in the eastern suburb of Beirut, Dbayieh, in six weeks time. 
450450 ^ u m o r > s interview with General Manager at Inchcape Retail Services - Lebanon, Michael Wright. 
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The company had an initial go ahead for seven branches from the parent company in 
London. The potential for more would be assessed in the course of time. Beirut and the 
suburbs would come first, and the provincial cities later. Obviously, the parent-firm was 
testing the market through its pilot project. Despite the historical connection that 
Spinneys had with Lebanon, Inchcape's operations in Lebanon still faced the same risks 
that face any business operation in a foreign market. 
The overall investment in Spinneys supermarkets was over US$ 11m. However, this 
amount was not paid in ful l by the parent-firm only. The company leased the premises 
from a Lebanese owner whose investment in the building is part of that total investment 
figure. The capital paid by Inchcape was around US$ 6 m. 4 5 1 In fact, it could be argued 
that the Spinneys project has instigated local investment in real estate to provide 
property for Spinneys supermarkets. On the other hand, the foreign firm is minimising 
the risk as much as possible by leasing property instead of buying it. 
6.2.1.1 Incentives for Inchcape's investment in Lebanon 
Inchcape holds the view that retailing is an area that they want to move into more 
strongly. Operations in retailing already existed in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, and 
Bahrain. The company believes that the retailing business in the Middle East has got a 
future as "markets mature" in this region. 'They look for countries to return to or to 
expand into, and Lebanon was one of the first countries to return to" The reasons are, 
according to Mr. Wright: 
- The people, their expectations, and their more Western life style. The historical 
relations between Lebanon and Europe and the missionaries that settled in it 
exposed its population to huge Western influence. In addition, the large number of 
Lebanese emigrants in Europe, US and Latin America keeps the population updated 
with all Western innovations. Add to that the temporary residencies in Europe of 
Lebanese who fled their country during the war. All these factors support Spinneys' 
assumption that their projected Western style supermarket would be welcomed. 
Beirut July 1998. 
4 5 1 Ibid. 
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- The higher GDP per capita compared to neighbouring countries like Syria and 
Jordan. Lebanon's GDP per head reached US$ 4,219.6 in 1996 while in Syria it was 
US$ 1,070, and US$ 1,634 in Jordan. In Egypt it was US$ 1,228452. 
Table 6.1 GDP per capita in Lebanon and the neighbouring countries 
CoBnUFy/ 1996 Lebanon Syria Jordan Egypt 
GDP per head US$ 4,219.6(a) 1,070 1,634 1,288 
(a): estimated according to the exchange rate of the Lebanese pound against US dollar in 1996. 
Source: EIU Country Profile: Syria; Jordan; Lebanon. 
- The consumer purchase ability is higher than neighbouring countries. Obviously, the 
higher GDP per head would be reflected in a higher purchase ability compared to 
neighbouring countries. The high consumption could be noted as well in the size of 
the imports of Lebanon as opposed to the imports of its neighbours. Lebanon 
imported more than Syria and Jordan in 1997, while the value of its imports was 
over half that of Egypt's imports in the same year.453 It is true that the high level of 
imports is partly a result of the lack of industrialisation in Lebanon. However, it is 
still remarkable to find that Lebanon - with a population around 4 million- imports 
over half the value of Egypt's imports, the population of which is around 60 million. 
The World Bank data on purchasing power parity and private consumption per 
capita shows how the Lebanese market is higher in consumption. 
Table 6.2 Comparative economic indicators from Lebanon and neighbouring 
countries 
Country 
Private consumption per 
capita 
Average animal growth 
% 
1990-97 
Imports 
mi 
US$& 
Lebanon 5.8 7,455 
Syria -0.6 4,018.8 
Jordan 0.5 4,103.2 
Egypt 2.1 13,210 
Sources: for Private consumption and PPP figures, World Bank Atlas, 1998 & 1999. pp. 24 &42. 
Imports' figures are derived from the Statistical Abstract of the ESCWA Region. Eighteenth Edition (UN, 
1998) pp 396 - 397. 
EIU country profiles. 1999-2000. 
Statistical Abstract of the ESCWA Region. Eighteenth Edition (UN, 1998) pp 396 - 397. 
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- The low taxes when a company reaches a profitable situation. "It is better than 
Europe but not as good as the Gulf. A sort of half way house", Wright said. The 
Hariri government slashed taxes down to a maximum of 10 per cent on personal and 
corporate incomes. Therefore, as far as taxes are concerned it is far cheaper to 
operate in Lebanon as opposed to EU countries where taxation is at least double 
these figures. However, business operations in Dubai do not face any kind of 
income taxation. Only custom duties are imposed on imported goods. 
6.2.1.2. Obstacles for FDI according to Inchcape's experience 
Inchcape's manager in Lebanon was not impressed by the trade barriers being imposed 
during the period of their commencement of operations. He was surprised by these 
changes "when Lebanon was known for free trade while barriers are well known to hurt 
trade". Mr. Wright was referring to trade barriers imposed by the Ministry of 
Agriculture against some products that compete with similar produce of Lebanon. He 
raised the issue of banning imports of apples. He agreed that the quality of apples 
produced in Lebanon is acceptable. However, he thinks that the standards of picking, 
packing and storing are poor which shortens the life of the product. "We said that at the 
right season we would be selling that kind of product because it is the right quality and 
price at the time but when it is off season we want to import it." Apparently, the 
Ministry of Agriculture considers that the excess of apple produce (146 000 Tons in 
1996)4 5 4 should be accompanied by a ban on imports all around the year. Mr. Wright 
feared facing losses because of this policy: "The fact that you can't sell them (apples) 
because they are in a bad condition means a total loss." When it was suggested that 
consumers might be used to such qualities, his reply was: "We want to bring Lebanon to 
higher standards. It has fallen back far enough in the 17-years war. It needs to bring 
itself up and not to put up with this standard because it is not war time anymore". 
Lebanon's joining of treaties like the GATT and Euro-Med partnership did not seem to 
reduce the Inchcape-Lebanon manager's fears. He complained that in the last year only 
(1995-96), there were three increases in custom duties. "More and more things are 
banned continually, and it is going to be difficult to bring anything in." He disagreed 
with the assumption that such barriers promote local industry and agriculture 
EIU Country Profile 1999-2000. p.38. 
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"Everybody around the world know that it does not work." In such cases, local 
businesses do not invest and markets never grow, he asserted. 
Vegetable and fruit products seemed to be crucial on Spinneys' list of products. Mr. 
Wright defended his disagreement with bans on agricultural imports by saying they are 
a major part of their envisaged stock. "Without it there is not much space for profit. It is 
a very low profit environment here in Lebanon." He emphasised that the margins for 
profit are very slim and the only way to achieve profit is through volume and offering 
variety of products. He considered that the players in the Lebanese market have no 
expertise in retailing, and all they do is cut prices against each other to draw customers: 
'They cannot get them through service, quality or fresh fruits, or range, because they 
cannot do all these things." In that sense he emphasised his company's superiority in 
retailing against its local counterparts: "We can, plus we can do the price". 
He warned that restrictions could change the positive assumptions that brought investors 
like his company into Lebanon. He commented that to conduct retailing business in an 
environment saturated with import restriction was easier in markets with bigger 
populations. Syria was the example he provided. When faced by the fact that the 
consumer purchase ability in Syria is much less than its counterpart in Lebanon, he 
insisted that "a big store in Damascus would do every bit as well as a big store in 
Beirut". 
The major problems which foreign investors seem to encounter with bureaucracy in 
developing countries did not seem of particular concern to Inchcape in Lebanon. This 
does not mean that problems with the administration do not exist. However, these 
problems were still minimal, according to Mr. Wright, when compared to potential 
problems in neighbouring countries. At least, problems that had erupted so far would 
not stop Inchcape from going ahead with its investment. Mr. Wright noted, however, 
that this is one of the reasons why this supermarket is considered to be a pilot project, 
before going ahead with bigger investment: "we check i f all our assumptions are correct 
all the way along before we plough on and invest in other stores". 
Another problem that faces FDI in developing countries is the red tape or bribery that 
has to be paid to officials who could hinder the process of starting up a business. It 
works out in many cases as hidden-taxes that businesses have to pay in order to avoid 
harassment from officials. Mr. Wright states that "strangely enough," it was not much. 
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This meant that it did exist but in very petty ways: "petty officials here and there 
occasionally cause some problems, but not to the business as a whole". He asserted that 
it was less than anticipated. When asked whether any influential figures had tried to 
cause trouble in order to gain partnerships in their project, Mr. Wright stated that many 
wanted to partner with Inchcape but no pressure was exerted. 
As for government incentives, usually countries that want to attract FDI present a 
package of incentives to draw the attention of foreign businesses. In the case of 
Inchcape in Lebanon, Mr. Wright said that there had been no active encouragement. He 
considered the ministries of finance and economy as being helpful only because they 
did not present any obstacles so far. The only obstacle came from the Ministry of 
Agriculture concerning barriers on imports of agricultural goods. 
6.2.1.3 Inchcape's plans for the future 
Spinneys is pursuing a programme with farmers to grow some products locally. One of 
these products is apples. The programme's aim is to produce according to the accepted 
standards for exports; the same standard that Spinneys looks for in the products they 
want to sell in their stores in Lebanon. This produce would be used by their stores in the 
country, but also exported to their operations in the Gulf region. This was the major 
reason for the dispute with the Ministry of Agriculture, which was discussed earlier. 
Inchcape-Lebanon asked for permit to import apples with the said qualification until 
their farming programme yielded results. 
Other plans concerning expanding their operations within the Lebanese market in the 
future were mentioned earlier. The company has the go ahead from Inchcape for seven 
supermarkets. However, this all depends on the result of the pilot project. 
When asked whether Inchcape could consider using Beirut as its regional headquarters 
Mr. Wright did not reject the idea i f the region was confined to the Levant. However, 
when it comes to the interior Arab region, he confirmed that Dubai is the hub today; 
'That is where our regional office is, and our two largest companies, Spinneys Dubai 
and our sister company M M I Dubai". He hoped that Beirut would regain some of its 
role but noted that it's a long way to go while Dubai "accelerates in modernisation". He 
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confirmed that many of the questions about problems for investment would never be 
asked in Dubai. 
Inchcape, which was about to start operations at the time these information were 
collected, planned to employ 220 staff members in Beirut, 211 of whom were to be 
local employees. Mr. Wright said that his company wants to integrate the local 
community: "Our policy is: as many Lebanese as possible." Concerning salaries, 
Inchcape pays the market rate as they believe that it would be impossible to compete 
while having a higher cost base than the others. Mr. Wright considered that Inchcape 
has already got higher costs because it "plays by the rules". He meant that the company 
declares all its employees with the authorities, pays the social security, and pays the ful l 
salary- not part of it. Here, he was referring to some firms that do not pay their 
employees ful l salaries, and others that avoid registering their employees with the social 
security departments to cut their costs. This deprives the employee of many social 
benefits. 
When Inchcape (Spinneys) started operating in Lebanon it entered the market 
challenging all its competitors by introducing hugely reduced prices. This created a 
massive outcry from other supermarkets in Lebanon who complained to the Ministry of 
Economy and Commerce, asking them to curb Spinneys competitive activities. 
However, the Ministry had allowed Spinneys to offer some products at below cost 
prices. This concession was for a limited period though. 
In an interview with a Lebanese newspaper, Inchcape-Lebanon's general manager, 
Michael Wright, repeated what he said about competition in the Lebanese market. He 
said that after a year of operation the market was very competitive, more than other 
markets in the region. However, he added that Spinneys had established itself as a 
benchmark for having the lowest prices in the region. 4 5 5 The customer count is about 
8,000 paying customers in a good day. However, figures on profit are not available. 
"We are not a public company so we do not have to reveal figures", Mr. Wright said. 4 5 6 
He revealed that on average, out of 600 top-selling items, only about 50 items are 
marked at a profit. The rest is sold at cost. 
455 
4 5 6 Ibid. 
DailyStar, Lebanese English daily. A year after the rebirth of Spinneys. (Beirut 27 October 1999). 
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The claimed success did not stop Mr. Wright from complaining about some 
governmental measures. While his complaints were confined to the Ministry of 
Agriculture when he was interviewed for this thesis, a year later he expressed his 
frustration about the competition policy of the Ministry of Economy and Commerce. He 
told the newspaper that the ministry was not prepared to allow a free market to develop. 
"He said that when he was selling bread at a price no one could match the ministry sent 
inspectors to the bakery and forced the business to raise the price it charged the 
supermarket".457 Wright claimed that Spinneys could afford small margins of profit as 
they have a big volume of sales. For example, Spinneys sold 300,000 bottles of 
shampoo, he revealed. Spinneys is using the UK Tesco products which have achieved a 
high score of sales. 
The pilot project seems to have convinced Spinneys to carry on with the expansion plan. 
Four other outlets are to be opened. The first is to open in Jnah in Beirut in 2000-2001 
(Part of this area is known as Spinneys after the traditional location of a Spinneys store 
before the civil war). The issue of the exact site is not solved yet. Three other shops are 
planned to follow in Achrafieh, Jounieh and the Central District of Beirut (if a site is 
provided). The total investment for this expansion plan is US$ 35 m. However, this 
includes the amount to be invested by landowners to develop the sites. 
A major change occurred during this year as Inchcape Middle East Group has sold off 
its Spinneys brand with its stores and distribution business in the Gulf to Cupola. The 
new owner is an investment group in Dubai run by Pakistani executives and backed by 
Saudi money. The deal was valued at US$ 116 m. A green light for the expansion of 
their retailing business in Lebanon was given by the new owner, while the managing 
team was asked to carry on with the job. Spinneys expect to create 1,000 new jobs once 
the new stores open.458 Inchcape's belief in the future of retail in the Middle East did 
not seem to live long enough. According to the parent-firm publications, Inchcape 
announced in March 1998 that it would focus exclusively on its international motors 
operations in the future. The firm asserted that this has been the largest and most 
successful part of the Group. As a result, Inchcape sold its Bottling businesses in South 
America and Russia, its Marketing Services businesses in Asia Pacific and the Middle 
East, its global Shipping Services business, and its Asia Pacific Office Automation 
4 5 7 DailyStar, Lebanese English daily. A year after the rebirth of Spinnevs. op.cit. 
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business. From 1 July 1999, Inchcape became a Motors-only firm. However, 
Inchcape did not leave the Middle East by selling its marketing services in the region. It 
is still operating in the Middle East as a distributor of motor vehicles. 
6.2.2 Other EU firms in retail 
This firm was registered in Beirut as a local subsidiary of the French Ecomax after 
1993. It is a Paris-based chain of supermarkets owned by Primisteres Reynoird, its 
mother company in France. However, Ecomax's main operations are in the French West 
Indies where it has a chain of 45 cut-price stores selling a basic range of essential items 
supplied in no-name packaging from its mother company in France.460 Ecomax opened 
13 retail outlets in Lebanon in 1996. It has been operating for 30 years in the Caribbean 
and wanted to export its style of shopping to Lebanon after deciding that the size of the 
country and its population which needed competitively priced food items would provide 
the perfect commercial environment.461 
The difference between the case of Ecomax and Inchcape's Spinneys is that the former 
specialised in low-cost unbranded goods. Ecomax also started operating two years 
before Spinneys. However, Ecomax's experience with the Lebanese market did not flow 
as its management expected. The little-known brands did not seem to appeal to a "label-
conscious Lebanese consumer".462 The dire financial situation of many Lebanese does 
not apparently stop them from wanting well-known brands despite the higher cost. 
"People here still think that cheap equals poor quality, even though we made our 
savings on shipping, freight and cutting out middlemen," said Jean-Pierre Deguille, the 
director of Ecomax in Lebanon.463 
Two major problems faced Ecomax after its arrival in Lebanon. First, it was seen as a 
threat to the local supermarkets that started squeezing the newcomer. The second is the 
4 5 8 DailyStar, Lebanese English daily. A year after the rebirth of Spinnevs. op.cit. 
4 5 9 Inchcape's web page: 
http://www.inchcape.a^co(te/Browse_Ccri^ 
inorid=l 
6.2.2.1 Ecomax SAL 
460 The DailyStar, op.cit. 18, February 1999. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 3, February 1999. 
Ibid. 18, February 1999. 
461 
462 
463 
208 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment ofEU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
delay and interference caused by the Customs and the Ministry of Economy, which did 
not seem to affect local businesses. This intensified when Ecomax noted that the 
unknown products were not appealing to the Lebanese consumer and decided to sell 
famous brands. Ecomax had to deal with local wholesalers whose high prices left 
Ecomax with very slim margins for profit. Moreover, Deguille claimed that many 
wholesalers refused to sell to Ecomax as they were threatened with a boycott by local 
supermarkets. "It's a jungle. If you're big and powerful you can do that, you can break 
the laws. That's a big problem in Lebanon," he asserted.464 It was then that Ecomax 
decided to import its own famous-brands from France through its parent-firm. However, 
they were caught by the "petty bureaucracy" at the Customs and the Ministry of 
Economy and Trade, which caused them discriminating delays. Ivar Quarante, the 
finance director at Ecomax told local reporters that they brought in a consignment of 
concentrated milk from Nestle and they were asked by the Customs for a certificate 
from the French Ministry of Health to prove that they had the capacity to produce milk 
products. "It was crazy. You might as well ask Ford if they have the capacity to make 
cars," he commented.465 Quarante added that Ecomax refused to pay bribes to ease the 
trouble with the Customs as it is not their policy. 
Ecomax has decided to divest its business in Lebanon. After losing US$ 15 m in two 
years it has closed nine out of its 13 outlets while the remained four were clearing their 
stocks by winter 1999.466 The Ecomax executives have noted that "it is easy to invest in 
Lebanon but much harder to operate". However, they admitted that they have learnt a 
lesson in Lebanon after they were absolutely sure that their style of West Indies 
business was going to flourish in Lebanon. "Maybe if we'd spent more time looking at 
the market things would have been different. We have to recognise the mistakes we 
made here," said Deguille. 
The case of Ecomax highlights the risk that is normally taken by a firm once it decides 
to establish operation in a foreign market. The local fierce competition and the lack of 
knowledge of the market could lead to astronomical losses and the failure of the 
business. It also sheds a light on the particularity of the Lebanese market in which 
consumers are so 'loyal' to celebrated brands, which are normally Western. As the 
4 6 4 DailyStar, op.ciL 18, February 1999, op.ciL 
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Westernised mentality of the people encouraged Inchcape to invest in Lebanon, the 
same mentality seems to have contributed largely to the failure of Ecomax. Although 
the sale of less-known brands was common in European countries, the Lebanese 
consumer was not yet familiar with such concepts. The brand would not sound Western 
if it had an obscure name, unlike Nestle, for instance. The Lebanese consumer needed to 
be taken into that concept gradually. Ecomax claimed to have achieved some progress 
once they showed the differences in prices between branded and unbranded products on 
the same shelf. However, the other obstacles created by the red tape and corruption in 
bureaucracy are alarming as they seem to have destroyed the chances of Ecomax to 
recover and compete. The case of Ecomax could perfectly serve as a discouragement for 
any FDI venture in the retailing sector in Lebanon. 
6.2.2.2 BHV/Monoprix 
The Lebanese Admic brought the famous French brands of BHV (Bazaar de l'Hotel de 
Ville) and MonoPrix. Like Inchcape, the motive for the investment in BHV was the 
westernised charateristic of the Lebanese population. The Chairman of Admic (the local 
franchisee) said that BHV's parent-firm, Galleries Lafayette and himself decided two 
years earlier that Beirut had the potential for a one-stop-shopping mega-store. Western 
retailers, he added, have many opportunities in Lebanon because people are open to the 
outside world, and many of them are French and English speakers.467 
The opening of MonoPrix followed that of BHV after six months. The latter, 
inaugurated in December 1998, is a DIY store and the first to be opened outside France. 
Abshee, chairman of Admic, commented that BHV did not accommodate for all 
customers' needs. Hence, the idea of opening MonoPrix, which is a supermarket 
specialised in food and related products. The quality of the consumers played an 
important role in introducing MonoPrix as well. Abshee commented that many 
Lebanese lived in France during the civil war and are familiar with MonoPrix's 
brand.468 
Unlike Inchcape's Spinneys, BHV and MonoPrix are franchises from their parent-firms 
to Admic, a local investing firm. The invested capital was around US$ 35 m, and was 
The DailyStar, op.ciL 21, December 1998. 
The DailyStar. 31, May 1999. 
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secured by the local firm through a Lebanese finance firm (Lebanon Invest). Admic 
faced problems in raising finance from the local market. Abshee expressed his firm's 
disappointment through negotiations with Lebanese banks as they asked for collateral 
against any loans.469 Spinneys did not declare facing such problem of financing. This 
can be attributed to the fact that the parent-firm had met the cost of investment. 
6.2.3 Trade and FDI 
The case study of the retailing sector proved that the British firm Inchcape made an FDI 
move into Lebanon when it decided to open Spinneys supermarkets. It committed a 
certain amount of capital to go ahead with a project that it must have considered 
feasible. It can be argued that the history of Spinneys in Lebanon before the war made 
Inchcape, who had no history in Lebanon before, interested in inspecting the niche for 
business in the country. The fact that Spinneys had a long-established name before the 
war reduced the risks of entering a new market for the first time. Ecomax operations in 
Lebanon resembled those of Inchcape's in the sense that the two firms have conducted 
FDI. Both companies divested their businesses during the period that falls outside the 
scope of this research. However, the act of divestment is not identical in the two firms. 
Ecomax has terminated its operations in Lebanon completely owing to the cumbersome 
losses they endured, while Inchcape's divestment in Lebanon was a result of the 
company's decision to withdraw from the whole business of retailing worldwide. 
Inchcape also found a buyer for its business that had no symptoms of failure, either in 
Lebanon or in the Middle East. The fact that the policy of expanding in Lebanon has 
been adopted by the new owner of Spinneys proves that the pilot project had given 
satisfying results. 
Nevertheless, when the cases of Inchcape (Spinneys) and Ecomax are compared with 
other retailing projects we find that not all foreign supermarkets or department stores in 
Lebanon can be considered FDI. The case of MonoPrix could be one of these examples. 
There is no denying that MonoPrix is a French supermarket. However, the company that 
brought it to Lebanon is Admic, which is a local firm. The capital invested in MonoPrix 
and its sister store BHV (US$ 35 m) was raised by Admic through debt and equity. 
The DailyStar. 21, December 1998. 
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There is no evidence that the parent-firm had invested any capital in the project. To this 
end, we could say that those two projects are pure franchises in which the foreign firm 
gives the investing firm the right to use its name. The return would be either through 
buying products from the parent-firm or by paying a certain price for the brand. In this 
sense, it does not differ from any of the big multinational names that could be found in 
Lebanon, like McDonald's, KFC, and recently, Burger King. 
Apart from retail, other trade business activities that EU firms were involved in were 
merely export-import trade. More precisely, most of them were representative offices to 
market for their products that are produced abroad. This is the case of Adidas Sarragan 
of France and Smithkline Beecham of the UK, for example. Moreover, given the 
chronic deficit in Lebanon's balance of trade, particularly with EU countries, we could 
anticipate the trend of trade conducted by these representative offices. These also cannot 
be considered FDI as they are in the country to promote their products, not to produce 
them in Lebanon. In other words, their business results in an outflow of capital from 
Lebanon without much coming in return. 
Table 6.3 Lebanon's external trade with some EU countries in 1996 
1996 Italy France Germany UK 
Imports US$ m 846.03 545.38 594.32 279.68 
Per. of total 12.1 % 7.8% 8.5 % 4.0% 
Exports US$ m 49.33 55.59 24.27 18.79 
Per. of total 6.3% 7.1 % 3.0% 2.4% 
Deficit US$ m -796.7 -489.79 -570.05 -260.89 
Source: IMF, Back to the future: Postwar Reconstruction and Stabilisation in Lebanon. 
6.2.3.1 What the theory of FDI says 
To understand fully the status of EU firms activities in Lebanon, it is better to go back 
to the criteria stipulated by the theories of FDI discussed in earlier chapters. In the retail 
sector and other sectors, the theories of foreign direct investment can help to highlight 
the differences between investing firms and others who are conducting different types of 
business. 
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International investments have been explained as the movement of factors of production 
between countries rather than the movement of goods and services only. The latter can 
be called international trade. International investment includes the transfer of productive 
resources like capital, technology and labour.470 Moreover, we have already explained 
in the theoretical chapter, that in order to differentiate between portfolio and direct 
international investments, something else next to capital must be involved in the latter. 
Dunning said that this could simply be informal managerial and technical guidance. In 
addition, a dissemination of valuable knowledge in the form of research and 
development, production technology, marketing skills and managerial expertise could 
be incorporated471 That is apart from the issue of control over the invested in unit 
which Hymer and Dunning stipulated. They asserted that direct investment means an 
exerted control by the investing firm over the invested in unit.4 7 2 
Therefore, to assess whether EU firms that are conducting business in Lebanon are 
involved in FDI or not, we should apply the theory to the EU firms chosen for this 
research and investigate whether the criteria for FDI are available in these firms. These 
criteria could be divided into the four activities that the firm should be exercising: 
transfer of capital into the host country; transfer of technology into the branch in the 
host country; transfer of know-how (marketing skills, managerial expertise...etc.); and 
exerting control on the subsidiary in the host country. 
6.2.3.2 The theory of FDI applied to EU firms in retail sector 
Going back to the retail sector, we will look at the cases of BHV / MonoPrix, Inchcape, 
and Ecomax. Certain criteria for FDI have been established here depending on the 
conditions stipulated by the theories of foreign direct investment. The following table 
will help to examine the case of these firms according to the criteria provided by the 
theories of FDI. 
4 7 0 Czinkota. M, op.cit, p.26. 
4 7 1 Dunning, J, (1970).op.cit, p.4. 
4 7 2 Ibid. 
Hymer. S. H, op.cit, p.l. 
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Table 6.4 Retail activities according to FDI criteria 
Criteria BHV/MonoPrix Inchcape Ecomax 
Capital transfer No Yes Yes 
Technology transfer Yes Yes Yes 
Know-how transfer Yes Yes Yes 
Exerting control No Yes Yes 
In the case of MonoPrix / BHV, there is no evidence that the parent-firm invested any 
capital in the Lebanese branch. The investing local firm raised the money. Once there is 
no capital invested in a business then, clearly, there is no investment. The definition of 
FDI concerning the issue of capital is adequately clear in the dictionaries of economic 
terms: 
"The acquisition by residents of a country of real assets abroad. This may 
be done by remitting money abroad to be spent on acquiring land, 
constructing buildings, mines, or machinery, or buying existing foreign 
businesses".473 
The issue of money is clearly emphasised in the definition. Therefore, once it is 
established that a parent-firm did not invest any capital in the newly established 
business, then it should not be considered FDI. Other factors determining whether the 
business conducted is FDI or not become secondary or irrelevant to the case. 
The business we are talking about then is pure franchise. The case of this is identical to 
the case of McDonald's. No capital was evidently invested by the McDonald's parent-
firm. The investment came from a local investor who acquired the franchise. 
Technology transfer is not the same size in retail industry as in manufacturing. 
However, it is still essential. Even the way the retail firm manipulates Information 
Technology can be considered as a technology transfer if this was available to the 
subsidiary. Computing programmes that were developed by (or for) the parent-firm can 
be considered as technology transfer once disseminated to the subsidiary or the 
franchisee in the host country. The same is true of the transfer of know-how. This could 
include, in this context, instructions that range from displaying products to stock-taking, 
advertising and management. The concept of know-how would be extended to the 
'Black. J, Oxford Dictionary of Economics. (Oxford University Press: 1997) p. 183. 
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details of production process in manufacturing. It is normally the outcome of the 
research and development process conducted in the parent-firm. However, the transfer 
of technology and know-how without capital is still not foreign direct investment. 
McDonald's' parent-firm seems not to see a problem in transferring the know-how to its 
franchises worldwide. BHV or MonoPrix obviously seem to be in the same situation. 
The proposal submitted by the local firm must have been economically feasible to the 
parent-firm in which the return is worth giving the brand name to the franchisee. Indeed, 
the Internalisation Theory of Foreign Direct Investment stipulated that unwillingness to 
pass the know-how to another firm abroad leads a parent-firm to invest abroad.474 A 
firm's desire to keep its knowledge of a product exclusive would be threatened through 
franchising. This could motivate the firm to invest directly in the host country keeping 
its know-how within. 
Obviously, the cases of Inchcape (Spinneys) or Ecomax are completely different. The 
parent-firm decided to invest a certain amount of capital in starting operations in 
Lebanon. Around US$ 6 m was invested by Inchcape in order to open its retailing outlet 
pilot project, Spinneys (figures on Ecomax's invested capital are not available).475 The 
major component of foreign investment, the capital, is there. Moreover, this foreign 
investment should be called direct because the parent-firm is exerting control over the 
subsidiary. The parent-firm's expatriate team manages it. Thus, the fourth factor that 
was missing in the cases of BHV/Monoprix and McDonald's is available here. The 
control by a parent-firm over its franchise is confined to supervision in order to 
maintain the reputation of its product.476 Looking at other factors stipulated as criteria 
for FDI, transfer of technology and know-how, these were surely fulfilled. The 
company made a decision to invest in retailing in Lebanon, which in other words means 
competing with the already existing supermarkets. When Inchcape representative says 
"we want to bring Lebanon to higher standards (in retailing)" and that "supermarkets 
here (in Lebanon) are still 20 years behind"477 it means that Inchcape is up to 
competition. To compete with the local supermarkets, Inchcape would have to use its 
advantages in the retailing industry. This could be explained by the Monopolistic 
Theory and Market Imperfection Theory of FDI: the firm believes itself to have a 
4 7 4 Rugman. A, 1988. op.cit. p. 104. 
4 7 5 Author's interview with Inchcape manager in Lebanon, op.cit. 
4 7 6 Black. J, Oxford Dictionary of Economics, op.cit, p. 186. 
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monopolistic advantage in an imperfect market where others do not have it. A decision 
to move into the market to exploit that advantage makes sense.478 
6.2.3.3 Size of FDI activities conducted by EU firms in retail 
It is striking to find that FDI activities conducted by EU firms in the retail sector in 
Lebanon were very minimal. Only the British Inchcape and French Ecomax qualified 
for the criteria of FDI. The number of foreign supermarkets in Lebanon is not very big. 
Local supermarkets outnumber foreign operators. By now we can say that the 
divestment of Ecomax and the subsequent sale of Spinneys by Inchcape have emptied 
the Lebanese market of EU operators of supermarkets. Other retail businesses can be 
noticed in Beirut shopping centres like the British Next, Mothercare, and the Body 
Shop. However, these names did not show in any of the foreign-firms listings in 
Lebanon. It is very likely that these retail businesses resemble the case of the French 
MonoPrix and BHV, where a local firm has acquired the franchise from the parent-firm. 
The names of the shops are just the brands used by local investors. 
6.3 Contracting 
This line of business activities proved to be the most popular amongst foreign firms, 
particularly EU firms, which came to Lebanon from 1993 onwards. Many of the EU 
firms that turned up bidding for contracts tendered by the government were quite big. 
Some ranked amongst the global top 500 companies. Obviously, many infrastructure 
rebuilding contracts were mouth-watering for these firms, hence the huge response. 
This part of the thesis discusses the business of a selection of EU firms, which were 
successful in gaining contracts from the government. These are mentioned earlier within 
the discussion of the EU firms share in contracting. However, this part will be dedicated 
to show the level of involvement of these firms in Lebanon, and the firms' plans for 
future business in Lebanon. The detailed case study is of the British-based firm, 
Kvaerner (Trafalgar House). The other companies chosen are Siemens S A, Bouygues, 
Hochtief A G, and Ansaldo. 
Author's interview with Inchcape general-manager in Lebanon, op.cit. 
4 7 8 Go back to theories of FDI: Monopolistic-Oligopolistic Advantage theory, and Market Imperfection 
theory (chapter 4). 
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6.3.1 Kvaerner Construction International -Beirut (Trafalgar House) 
Kvaerner is in fact a Norwegian firm. However, two reasons contributed to the decision 
to discuss the case of its business operations in Lebanon. Firstly, although originally 
Norwegian, Kvaerner gained its place amongst big UK firms by its take-over of the 
British Trafalgar House. Kvaerner then moved its headquarters to London. Secondly, 
Trafalgar House was chosen as a case study after being awarded the contract to rebuild 
the Beirut Sports Complex, which was valued around US$ 60 m. After it commenced 
the job, Trafalgar House in the UK was taken-over by Kvaerner. 
According to Ken Gilder479, the project manager in Beirut, Kvaerner was an enormous 
Norwegian company that was four times the size of Trafalgar House and wanted an EU 
base. The feeling was that Norway was slightly cut off. They looked for companies to 
buy either in Germany or the UK. After the deal with Trafalgar House, Kvaerner moved 
its head office with the main board of directors to London. It now operates out of the 
UK while the bulk of its staff is British. Gilder said that the company is virtually 
British. 
KVAERNER 
E & C Business 
Engineering and 
Construction 
Shipbuilding Oil & Gas 
UK Building 
Construction Pulp & Paper 
UK Civil International 
Source: Kvaerner's web page: Http://www.kvaerner.com 
Kvaerner has got five divisions: Construction division; Engineering and Construction 
Business division; Pulp & Paper division; Oil & Gas division; and shipbuilding 
division480. Kvaerner's business in the Middle East comes under the construction 
division only. Lebanon is not the only country in the Middle East that hosts Kvaerner 
business. Gilder declared that at the same time Kvaerner had two construction projects 
4 7 9 Author's interview with Ken Gilder, project manager at Kvaerner Construction International - Beirut. 
August 1988, Beirut - Lebanon. 
480 Kvaerner's web page: http://www.kvaerner.com 
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in Egypt, and one in Dubai. In the latter, a subsidiary of Kvaerner, Cleveland Bridge, is 
involved in bridge building. 
As mentioned earlier, Kvaerner was awarded the contract to rebuild the biggest sports 
complex in Lebanon. The complex was destroyed during the Israeli invasion in 1982. It 
was one of the biggest construction projects to be tendered out. One of the reasons why 
Kvaerner got the job, as Gilder explained, was that Kvaerner's chance was derived from 
the fact that the project was a "complex". He emphasised that this was normally the case 
for all projects taken by European firms: " i f we were competing in the normal type of 
building, then I believe local contractors and others from other parts of the Middle East 
like Saudi Arabia would be more competitive". He emphasised that not many 
companies in the world could build stadiums, however. 
When asked why he thought local and Arab contractors would be more competitive than 
foreigners in other types of construction contracts, Gilder confirmed that this was due to 
the cost. For "non-complex" projects, a local consultant like Dar al-Handasah would 
carry the design, for instance. 'They are very capable of doing that." He said that this 
would be far cheaper than going to Europe to get a structural design for a stadium. 
Gilder emphasised that what really makes it viable for a foreign company to price a job 
is the fact that a local company could not do that. He recalled that most of the 
companies who had bid for this project were European. 
6.3.1.1 Incentives for Kvaerner to conduct business in Lebanon 
The first positive aspect of conducting business in Lebanon according to Kvaerner's 
project manager was the ease with which expatriates could be convinced to come to 
Lebanon. Gilder was referring here to expatriate engineers and supervisors who are 
essential for the company's business. 'Those expatriates worked in other countries that 
are not very pleasant to be in." He noticed that expatriates could live "normal" lives in 
Lebanon without having to worry about any social restrictions like in some other 
Middle Eastern countries. 
Another incentive was the promising size of the market that Kvaerner saw when it 
moved into Lebanon. They found a country needing reconstruction, which meant 
numerous opportunities. However, Gilder added that this did not necessarily turn out to 
be true, but that it was an incentive at the time. 
218 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment ofEU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
Kvaerner did not face any problems in importing material. In that context, Gilder 
considered Lebanon much better than other countries in the region. Getting imported 
goods through the ports or airport in Beirut, although difficult by British standards, was 
much easier when compared to Saudi Arabia, Gilder said. Custom duties were very low 
when Kvaerner commenced work in Lebanon, Gilder noticed. However, they had 
subsequently increased significantly, he added. 
Kvaerner enjoyed the abundance of Syrian cheap labour. The big labour supply was 
something that a construction company would certainly need. 
6.3.1.2 Difficulties faced by Kvaerner 
Dealing with the government administration and the CDR did not seem to please 
Kvaerner's manager in Lebanon. He complained about problems he faced with the 
administration and representatives of the government, causing delays at some times. 
However, he confirmed that it is understandable after 17 years of war that the 
government is trying to put its administration back together. 
Another "big difficulty", according to Gilder, was in dealing with local consultants who 
were representing the client (ie. the government). He complained that local engineers 
lacked the experience that is available in Britain, or "even in some parts of the Middle 
East". He said that some consultants, like Dar al-Handasah, worked abroad during the 
civil war, so they kept their business and experience developing. When they moved 
back they brought their acquired experience with them. Others, he complained, did not 
work abroad and thus they lacked the experience that European firms would be looking 
for. This, he said, created problems in dealing with government consultants. 
Kvaerner was not put off doing business in Lebanon because of the red tape or bribery 
that sometimes has to be paid. Gilder commented that this is no different from any other 
part of the Middle East. "That is the way this part of the world works," he added. 
Problems might erupt but it did not hinder the business. Gilder considered that any 
businessman coming to this part of the world expecting no bribery is either totally 
innocent and naive or "being a bit silly". He rejected the name "hidden-tax" because it 
is clearly there and one has got to act accordingly: "It is wrong but not hidden". 
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Problems arose in receiving regular payments from Kvaerner's client, the government. 
Gilder did complain about the delay in receiving payments. He said that it was 
becoming increasingly difficult. He stressed that they were sure they would receive the 
payment eventually. However, it is a problem, as contractors would be taking it into 
consideration when they price another job. Consequently, the price would certainly be 
higher. 
6.3.1.3 Contracting is the motive 
Kvaerner moved into Lebanon only because of this particular contract. Gilder asserted 
that although they wanted to explore other opportunities for business in the country, 
winning the contract was the major motive. He emphasised that construction companies 
do not move into a country to look for a job - "They find the job, then they move in and 
look for another one". At the time of this fieldwork, Kvaerner was in the process of 
looking for other business opportunities, as their present contract was nearly finished (in 
summer 1998). However, construction was Kvaerner's sole interest in Lebanon. The 
company was not interested in other sorts of business in Lebanon although the company 
itself has got other divisions next to construction. This can be purely due to Kvaerner's 
lack of interest in other fields of business in Lebanon. However, such a decision would 
certainly be affected by the availability of business opportunities. Obviously, Lebanon 
does not offer lucrative opportunities in the pulp and paper industry or in oil industry, in 
which Kvaerner is involved elsewhere. Only one section of Kvaerner was operating in 
Lebanon, the construction division. However, Kvaerner was interested in looking for 
more opportunities in contracting. Its team in Lebanon had priced some contracts during 
that period and they were waiting for a reply. If there were no more contracts for 
Kvaerner, the decision was to pull out upon the completion of the job. 
On that same point, Gilder emphasised that they were interested in contracting only and 
had nothing to do with FDI. However, he noted that Kvaerner invested some capital for 
the commencement of works, expecting to recover it when the job is accomplished. The 
amount of money invested was not to be declared. 
Kvaerner created opportunities for employment in the country, though. In addition to 
the expatriates, Kvaerner had Lebanese engineers, local administrative staff, and basic 
labour, mainly Syrian. At the peak of its operations, Kvaerner had about 1600 Syrian 
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workers, around 200 Lebanese (engineers and administrative) and about 30 Britons. 
About 70 per cent of the top-level supervision were British. 
6.3.2 Other contracting EU firms 
At the same time as Kvaerner was operating in Lebanon, there were a substantial 
number of other contracting firms of EU origins. They were involved in a plethora of 
activities related to rebuilding infrastructure. The nature of these firms' activities is 
almost identical to that of Kvaerner - following the same pattern of contracting from the 
government. A brief discussion of the activities of some of these EU firms shows the 
resemblances and differences between all of them. 
6.3.2.1 Seimens SA 
Siemens is a giant German company specialising in telecommunications and electricity. 
It has been registered in Lebanon since 8 th January 1994. Siemens' share of contracts 
tendered by the government was 4 contracts, most of which were quite substantial. 
The first was in electricity, building a new power plant in the North, for a value of US$ 
274 m. The contract was signed in January 1995 for a period of 30 months. The second 
contract was to rehabilitate and extend exchange equipment for the public telephone 
landline network. It was valued at US$ 33.68 m, signed in October 1993 for two years. 
The third contract was to rehabilitate and install new telephone lines, valued at US$ 153 
m. It was signed in September 1994 for three years. The last contract was a small one to 
supply equipment for interchange traffic. The value of the contract was US$ 1.32 m. It 
was signed in February 1996 for a period of 4 months. Siemens also won private sector 
contracts providing equipment to the GSM network company FTML (Cellis). 
6.3.2.2 Bouygues 
Bouygues is a French company which has been registered twice in Lebanon under 
different statuses: the first time was on 16th March 1994 with business type stated as 
electricity and trade; the second was under Bouygues off-shore on 26th February 1997 
with the business type declared being contracting. 
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Bouygues won one contract from the government in the electricity sector. It was for the 
rehabilitation of distribution networks in the regions. The contract was valued at US$ 53 
m. It was signed in November 1993, for a period of 18 months. 
Another contract that Bouygues won was a prestigious job for the private company 
building the BCD, SOLIDERE.481 Bouygues was assigned to build the marine defence 
for the seafront of Beirut. The value of the contract was US$ 230 m. It was signed in 
mid-1996 and was expected to finish in 39 months. 
6.3.2.3 Hochtief A G 
Hochtief is a German firm whose business line declared in its registration in Beirut is 
construction. It was registered in Lebanon on 11 t h of December 1994. Hochtief received 
one of the biggest contracts awarded by the government. In a joint venture with the 
local/Athens based CCC, Hochtief snatched the contract to build the new Beirut 
International Airport. The value of the contract was US$ 387 m. It was signed in 
September 1994 with a 4-year period to be finished. 
6.3.2.4 Ansaldo 
This is an Italian company that is specialised in electricity projects. It was registered in 
Lebanon as Ansaldo-Energia Spa in February 1996. However, this date seems a bit 
disputable, as Ansaldo has been conducting business in Lebanon since the end of 1993. 
Ansaldo gained two contracts in the electricity sector: the first was to rehabilitate power 
plants that belonged to EDL. The contract was valued at US$ 106 m starting from 
October 1993 for a period of 18 months. The second contract was to build a new 
combined cycle power plant in Southern Lebanon. The value of this contract was 
around US$ 260 m. It started in January 1995 for a period of 30 months. The two 
contacts were quite important. No record of other contracts has been traced. 
6.3.3 Contracting and FDI 
By looking at the information discussed above we realise that these EU firms were 
contractors who came to do a job advertised by the government for a certain amount of 
millions of dollars. Differences between these firms were confined to the kind and value 
Beirut Central District 
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of their jobs, while the contract was the main common motive for their move into 
Lebanon. Had these contracts not come up, many of these firms would not have 
considered doing business in Lebanon. These firms' commitment to Lebanon is limited 
to finishing the contract on time, as long as the payments are coming through. Once the 
contract is finished, these firms would not have the intention to stay in the country one 
more day, unless another contract came up. One could argue that these firms have 
created job opportunities for the local labour force. That is completely true. However, 
another opposing argument says that the reconstruction projects themselves raised the 
opportunities for employing local labour, not the European firms. Had the contract been 
awarded to a local firm, the same labour force, more or less, would have been needed 
and thus work opportunities would be there. The major reason for the EU firms and 
other foreign counterparts seizing these contracts was that their offers were more 
competitive, price- or quality-wise. Another reason is the fact that some jobs could not 
have been done by local firms which were not qualified enough. Competition for 
contracts in electricity and telecom was almost amongst foreign firms only. 
The only contracting business that could be considered to be direct investment is 
projects developed on B.O.T., D.B.O.T.., and B.O.O. In such contracts, a firm, whether 
European or not, commits itself to invest an agreed amount of capital in a certain project 
which it would be given a concession to exploit for a certain period. This is the case of 
France Telecom when it took the concession of GSM phones in a joint venture with a 
local firm to establish FTML. It is also the case of Finnish Telecom when they were 
given another concession for GSM phones with a local partner in Libancell. The 
'traditional' type of contracting, however, does not involve committing a certain amount 
capital for investment purposes. 
6.3.3.1 The theory of FDI applied to contracting 
The presence of giant EU firms in the post-civil war period was hailed by many as a real 
return of international business interest to Beirut. Inevitably, the sudden appearance of 
these foreign firms must have revived the hopes of the people who had not seen many 
foreigners in the past decade, and certainly not many foreign firms. Moreover, there was 
a common hope shared by the majority of Lebanese people, officials and common, that 
once the war was finished, foreign businesses and capital would flow abundantly into 
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Beirut. The presence of companies like Siemens, Clemssey, EDF, and Trafalgar House 
(Kvaerner) initially appeared to support that argument. However, as I have pointed out, 
these firms came for the simple reason of winning contracts tendered by the 
government. They are foreign businesses but not foreign direct investors. I f we apply 
the criteria of FDI to some of the contracting firms we can pinpoint who is involved in 
investment and whose business is confined to contracting. We wil l look at the cases of 
Kvaerner (Trafalgar House), Siemens and France Telecom. 
Table 6.5 Contracting activities according to FDI criteria 
Criteria Kvamaer Siemens France Telecom 
Capital transfer No No Yes 
Technology transfer Not applicable Not applicable Yes 
Know-how transfer Not applicable Not applicable Yes 
Exerting control Not applicable Not applicable Yes 
The cases of Kvaerner and Siemens are identical when it comes to the factor of capital 
transfer. Both of them have received contracts to participate in the rebuilding of 
Lebanon's infrastructure. Kvaerner, as we discussed earlier, took over Trafalgar House 
that won the contract to rebuild the Beirut Sports Complex for a total amount reaching 
US$ 60 m. Siemens, with four contracts in electricity and telecom sectors, had a bigger 
share as its contracts mounted up to US$ 462 m. That is apart from other contracts from 
the private sector.482 The common factor between the two EU firms is that they 
commenced business in Lebanon upon winning contracts that they bid for. The value of 
contracts is the amount of money received by these firms in return for doing the job. 
The Lebanese government is the client who is paying for the job. Therefore, the two 
firms had not invested any capital on their behalf. Simply, they have done a job in 
return for which they were paid, or are being paid, their wages. Indeed, they have not 
established any subsidiaries into which they would have pumped capital. They have just 
accomplished the projects they were assigned. 
The same goes to the factors for transfer of technology and know-how. We have seen 
the two factors not applicable to the case of Kvaerner and Siemens in Lebanon. The fact 
that they did not establish subsidiaries, or even franchises, in Lebanon makes no room 
Information already discussed in the previous chapter. 
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for any transfers. In other words, whom would they transfer technology to? A transfer 
of technology or know-how takes place when there is a process of production taking 
place in the host country. The reason for it is to transmit the results of research and 
development, conducted by the parent-firm in its home country, to the subsidiary or the 
franchise in order to produce an identical product. However, in the case of their business 
operations in Lebanon, Kvaerner and Siemens were not engaged in any production 
process. One might argue that the two firms transferred technology and know-how 
through bringing their advanced equipment and their expertise. However, although 
contracting firms brought technology and know-how, they have transferred ready-made 
products for which the government had to pay the price. It is true that Siemens brought 
advanced equipment for telephone networks and power plants. However, Siemens, who 
is involved in manufacturing these capital products, did not produce any of them in 
Lebanon, nor it did operate them. It has just installed them. One could argue that the 
installation of new equipment and, in some cases, teaching local labour how to operate 
them, is a kind of residual transfer of technology and know-how. However, the 
technology and know-how that are meant by FDI theories are intermediate intangible 
assets transmitted between the parent-firm and its subsidiary to affect the product itself. 
This does not seem to be fulfilled in the cases of contracting firms in Lebanon. 
Therefore, the theory that is applicable here is the theory of international trade rather 
than theory of FDI because these firms brought ready-made technology for which 
Lebanon paid ful l price. The theory of international trade deals with movement of goods 
and services between countries, unlike theories of international investment that deal 
with the movements of productive resources.483 
The issue of control, the fourth factor, is also not applicable for the cases of those two 
firms as there is virtually nothing to control. We have already established that the two 
firms did not establish any production through subsidiaries or franchise, therefore, the 
question of control is completely irrelevant. 
On the other hand, the case of France Telecom business in Lebanon is hugely different. 
The French company is involved in a joint venture with a local partner in operating the 
GSM phone system. Their company FTML is a branch of FTMI (France Telecom 
Mobiles International). It was founded in August 1994 with a capital of 30 millions 
4 8 3 Czinkota. M, op.cit, p.26. 
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USD, held to 67% by FTMI and to 33% by the Lebanese group MIKATI. FTML won 
one of the mobile phone BOT contracts given by the Ministry of Post and 
Telecommunication. Unlike Kvaerner and Siemens, France Telecom invested capital in 
FTML. Therefore, millions of dollars were invested by the parent-firm France Telecom. 
This way, the first condition for a business to be foreign investment (capital transfer) is 
fulfilled. The fact that the parent-firm owns 67 per cent of the firm means that the firm 
has a control over the subsidiary. Thus, France Telecom business is a direct investment. 
The firm has transferred technology and know-how to the Lebanon's subsidiary as it 
introduced the concept of mobile phones into Lebanon. 
6.3.3.2 Size of FDI activities conducted by EU firms in contracting 
It might seem redundant to investigate the proportion of contracting EU firms that could 
have been involved in FDI activities in Lebanon after we have established the crucial 
difference between the two types of business. Contracting is a short-term commitment 
by which the awarded firm commits itself to the accomplishment of a certain project for 
an agreed amount of price. Meanwhile, FDI is a long-term commitment by the investing 
firm, which allocates a certain amount of capital for the establishment of its operations 
in a host country. However, there are certain types of contracting businesses for which 
this distinction is inappropriate. These are the B.O.T. and D.B.O.T. Such contracts are 
different because the contracting firm would meet the entire financial cost of the project 
in return for the concession to operate the enterprise for an agreed period of time. The 
firm in this case is taking up the whole risk, which in fact might lead to a devastating 
loss of the investment in case the project failed. The Lebanese government has 
introduced a set of projects for the private sector to contract on a B.O.T. basis. Amongst 
EU firms involved in contracting only two companies are involved in B.O.T. contracts. 
Due to the fact that this type of business is different from the conventional contracting 
system they were classified separately. These two firms are France Telecom and Finnish 
Telecom. The business of these firms that was discussed earlier shows that they are in a 
different business when compared to the other contracting firms. However, no other EU 
firms are involved in B.O.T. contracts. The French Bouygues and Domez were about to 
sign a B.O.T. contract to build the Beirut-Damascus highway toll-road. However, they 
pulled out, as they did not reach a satisfying agreement with the government by which 
http://www.cellis.com.lb/cellis-eng/index.btml 
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the latter would provide guarantees for recouping the investment. Therefore, the 
proportion of FDI in the contracting line of business is confined to two EU firms only. 
The government has tendered many B.O.T. projects. However, the response of EU firms 
has been very poor. Obviously, the tendered projects that ranged from car parks to the 
building of industrial estates did not appeal to EU businesses. That could be partly due 
to the nature of the projects, which might have not appealed to the Europeans, and 
partly due a high risk involved concerning recouping the initial investment. 
6.4 Finance 
The list of foreign firms registered in Lebanon after 1993 showed that the financial 
sector came third to construction and trade in the EU firms business interests in 
Lebanon. The number of EU finance firms coming into Lebanon amounted to 10 by the 
end of 1998. This number includes insurance firms and commercial and investment 
banks. The firms chosen to discuss here are: Paribas, Flemings, Commerz Bank and 
Schroders. 
6.4.1 Schroders 
The Schroders Group was founded in the early 1800's. It is a leading international 
merchant and an investment banking group. Its activities cover a wide range of financial 
services including corporate finance, investment management, private equity, structured 
products and capital markets. It ranks amongst the largest 100 companies listed on the 
London Stock Exchange and has a total market capitalisation in excess of US$ 7 bn. 4 8 5 
Schroders, according to the company publications, is an acknowledged leader in 
corporate finance and ranks among the top five companies globally in project finance, 
privatisation and cross-border European mergers and acquisitions. It is also one of the 
largest fund managers in the UK with total assets under management in excess of US$ 
176 bn, as of December 31 s t 1997.4 8 6 Schroders has offices in over 30 countries. 
Schroders Asseily Group represents Schroders in Lebanon. Indeed, it has been 
responsible for Schroders' business in the Middle East and North Africa since the early 
1970s. This group includes: J Henry Schroder & Co SAL (Beirut); Schroder Asseily & 
4 8 5 Schroders in the Middle East. A brief about Schroders and its partners in the Middle East obtained 
from their offices in Beirut 1998. p. 2. 
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Co Limited (London); Schroder Asseily (Guernsey) Limited; and JHSC Management 
Limited (Cyprus). This group is a subsidiary of Schroders and provides a range of 
investment and corporate finance services for individual and institutional clients, with a 
particular focus on the needs of the region. 4 8 7 According to Roy Gardner, Schroders 
Asseily is 65 per cent owned by Schroders, while the remaining 35 per cent is owned by 
the local Asseily family . 4 8 8 
Schroders Asseily's primary activity in Lebanon is to provide financial advisory 
services to corporations operating in Lebanon. This includes local and foreign firms in 
Lebanon. The company advises its clients on how to raise finance, and sometimes raises 
finance itself on behalf of clients. But Schroders Asseily operations in Beirut are not 
confined to Lebanon because the Beirut office covers the Middle East and North Africa, 
as mentioned earlier. A secondary role of the Beirut office is the provision of 
investment management services to individuals. According to Mr. Gardner, Lebanese 
customers deposit their money with Schroders Asseily who manages it on fiduciary 
basis. The company invests the deposited capital in stocks, equities, and bonds all over 
the world through co-operation with Schroders- London, the parent company. 
Dr Anthony Asseily who had been with Schroders since the 1960s, made the decision to 
start operations in Lebanon. Dr Anthony Asseily and his brother George Asseily, a 
leading industrialist in Lebanon, decided with Schroders in 1974 to form a joint venture, 
which would act as Schroders merchant banking subsidiary in the Middle East. Gardner 
commented that at that time there was only one city in the region that you could build 
in, and that was undoubtedly Beirut. Gardner confirmed that Beirut's office never 
closed during the war period. However, he admitted that during that period there would 
be a month of activities followed by years of nothing happening. 
The decision to operate fully back in Beirut's office was made at the beginning of the 
reconstruction period. In 1994, the office restarted operating on a care and maintenance 
basis. Gardner himself was recruited from the Saudi American Bank in Riyadh in 1995. 
One of the reasons to restart operations from Beirut, he said that firstly, it was the 
obvious need for Lebanese banks and companies to increase their capital. Lebanese 
4 8 6 Schroders in the Middle East op.cit, 
4 8 7 Ibid. 
4 8 8 Author's interview with Roy Gardner, Assistant General Manager at Schroders Asseily- Beirut. 
August 1988. Beirut- Lebanon. 
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banks were completely under capitalised due to the devaluation of the Lebanese pound 
during the 1980s. Secondly, it was the fact that Beirut is a perfect place to be based in 
order to cover the Levant and the Gulf region. 
6.4.1.1 Incentives to be based in Beirut 
The geographical location of Beirut seemed to be of significant interest for the 
Schroders Asseily assistant general manager in Beirut. He considers that it is easy to 
cover Jordan, Egypt and Syria (once it opens) conveniently from Beirut. Being in the 
middle between Europe and the Gulf region enriches its locality advantage. He said that 
getting to Kuwait or Dubai from London, for instance, is a waste of two days unless 
taking an overnight flight. In comparison, he stressed that he could do his work 
normally in Beirut, Monday to Friday, then jump on a plane to Dubai where they would 
be starting their week. By Monday morning he could be back in his office in Beirut 
"without missing the beat. Highly convenient".489 
Another incentive for foreign businesses in Lebanon, according to Gardner, is the 
Lebanese people themselves. The skills and abilities that are available make Beirut a 
natural centre for financial services in the region, he stressed. Beirut has the potential to 
benefit from the many Lebanese working abroad in banks, financial institutions, 
insurance companies. These would love to come back and bring in new talent, he added. 
6.4.1.2 Is Schroders a foreign investor in Lebanon? 
In the sense that a foreign firm creates employment opportunities, brings capital into the 
country, generates money in the local economy, and transfers technology, Gardner 
absolutely agreed that Schroders is a foreign investor. The firm's capital in Lebanon is 
not large - only LL 2 bn (US$ 1.33 m). However, he stressed that the firm does not need 
it. The firm brings capital into the country by raising finance for local companies from 
abroad. The firm was employing only six people in Beirut, when the research was 
conducted. However, again he stressed that their operations in Beirut kept many 
employees in their jobs. As an example, he referred to a deal they arranged for the local 
bank, Banque du Credit Populaire, in which Schroders Asseily drew US$ 15 m of 
Author's interview with Roy Gardner, op.ciL 
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investments from Oman. This deal secured the jobs of 120 employees who were about 
to lose their jobs, as the bank would have gone into liquidation, he asserted. 
Gardner added that his company is not a typical example of FDI. However, he believed 
that his company brought into Lebanon advanced financial techniques developed by 
Schroders. In return, the firm got the "natural entrepreneurial flair of the Lebanese", he 
believed. Schroder Asseily's job in Lebanon is to act as a catalyst that allows foreign 
capital to come to create jobs in the country. 
6.4.1.3 Deals arranged by Schroder Asseily 
Schroder Asseily has arranged deals within its financial advisory job ranging from 
acquisitions to finance-raising. These deals were not confined to the Lebanese market 
but reached other Arab countries. This proves that Schroders Asseily was using Beirut 
as a base for the region, not only Lebanon. Some of the recent deals included: 
Advising the buyers on the acquisition of a substantial interest in Lecico, the largest 
ceramic and tiles manufacturer in the Middle East.490 Lecico have plants both in 
Lebanon and Egypt. The buyers were a Finish company (Santic OY Ltd) and a 
Lebanese one (Intage Holding Ltd) . 4 9 1 
- Advising Olayan Saudi Holding Company on the acquisition of the food and 
commodities division of a privately owned Saudi Arabian company. 
Advising Cimenterie Nationale SAL, Lebanon's second largest cement 
manufacturer on the financing of a US$ 100 m expansion. This was the largest debt 
financing for a Lebanese borrower involving the IFC. 4 9 2 
- Advising Davy International in respect of the financing of a US $200 m direct 
reduction iron plant, falling within HADEED's expansion programme in Saudi 
Arabia. 
Advising two FTSE 100 companies on proposed acquisitions falling under the 
Egyptian privatisation programme. 
Schroders in the Middle East op.cit, p.9. 
1 Author's interview with Roy Gardner, op.cit. 
2 Schroders in the Middle East op.cit, p.9. 
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Advising on the reconstruction and re-capitalisation of Banque du Credit Populaire 
in Lebanon. The company raised L L 23 bn (around US$ 15 m) in equity from an 
Omani group to re-capitalise the bank.4 9 3 
Advising Soci&e" Nationale d'Assurance (SNA) to raise finance. Schroder Asseily 
brought in the French insurance company AGF (now taken-over by Alliance). AGF 
bought a 30 per cent stake in SNA, worth over US$ 11 m. 4 9 4 
Schroder Asseily arranged for the issuing of convertible bonds that financed the 
regional skiing resort at Faraiah, and raised finance for the SOFTL centre in 
Ashrafieh. 4 9 5 
Schroder Asseily also acted as an advisor to the UK Ministry of Defence on the 
Saudi Arabian Economic Offset Programme.496 The report describes the job as a 
unique initiative between the British and Saudi Governments to promote the 
development of the industrial base of Saudi Arabia through joint ventures between 
Saudi and foreign companies. In the context of this appointment, Schroder Asseily 
has been closely involved in the identification and development of a wide range of 
projects in the Kingdom. Total investments are expected to exceed US$ 3 bn over 
the life of the programme.497 
The number of employees working in Schroder Asseily office in Beirut was eight in 
totaL These included an Assistant General Manager, three corporate finance officers 
(the company was in the process of recruiting another one), one accountant, and three 
support-staff. 
The Assistant General Manager was the only foreigner in the office. The corporate 
finance officers were Lebanese nationals who had worked abroad, and the rest were 
local. 
4 9 3 Author's interview with Roy Gardner, op.cit. 
4 9 4 Ibid 
4 9 5 Ibid. 
4 9 6The date is not available but very likely to be in 1997 as most of the dates mentioned in the report go 
back to that year. Schroders in the Middle East, op.cit. p.9. 
4 9 7 Ibid. 
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6.4.2 Other finance firms 
Schroders is only one of the foreign names known in the financial sector in Lebanon. 
Numerous foreign finance firms have been active in the Lebanese market since 1994. 
However, the activities of these firms have varied. A brief discussion of some other 
firms' activities would help in establishing the common points and differences between 
the activities of foreign finance firms in Lebanon. Above all, it would help in finding 
out which activities can be considered as foreign direct investment. 
6.4.2.1 Paribas Ltd 
The French bank is one of the big European banks with a worldwide presence. Its 
origins date back to 1872 with the founding of Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas through 
a merger of Banque de Paris (founded in 1869) and Banque de Credit et de Depots des 
Pays-Bas (created in 1863 in Amsterdam). Nowadays, it is organised around four core 
businesses: corporate and investment banking; asset management and banking services; 
retail financial services; and proprietary investments and real estate.498 It was registered 
in Lebanon on April 1995. Paribas only has a representative office in Beirut. It has been 
active in brokering deals for bonds and GDR issuing by the government and private 
banks, respectively. 
6.4.2.2 Commerzbank 
The origins of this German bank go back to February 1870, when predominantly 
Hanseatic merchants, merchant bankers and private bankers founded Commerz- und 
Disconto-Bank in Hamburg.4 9 9 After World War I I , the Allies ordered a break up of all 
banks in Western Germany into regional units. The successor institutions of 
Commerzbank were able to re-emerge and form a single company by 1958 and since 
1965, Commerzbank has been represented in every large town and city in western 
Germany. Nowadays, Commerzbank is one of Germany's big three private-sector banks 
in Frankfurt and is engaged in both commercial and investment banking activities. 
Outside Germany, the bank has over 50 outlets in more than 40 countries.500 
4 9 8 Paribas web page: 
http://ww.paribas.coin/Site/HomeDb2.nsf/FrMain 7ReadForm&leveI=200.200&lang=EN. 
4 9 9 Commerzbank web page: htQ)://www.commerzbank.com/navigate/hist_frm.htm. 
5 0 0 Ibid. 
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Commerzbank decided to open a representative office in Beirut back in 1957. This was 
one of its first offices abroad.501 However, as the shelling reached Commerzbank's 
office in Beirut, the bank decided to close its office temporarily in 1982. The bank 
carried on with its activities in Lebanon through a network of correspondents. With the 
beginning of the reconstruction process, Commerzbank decided in late 1994 to re-
activate its representative office in Beirut "to be able to provide better service to the 
existing network of correspondent banks and clients".5 0 2 
Commerzbank was the only German bank to participate in the Eurobond issues by the 
Lebanese government. In June 1997, Commerzbank was the first to launch a DEM 
Bond issue for the Lebanese government (DEM 250m, for 5 years). Moreover, 
Commerzbank participated in financing the reconstruction process by arranging finance 
for the power plants projects in Beddawi and Zahrani. Here also, Commerzbank was the 
first German bank to do so. 5 0 3 
6.4.2.3 Flemings 
This is a London-based British bank that is well established as an international asset 
management and as an investment banking group. It has a network of offices in over 40 
countries and over 7500 staff. Flemings' origins date back to 1873 when Robert 
Fleming, founder of the firm, set up the first investment trust in Scotland investing in 
the emerging market of the US. Robert Fleming & Co was established in 1932. 
Flemings is privately owned. 5 0 4 
Robert Fleming Holdings Ltd opened a representative office in Beirut in October 1995. 
This office was to cover the region of the Near East. They arranged for the issuing of 
Global Depository Receipts (GDR) by Banque Audi in November 1995. The US$ 34 m 
issuing was the first international public equity to be issued by a Lebanese institution. 5 0 5 
It can be assumed that the imminent deal then was an incentive to open the 
representative office as obviously negotiations for the deal should have started earlier 
than one month before (the difference between date of opening the office and issuing 
5 0 1 Information collected through e-mail correspondence with Commerzbank office in Beirut December 
1999. 
5 0 2 Ibid. 
5 0 3 Ibid. 
5 0 4 Flemings web page: http://www.flemings.com/world/index.htm. 
5 0 5 Banque Audi: Winning position. Flemings Research, Banking, Lebanon. September 1997. p:4. 
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the international public equity). Another followed in 1997, when Banque Audi had its 
second GDR issue for raising up to US$ 75 m. 5 0 6 
However, these seem to be the only deals that Flemings secured in Lebanon. Other 
deals of GDR issuing seemed to go to other competitors like Merrill Lynch. Flemings' 
representative in Beirut referred to poor relationship management by Flemings as a 
major reason for not doing well in Beirut. He considered the appointment of a junior 
representative, i.e. himself, being 25 when he arrived in Lebanon, was problematic 
when he had to deal with chairmen of local banks discussing their capital structures or 
how to fund new branches. The feeling was that he could only listen to that chairman 
who spent the last 40 years building his bank. He believed that a successful relationship 
for corporate finance and capital markets work should be managed at a senior level. 5 0 7 
Merrill Lynch had a more experienced manager based in London (35-40 years old) who 
maintained the relationship with Lebanese clients. Another issue highlighted by the 
Flemings' representative was the solid network of private accounts that Merrill Lynch 
had in the Middle East. Unlike Flemings, Merrill Lynch had the ability to guarantee 
their issuing clients in Lebanon a quick placement of their securities. Herbert said that 
Merrill Lynch could easily present a list of private accounts over which they have the 
power to convince their holders that their new GDRs are worth investing in. Flemings 
had the placing power but all depended on the client whether to buy or not. 5 0 8 
The lack of business for Flemings might have been the reason for reducing their 
presence in Lebanon. After Herbert's resignation, the decision to second another 
representative to Lebanon was revised and representation was confined to a local 
employee who collects data and arranges appointments for visiting delegates. However, 
we have to bear in mind that stagnation in the economy was already prominent. That 
might have well contributed to Flemings' decision not to send a new and experienced 
representative to Lebanon and to serve the market through delegations only. 
5 0 6 Banque Audi: Winning position.op.ciL 
5 0 7 Author's interview with Dominic Herbert, Flemings' representative in Beirut until summer 1998. July 
1998. 
5 0 8 Ibid. 
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6.4.3 Finance and FDI 
This third line of business, finance, came third in popularity amongst EU firms 
registered in Lebanon after 1993. However, the figure of 10 firms involved in finance 
moving into Lebanon is not very impressive. Given the history of Beirut in financial 
services a better response would be expected. One should take into consideration, 
however, that some foreign and EU banks and finance firms were present in Lebanon 
before the war. Some of the banks kept operating in Lebanon, mainly those with local 
partners. Others kept a lower profile. Certainly, the civil war resulted in the exodus of 
numerous foreign firms from the country. However, those that did not flee officially 
(i.e. closing their offices permanently) were not counted amongst the returnees. This is 
the case of Schroders, for instance. The office was never closed permanently although 
business was virtually non-existent during long periods of turmoil. Life was injected 
again into Schroders' office in Beirut after the end of the civil war. Looking at the list of 
foreign banks operating in Lebanon we find the same result: many EU banks were never 
removed from the list. The French BNP (Banque Nationale de Paris) was still there. The 
British Bank of the Middle East, now part of HSBC, also did not close its operation in 
Lebanon. The finance firms that came into Lebanon were mostly firms that were never 
present in Lebanon before the war. The likes of Flemings and Paribas are good 
examples. Investment banking was not popular in Lebanon before the war. Al l foreign 
and local banks registered in Lebanon before the war were involved in traditional 
commercial banking. However, the war left many Lebanese banks and firms under-
capitalised. It was an incentive for foreign finance houses to move in trying to sell their 
services to Lebanese clients. Also, the hopes of reviving the Lebanese Stock Exchange 
raised these firms' hopes of good deals in advising on restructuring and listing local 
companies. 
Nevertheless, the question that needs to be answered is i f these finance firms coming 
into Lebanon can be considered as conducting FDI. Most of these firms had opened a 
representative office upon arrival in Lebanon. Their expenditure is normally confined to 
the rent of their offices and salaries, in addition to other domestic spending. Investment 
banking firms play a role in raising finance for local firms and bring portfolio 
investment. They might also bring foreign investors into a merger and/or an acquisition 
deal. However, we could argue that they are not direct investors themselves. A viable 
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justification for this argument is that, although their presence might in many cases bring 
capital into the country, the capital invested is not theirs. Yet, this argument could be 
reversed once discussing the issue of other finance firms that have shown a bigger 
interest in the country. This interest could be represented by renting or buying bigger 
premises, bringing more expatriate employees and employing a substantial number of 
local labour force. HSBC Holding is a suitable example. Being the owners of the British 
Bank of the Middle East, HSBC bought in 1999 a new building in Beirut for the price of 
US$ 13 m 5 0 9 . This amount of money has either been transferred from the parent-firm in 
London, or most likely been raised from the bank's profit from its operations in 
Lebanon. Whatever the case, the millions of dollars paid into the premises would 
certainly lead us to consider this move as FDI. The two examples come from the same 
line of business, finance. While there is a difference in the sort of service they provide 
(Flemings is specialised in investment banking while HSBC in Lebanon is involved 
mainly in commercial banking, in addition to investment banking and corporate 
finance), both are financial services. The difference between the two cases is the level of 
interest and commitment adding to it the difference in the business needs of each of the 
two firms. 
6.4.3.1 The theory of FDI applied to finance 
The application of FDI theories becomes more complicated when we start discussing 
the third line of business chosen for this research. The diversity of activities within 
finance which comprises commercial and investment banking, insurance firms, 
accountancy, financial consultancy and others does not make our task easier. We have 
seen already that it is difficult to distinguish between finance firms' activities that could 
be considered FDI and others that could not. An application of the criteria provided by 
the theories of FDI would help in drawing lines between different finance activities. The 
case of Flemings and Schroders wil l be addressed, in addition to the case of HSBC. 
Although HSBC's business in Lebanon did not start after 1993, the period that this 
thesis focuses on, their business activities were brought into this research to help in the 
analysis. Their decision to buy the new premises in 1999 falls beyond the period this 
thesis addresses, 1993-1998. However, as the news of it came while analysing the data 
The DailyStar, op.cit. 18/6/99. 
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available, it was thought to be helpful in this particular analysis without disturbing the 
time limit. 
6.6 Finance activities according to FDI criteria 
Griteria Flemings Schroders HSBC 
Capital transfer Current Current Yes 
expenditure only expenditure only 
Technology transfer Not applicable Not applicable Possible 
Know-how transfer Yes Yes Yes 
Exerting control Yes Yes Yes 
As in the previous cases, theories of international investments stipulate a movement of 
capital between countries, i.e. a transfer of one of the major productive resources, as 
Czinkota called i t . 5 1 0 Such international movement of capital is usually motivated by an 
eagerness to maximise the profits. Hence the tendency to gravitate towards locations 
with higher rates of return.5 1 1 Profit maximisation could be achieved through either 
portfolio investment or direct engagement in a production process. The latter means that 
a product would be developed in the host country for which capital investments would 
be essential. 
One of the major problems facing us in applying the theories of FDI to finance firms is 
the fact that theories of foreign direct investment were developed mainly to explain the 
case of manufacturing industries. The rise of these theories in the 1960s was mainly to 
explain the motives behind the tendency amongst American manufacturing firms to 
establish production abroad. That is why we find that theories of international 
investment were based on theories of international trade. Therefore, service industries, 
including financial services, do not seem to be appropriately covered by these theories. 
However, although finance firms were not named as such in the theory, it is possible to 
find a compromise in which theories of FDI can be applied. The core element of the 
theory is the product. The firm has a specific product developed in its home country and 
exported to other countries. Once a decision to invest abroad is taken, it means that the 
product wil l be developed abroad. Indeed, it can be justifiably argued that services are 
products, as well. Financial services are intangible products developed by finance firms. 
Therefore, we could look at finance firms operations in a foreign country in a similar 
5 1 0 Czinkota. M, op.cit, p.26. 
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way to manufacturing firms. As we have established earlier, capital transfer is essential 
for any foreign business operation to be considered foreign investment. Looking at the 
case of firms like Flemings and Schroders, the picture is quite different. Those two 
firms have got representative offices in Beirut. Both had a very limited number of 
employees, though Schroders was larger in that sense. Capital transfer in this context is 
confined to current expenditure as opposed to capital expenditure. Expenditure that is 
confined to salaries and rent cannot be considered investment although it is spent 
abroad. Once we compare these two cases to the case of HSBC we can easily notice the 
difference. HSBC had US$ 13 m of expenditure only to purchase a new building in 
Beirut. There is capital investment involved here. HSBC has over two branches in 
Lebanon. This means inevitably extra capital expenditure. 
A very useful way to differentiate investing finance firms from non-investing ones 
would be to divide them into two further categories: branches and representative offices. 
Those two terms came up in the previous paragraph. I f you look back you will see that 
Flemings and Schroders have established representative offices in Beirut. Meanwhile, 
HSBC has got branches in Beirut. This leads us to investigate the type of business. I f 
the case of representative offices is identical to the case of representative offices of 
trading firms, then the theory of international trade is more applicable. These finance 
firms are promoting their product, financial services, in foreign markets. Their 
representative offices are just bridgeheads to reach foreign markets in order to bring 
more business to their headquarters in London. So, i f we consider the transfer of 
technology and know-how we could say that this has been a transfer of product straight 
to the market. On the other hand, branches have got a different role. The branches of 
HSBC in Beirut are operating much the same as local banks. They are involved in 
commercial banking, which means they have assets and liabilities in the Lebanese 
financial market. They are producing their service in Lebanon, and it would certainly 
sound sensible that any technology available for HSBC parent-firm would be 
transferred to its subsidiary in Lebanon if that would serve its competing position 
among commercial banks. The issue of control is not very difficult to assess in those 
cases. Representative offices are obviously controlled by the parent-firm. In the case of 
Schroders, as it is a result of a joint venture between Schroders - Asseily, Schroders 
1 Czinkota. M, op.cit, p.26. 
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own 65 per cent of the joint venture which is based in London. However, as capital 
investment is not involved then the issue of control is not very relevant. Meanwhile, in 
the case of HSBC it is different. Lebanon's operations are controlled by the parent-firm, 
which appoints the executive positions in HSBC Lebanon. 
The same style of categorising could be applied to other finance firms like insurance 
and accountancy. I f the firm is establishing a representative office than the firm is not 
investing. However, i f the firm is establishing a branch, and buying or merging with a 
local finance firm so that capital expenditure is involved, then this firm is a direct 
investor. 
6.4.3.2 Size of FDI activities conducted by EU firms in finance 
Tracing FDI activities by EU firms becomes immensely difficult when we reach the 
finance sector. It is already obvious from the above analysis that drawing a line between 
the investment and non-investment activities of finance firms in Lebanon is hard 
enough. The combination of the criterion of capital transfer and consequent condition of 
operating as a branch or merger with a local firm excludes all finance EU firms 
registered between 1993-98 from the FDI category. They have either established 
representative offices, or have given no indication of capital transfer from the parent-
firm to the subsidiary in Lebanon. HSBC was not registered amongst the newly in-
coming finance firms. In this sense, its case is identical to the case of other European 
banks that already existed before the beginning of the reconstruction period. These 
included Crddit Lyonnais France SA as the owner of over 66 per cent of the shares in 
Credit Lyonnais Liban SAL, which was established in 1951. Also included is Banque 
Libano-Francaise in which Banque Indosuez owned 51 per cent of the shares; Banque 
Nationale de Paris Intercontinentale with BNP owning over 80 per cent of it since its 
establishment in 1944; and the Dutch ABN Amro that has been established since 1954 
with four branches operated by 141 employees512. However, one European insurance 
firm, the French AGF, has entered the Lebanese market in 1997 through buying 30 per 
cent of the Lebanese insurance firm SNA. The amount of AGF's investment was 
announced as US $11 m.This investment move can be considered to be FDI as 30 per 
5 1 2 Information derived from the Web site of The Association of Lebanese Banks: 
http://www.abl.org.lb/index2.html 
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cent of the shares allow the investing foreign firm to have a say in the way the firm is 
operating. Apart from AGF, no other FDI attempts by EU firms in the finance sector 
were apparent. 
6.5 Conclusion 
Judging by the criteria stipulated by the theories of foreign direct investment, the 
activities of EU firms in Lebanon appear to have involved very little direct investment 
in the post-civil war period. The case studies in this chapter and the categorisation 
provided in the previous chapter support this argument. EU firms followed one another 
in relatively large numbers into Lebanon with the beginning of the reconstruction 
process. This is normally the case with foreign firms; "they are like sheep, move in 
herds and flocks and follow each other once one leads the way". 5 1 3 In the case of 
Lebanon, they followed each other in bidding for contracts to rebuild the infrastructure 
of Lebanon. However, direct investment did not seem to have appealed to the crowds 
and lost ground to easy contracts. Apart from infrequent cases, EU private direct 
investments have been virtually non-existent. The niche in the Lebanese market for EU 
firms was laid in the contracts that were difficult for local firms to execute. Their 
experience gave them the advantage over local and Arab firms in many cases. In other 
cases, local and Arab firms had no chance to compete with EU firms, as the 
technological gap was too wide. Obviously, EU firms 'found the cheese' in contracting 
but certainly not in investing. 
The cases of firms like Inchcape and France Telecom are not numerous. Those firms 
found the niche in the market to place a direct investment. For other firms, it is not quite 
the same. The Westernised mentality of the consumers encouraged Inchcape to 
introduce its Western style in retail. Other European firms had the same belief but did 
not risk their own capital (BHV/Monoprix). Instead, they franchised their business to a 
local investor. France Telecom and Finnish Telecom invested in mobile phone networks 
but had local partners. The presence of a local partner can be seen as a risk minimiser 
(in the case of Finnish Telecom the local partners owned the majority of shares). The 
local partner in fact knows the market and the investing environment much better than 
the new arrivals. The lack of the knowledge of the market is always a disadvantage for 
5 1 3 Author's interview with Mr. Sinclair Road, COMET. Winter 1998. 
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foreign investors competing with local counterparts. By having local business partners, 
foreign companies rid themselves from obstacles resulted from their poor knowledge of 
the market. However, as far as the telecommunications sector is concerned, investment 
in the mobile phones network in Lebanon was commonly considered a 'gold mine'. 
Lebanon was in desperate need of telephone services and it was believed that the 
landlines network would take years to be rehabilitated and expanded. Even common 
people in Lebanon consider that the mobile phone companies operating in Lebanon 
made profits since the first day of operation. Indeed, these firms had collected in 
advance the price of phone-lines long before starting operation. A down payment of 
US$ 500 was essential for booking a line in the then coming network. The investing 
companies benefited from the desperation of the Lebanese customers who were in real 
need of telephones. This proves that foreign businesses wil l jump on the chance for 
investment once the risk is minimal. 
As for finance, the lack of FDI moves by finance firms raises two main points. Either 
the Lebanese market is not worth investing in because it does not offer attractive 
opportunities; or the market is already saturated with European finance firms that 
rejuvenated their businesses after the war. Certainly, the presence of European banks 
before 1993 cannot be underestimated. Al l were big names in international banking, 
particularly French. However, the reiterated governmental aim to regain Beirut's role as 
the financial centre would necessitate the flow of foreign finance firms into Beirut. The 
surge in the representative offices' numbers can be interpreted as a careful move to 
assess the available opportunities for business. These are issues to be explained more 
when we look at the reasons for the lack of FDI by EU firms in Lebanon. What can be 
emphasised here though, is that EU firms were attracted to Lebanon by opportunities 
arising from the massive reconstruction plan undertaken by the government. This 
European interest can be interpreted as a very short-term interest with very little 
commitment to the country. 
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Chapter Seven: Reasons for the Lack of FDI in Lebanon 
7.1 Introduction 
The theories of foreign direct investment have helped in defining the criteria by which 
FDI activities can be differentiated from other types of foreign businesses. In the 
previous chapter, I have used these theories to answer the 'What' question: What kind 
of foreign business can be considered foreign direct investment? Applying the answers 
to the case of foreign businesses in Lebanon, it was proved that very little direct 
investment has been included in the operation of EU firms in Lebanon. This also can be 
applied to other non-EU firms that operated in Lebanon in the same period (93-98). In 
this chapter, the same theories are used to answer the 'Why' question: why has there 
been very little FDI in the operations of foreign firms in Lebanon? 
7.2 International Product Life Cycle Theory as a motive for FDI in Lebanon 
I shall start with the first motive stipulated by Vernon in his International Product Life 
Cycle Theory. To recapitulate, he considered FDI to be a subsequent step after 
international trade (i.e. production in the foreign market would replace exports). A new 
product would be developed in an industrialised country where the research and 
development facilities are available, in addition to the high consumer purchase ability. 
The same would later be exported to other countries within which competition would 
soon erupt from local producers imitating the new product. As locally manufactured 
products would normally have the advantage of not being subject to trade barriers, high 
custom duties or cost of transport, the exported product into such markets would face 
fierce competition. It is then that a decision to establish production abroad would take 
place, depending on the importance of the foreign market for the firm. This way a firm 
would avoid trade barriers, high custom duties, and costs of transport. 
It is difficult to apply this theory to the case of EU firms in Lebanon. We have discussed 
earlier the case of the German firm, Siemens, and others like Ansaldo of Italy or Alcatel 
of France, and we found that they were in Lebanon only for contracting reasons and not 
investing. These companies are massive producers of electronic and 
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telecommunications equipment in addition to being contractors. However, their interest 
in Lebanon was confined to contracting. These firms have exported products to 
Lebanon, be they goods or technological expertise, produced either in their home 
countries or in other host countries. To investigate whether they have reached the stage 
where they should replace their exports to Lebanon by local production we need to 
answer a few questions: a) has there been any competition from local industry?; b) have 
trade barriers and custom duties been problematic?; c) has the cost of transport been 
affecting the competitivity of their exports? 
The exports of such companies to Lebanon cannot be faced by local competition 
because such production does not exist in Lebanon. Therefore, these companies would 
be competing amongst each other. This way, these companies are all equally subject to 
the same conditions like trade barriers and cost of transport and their competition is 
more affected by the cost of production in their country of origin. This is why we find 
that the size of Lebanon's imports from Italy, for instance, is the highest when 
compared to other EU countries, and even the US. The reason is that Italian products are 
cheaper on the Lebanese market than other products. These firms could possibly face 
competition from other producers in South Asia. However, local competition in this 
sense does not exist. Trade barriers in Lebanon are not a major problem. Lebanon is 
well known for the traditional freedom in importation. Some recent increases in custom 
duties on some products have caused concerns amongst traders. These increases, 
however, were intended to boost government revenues more than to curb imports. 
Nevertheless, products that are considered essential face fewer, lower custom duties. 
But, as mentioned earlier, all competitors would be facing the same rules. 
These examples could be applied to plenty of other EU producers that export to 
Lebanon: Daimler-Benz (the producer of Mercedes cars) or Renault of France. Indeed, 
this applies as well to non-European firms: such as General Motors of the US or Hitachi 
of Japan. These firms, or others exporting to Lebanon, do not face local competition. 
Therefore, as far as the issue of reducing the cost of exports is concerned, such a motive 
does not apply to manufacturing firms exporting to Lebanon. Moreover, the analysis in 
the previous chapter has highlighted the Western orientation of the market. This 
mentality can serve EU producers in guaranteeing continuous marketing for their 
products in a 'Westernised' market like Lebanon. Therefore, it is not only the lack of 
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local competition, but also the guaranteed prestige of Western products in the market, 
that secure the market for EU exports. 
7.3 Ownership of specific advantage as a motive for FDI in Lebanon 
A firm's specific advantage has been stipulated as a motive for FDI in many theories. In 
discussing the Monopolistic - Oligopolistic Advantage Theory, Toaka talked about an 
"exploitable factor" that the MNC should own to give it an advantage abroad.514 Hymer, 
Kindleberger, Caves, and Dunning, all stressed the need for the firm to have a specific 
advantage to make any FDI activity successful. Kindleberger stressed that a firm in a 
foreign country must have an advantage over existing or potentially competitive firms, 
otherwise, local firms would be operating more cheaply.515 Indeed, this factor of a 
firm's specific advantage is at the core of the Market Imperfection Theory, which 
Hymer was the first to discuss. He considered markets to be imperfect when there is a 
horizontal or bilateral monopoly or oligopoly, and suggested that collusion, by having 
all enterprises owned by one firm, would be profitable. 5 1 6 Markets of perfect 
competition where firms have homogeneous products and equal access to factors of 
production are rather theoretical, according to Caves.517 His model of Market 
Imperfection stipulated the competitive advantages that firms acquire. Dunning's 
Eclectic Model stated that a firm should have almost the same advantages to conduct 
FDI: product differentiation; brand names; special marketing skills; and technology.518 
Therefore, in the case of EU private direct investments in Lebanon, the following must 
apply: a firm's specific advantage is essential for any company before it decides to 
locate its business in Lebanon. By examining the case of Inchcape (Spinneys) through 
its retail business in Lebanon, we could detect a belief within that firm that it had a 
specific advantage to compete with local supermarkets. The firm believed that local 
supermarkets did not possess the same high standards as Inchcape.519 Other direct 
investors like France Telecom and Finnish Telecom also had specific advantages that 
protected them from any local competition. They have entered a telecommunication 
5 1 4 Taoka. G, op.cit, p.48. 
5 1 5 Kindleberger.C.P, op.cit, p.ll. 
5 1 6 Hymer. S, op.cit, p.25. 
5 1 7 Caves. R, op.cit, p. 17. 
5 1 8 Ibid. 
Rugman. A, 1988.op.cit, p. 119. 
5 1 9 Author's interview with Inchcape's general manager in Beirut, op.cit. 
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market that never had mobile phone services before. Therefore, local competition was 
not existent. However, their specific advantages would have been questionable had the 
market been opened to other telecom firms. These two firms and their local partners, 
thus, are largely protected from foreign competition by the government concessions.520 
However, although foreign firms would have great specific advantages when compared 
to local firms, this does not mean that they should start producing overseas. We 
understand from the International Product Life Cycle Theory that FDI takes place when 
markets would be better served from within rather than through exports. Therefore, 
although the exporting firm might have great advantages as opposed to local 
competitors (like technology and brand names), that does not necessitate a move of 
production to the host country. The market might be still perfectly serviced and tapped 
through exports. This way, foreign firms would still be benefiting from market 
imperfection as well, i f their exported products have proven to be very competitive and 
much in demand (i.e. market imperfection in trade). We have already established that 
the Lebanese market is accessible for exports and that local production does not 
represent strong competition to imported products. 
7.4 Imtemalisation as a motive for FDI activities by EU firms in Lebanon 
The process of producing a firm's product abroad can be established without a direct 
investment in the host country. Hence comes the authorisation and licensing rights 
given by the parent-firm to local producers in the foreign country. Franchise is one 
aspect of this method of production. The likes of Coca-Cola and McDonald's are very 
good examples of licensing and franchising. The product, be it a good or a service, is 
produced abroad by local firms that are supervised by the parent-firm just to maintain 
the quality and the reputation of the brand. 
However, when the parent-firm decides that its knowledge of the product and the 
technology used are too precious to be transmitted to an outsider, a decision to extend 
its production arm to the foreign market becomes sensible. Robock argues that the 
firm's initial expenditure on research can be recouped if it keeps the use of information 
internal.5 2 1 In explaining Dunning's view of internalisation, Rugman highlighted the 
The two GSM firms have the exclusive right to provide mobile phone services in Lebanon. 
1 Robock. S, 1989. op.cit, p.45. 
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difficulty in valuing the technology being sold to the other firm. He also mentioned the 
advantages of using price discrimination and cross-subsidisation for products.522 
In the case of EU firms in Lebanon, we have already established that market 
imperfection in itself did not tempt many EU firms to conduct FDI activities in 
Lebanon. Exports seemed to be the right way to tap the market as we already 
mentioned. Therefore, it is a bit difficult to find internalisation being on the agenda of 
EU firms interested in Lebanon when market imperfection has not yet tempted them. In 
the case of Inchcape (Spinneys), internalisation can be traced, as the team managing the 
venture was seconded from the parent-firm, and a direct control was being exercised by 
the parent-firm. However, in the case of BHV/Monoprix and other multinational firms 
like McDonald's or KFC, we could see that the firm had no objection to extending its 
knowledge to a franchisee. 
In the case of France Telecom we can say that its operations in Lebanon are 
internalised. The parent-firm controls 67 per cent of the joint venture in Lebanon, and a 
managerial team from the parent-firm has been seconded. The same is the case of 
HSBC in Lebanon; a direct control from the parent-firm has been accompanied by 
internalisation within the firm and its arms in foreign markets. 
However, the cases of EU firms that could be used as examples are very limited. This is 
due to the earlier conclusion that the market can be served by exports, whether in goods 
or in services. Manufacturers can export their products and would at most need a 
representative office to promote their products. Finance firms, as well, could export 
their services to the country and a representative office might suffice for them. 
Internalisation, therefore, is a late stage in the international production process, which 
foreign firms in Lebanon have not yet reached. 
7.5 Oligopolistic reaction as a motive for FDI in Lebanon 
The essence of this approach is its explanation for a firm's decision to invest abroad 
following a rival firm's decision to establish production in the same foreign country. 
Knickerbocker said: " I f a firm A makes a move, say investing abroad, then the concept 
of oligopolistic reaction tells us something about firm B, a rival to A, is likely to do". 5 2 3 
5 2 2 Rugman. A, 1988, op.cit, p.119. 
5 2 3 Knickerbocker. F, 1973.op.cit, p.8. 
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As we mentioned in the theoretical chapter, Knickerbocker built his model on the basis 
of Vernon's Product Cycle Model, which explained mainly the move of US firms 
towards producing abroad.524 This was an explanation of how US firms followed each 
other in their overseas moves when American firms became skilled in 'pioneering' 
products while other foreign firms lagged behind.5 2 5 Investment abroad involves 
uncertainty. This is what we referred to earlier while emphasising the need for a firm's 
specific advantage to compensate for the disadvantages of operating in a foreign market. 
Ietto-Gilles said that rival firms would also face uncertainty, however, it is more risky 
not to invest.526 The risk here means leaving firm A to reap all the benefits of producing 
in the foreign market where competition is already weak. Knickbocker concluded that 
the behaviour of firms in oligopolies tends toward a pattern of action-reaction, and 
527 
move-countermove. 
In the case of EU firms operating in Lebanon between 1993-98, it is a bit difficult to 
trace any oligopolistic reaction amongst FDI operations. One could argue that the period 
of time is rather short. In other words, the reconstruction period did not provide 
sufficient time for firm A to set up yielding operations to provoke firm B to set up 
similar operations. However, it is worth saying that when FDI is an oligopolistic 
reaction, it is normally a subsequent step to an aggressive move by the first firm that 
conducted FDI. In other words, the oligopolistic reaction is a defensive move. 
Nevertheless, the first move is still missing in Lebanon. In my view, oligopolistic 
reaction in FDI wil l be easier to trace i f and when there is a significant trend of FDI 
activities. In the case of Lebanon, we have already established that FDI, particularly by 
EU firms, is still minimal. 
However, we can detect some early moves of investment that may be considered as 
oligopolistic reaction. Referring back to the case of Inchcape (Spinneys) and MonoPrix, 
we could see that the latter followed the former. It is possible to suspect that the move 
by the owner of MonoPrix franchise in Lebanon is an oligopolistic reaction to 
Inchcape's move to open Spinneys. However, the investment came from a local investor 
who brought the French brand into the country, not from the French chain itself. 
Moreover, the argument that the local investor has been motivated by the opportunities 
5 2 4 Ietto-GiUies. G, 1992.op.cit, p.130. 
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rising from a Westernised market proves to be stronger, and thus the move is still 
aggressive. After a l l MonoPrix did not establish business in Lebanon to protect an 
existent market share from the aggressive move of Inchcape. 
The moves by many EU finance firms to establish offices in Lebanon could also be 
considered as an early oligopolistic reaction. It is the "bandwagon effect" that Ietto-
Gilles talked about when trying to explain the defensive moves of foreign investment.528 
This might explain how most of these firms registered their representative offices within 
a short period. However, these moves were not really FDI activities, as we already 
concluded in the previous chapters. 
7.6 Location-specific advantage as a motive for EU firms FDI in Lebanon 
The Eclectic Model, or the O.L.I. Model developed by Dunning, has shed light on the 
importance of the location in motivating a firm to conduct an FDI activity. This crucial 
point has not been noticed by preceding theories of FDI, which focused on other factors. 
Only the Product Life Cycle Model touched upon this point when it mentioned trade 
barriers as a motive for firms to establish production in foreign countries. However, this 
theory did not take the factor of location any further. McDermott considered that 
Dunning's location-specific advantage means there are certain benefits to be gained by 
exploiting the firm-specific advantages outside the home country.5 2 9 Dunning 
acknowledged that a firm serving a market through foreign production depends on 
resource endowments not available to, or not utilised by other firms. These endowments 
could be ownership specific (i.e. internal within the enterprise) or location specific (i.e. 
available to other firms and should be used in their locality). 5 3 0 He drew a long list of 
location specific "variables" that would affect direct investment activities whether in the 
home or the host countries. Amongst these variables were the access to natural 
resources and markets; availability of production factors at a competitive price; cost of 
transport; investment incentives and disincentives; and artificial barriers (i.e. trade 
barriers).531 
5 2 7 Knickerbocker. F, 1973. op.cit, p.5. 
5 2 8 Ietto-Gilles. G, 1992. op.cit, p. 130. 
5 2 9 McDermott M, 1989.op.cit, p. 10. 
5 3 0 Dunning. J.H, International Production and the Multinational Enterprise. (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1981) p.25. 
5 3 1 Dunning. J.H. The Globalisation of Business. The Challenge of the 1990s. (London: Routledge, 1993) 
p.99. 
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This contribution by Dunning to the theory of FDI is of great help in this research: it 
explains the lack of FDI activities in Lebanon. Rugman suggested that they could also 
include skilled low-cost labour force. Other important factors are the size of the market, 
the cost of factors of production, the level of bureaucracy in government administration, 
corruption, and above all political stability. Government policy in providing pull-
factors, such as financial incentives, should also be counted as location-specific 
advantage. These are the factors that were highlighted by the interviewees chosen for 
this research. In discussing these factors, they showed Lebanon's position as far as 
attracting FDI is concerned. 
7.6.1 Trade barriers 
In the earlier discussion on the motives of FDI according to the Product Life Cycle 
Theory, we established that trade barriers in Lebanon are not substantial. Apart from a 
few agricultural products that compete with local produce, almost all 'legal' goods can 
be exported to Lebanon. Custom duties have been increased in the last few years but 
this cannot be considered part of a protectionist policy as much as it was to boost 
government revenues. One major reason for the increase in the value of custom duties is 
the adjusting of the exchange rate of these duties. During the 1980s, the sharp 
devaluation of the Lebanese currency was not extended to affect custom duties. Instead, 
the rate of the LL against the US Dollar remained strong. This way, revenues from 
custom duties were negligible. High custom duties were imposed on car imports, 
particularly used cars. The motive was to reduce the number of old cars in Lebanon for 
ecological reasons. Yet, custom duties in general were still within affordable limits. In 
this sense, trade barriers were never a serious problem for exports into the Lebanese 
market and thus foreign producers did not have to improvise another way to jump trade 
barriers. I f the producer was concerned about the Lebanese market solely, then the lack 
of trade barriers can be interpreted as a reason for the lack of locating foreign 
production in Lebanon. 
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7.6.2 Natural resources 
These are the factors of production provided by nature.532 It refers to all the freely given 
material phenomena of nature within the boundaries of men's activities. Additional 
qualities of situation and location can be considered natural resources. These include 
fertile land, oil, coal or other ores or mineral deposits, natural forests, rivers which can 
produce hydroelectric power, wind if it can be usefully harnessed as a source of power, 
rainfall etc. 5 3 3 Examples of FDI activities motivated by natural resources can be drawn 
from around the world. Kvaerner's pulp and paper industry is located in countries like 
Brazil 5 3 4 , amongst others with abundance in forests. Over 30 per cent of Totalfina's 
output of oil comes from the Middle East region. 5 3 5 The activities of these multinational 
firms in these particular countries were obviously attracted by the natural resources 
available there. 
Natural resources are hardly existent in Lebanon. The small size of the territory does not 
provide enough fertile land for agricultural investments. Urbanisation has reached 
remote areas due to the need for housing. This affected forestation as wel l . 5 3 6 Similarly, 
there have been no records of oil discovery in Lebanon so far, while coal and other 
minerals are not available. Big multinational oil firms have interests in countries 
endowed with substantial amounts of oil resources. Lebanon does not fall within this 
category. 
7.6.3 Size of the market 
The size of the market is one of the major factors that would affect the firm's decision 
to invest or not. The market in this case means the size of demand demonstrated by 
local consumers of the firm's product, or even the potential for adequate demand that 
would allow the firm to recoup its investment. This could be demonstrated through a 
large population with a strong or sufficient purchasing power. A high GDP per capita 
would contribute to the host countries' comparative advantages. 
This is how the Oxford Dictionary for Economics defined it 
5 3 3 Pearce. D. W, The MacMiUan Dictionary of Modern Economics. (1981) p.302. 
5 3 4 Kvaerner's web page: http://www.kvaerner.com/pulp/ 
5 3 5 Totalfina's web page: http://ww.totalfina.com/us/profil/activite.html 
5 3 6 Ironically, investment in the timber industry could have been more feasible thousands years ago, 
during the Phoenician time. The mountains of Lebanon were then covered with forests. 
250 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment of EU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
In the case of Lebanon, the country's GDP per capita, which is over US$ 4,000, is the 
highest in the region (excluding oil-producing Gulf countries and Israel). The 
purchasing power parity and growth in private consumption are the highest as well. The 
imports of Lebanon are also relatively the highest (according to population size). 5 3 7 
However, with a population of only 4 million, Lebanon does not provide substantial 
opportunities for manufacturing industries. Shehadi pointed out that Lebanon's position 
as a host country for FDI depends on the sort of industry considered. He noted that i f 
the product is a high value-added one, then it is the purchase ability that determines the 
size of the market. As far as low value-added products are concerned, the size of the 
population becomes equivalent to the size of the market.'! think Lebanon has no chance 
in this field (...) the market is small and our neighbours have closed economies."538 The 
Israeli market is absolutely out of consideration due to the Arab boycott policy towards 
Israel. Meanwhile, the Syrian market is one of the most difficult markets to penetrate 
due to the governmental control of importation. The government of Harriri has 
concluded trade agreements with Syria in which trade between the two countries was to 
be facilitated by abolishing trade barriers. However, the fruits of this development have 
yet to be seen. Along these lines, it could be argued that a firm that is engaged in 
producing low-price clothes would be better placing its investment in a country like 
Egypt instead of Lebanon. Egypt, with a population of 60 million would certainly 
provide a better market than Lebanon. However, would Lebanon be a better market for 
stereo systems or computers? These are high-tech products with high value-added. It 
has to be said that although Lebanon's GDP per capita and its purchase power per capita 
are higher than Egypt, these figures do not show the real differences in income levels 
and wealth distribution within each country. Therefore, even i f we assume that 50 per 
cent of Lebanon's population has the ability to buy a PC, this would leave us with 2 
million people. Meanwhile, i f we assume that 5 per cent of Egypt's population could 
afford buying a PC this means 3 million buyers. In this sense, Egypt would appear a 
more attractive market. 
See tables provided in the previous chapter. The section on Inchcape. 
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7.6.4 Cost of factors of production 
These are the economy's productive resources that are essential for any production 
process. They are classified as: land, labour, capital and entrepreneurial ability. In this 
part, the first three factors are to be discussed. As for the fourth factor, entrepreneurial 
ability, it is to be disregarded as this thesis is concerned with exogenous entrepreneurs 
who do not form part of the productive factors that Lebanon offers. 
7.6.4.1 Cost of land and property 
The cost of land and property can be crucial in encouraging or discouraging a foreign 
firm wanting to establish FDI activities. This is in fact a major problem for investments 
in Lebanon. The limited size of the territory and the centralisation of business activities 
in the capital Beirut increased demand for property in the region. Thus, the cost of land 
and property in Beirut and the surroundings is very expensive.539 Hamdan considered 
real estate to be the major component of the asset of any factory. This, he argued, puts 
Lebanon in a less competitive position in the region. In the Gulf countries, real estate is 
the minimum component of any factory's assets, as it would be given to the investing 
firm by the government for 99 years.540 While the cost of property in the regions is 
relatively cheaper than in the capital's surroundings, this would mean facing the 
expensive costs of transport. Shehadi commented that the cost of transporting a lorry-
container load from Mount Lebanon to the port of Beirut is equal to shipping it to 
Marseilles in France. Therefore, the cost of acquiring property to establish a factory 
could be a real obstacle discouraging FDI. 
7.6.4.2 Availability of skilled-cheap labour 
Labour is also one of the major factors of production whose availability is crucial in 
determining the location of production. I f a company decides to establish production in 
a foreign market to increase its competitivity within the market, it implies a move 
towards reducing the cost of the product. A more expensive labour force than in the 
home country would not encourage an FDI move. Whether the company is looking for 
5 3 8 Author's interview with Dr Kamal Shehadi, Lebanese economist. 
5 3 9 Author's interview with Dr Antoine Haddad. Lebanese economist, op.cit. 
5 4 0 Author's interview with Dr Kamal Hamdan. Lebanese economist, op.cit. 
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unskilled-cheap labour or skilled-cheap labour depends on the needs of its line of 
business. Nevertheless, firms involved in manufacturing would tend to look for skilled 
or semi-skilled labour. 
In Lebanon, skilled labour is not available at a competitive cost. Al l interviewees for 
this research, whether Lebanese economists or European business representatives, 
agreed that the labour factor is not competitive in Lebanon. Opinions ranged from 
negating the presence of skilled labour in Lebanon,541 to its scarcity in industry, mainly 
intensive labour industries.542 When available, it does not fit the EU requirements, 
particularly at the medium-size managers' level, 5 4 3 and when technical skills, 
manufacturing industry and tourism services are concerned.544 Nevertheless, the 
majority agreed that, when available, skilled labour is expensive and hardly competitive 
when compared to its counterpart in neighbouring countries. 
The lack of competitive labour is the result of various factors. Some are inherent in 
Lebanon's economic development since independence, and others are the result of more 
recent changes. In the manufacturing industry, the lack of competitive skilled labour can 
be attributed to the fact that Lebanon is not an industrial country. At the best of times, 
Lebanon's industry contributed 20 per cent of the country's GDP. During the post-
independence period, the country was developing an economy dependent mainly on 
financial and non-financial services. At a time when neighbouring countries, like Syria 
and Egypt, were pursuing a process of industrialisation to substitute their dependence on 
imports (ISI), Lebanon was applying an entirely different strategy. The Lebanese 
financiers found in the plight of Arab private businesses, being nationalised, a niche for 
their business prosperity. Lebanese banks became the shelters for flight capital from 
these countries. These events widened the pace of development in the financial services 
sector. Meanwhile, development in industry was at a much slower pace. Moreover, 
unlike other neighbouring countries, the governments of Lebanon never provided 
substantial subsidies to local industries. In other words, industrial development 
depended fully on the capacity of private entrepreneurs. This gave Lebanese industry 
5 4 1 Author's Interview with Lebanese economist Antoine Haddad. op.cit 
5 4 2 Author's interviews with Lebanese economists Dr Elie Yashoui and Mazen Hanna. Beirut July 1998. 
5 4 3 Author's interview with the representative of the Delegate for German Trade and Industry, Alexi 
Nassan. Beirut. July 1998. 
5 4 4 Author's interview with Lebanese economist Dr Kamal Shehadi. op.cit. 
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the characteristic of being primarily composed of family businesses, with many 
operating with less than 10 employees. Such a situation does not contribute to 
developing a large pool of skilled labour from which a foreign company could pick its 
labour force. Meanwhile, the nationalisation of industry in countries like Syria and 
Egypt got the state directly involved in industrial development. Factories grew bigger 
while vast numbers of employees were recruited by the state to operate them. This 
factor gives countries like Egypt a comparative advantage when FDI is concerned. The 
abundance of labour contributes to reducing its price on the pure basis of supply and 
demand. Meanwhile, the lack of skilled labour in Lebanon, and the flight of many of 
them during the war, widens the gap between their high cost and the low cost of their 
counterparts in neighbouring countries. 
In the services sector, the situation is a little better. The country developed a very 
successful services sector in the 1950s and 1960s. The Lebanese banking sector was 
serving not only Lebanon but also the whole region as far as the Gulf countries. Trade 
also developed immensely and the port of Beirut became the principal Levant port after 
Haifa was relegated to a mere Israeli port and the Suez Canal became inaccessible. This 
development in the sector needed a parallel development in the labour force. Indeed, an 
impressive skilled labour force was built in Lebanon's financial and non-financial 
services sector. This ranged from financial services, including banking and insurance, to 
non-financial services including tourism, health-care and education. The economic 
prosperity between the post-independence and civil war periods had its spill over effect 
on the standard of living of people involved in prosperous sectors. Their personal 
incomes were higher than those of their counterparts in neighbouring countries. 
However, their counterparts, say in Egypt or Syria, were not operating in the same 
domain. The state-led economies in these countries imposed a rigid system on financial 
and non-financial services in which labour skills did have neither incentives, nor means 
to develop. 
The civil war destroyed almost all competitive advantages of Lebanon in the services' 
field. Finance and commercial activities had to move to other regional centres. Some of 
these new centres were in fact just opening up, like Cairo. Moreover, the Gulf region 
developed its financial services. The civil war culminated in the flight of the majority of 
skilled labour in the financial sector to Europe or to the Gulf. The civil war also caused 
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a slow pace in the development of financial and non-financial services at a time when 
competing regional centres were developing rapidly. The labour force that has stayed in 
Lebanon appeared to be behind, by the end of the war. Their counterparts in the Gulf, 
for instance, have developed up-to-date skills and were much more familiar with the 
new technology used in the sector. 
In addition to the high cost of property in Lebanon, industries, in particular, face another 
high cost in the utilities needed for running a factory. The major expensive utility is 
electricity.5 4 5 Any visitor to Lebanon will easily notice the complaints about the high 
cost of electricity. The cost of kwh in Lebanon is higher than anywhere else in the 
region. It could be argued that the higher cost is a result of huge thefts taking place on 
the network. However, the government does not provide any subsidised electricity to 
industries. When compared with Gulf countries or Syria, the cost of electricity in 
Lebanon is extremely uncompetitive. 
7.6.4.3 Cost of finance 
A major incentive for foreign direct investments could be cheap finance. Many firms 
tend to finance their projects through debt and/or equity instead of investing their own 
capital. In Lebanon it is almost impossible to get a bank loan for building or upgrading a 
factory. Most bank loans are short term and go into financing trade. For example, the 
loans given by Lebanon's biggest bank, BLOM, in 1998 included only 12 per cent for 
manufacturing. Meanwhile, trade activities received 48 per cent. The general manager 
of the investment arm of BLOM argued that manufacturers expect long-term lending at 
lower interest rates. He added, "why should I , as a bank, lend at a lower interest rate 
when I could lend at a higher one?"546 Indeed, the higher rate that Osseiran referred to 
was not only offered by the commercial sector but also by the government. To finance 
its reconstruction programme and current expenditure the government was offering high 
interest rates on treasury bills. Osseiran wondered how he could lend a manufacturer at 
7 per cent interest rate when the government was offering 18 per cent. As previously 
explained, the government was crowding out the private sector by offering high 
interests that hardly any business could achieve. 
Author's interview with Alexis Nassan. op.cit. 
5 4 6 Author's interview with Dr Fadi Osseiran. General manager of Banque D'Affaires Du Liban et 
D'Outre-Mer SAL. (BALOM). August 1998. Beirut. 
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This high cost of finance would discourage foreign investors as well. It is also 
contributing to lowering the comparative advantages of Lebanon against other countries 
in the region. Hamdan argued that the cost of finance in the Gulf is cheaper as interest 
rates are around 7 per cent. 
Therefore, when it comes to considering the cost of the factors of production, Lebanon 
appears to have no comparative advantages at all. Labour, land and capital are 
comparatively expensive. Even if we assume that some factors, like capital, could be 
arranged from other sources, the cost of other factors of production is still influential. 
7.6.5 Public administration 
The problems with government or public administration can range from a high level of 
bureaucracy to the lack of transparency, and the absence of either a clear policy on 
foreign investments or an appropriate legal framework. 
7.6.5.1 High level of bureaucracy 
The term bureaucracy was first used in 1745 by Vincent de Gournay as a derogatory 
reference to a type of government in which power resided with officials. He was then 
describing the Prussian government.547 Max Weber (1864-1920) developed 
bureaucracy, however, as an "ideal type" of social system. He considered bureaucracy 
to be typified by a rational and effective organisation that operates on the basis of 1) 
rules by which tasks are organised; 2) a division of labour which produces 
specialisation; 3) hierarchy, meaning superior-subordinate relationships; 4) decisions by 
technical and legal standards; 5) administration based on filing systems and institutional 
memory; and 6) administration as a vocation.5 4 8 Bureaucracy in the contemporary world 
"refers primarily to government agencies that are characterised by day-to-day policy 
implementation, routine, complex procedures, specialisation of duties, rights of 
authority and status, and resistance to change".549 Chandler noted that bureaucratic 
behaviour is often objectionable to citizens because it denotes delay, red tape, pettiness, 
ritualistic attachment to rules, and concentration of power in persons neither elected by 
Chandler. R.C, The Public Administration Dictionary. 2nd edition. (Santa Barbara, Calif: ABC-Clio, 
1988) p.168. 
5 4 8 Ibid, p.169. 
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nor responsible directly to the people.550 However, he pointed out that the pathological 
aspects of bureaucracy do not necessarily refer to bureaucracy as a social organisation 
but largely to the pattern of individual behaviour of bureaucrats.551 No wonder then that 
a bureaucrat is defined in contemporary dictionaries as an "inflexible administrator" 552 
In Lebanon, the level of bureaucracy is perceived to be high, although it does not have 
the reputation of being massive and Soviet-type as in other neighbouring countries.553 
Yet, this does not deny the hindering effect on foreign businesses. The war has 
contributed markedly to the deterioration in the public administration and subsequently 
to the bureaucratic problems.554 Shehadi commented that many of the documents and 
licences needed for business are meaningless. 'These made a lot of sense in the 1940s 
but do not make sense at all now-a-days".555 Indeed, it is common that a document in a 
public-administration department would have to pass through many offices and 
accumulate a huge number of signatures. Many parts of such process sound incredibly 
backward these days. Hanna referred to these procedures as small red tape steps that 
hinder FDI in Lebanon.556 
The accumulation of red tape in Lebanon's public administration is the source of major 
complaints from the business community in Lebanon, whether local or foreign. Lebanon 
in fact is not unique in this sense. Complaints of red tape in public administration 
existed almost everywhere in different levels. Kaufman pointed that when people rail 
against red tape, they mean that "they are subjected to too many constraints, that many 
of these constraints seem pointless, and that agencies seem to take forever to act".5 5 7 
Chandler stated that red tape originated in seventeenth-century England, where it was 
the practice to tie official documents with a tape of reddish hue. He added that 
"procedures, rules, and regulations - often referred to as red tape- protect people's 
rights as well as cause them annoyance".558 Therefore, "excessive rule making is 
frequently the outgrowth of good intentions on the part of the legislators to prevent, 
' Chandler. R.C, The Public Administration Dictionary, op.cit, p. 169. 
5 5 1 Ibid. 
5 5 2 Isaacs. A, The Oxford Dictionary for the Business World. (Oxford University Press: 1993) p. 105. 
5 5 3 Author's interview with Jim Sillar. Assistant to the Secretary-general of The Arab-British Chamber of 
Commerce. London. May 1998. 
5 5 4 Interview with Mazen Hanna, Advisor at the Ministry of Finance, op.cit. 
5 5 5 Interview with Dr Kamal Shehadi. op.cit 
5 5 6 Interview with Mazen Hanna. op.cit. 
5 5 7 Kaufman. H, Red Tape: Its Origins. Uses, and Abuses. (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1977) p.4. 
5 5 8 Chandler. R.C, 1988.op.cit, p.233. 
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correct, or eliminate abuses within the system". However, "when excessive red tape 
causes the system to be virtually inoperative, the red tape must be cut". 5 5 9 Lebanon's 
problem is in fact the excessive red tape that causes huge delays in getting targets 
achieved. It is not only due to excessive use, as Chandler suggested, but also because 
the rules are out of date. The 'bureaucrats' of Lebanon are using rules that were 
established decades ago and have not been updated since. 
The red tape in the Lebanese administration has resulted in a more dangerous problem, 
which is bribery. Obviously, more strict rules that involve a lot of bureaucratic work 
would result in the need to deal with numerous numbers of public administration 
departments and tens of clerks. It has become common knowledge that any stamp or 
signature has a price. Moreover, to avoid going through such a vicious circle, the job of 
a mediator has become prosperous. They offer their services to go around collecting 
'signatures' for an agreed price. This is the bribery and hidden-tax that businesses suffer 
from in Lebanon. It became a system in itself, and anyone who does not know the 
system faces big difficulties in, for example, opening a shop in Lebanon.560 The advisor 
to the minister of Economy and Trade highlighted that a lot of hidden-taxes are paid in 
the government administration.561 In our case studies we noted that Spinneys faced the 
hidden-tax problem in very petty ways. In Kvaerner's case, its project manager rejected 
the name hidden-tax because it is well known to happen "in this part of the world". 
However, he said that it causes problems but does not hinder the business.562 However, 
Shehadi argued that bribery is creating an extra cost for business, and reaches in some 
estimates 3 to 5 per cent of a company's turnover. An investor would not have any 
interest in setting up a business in such a case, as this could be half or more than the 
company's profit, he added.563 As Hamdan put it: "they say we have reduced taxes on 
profits but this [bribery] is another tax, and a great obstacle for F D I " . 5 6 4 
5 5 9 Chandler. R.C, 1988.op.cit, p.234. 
5 6 0 Author's interview with Mazen Hanna. Ministry of Finance. op.ciL 
5 6 1 Author's interview with Dr Helmi Ghandour. Advisor to the Minister of Economy and Trade. Beirut. 
July 1998. 
5 6 2 Author's interview with Ken Gilder. Kvaerner's project manager in Beirut op.cit. 
5 6 3 Author's interview with Dr Kama! Shehadi. op.ciL 
5 6 4 Author's interview with Dr Kamal Hamdan. op.ciL 
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7.6.5.2 Lack of transparency and openness 
To be transparent is shortly defined as being obvious and easily understood.565 While 
discussing transparency in the European Union, Janet Mather suggested that it should 
have three dimensions: First, the minimal transparency that includes availability of 
comprehensible information. "Any system which lacked this could hardly be termed 
transparent at all". Second, the liberal transparency by which access to the thinking 
behind decisions is guaranteed. " I f we know how decisions have been made and who 
contributed to them, we can hold decision-makers accountable in the last resort", she 
said. Third, the democratic transparency by the opening of decision-making process to 
non-governmental participation. " I f a polity is to be considered democratic, there should 
be sufficient information available to enable people to participate in decision-taking".566 
In Lebanon, even minimal transparency does not exist in the public administration. 
Hamdan considered the lack of transparency to be "the big obstacle" in the way of 
attracting F D I . 5 6 7 It is almost impossible to acquire information about business 
regulations or even on a particular company. This is one of the major problems that this 
research faced while collecting data. Relevant statistics were not easily obtainable. For 
foreign businesses such a situation is certainly discouraging. Not knowing the way 
around leads to falling into the traps of delay and bribery. Being secretive about rules 
and information helps only the bureaucrats in maintaining their control. That is how 
every little clerk in a governmental department becomes substantially important as he 
could easily keep someone's documents in his drawer as long as he wants. Nassan noted 
that to get a work permit or a residency permit for a foreigner, a bribe is essential. He 
wondered why he should pay over US$ 1,500 to get his secretary a work and residency 
permit while it would cost only US$ 100 in Saudi Arabia. He called this problem a 
hidden investment barrier.568 This makes other Arab countries much cheaper as a base 
for operations, indeed. Obviously, foreign businesses in most cases are not willing to go 
through such hideous procedures. 
Also, Author's interview with Philip Khoury, strategy analyst at Flemings. London. June 1998. 
5 6 5 The Oxford Dictionary for the Business World. (1993).op.ciL p.880. 
5 6 6 Mather. J, Transparency in the European Union - An Open and Shut Case? In Openness and 
Transparency: Meaningful and Meaningless? Conference papers. European Information Association 
1997. p.3. 
5 6 7 Author's interview with Dr Kamal Hamdan. op.ciL 
5 6 8 Author's interview with Alexi Nassan. op.ciL 
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7.6.5.3 Lack of a legal framework for FDI 
The legal framework that is meant here is a list of laws and rules that should include the 
rights and duties of foreign companies or persons interested in investing in Lebanon. 
However, it should be made clear that the regulations are not negative towards foreign 
investments. On the contrary, the Lebanese governments have always been proud of the 
freedom of business activities granted by the legislator without differentiating between a 
native and foreign firm. Ghandour proudly declared that Lebanon was a pioneer in the 
region where rights for establishment are concerned.569 It is true that Lebanon gave 
foreign businesses the right to operate freely when neighbouring countries were 
nationalising all foreign interests. The Lebanese rhetoric was emphasising that what 
applies to Lebanese applies to foreigners. This is true to a great extent. The freedom to 
transfer capital in and out of the country, to open bank accounts in any currency, the 
free exchange market, and bank secrecy, all were beneficial to local and foreign 
businesses. However, the problem is embodied in the lack of a legal framework that 
combines all the laws applying to foreign businesses. The laws that govern foreign 
businesses operations in Lebanon are scattered between rules concerning registration, 
the form of the company, taxation, rights of employees, and others. These rules are not 
separated from the ones related to local businesses. The excuse for such a situation was 
that Lebanon never distinguished between foreign businesses and local ones. Business 
guides tend to talk about the open and liberal business environment when the regulatory 
framework is discussed. They refer to foreign businesses only when certain exceptions 
apply. 5 7 0 However, a foreign businessman would not have the time to go through all 
commercial laws to find what would apply to his firm's case in Lebanon. In other 
neighbouring countries certain laws have been introduced to encourage foreign 
investment. In Syria the Law 10 of 1990 sums up all the rights and duties of foreign 
businesses in Syria. It could be argued that Syria needed the Law 10 because foreign 
investment was not allowed before. This is absolutely right, but Lebanon needs a similar 
regulation to facilitate the matter for foreign investments. 
Moreover, despite all claims that the Lebanese legal framework is welcoming to foreign 
investments, there remains a certain discrimination against foreign businesses. This 
comes under the exceptions that are scattered amongst commercial laws. 
5 6 9 Author's interview with Dr Helmi Ghandour. op.cit. 
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Firstly, foreigners have a very restricted right to ownership of property and real estate. 
According to the Legislative Decree No. 113 dated 16 September 1983, non-Lebanese 
are not permitted, except as provided for in the law, to acquire any real estate rights in 
Lebanon. "Said rights include real estate property, rent of land and built real estate if the 
duration of such rents exceeds ten years, investing real estate property.. .etc.".571 The 
Decree states that: 
No permit may be granted: 
1) Regarding real estate located within ten kilometres from the Lebanese boundaries. 
2) To one person for an area exceeding 3000 square meters in all Lebanon including a 
maximum of 1000 sq. meters in Beirut... 
Nationals of Arab countries may acquire an area not exceeding 5000 sq. meters in all 
Lebanon including a maximum of2000 sq. meters in Beirut. 
The Decree goes further in its restriction, stipulating that the acquisition of bigger areas 
can be permitted but in very limited cases. This includes companies involved in the 
construction of buildings for sale, industrial or tourist companies. However, these 
companies should have at least half of the shareholders with Lebanese nationality. 
Effectively, this means that the company is almost local. Moreover, the area required 
should not exceed 20,000 sq. meters (a maximum of 5,000 in Beirut). For scientific, 
cultural, charitable institution or diplomatic and consular missions, such permits could 
be granted as well. The necessity of the acquisition for the project is essential and the 
maximum area authorised would not exceed 3,000 sq. meters in Beirut and 10,000 sq. 
meters outside Beirut for diplomatic missions. For scientific and charitable institutions 
the size goes up to 15,000 sq. meters.573 
The 'dilemma' of the foreign person or company does not stop at the very limited right 
to ownership. The process of applying is another problematic procedure that is enough 
to put off any investor from continuing. The Decree stipulates that the application to 
acquire real estate should be submitted to the department of real estate at the Ministry of 
5 7 0 Emerging Lebanon 2000. The Annual Business. Economic, and Political Review, op.cit, p. 157. 
5 7 1 Nasr. K, Business Laws and Taxation in Lebanon (1996) p. 62. 
5 7 2 Ibid. 
5 7 3 Ibid. 
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Finance. This should include in addition to essential personal information, a statement 
from all concerned real estate departments in the country showing all real estates owned 
by him in Lebanon; a declaration made and signed before the Notary Public stating all 
properties owned by the applicant. In case of corporations, the application would need 
further paper work. Eventually, a decree issued by the Council of Ministers within three 
months would guarantee the licence, i f the application were to be approved. I f rejected, 
the application may not be submitted again before two years are up. Moreover, taxes on 
registering a property for a non-Lebanese are rated at 17 per cent of the value of the 
property itself. 5 7 4 
Secondly, in establishing a Joint Stock Company (equivalent to Public Limited 
Company in the UK), there are no laws limiting the nationality of shareholders. 
However, the majority of the board of directors have got to be of Lebanese nationality. 
The head of the board of directors can be a foreigner as long as a work permit has been 
granted.575 Nevertheless, i f this newly established Joint Stock Company is to be 
involved in "the exploitation of public utilities" it should have one third of its capital 
represented by registered shares owned by Lebanese shareholders. These shares may not 
be transfered to non-Lebanese in any case.576 
Thirdly, in a Limited Liability Company, all partners can be foreigners. However, i f the 
firm's objective is to engage in commercial representation it should have a Lebanese 
partner.577 Moreover, an LLC does not have the right to engage in businesses like 
insurance, economy, savings, regular air transport, banking and capital investment for 
the account of third parties. This, however, applies to local and foreign firms operating 
in Lebanon.578 
Fourthly, a Holding Company should have at least two members of the board of 
directors of the Lebanese nationality.579 
Fifthly, concerning foreign insurance companies, in addition to not being allowed to 
operate in Lebanon unless they are set up in the form of a joint stock company, the 
5 7 4 Nasr. K, (1996), op.cit. 
5 7 5 Stephan. J. S. "Lubnan a-na'iem a-dareebi: al-isstissmarat fi Lubnan" (Lebanon the Tax Haven: 
Investments in Lebanon) (Beirut 1997) p. 16. 
5 7 6 Nasr. K, (1996).op.cit, p.35. 
5 7 7 Emerging Lebanon 2000. op.cit, p. 159. 
5 7 8 Nasr. K, (1996). op.cit, p.32. 
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employees of such companies should be Lebanese except for three foreign specialists 
and one manager or general representative 580 
Sixthly, foreigners are not allowed to conduct any commercial representation business. 
The Legislative Decree No. 34 of August 1967 defined a commercial representative as 
"the agent who within the framework of his normal independent profession, and without 
being bound by an employment agreement, undertakes negotiations for the conclusion 
of sale, purchase, hire and services, and should the occasion arise, carries on such 
activity in the name of producers or merchants and for their account".581 The modifying 
Decree No.9639 of February 1975 stated that the commercial representative should be a 
Lebanese national having a place of business in Lebanon. In partnerships and limited 
liability companies, the majority of partners should be Lebanese and the majority of 
capital is to be owned by Lebanese partners. The person authorised to sign for such 
firms is to be Lebanese as well. In a joint stock company, the shares and the majority of 
its capital should be owned by Lebanese shareholders, as well as two-thirds of the 
members of the board of directors. The general manager or his delegate should all be 
Lebanese.582 
On top of all these regulations, the registration procedure for a branch of a foreign 
company is not a straightforward procedure. After preparing a long list of documents, 
these should be attested by the authorities concerned in the home country of the 
company and legalised by the Lebanese consular official there. These documents should 
then be authenticated by the Lebanese Ministry of the Exterior in Beirut. A sworn 
translator should then translate them into Arabic before they can be legalised by the 
Notary Public. These documents should then be submitted with an application for the 
approval of the Ministry of Commerce and Economy. Once such approval is granted, a 
copy of the documents should be submitted to the Commercial Register with an 
application containing a summary of the Articles. This application should be in 
duplicate and should contain a long list of information about the firm, the location of its 
head office and worldwide branches, names of partners, amount of capital, and 
others.583 Moreover, the commercial registration charge for any company or 
5 7 9 Nasr. K, (1996). op.cit, p.32 & Stephan. J, op.cit. p.20. 
5 8 0 Nasr. K, (1996). op.cit. p.50. 
5 8 1 Ibid. p.18. 
5 8 2 Ibid. p. 19. 
5 8 3 Ibid. p. 52. 
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establishment is LL 1,200,000 (US$ 800). In addition, a stamp duty of LL 1,800,000 
(US$ 1,200) is levied upon the formation of a foreign joint stock company. This figure 
is reduced to LL 1,000,000 (US$ 666) i f the joint stock company is Lebanese. A 
factory, and industrial or commercial establishment would pay L L 750,000 (US$ 500). 
Add to that, a 0.1 per cent of the company's capital to be paid to the Notary Public 
Office for the Lawyers Syndicate. Likewise, to register in the Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry, there is an initial fee ranging from LL 146,000 (US$ 97) to LL 582,000 
(US$ 388) depending on the capital of the firm, in addition to a stamp duty of LL 
25,000 (US$ 16) 5 8 4. Such a procedure would certainly be a nightmare for a foreigner 
who does not know the country and its administration. Indeed, it is a hideous process for 
locals. It would certainly discourage any investor who is a bit dubious about the FDI 
move. 
7.6.5.4 Labour social security cost 
The social security for labour is ruled by Decree No. 13955 that goes back to September 
1963, which stipulates the regulations for the National Social Security Fund. There have 
been huge complaints from the business community in Lebanon about the backwardness 
of these rules, which force employers to endure huge costs.585 Clearly, the current 
regime is disputed not as an obstacle for FDI only but also as a serious problem for local 
businesses. It has been claimed that it contributes strongly to the high cost of labour in 
Lebanon.586 
The Social Security in Lebanon is divided into three sections: sickness and maternity 
insurance; family allowances scheme; and end of service indemnity scheme. The rules 
stipulate that these sections are funded by employers, employees and the Lebanese 
government.587 However, the stipulated contribution of employees and employers shows 
that the employer has to meet almost the whole cost. The following figures explain how 
the share is divided. 
Sickness and maternity (Health insurance): 15 per cent of the employee's salary. 
This amount should not exceed three times the minimum monthly salary limit 
5 8 4 Ibid. p.17. 
5 8 5 Author's interview with Sa'ad El-'Owayni, General manager of the Lebanese Industrialists' 
Association. Beirut August 1998. 
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decided by the government (LL 300,000). However, 12 per cent is to be paid by the 
employer while the employee pays the remained 3 per cent. 
- Family allowances scheme: It is equal to 15 per cent of the employee's salary. This 
also should not exceed the value of three times the minimum monthly salary. 
However, the employer pays it totally. 
End of service indemnity scheme: This represents an equivalent of 8.5 per cent of 
the monthly salary. The employer pays the whole amount.588 
Effectively, the payments to the Social Security Fund amount to an equivalent of 38.5 
per cent of the monthly salary. However, only 3 per cent of the salary is to be paid by 
the employee while the employer pays the rest (35.5 per cent). Therefore, a foreign 
company that is interested in operating in Lebanon should take into consideration that 
taxation is only a maximum of 10 per cent on corporate income as the taxation law 
states. There is the extra cost of social security that the company would have to endure. 
7.6.5.5 Work and residency permits for foreigners 
Any foreigner needs a work permit, to be obtained from the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs, before undertaking any job in Lebanon. This includes employees and 
employers. Theoretically this work permit could be granted, as long as there is no 
prejudice to the policy that a Lebanese national is given priority and preferential right. 
However, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affair has a long list of jobs and 
professions exclusively reserved for Lebanese nationals. According to the Ministerial 
Order dated 11/1/1993, foreigners may not be given work permit as employees in all 
administrative and banking jobs of any kind, mainly manager, deputy manager, head of 
personnel, treasurer, accountant. Also secretary, filing, computer, storekeepers, 
salesman, exchange, jewellery, laboratory, pharmacy, electrical and sanitary works, 
glass, mechanic and maintenance, office boy, guard, teaching in elementary, 
intermediate and secondary schools with the exception of teaching foreign languages 
when necessary, engineering works, barber, driver, and jobs where Lebanese are 
available.589 
5 8 7 Stephan. J 1997. op.ciL p.117. 
5 8 8 Ibid. 
5 8 9 Nasr. K. 1996 op.cit. p.59. 
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Concerning foreign employers, not all professions are opened to them. The same 
Ministerial Order points out some professions that are exclusive for Lebanese. These 
include all kinds of trading, exchange, accounting, commercial representation, 
commission, engineering of all kinds, contracting and building trade, jewellery, shoes 
and clothes industry, all kinds of furniture and other complementary industries, sweets, 
printing, publishing and distribution, manufacturing building materials, barbershops, 
cars maintenance, and in general any profession that may form competition to the 
Lebanese.590 Once the profession allows a foreigner to be an employer, he/she would 
need to be in a partnership with one or more Lebanese nationals. Nevertheless, the 
Lebanese share in the capital should be over 51 per cent, and the contribution of the 
foreigner no less than L L 500 million (around US$ 333,330,000). The Residency Permit 
could be obtained once a work permit has been granted. 
However, the cost of the permits for work and residency are significantly high. The 
work permit charges go up from LL 150,000 (US$ 100) for the lowest category to LL 
1,000,000 (US$ 666) for the highest category. These are preceded by prior approval 
charges ranging from LL 30,000 (US$ 20) to LL 200,000 (US$ 133). Charges for the 
residency permit range from LL 200,000 (US$ 133) to LL 800,000 (US$ 533). These 
charges are the same upon renewal, which should take place in a maximum period of 
two years.591 To calculate the administrative cost for foreigners to set up a business in 
Lebanon we realise that a foreign investor whose interested in establishing business in 
Lebanon and being the employer, the preliminary cost would be around US$ 2,418. The 
foreign party should be operating within a partnership and, as mentioned earlier, his/her 
capital should be no less than L L 500 m and his/her share would represent no more than 
49 per cent of the total capital. For a foreign company without a registered foreign 
employer, with one foreign employee at least, it would be around US$ 2,284. Both 
cases are comparatively expensive. 
5 9 0 Nasr. K. 1996 op.cit, p.59. 
5 9 1 Ibid. p.61. 
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Table 7.1 Administrative cost facing foreign companies in Lebanon 
Administrative cost for a local firm with 
a foreign employer 
Administrative cost for a foreign firm 
with no foreign employer 
Registration charge as Reg. Charge as a 
a local firm LL 1,000,000 Foreign company LL 1,800,000 
Work permit (employer) LL 1,000,000 Work permit LL 600,000 
Reg. Chamber of Reg. Chamber of 
Commerce LL 327,000 Commerce LL 327,000 
Lawyers Syndicate fee Lawyers Syn fee LL 100,000 
0.1 % of total capital LL 500,000(min)a (min) 
Residency permit L L 800.000 
Residency permit LL 600.000 
Total cost: LL 3,627,000 
US$ 2418 
Total cost: LL 3,427,000 
US$ 2284 
a- The minimum cost of the Lawyers Syndicate fee is LL 100,000, but a foreign employer is required to 
have a minimum capital ofLL 500 m which takes the fee up to a minimum ofLL 500,000, before counting 
the cost to be encountered by the local partner. 
These costs are to be met before doing any business in Lebanon, and the delay in going 
through the whole procedure can be imagined. Part of this ill-favoured procedure must 
be repeated every time permits are to be renewed. Extra costs are incurred once any 
foreign employee has joined the firm's labour force in Lebanon. 
These requirements and costs appear backward when compared to the process of 
establishing business in a developed country. In the UK, for instance, there is no charge 
for getting a work permit for foreigners. The recent revision of work permit 
arrangements stated that no decision has been made to charge for it. Moreover, it 
considered a scheme to allow multi-national employers to self-certify rather than apply 
for a work permit for employees on intra company transfers, which wil l be piloted to 
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assess whether there are benefits to be gained. To facilitate the process of applying 
for work permits, which is the employer's duty, a new facility to apply by e-mail was 
being introduced.593 For investors, a sum of £ 200,000 (around US$ 320,000) marked 
for investment in the UK is enough to grant the applicant a one-year visa. I f the business 
is set up within that period an extension of three years can be granted. Permanent visa 
can be given after the four-year period has elapsed and if the business subsists.594 There 
are no restrictions on property ownership for foreigners. Obviously, there is a wide gap 
between investment environments in countries like the UK and Lebanon. 
7.6.5.6 Lack of a coherent policy to attract foreign investments 
Apart from the problems created by the heavily bureaucratic administration and the 
outdated legal framework, the development of FDI activities in Lebanon faces the lack 
of a coherent strategy to attract foreign direct investments. The Lebanese government 
established the Investment Development Authority of Lebanon (IDAL) in 1994, to 
attract foreign investment. Its task was to identify large-scale investment opportunities 
and facilitate their implementation.595 In fact, IDAL's job was preparing studies for 
projects that can be developed in B.O.T., D.B.O.T., or O.T and tendering documents for 
the said projects. However, IDAL has not been very successful in attracting foreign 
direct investments into the tendered projects. The response was limited to a few car-park 
projects, and other O.T projects. The big projects that IDAL focused on, like industrial 
zones and the Beirut-Damascus toll-road, failed miserably. The failure of IDAL's 
proposed free-industrial zones to be built on a B.O.T. basis in the North and Bekaa were 
attributed to the wrong policy followed by IDAL. Yashoui commented that foreign 
investors would not be interested in building free-industrial zones, as IDAL proposed. 
He pointed out that the answer of foreign investors was that the government should 
build these industrial complexes and then foreign industries would use them as 
operation bases.596 Hayek, from IDAL, refuted this argument asserting that IDAL has 
conducted many studies about the need for industrial zones. These studies were 
supported by an American consultancy firm, and a potential for these industrial zones 
5 9 2 Overseas Labour Service (DfEE): "Work Permit Review" Release RB.2.3 Mar 2000. 
http://www.dfee. gov.uk/ols/ 
5 9 4 Business Emigration to the United Kingdom, http://www.awis.net/uk-biz.html 
5 9 5 IDAL Web page: http://www.idal.com.lb/about/about.htm 
5 9 6 Author's interview with Dr Elie Yashoui, Lebanese economist op.cit 
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was found. Hayek was very optimistic that a positive response to the proposed industrial 
zone B.O.T. projects was immanent.597 However, up till the time of writing these words, 
this response had not materialised. 
In addition to the creation of IDAL, the Lebanese government decided, under Hariri, to 
slash corporate and personal income taxation to a maximum of 10 per cent. Moreover, 
they emphasised the principles of the free market system praising the freedom of 
exchange, freedom to transfer capital in any currency and banking secrecy. The 
government also embarked on a massive reconstruction project to rebuild the devastated 
infrastructure of the country. In fact, the government did a very satisfactory job in 
rehabilitating the infrastructure of the country. One of the government's major aims was 
to build this infrastructure to attract private investments, including FDI. However, a 
question arises here: are sophisticated infrastructures and hanging projects enough to 
attract foreign investors? A British businessman's reflection on the situation was that 
creating a perfect climate for foreign business could be achieved anywhere; however, 
the technique for bringing investors into that climate is more important.598 He asserted 
that a process of worldwide advertising should take place after identifying the target 
investors. Nevertheless, this should be within a strategy by which the government 
would first identify the strengths in its economy and the sectors that could attract 
investors. Sillars criticised the policies of Arab governments, including Lebanon's, 
when it comes to attracting foreign investments. " I do not get the impression that Arab 
governments have done sufficient analysis of what their economies can do, their 
limitations in terms of attracting investors into their domestic economies, and their 
potential in attracting investors to locate in an Arab country to serve a wider market" he 
stated.599 A native Scot, Sillars was proud to present the case of Scotland as an example 
of a coherent policy to attract foreign investments. With a small population of 5 million, 
Scotland had no chance in attracting a car manufacturer to invest in the country, he 
asserted. The cost of transporting the bulky products to the main market in England and 
Europe would be high. Instead, the Scots targeted electronic companies that produce 
computers. Scotland already had an associated industry with them through the 
5 9 7 Author's interview with Kamal Hayek. Engineer and Financial Analyst at IDAL. Beirut July 1998. 
(Now he is the head of IDAL). 
5 9 8 Author's interview with Sir Jim Sillars, Assistant to the Secretary-General of the Arab-British 
Chamber of Commerce. London. May 1998. 
5 9 9 Ibid. 
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microchip industry. These companies serve the UK and European markets from 
Scotland. 
Sillars emphasised the need to look for the strengths of the economy and the niche for 
investment before targeting foreign investors randomly. In a way, the struggle between 
countries to attract FDI is like trading in a market. Every seller would have to display 
his goods nicely to attract the sight of the buyers. The best vendor would be the one 
who does not rely on the display only but shouts to attract a bigger crowd for his best 
items. Lebanon's problem is that the government and the business community have not 
defined the best 'items' to display clearly and advertise. Instead, they were advertising 
the items that every 'seller' has got, and most probably in a better shape and at a better 
price. In reality, the Lebanese government did not identify the strengths of the economy 
and in which sectors Lebanon would have comparative advantage. Instead, the 
Lebanese government always praised the infrastructure the country has rebuilt, in 
addition to its free market, and free banking sector. However, almost every country 
trying to attract foreign investment provides equivalent, i f not better, infrastructure, and 
they give a package of financial incentives. Nevertheless, the most successful amongst 
these countries are the ones that highlight their comparative advantages. They attract 
investors by the lucrative packages they offer, which would include feasibility studies 
that can reassure them. Lebanon's packages did not include any significant financial 
incentive apart from the traditional freedom to exchange currency and remit profit, in 
addition to low-rates of taxation. Tax exemptions were available only for projects in the 
proposed industrial zones. Moreover, the Lebanese government did not provide any 
financial guarantees for foreign investors. This was the major reason for the failure of 
the toll-road project, as the Lebanese government refused to promise to top-up the 
revenues of the investing companies i f the turnover fell short of covering the cost of 
investment. The Lebanese government made it clear that in B.O.T. projects, the 
entrepreneur should bear the financial risk entirely. The obvious reason for the lack of 
such financial incentives is the inability of the government to provide financial 
guarantees. The Lebanese government favoured the B.O.T. schemes to rid itself of the 
financial burden of constructing these projects. 
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7.6.6 Lack of political stability 
To all the above inherent obstacles for foreign direct investment, we should add the 
prevailing problems resulting from the lack of political and economic stability in 
Lebanon. This thesis cannot refute the negative impact of instability in the country. 
However, this thesis would disagree with the argument that achieving comprehensive 
peace would cause a flow of FDI. 
Although the civil war has ended since 1991, Lebanon has still not yet achieved 
political stability. The country is not 100 per cent safe for investments, mainly when the 
investor is a foreigner who would have very limited knowledge of Lebanon. The fact 
that part of the country was, during the researched period, still occupied by Israel 
contributes highly to the lack of a sense of security for foreigners in Lebanon. Certain 
Lebanese opposition factions also interpret the presence of Syrian troops in the country 
as another occupation. During the period between 1993-98, the reconstruction process 
was at a peak, yet foreign investments proved to be far below expectations. Obviously, 
the lack of stability and security maximises the risk for businesses. The peace process 
between Lebanon and Israel gave hope to the Lebanese government, the business 
community, and some foreign businesses. Nassan stated that the German Trade 
Delegate opened its office in Beirut in 1995 because of the peace process.600 However, 
the stalemate in the negotiations proved the widespread optimism to be wrong. 
Moreover, the subsequent escalations in tensions in southern Lebanon, which mounted, 
from time to another, reaching Beirut and the northern parts of the country, could have 
easily caused a setback to any developing business interest in the country. The ex-PM 
Hariri, whose government embarked on the massive reconstruction plan, was blamed 
for betting too much on the imminent accomplishment of peace between Lebanon and 
Israel. 6 0 1 Corm also criticised the government of Hariri for having built its policies on 
the hope that peace was coming soon.6 0 2 The hope for the imminent achievement of 
peace seemed to recede further with the election of Benjamin Netanyahu as Prime 
Minister in Israel in 1996.6 0 3 However, despite all the accusations that Hariri's policies 
6 0 0 Author's interview with Alexis Nassan. op.cit. 
6 0 1 Barazi. M, "Al-Hariri wal-furass a-da'iaa: qiraah fi 'aahd wa-'auhoud". (Hariri and the Lost 
Opportunities). (Beirut, Data and Investment Consult - Lebanon: 1999) p.9. 
Corm. G, 1996. p.85. (George Corm became the Minister of Finance in the Salim Hoss cabinet that 
succeeded Hariri's. 
6 0 3 Emerging Lebanon 2000. op.cit, p. 12. 
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were reliant on the 'coming' peace, Hariri declared after his departure from the 
government that he never considered peace to be unequivocally happening. "It is 
paramount to emphasis that, while we have always viewed peace as an objective, we 
never gambled on it" he said. 6 0 4 
Another aspect of political instability in the country is the presence of Syrian troops in 
almost two-thirds of the country. Although the Lebanese government reminds the 
opposition regularly that the Syrian troops have entered Lebanon upon the Lebanese 
government's request, part of the opposition still consider the Syrian militarily presence 
as occupation. For a foreign investor, this situation would be precarious, with worries 
that a militarily conflict would erupt. Nevertheless, it does not take an expert to detect 
the Syrian influence in Lebanese internal and foreign politics. Since the signing of the 
Taif Accord and the consequent defeat of General Michel Aoun, Syria has been playing 
a stabilising role in Lebanon. Its contribution to the dismantling of militias is 
undeniable. Yet, the overwhelming dependency on the Syrians to stabilise the country 
and decide on foreign policies could be seen as a destabilising factor by foreign 
businesses. The strong influence might prove very unhealthy in case of any crucial 
changes within Syria. 6 0 5 
Nevertheless, although the civil war has ended years ago, the period between 1993-99 
did not show a clear reduction in sectarianism. True, parliamentary elections have been 
restored and three rounds of elections have already taken place. However, a commonly 
agreeable electoral law had yet not been reached by the end of 2000. Every round of the 
three elections was to be preceded by lengthy debates on the form of suffrage law for 
the expected elections. The main concern before every elections round was the 
representation of communal leaders, and how to divide constituencies in the best way to 
serve their interests. In other words, the basic principles of the Taif Accord concerning 
abolishing sectarianism in the government are yet to be implemented in the electoral 
system, let alone the administration. This division of the society and the intensified pre-
elections disputes could be seen as a real threat for stability in the country, and thus 
increase the risk for foreign investments. 
Hariri. R, Statesmanship in Government, Emerging from War and Entering the Future. (Beirut, Arab 
United Press Co: 1999) p.91. 
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7.6.7 Lack of economic stability 
The situation of the Lebanese economy during the reconstruction period was discussed 
in details in the third chapter. These details have shown the dramatic developments that 
took place after the arrival of Hariri into the PM's office reflected in a short spurt of 
economic growth followed by a downturn trend. Therefore, the macroeconomic picture 
of Lebanon's economy was not very encouraging in the second half of 1990s. The 8 per 
cent growth of GDP in 1994 declined to 6.5 per cent and 4 per cent in 1995 and 1996 
respectively,606 while the planned growth rate had been anticipated at 9 per cent over a 
10-year period. Inflation was controlled at 10 per cent but dollarisation was over 56 per 
cent of deposits. Public finances contributed to the bleak image, with around 52 per cent 
in budget deficit/expenditure in 1996. This deficit was rated at 18 per cent of GDP in 
the same year.607 Public debt reached over US$ 16.50 bn (Nominal domestic debt + 
foreign debt) in 1997. This situation was reflected in the verdicts of the rating agencies, 
which saw a BB minus for long term credits by Moody's due to the high risk resulting 
from high public debt and budget deficit. 
The lack of economic stability affects the flow of foreign direct investment in several 
ways. Any company with outward-investment intentions would be scared off by a 
declining growth rate in the economy of the host country. This would create fears of not 
recouping the firm's investment. The failure of the government's fiscal policies to 
reduce the budget deficit would not impress foreign direct investors. The steady growth 
in public debt reaching dangerous limits certainly increases the risk element for any 
investor. The currency might not be able to resist and so plunge to very low rates, taking 
with it any investments conducted in the Lebanese Pound. The low tax rates policy is 
surely an incentive, yet it is useless when other incentives are not available. 
6 0 5 Author's interview with Andrew Gilmour. Head of Middle East and North African Department. The 
Economist. London. May 1998. 
6 0 6 Oxford Business Group. Lebanon: The Annual Business. Economic and Political Review 1997-8. 
op.cit, p.37. 
6^Ibid. 
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7.7 Conclusion 
The Lebanese governments under Hariri between 1993-98 have proved to be a failure in 
attracting foreign direct investment. It can be claimed that the first years of 
reconstruction were aimed at rebuilding infrastructure to establish a welcoming 
environment for FDI. However, three years after commencing the reconstruction 
process, significant FDI was yet to come. Statistics showed that FDI was very shy. It is 
true that a good infrastructure is essential for attracting foreign businesses, however, 
other factors are crucial for any direct investment activity. The criteria to attract FDI 
were not fulfilled in Lebanon. Certainly, the governments of Hariri should not be 
blamed solely for the lack of FDI. The flaws were related to a combination of factors 
that involved the nature of the country, the size of the market and the cost of the factors 
of production. Lebanon is not endowed with natural resources that would attract foreign 
companies. Lebanon is one of the very few Middle Eastern countries that were not 
fortunate enough to discover any oil reserves in their territories. This did not only 
prevent activities in oil extraction but also raised the cost of energy for manufacturing 
industries. The size of the market did not offer any potential for volume production in 
manufacturing to allow investing firms to benefit from economies of scale. The Hariri 
governments worked on some trade agreements with Arab countries to guarantee access 
for Lebanese products. But the agreements with Syria are yet to yield positive results. 
As long as the Syrian consumer purchasing power is low, opportunities to benefit from 
the Syrian market will anyway be very limited. Moreover, in case of a dramatic 
development in the Syrian economy by which a great degree of openness would be 
granted, there would be no guarantees of FDI inflows into Lebanon's manufacturing 
industry. Syria itself might stand as a far better destination for the foreign investment. 
This is due to the fact that factors of production are far cheaper than Lebanon. The 
factors of production - land, labour, and capital, are not available at a competitive price 
in Lebanon. Land and property are amongst the most expensive in the region while 
cheap-skilled labour is a rare commodity. Interest rates on borrowed capital cannot be 
higher. 
On the other hand, the government's policy exacerbated the ill-favoured situation of 
FDI environment. The legal framework was not adequately improved to create a 
transparency. Instead, red tape kept riddling administrative procedures and thus 
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corruption flourished. The case studies of this research have shown that corruption and 
bribery did exist in the Lebanese administration. This situation was either to be accepted 
to do the business, like in the case of Kvarnaer, or to be fought against and lose to, as in 
the case of Ecomax. On top of these disincentives, political stability was yet to be 
achieved during Hariri's era, a development that he was accused of betting on 
unrealistically. Meanwhile, economic stability was growing far from being reached. 
These last two factors contributed largely to the high risk facing the establishment of 
any foreign business in the country. It is no wonder afterwards if FDI activities were not 
very popular in the Hariri period, not only amongst EU firms but foreign businesses in 
general. 
After applying the theories of FDI to the case of EU firms in Lebanon, it can be 
suggested that the lack of the location-advantage is the most important reason in 
explaining the lack of FDI activities in Lebanon. The absence of significant intentions 
to exploit firm-specific advantages or to internalise firm's activities was related to the 
poor comparative advantages that the location provided. The moves to utilise a firm-
specific advantage or to internalise activities are, therefore, measures to exploit a 
location-specific advantage. In Lebanon, the factors that could strengthen its location-
advantages were absent. This thesis argued that a combination of these factors 
accounted for the lack of FDI in Lebanon. However, the limited size of the market and 
the high cost of factors of production were, and still are, the most decisive factors. 
Political instability should not, nevertheless, be ignored. Al l these factors proved that 
Lebanon was not competitive in attracting FDI. 
The obstacles hindering FDI in Lebanon affect equally all foreign businesses whether 
they were EU firms or non-EU foreign firms. The size of the market, for instance, 
affects any producer considering setting up some production in Lebanon. The same 
applies to the cost of factors of production and the lack of natural resources. This 
explains why the lack of FDI activities was not confined to EU firms but also reflected 
the situation of firms from other foreign countries. The major foreign investments came 
from Arab businessmen who directed their capital into some touristic projects, 
particularly hotels, and some banking activities. This in fact follows the historical 
pattern of Arab investments in Lebanon. Arab capital was always channeled into such 
projects. Yet, it has to be said that the Arab interests in investing in Lebanon's tourism 
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are no match for their interests in neighbouring countries like Egypt. Again, Lebanon's 
comparative advantages were weakened during the period of civil war while the others 
have moved on. 
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Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the extent and nature of European 
(EU) business activity in Lebanon, and in particular to analyse the extent of EU private 
FDI within that activity during the period of reconstruction (1993-98). The thesis 
established that the Lebanese government under Hariri was eager to attract such 
investment as part of the private sector's contribution to the reconstruction programme. 
The private sector was expected to respond to the state-led reconstruction process by 
parallel investments to instigate growth in the economy. The local private sector failed 
to meet the government's expectations, partly due to the crowding-out effect of the 
government's intensive borrowing from the domestic sources to cover its doubling 
budget deficits. The thesis demonstrated that although EU firms have substantially 
increased their activities in Lebanon, they also have not been engaged predominantly in 
FDI activities. 
Using the criteria drawn from the theoretical material on FDI, this thesis explained that 
the lack of FDI activities amongst EU firms was due to the lack of comparative 
location-specific advantage in Lebanon. This advantage was highlighted in Dunning's 
Eclectic Model of FDI as a motive for establishing production in a particular foreign 
country. Other theories that stressed the role of firm-specific and internalisation 
advantages fell short of explaining, on their own, the reasons behind the lack of EU 
private direct investments in Lebanon. A firm could move its production into a certain 
foreign country to exploit a specific advantage related to its products {firm-specific 
advantage). This advantage can be due to higher quality, or popularity of the brand. A 
firm could also decide to internalise its operations in a particular foreign country to keep 
the result of its R&D internal {internalisation advantage). However, the decision to 
operate in that particular foreign country would have reasons related to advantages 
stemming from the locality. It appears that Lebanon lacked many comparative location-
advantages that EU firms could have benefited from. 
A significant increase in EU firms' activities in Lebanon was instigated by the 
reconstruction process. Many EU firms moved into Lebanon bidding for reconstruction 
contracts. EU firms received the majority of the contracts tendered by the government to 
rehabilitate the infrastructure of the country. These firms were more qualified to do the 
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arising jobs that needed giant firms with extensive experience. Local and Arab firms 
were not qualified to be in charge of massive projects, like the rehabilitation of the 
electricity or telecommunication sectors. US firms, on the other hand, did not represent 
competition due to the US ban on its citizens travelling to Lebanon. Yet, it has been 
noted that the EU and member states have improved the positions of EU firms in 
bidding for tendered projects, by providing conditional finance. France has been 
particularly forward in this regard. The close historical relationship between France and 
Lebanon has given French businesses an edge in their comparative cultural and 
linguistic knowledge of Lebanon. It is not surprising therefore to see that French firms 
represented the majority amongst EU firms operating in Lebanon, and those awarded 
contracts. 
I have shown that Lebanon proved to be a good place for activities related to trade and 
contracting during the reconstruction period. However, it did not develop into an 
attractive destination for FDI activities. In the following paragraphs I shall endeavour to 
suggest what should have been done to improve the competitiveness of Lebanon's 
location-advantages to attract FDI from the EU and other sources of foreign capital. 
The most important point is that the situation requires a strong government intervention 
to formulate a proper strategy to tackle the problems resulting from the lack of 
comparative location-advantages. These are the ones related to the limited size of the 
market, high cost of factors of production, absence of coherent legal framework for FDI, 
and political and economic instability. 
- Size of the market: Any firm interested in producing in Lebanon is faced with the 
limited size of the market. Despite a comparatively high per capita GDP, the limited 
size of the population affects the size of the market. The local market, although high 
consuming, offers limited opportunities for giant European producers. Moreover, the 
market is very competitive, and in certain industries or trades, a new arrival would have 
to be very careful in conducting competition. This was obvious in the case of the French 
supermarkets' chain - Ecomax. Local competition forced the European operator to 
retreat after sustaining heavy losses. It was suggested also that the giant ice-cream 
producer, Walls, decided to drop plans to establish production in Lebanon. The 
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feasibility studies showed that around 5 local producers controlled the local market. 
Walls apparently realised that it would face fierce competition while the market is not 
worth such risk. Instead, Walls decided to establish its production in Egypt where 
location-advantages were more competitive: less local competition in a massive market. 
The Lebanese government needs to expand prospects for the marketing of locally 
produced goods in order to attract investments into manufacturing and other industries. 
For such purposes, the establishment of a regional free-trade area would be beneficial to 
Lebanon. The Syrian market is the obvious destination to aim to expand into. Lebanon 
and Syria have signed a free-trade agreement in February 1998 stipulating a gradual 
elimination of custom duties between the two countries. This agreement was a part of 
the co-operation process that started between the two countries with the 1991 
Brotherhood, Co-operation and Co-ordination Treaty. However, these agreements are 
faced with a mixed feeling in both countries. In Lebanon, it is believed that the free-
trade agreements allow for an unlimited inflow of low-cost Syrian products into the 
Lebanese market. Although it is beneficial for consumers, the Lebanese domestic 
industries would suffer competition. Meanwhile, some industrialists in Syria believe 
that the Lebanese market was already an accessible free market, and thus Lebanese 
producers would be benefiting from having access to the traditionally closed Syrian 
market.609 It is true that Syrian industrial products have flooded the Lebanese market. 
Factors of production in Syria are much cheaper than Lebanon. Meanwhile, Lebanese 
exports are facing a low purchasing power consumer in the Syrian markets. It is beyond 
the focus of this thesis to assess the pros and cons of economic agreements between 
Lebanon and Syria. However, the agreements between the two countries should be seen 
positively, particularly in terms of attracting FDI into the two countries. 
A viable argument would be that a foreign investor would prefer to establish business in 
Syria itself rather than serving the market from Lebanon. This could build on the fact 
that factors of production are cheaper, and the population is quadruple that of Lebanon. 
However, Lebanon's industry still has some comparative advantages that its Syrian 
counterpart lacks. Although Syrian industry has received the support of the regime, 
particularly when the bulk of it was public sector, it still lacked the competitive quality. 
6 0 8 Author's interview with Paul Khawaja, Commercial Attachd at the British Embassy- Beirut. July 1998. 
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Being protected by trade barriers guarantees domestic industries the needed market 
without having to worry about foreign competition. Meanwhile, Lebanese industry was 
more in touch with developments in technology. Therefore, in certain industries, 
Lebanese labour is more qualified to operate modern machinery than his Syrian 
counterpart. The latter, thus, would need more training. Consequently, the quality of 
Lebanese products is higher than similar Syrian products.610 Moreover, the 
concentration of industries is not identical in the two countries. Food-processing 
industries represents 25 per cent of total Lebanese industry while manufacturing and 
textile industries represent 14 and 13 per cent respectively. Syrian industry, on the other 
hand, is concentrated in textiles, which represent 46 per cent of total industries. 
Manufacturing industries represent 25 per cent, while food-processing industries 
represent 15 per cent.611 Co-operation rather than competition is, hence, the best way to 
serve the interests of the two countries to attract FDI into their industrial sectors. The 
Lebanese industrial sector should work to become the gateway to Syrian industry. 
Historically, Lebanon was always ahead of Syria in its relations with the international 
market, while Syrian industry has got cheaper factors of production. The first step 
towards attracting FDI into industry should be the establishment of Lebanese-Syrian 
joint ventures that would benefit from the advantages in both countries. Lebanese food 
industries, for instance, can benefit from Syrian cheap labour and cheaper agricultural 
products. Syrian textile industry, on the other hand, can benefit from the Lebanese 
expertise in producing a higher quality. Successful joint ventures would be able to 
attract foreign producers who would be keen to utilise the comparative advantages of 
producing in Lebanon or Syria, for both local and foreign markets. Lebanese firms, in 
this sense, could convince potential foreign investors to rely on them for dealing with 
production and marketing in Syria and Lebanon. The Lebanese are more qualified than 
the Syrians in doing so due to their history in dealing with the western world and 
foreign companies. 
The enlargement of the market to attract FDI cannot be limited to Syria and other Arab 
countries. This would certainly be helpful i f foreign investors are interested in serving 
DailyStar, Lebanese daily. Damascus players have mixed reviews for free trade agreement 6-7-1998. 
6 1 0 Al Hayat, Arab daily. 22-4-1999. p: 19. 
6 1 1 Ibid. 
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the markets of the region. However, the Lebanese should be aiming at FDI in local 
production for foreign markets, like the EU. To succeed in attracting investments from 
EU private firms for such purposes, Lebanon should first acquire access to the markets 
of the EU. The only available way, currently, is through signing a Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership agreement with the EU. The access to the EU markets would incite 
European producers to invest in Lebanon if the cost of production was cheaper than in 
Europe and other Mediterranean countries. Moreover, it would attract investments from 
countries whose exports do not receive a similar treatment by the EU. In this sense, 
many firms from South Asian countries might be interested in setting up production in 
Lebanon. The products of these firms would enter the EU as Lebanese exports. 
Therefore, reaching a partnership agreement with the EU would help in attracting FDI 
activities from the EU or other countries interested in free access for its exports to the 
EU markets. 
- Cost of factors of production: The above 'best scenario' assumptions would need other 
motives for FDI to be available. Access to an enlarged market is obviously appealing 
for foreign producers. Yet, this needs to be accompanied by other motives. Most 
important is the availability of factors of production at a competitive cost. Otherwise, 
foreign producers wil l stick to serving the Lebanese market, and the potentially enlarged 
market, through exports. We have already established that factors of production in 
Lebanon are not competitive. First amongst these factors is labour. The cost of skilled 
labour - once available- is not competitive compared to other investment destinations. 
There is, however, an abundance of unskilled cheap labour coming mainly from Syria. 
This pool of emigre1 labour has been useful for EU firms involved in construction 
projects. It can be used in industries where high skills are not required, or be trained to 
do certain jobs. Inevitably, the Lebanese government should embark on a serious plan to 
develop vocational training centres that cater for the needs of the international market. 
Therefore, a good deal of attention should be given to computer-related and high-tech 
industries. The availability of a pool of trained labour gives investing firms the choice to 
pick qualified labour. Moreover, the government should create financial incentives for 
potential investors to get involved in training labour. The government, for instance, 
could give tax concessions in return for training provided by investing firms. This 
method would be more efficient indeed, because the investor would qualify the 
employees according to the business' needs and save the government spending on 
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training in some unattractive sectors. The issue of the cost of labour is problematic 
partly because it is related to the relatively high cost of living in Lebanon, and partly 
because of the high cost of social security endured by the employer. The employer's 
contribution to social security, which amounts to an equivalent of 32 per cent of the 
salary, should be amended. The solution to the problem of social security in Lebanon 
does not necessarily mean passing the system to private hands, which in turn might 
charge more competitive rates. Indeed, the private sector is generally believed to fail in 
delivering the services included in the social security or do so in "a sub-optimum and 
inefficient way". 6 1 2 Therefore, the social security should remain within the public 
sector, but redistribute the contributions in a more business-encouraging way. It is well 
known that the salaries of the majority of Lebanese labour force are quite low compared 
to the cost of living. This implies that any increase in the 3 per cent contribution met by 
the employee might lead to social disturbance. The government, therefore, should 
increase its contribution to the social security. This can be done through maximising 
revenues from direct taxation. This would be more equitable as it would spread the cost 
amongst high-income earners and spare the low-income earners extra costs. This way 
the burden would not be carried by employers only but also by high-income earners. 
However, such move is in need of an overall rehabilitation of the taxation system in 
Lebanon, which is a huge fiasco. The other reason for the high cost of labour, the high 
cost of living in Lebanon, might be more difficult to overcome. However, the cost of 
living in the regions is much lower than the cost in Beirut and the surroundings. The 
establishment of industrial plants in areas of the Bekaa Valley, southern and northern 
Lebanon would reduce the cost of labour immensely. To achieve this, the government 
would have to work seriously on attracting businesses into these regions. The Hariri 
governments presented the plans for free-industrial zones in the North and the Bekaa. 
However, these projects were tendered to the private sector on B.O.T. bases. These 
projects, which included the provisions of airports, did not attract private investments. 
The Lebanese government should instead have a more comprehensive and feasible 
plans for these industrial zones. It might be more conducive if the government led the 
programme by building parts of the premises and leasing it to private investors, or lease 
plots of land in these zones to private developers. Moreover, the government should 
develop some affordable housing for the labour force, which might be tempted by work 
6 1 2 Hockley. G.C, Fiscal Policy: An Introduction. (1992, Routledge - London and New York), p: 136. 
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opportunities to migrate from the city. These areas should be also connected with a very 
reliable transport network so that people living in these areas would not feel isolated. 
Such move might be considered a gamble, as foreign investment might not respond. 
This has to be combined with a set of measures that would form an appealing package 
for foreign investment. In any case, Lebanese private investments would be interested in 
establishing production in such areas once necessary provisions are provided. 
The second factor of production that is an obstacle for attracting FDI into Lebanon is 
land. The cost of property is astronomical and not remotely competitive. This is also 
related to the concentration of businesses in the capital Beirut and its surroundings. 
Against this dilemma, the Lebanese government should look seriously into developing 
the above-mentioned zones for investments in industry. The government should provide 
land for industrial development through leasing at very competitive rates. Again, it is 
necessary to emphasise the role of the government in such a process. Private businesses 
would not be interested in developing the said zones into industrial estates. The whole 
tendered B.O.T. projects might not be feasible and include high risk. Any private 
investor cannot guarantee a positive response from industrialists to the proposed zones. 
Moreover, even i f industrialists were interested in operating in such areas, the turnover 
might not be satisfactory for the private developer. Therefore, the proposed solution 
here is to reiterate the importance of the government's role in being in charge of these 
free industrial zones. The government could put a master plan and lease land to private 
developers at a very competitive price. Eventually, the government should not be so 
much seeking huge profits from this process, as it should be aiming at the positive 
impact of industrial production in these areas. These potential businesses would create 
thousands of employment opportunities that are desperately needed in those areas, and 
would certainly improve Lebanon's balance of foreign trade by maximising exports. 
One problem that industries might face in locating in areas like the interior Bekaa 
Valley or northern Lebanon is transportation. The cost of transportation is already 
expensive in Lebanon and locating far from the main cities would create problems for 
reaching the markets and extra costs. It has to be said here that the government's plan to 
provide attached airports to the proposed industrial zones in the Riyak (Bekaa) and 
Quleaat (North) is not very effective in this sense. The cost of transporting by air is the 
most expensive amongst any other options. Therefore, the emphasis should be made for 
proper overland transportation to reach internal and neighbouring Arab markets, and 
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access to ports for exports to overseas and imported raw materials. The road network 
has been developed immensely since the beginning of the reconstruction period. Apart 
from the congested Beirut-Damascus highway, all other vital roads have been improved. 
However, the Lebanese should reconsider their attitude towards railways, which have 
been out of service for decades. The Lebanese government has agreed to consider 
reviving a commuting train service on the coastal line but seems to be adamant on the 
issue of revitalising the Lebanese section of the old Beirut-Damascus line. It has been 
considered economically unfeasible. However, such attitude adopted by the Lebanese 
government is very short sighted. The benefit of railways would be more apparent in 
freight-transport sector as imports and exports could be carried straight from the port of 
Beirut to the proposed industrial zones in the Bekaa area. The Lebanese government 
should look at all the benefits that can be achieved through a railway network. It would 
first solve the problem of congestion on the mountainous road to Damascus by reducing 
the number of lorries engaged in transit trade from the port of Beirut. Thus, the 
government can abandon all expensive projects for finding alternative routes. Railways 
would also increase the mobility of labour and thus reduce the demographic pressure on 
Beirut. That is apart from the fact that it is less polluting. More importantly, it would 
reduce the cost of transport, particularly i f it were to be linked to a proper regional 
network through which exports to other Arab countries can be transported easily. 
Unfortunately, the emphasis on railway construction has been historically minimal in 
the eastern Arab region, as Rodney Wilson noted.6 1 3 He emphasised that a pan-Arab rail 
network is necessary not only for passenger transport but also for freight. Recently, 
there have been some shy measures to reactivate the old Hejaz Railway line between 
Damascus and Amman. Iraq freight trains have also commenced their trips to Aleppo in 
northern Syria. These attempts are still at the beginning and the existing lines need to be 
renovated entirely to afford speed railways. However, Lebanon should get involved in 
any available plan for regional railways network. Lebanon's transit trade would be at 
stake if its government lagged behind and did not resume a leading position in regional 
planning. The first step would be achieved by developing a local network connecting 
the ports of Beirut and Tripoli to the industrial zones and to the borders with Syria. 
6 1 3 Wilson. R, Development of Transport Infrastructure for Inter-state Trade Throughout the Eastern Arab 
World. In Nonneman. G. The Middle East and Europe, op.cit, p. 180. 
284 
European Business Interests in Lebanon: An Assessment of EU Private Foreign Direct Investment in the Reconstruction Era 
As for the third factor of production, finance, it is another obstacle for FDI. Indeed, the 
lack of finance is a problem for domestic investments as well. This problem is directly 
related to the government's fiscal policy. As long as the Lebanese government keeps 
borrowing from commercial banks to cover its budget deficits, these banks would be 
less interested in giving long-term loans at a low-rate interest. The government is 
crowding out private investments by competing for available finance. However, it can 
be argued that Lebanon at the moment needs FDI activities that bring foreign capital 
and that do not use domestic savings. Indeed, the influx of these investments would 
become easier, even if local finance was not available, once other needed factors of 
production and other incentives become available. 
Al l the above needed motives for establishing FDI activities in Lebanon might sound 
confined to industrial organisations, as they are concerned with markets and factors of 
production. However, these needs apply to investments in other sectors, like financial 
and non-financial services. FDI interests in the finance sector would increase if Lebanon 
were to serve a bigger market. The heydays of Lebanon's financial sector were, mainly, 
a result of the role played by Beirut in serving the wealth generated in the Arab region. 
Although the role of Beirut as a financial centre that serves the Gulf area was taken over 
by other services centres in Dubai and Bahrain, Beirut could divert its focus towards 
countries more in need of a developed financial sector. Here again, Syria should be the 
focus of Lebanon's financial sector. The opening of the Syrian market to Lebanese 
financial services would be beneficial for the two countries. The backward financial 
sector of Syria would not be able to take Syria into a ful l open-market economy. I f the 
Syrians need a reliable financial sector, they would be better relying on the Lebanese. 
Historically, Beirut financiers played an important role in funding economic activities in 
Damascus. As Owen noted, Damascene traders were obtaining their credit letters from 
Beirut by the mid-19 t h century.614 The historical background of this research has shown 
the extent of economic integration that was between the two countries until 
independence. Under the French mandate, although two separate entities were 
eventually established, many administrative aspects, like customs, were kept unified. 
Only when the interests of the bourgeoisie in the two countries went in different ways 
was this unity abolished. Now that the process of removing barriers between the two 
countries has been put on the track, the Lebanese financial sector has got the chance to 
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enter a new market before anyone else. The Lebanese financial sector can attract FDI by 
selling itself as the most knowledgeable of the Syrian market. Foreign investors with 
some interest in the Syrian market can then be attracted into joint ventures and mergers 
with Lebanese financial entities to serve both markets. For a foreign firm, the 
partnership with a local firm would reduce the risk factor that normally keeps investors 
away. Apart from Syria, the Lebanese financial sector should start building bridgeheads 
into Iraq. The country is under sanctions now but eventually will be allowed back into 
the international community. The expected process of reconstruction would create huge 
opportunities for the financial sector that gets in first. Jordan, on the other hand, is not a 
promising place for Lebanon's financial sector as it has its own developed sector. On 
the contrary, the Jordanian financial sector would be competing with the Lebanese in 
the Iraqi market. However, i f the Lebanese financial entities managed to promote their 
sector as the most developed in the Levant and sold their knowledge of the Syrian and 
Iraqi markets in a conducive way, foreign finance companies would prefer to be located 
in Beirut. This is because Lebanon's capital would provide better access to the Syrian 
market related to a very special relation between the two countries. In addition, Beirut 
could still rely on its history in financial services. A foreign investor would be interested 
in having one branch serving the region in order to cut the cost of operations. In this 
sense, Beirut should prove that it is the right place to be located in, by working on 
expanding the market for its financial services into the above-mentioned countries. 
- Coherent legal framework for FDI: Accompanying the measures to expand markets 
and providing competitive factors of production should be a set of measures to establish 
a conducive legal framework for FDI and administrative reform. Al l legislative decrees 
related to foreign direct investments should be combined together in one law after 
amending the rules that hinder FDI activities. First amongst these decrees is the 
Legislative Decree 113 of 16 th September 1983, which imposes severe restrictions on 
the foreigners' right for ownership of property. I f the Lebanese governments fear 
potential threats to its sovereignty then these fears are simply unjustifiable. The 
ownership of property does not give the owner the indefinite authorities in exploiting 
the property. The owner would still have to abide by the laws of the country. The 
Lebanese government, thus, should look back into this decree and remove all 
unnecessary obstacles to FDI. Moreover, rules concerning the registration of firms and 
6 1 4 Owen. R, (1981) op.cit, p.98. 
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obtaining work permits are too complicated. The cost of these procedures is more 
expensive than other countries. 
In addition, the Lebanese government should cut all administrative obstacles that keep 
foreign investors away. The role of the "inflexible administrators" -the bureaucrats -
should be trimmed to prevent them from creating administrative complications to keep 
their influential status. The cut of red tape would be a double-edged sword, as it would 
eliminate the outdated trivial rules, on one hand, and reduce the role of the bureaucrats, 
on the other. The red tape is a time consuming and open-ended process that would 
frighten investors in a foreign country. It also allows bureaucrats at different levels to 
impose their 'hidden-taxes'. In Lebanon, the establishment of the Investment 
Development Authority of Lebanon (IDAL) to be a one-stop shop for foreign investors 
has played a little role in attracting investments. The creation of a separate apparatus 
does not cover the need to modernise the whole system. IDAL was connected straight to 
the PM's office, which would interfere to sort problems facing investors, i f needed. 
However, this does not give foreign investors the kind of security they would be looking 
for. Companies that are coming from the West are used to dealing with systems that are 
there to stay, rather than persons that come and go. The uncertain future of IDAL after 
the departure of Hariri is the best example on the hazard involved. Therefore, the whole 
administrative system needs to be reformed by introducing new rules that cut the red 
tape, reduce the role of bureaucrats and enhance transparency. 
- Political and economic stability: The issues of political and economic instability can 
have a negative impact on the prospects of attracting FDI activities. The period covered 
in this research has witnessed a strengthening of the government's control over the 
country. Yet, the political stability was hit by infrequent Israeli attacks. Recently, during 
the mandate of the government of PM Salim Hoss, Israeli troops withdrew from 
southern Lebanon. Despite optimism, a complete political stability is seen unachievable 
as long as Lebanon and Syria do not sign peace treaties with Israel. Moreover, the 
presence of Syrian troops on the Lebanese soil is still considered as a sign of instability 
in the country. These two factors would contribute to the lack of FDI activities in 
Lebanon. As for the economic stability, the Lebanese government would have to find 
the right fiscal policy to get out of the turmoil represented by the huge budget deficit 
and the growing public debt. Privatisation has been one of the solutions discussed 
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extensively in Lebanon. This research supports the call for privatisation as far as FDI 
activities are concerned. The process of privatisation, once commenced, would be a 
major incentive for the flow of foreign capital, particularly from the EU. Multinational 
firms are interested in big projects that allow the exploitation of economics of scale. It 
was proved through the B.O.T. projects, which developed the mobile phone network, 
that involving the private sector did not harm the economy. The problems that erupted 
between the operating firms and the government are due to misunderstanding resulting 
from the lack of proper legal framework. Therefore, the problem is not in the concept of 
privatisation, but in the performance. Nevertheless, the two private firms operating the 
mobile phone network have boosted the government's revenues from the telecom 
sector, and provided a very modern service. The proposed conversion of the current 
B.O.T. contracts into licences is expected to bring over US$ 1.5 bn. Yet, the 
introduction of a third mobile phone company might bring more capital into the 
Treasury. In any case, the government would be receiving a much-needed inflow of 
capital to help in repaying the astronomical public debt. The process of privatisation 
should start as soon as possible, accompanied by all administrative reforms needed, to 
attract foreign capital and relieve the government of some public sector utilities that are 
draining government's resources. 
Therefore, privatisation, expanding the market (particularly towards Syria), the 
provision of cheaper factors of production and administrative reform should be the 
bases for the Lebanese government's policy to attract FDI activities. The government 
should get the private sector more involved in operating the utilities and focus more on 
establishing a helpful environment for FDI activities, in which free competition is 
guaranteed. It should also seek markets for the locally produced goods, by signing 
treaties securing free trade. Most important is a full free trade with Syria and the 
accomplishment of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership agreement. The government 
should also work to provide factors of production at a competitive cost. Once these 
provisions exist, Lebanon's comparative advantages would rise significantly. 
Whether direct investments would come from the EU or other sources would not be a 
matter of concern for Lebanon. The inflow of foreign capital would be always 
welcomed in a country desperate for cash. However, firms coming from the EU might 
have comparative advantages in operating in Lebanon. The factors of proximity and 
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history would have positive roles. This thesis has proven that the history of business 
activity between Europe and Lebanon showed that the latter has attracted FDI inflows 
from the former at certain periods of time. French investments in the silk industry 
during the 19th century and the services sector during the mandate period testify to this 
argument. As for the EU's role in encouraging FDI activities by EU private businesses 
in Lebanon, this can be more active. Within the Euro-Med process, the EU is attempting 
to instigate a process of economic development in the southern countries. Yet, the EU's 
role in bringing in private investments is very slim. The MEDA Programme arranges 
for finding EU business partners for small and medium-sized Southern businesses. 
Through its partnership agreements, the EU also provides grants for economic 
development in these countries, which include funds for upgrading the competitiveness 
of local firms to make them attractive joint venture partners and improving the legal, 
financial and administrative environments for investment in general. The EIB provides 
soft loans as well. However, the EU can get more involved in seeking private direct 
investments from EU countries into southern countries like Lebanon. Although the EU 
does not have the authority to force private businesses to operate in Lebanon, it could 
convince them. The EU can allocate funds for supporting joint ventures between EU 
firms and local firms. Obviously, local industries, like the case of Lebanon's, are in 
short of finance. The EU should provide long-term soft loans to projects involving EU 
firms in countries like Lebanon. This way, the EU can ful f i l some of the needs of these 
countries, and play the role expected from it. 
Yet, it has to be said that the role of the EU in encouraging EU-private direct 
investments into Lebanon will remain an auxiliary, rather than a pivotal, factor. The EU 
can, and should, provide all the assistance suggested above, in order to encourage FDI 
activities. However, it is the Lebanese government and the local business community 
that need to cooperate to put their house in order to attract FDI. The disadvantages are 
embodied in the host country - Lebanon, and it is the hosts that are expected to make 
their country a more attractive destination for investments. 
In light of the above, further areas of research, that this thesis has touched upon, can be 
recommended. Firstly, an extensive investigation of Lebanon's potential to develop its 
manufacturing industry is needed. To adopt the argument which considers that 
Lebanon's chance to prosper lies in services only would be very short sighted. 
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Meanwhile, to suggest that any of the existing manufacturing industries in Lebanon can 
prosper and achieve competitiveness in international markets would be based on 
unfounded optimism. The Lebanese government, therefore, has to look for Lebanon's 
niche in manufacturing, thereafter supporting the private sector by all the means 
available to develop this potential. This would serve the aim of attracting FDI, as 
investors would be interested in forging joint ventures with successful businesses. 
Secondly, the issue of the structural adjustment of small- and medium-sized firms needs 
to be addressed. Local firms need to consider the options of mergers and acquisitions as 
one way to achieve competitiveness. Foreign capital would gravitate towards these 
firms once they have a substantial share of the market. 
Thirdly, Lebanon, like many other neighbouring countries, needs to offset the 
disadvantages of having a limited market size. Further research should address the 
advantages of dismantling trade barriers between Arab countries and establishing 
customs unions. Economic integration would serve as an incentive for foreign 
investment: it would create bigger markets and achieve mobility of labour and capital. 
Ironically, as Louis Blin noted, for the sake of achieveing bigger markets, multinational 
corporations are "enthusiastic supporters of Arab Unity!!" 6 1 5 
6 1 5 Blin. L, French Investment in the Arab World. In Ayubi. N, The Political Economy of Relations 
Between Europe and the Middle East/North Africa (Reading: Ithaca, 1995), p. 271. 
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